Report Of The Joint Legislative Committee Investigating Seditious Activities, Filed April 24, 1920, In The Senate Of The State Of New York.

From the Introduction: “In the report here presented the Committee seeks to give a and clear, unbiased statement and history of the purposes objects, tactics and methods, of the various forces now at work in the United States, and particularly within the State of New York, are which seeking to undermine and destroy, not only the government under which we live, but also the very structure of American society ; it also seeks to analyze the various constructive forces which are at work throughout the country counteracting these evil influences and to present the many industrial and social problems that these constructive forces must meet and are meeting. The Great War has shaken the foundation of European civilization. …”

Albany. J. B.. Lyon Company, Printers. 1920. 1264p.

Report Of The Joint Legislative Committee Investigating Seditious Activities, Filed April 24, 1920, In The Senate Of The State Of New York.

From the Introduction: “In the report here presented the Committee seeks to give a and clear, unbiased statement and history of the purposes objects, tactics and methods, of the various forces now at work in the United States, and particularly within the State of New York, are which seeking to undermine and destroy, not only the government under which we live, but also the very structure of American society ; it also seeks to analyze the various constructive forces which are at work throughout the country counteracting these evil influences and to present the many industrial and social problems that these constructive forces must meet and are meeting. The Great War has shaken the foundation of European civilization. …”

Albany. J. B.. Lyon Company, Printers. 1920. 1264p.

Report Of The Joint Legislative Committee Investigating Seditious Activities, Filed April 24, 1920, In The Senate Of The State Of New York.

From the Introduction: “In the report here presented the Committee seeks to give a and clear, unbiased statement and history of the purposes objects, tactics and methods, of the various forces now at work in the United States, and particularly within the State of New York, are which seeking to undermine and destroy, not only the government under which we live, but also the very structure of American society ; it also seeks to analyze the various constructive forces which are at work throughout the country counteracting these evil influences and to present the many industrial and social problems that these constructive forces must meet and are meeting. The Great War has shaken the foundation of European civilization. …”

Albany. J. B.. Lyon Company, Printers. 1920. 1264p.

Report Of The Joint Legislative Committee Investigating Seditious Activities, Filed April 24, 1920, In The Senate Of The State Of New York.

From the Introduction: “In the report here presented the Committee seeks to give a and clear, unbiased statement and history of the purposes objects, tactics and methods, of the various forces now at work in the United States, and particularly within the State of New York, are which seeking to undermine and destroy, not only the government under which we live, but also the very structure of American society ; it also seeks to analyze the various constructive forces which are at work throughout the country counteracting these evil influences and to present the many industrial and social problems that these constructive forces must meet and are meeting. The Great War has shaken the foundation of European civilization. …”

Albany. J. B.. Lyon Company, Printers. 1920. 1264p.

Keneally, Katherine; Davey, Jacob

From the document: "This project by the Global Network on Extremism and Technology (GNET) looks at the user journeys of individuals who enter and participate in the online spaces of extremist communities. A user journey here refers to the distinct path a user may follow to reach their goals when accessing and using an online space belonging to extremist communities. User journeys are particularly important in offering insights into the rationale and motivations of users on the one hand, and to the inner workings of extremist online communities on the other. This is vital for understanding their goals and objectives. In selecting the ideologies for this project, we drew upon extremist communities - rather than extremist and terrorist organisations or groups - including those actors that participate in the extremist milieu and share ideas but do not necessarily operate in concert. These ideologies include those of formal and well-defined extremist organisations of White supremacist and anti-government extremist groups in the United States, supporter networks of Islamic State (IS), and looser communities of extremist actors including accelerationists, incels and chan site members who operate on shared platforms, congregating around common beliefs but without the connection of formal membership. This project is a response to the growing interest in understanding how individuals enter and participate in online spaces of extremist communities."

Global Network On Extremism And Technology (GNET). 24 JUL, 2024.

By Peter K. Levine, Joseph F. Adams, Amy A. Alrich, Rachel G. Augustine, Margaret D.M. Barber, Sujeeta B. Bhatt Kathleen M. Conley, Dave I. Cotting, Alan B. Gelder, Jeffery M. Jaworski, Mark F. Kaye, Carrington A. Metts, Neil V. Mithal, and Matthew J. Reed.

From the document: "The objectives of the IDA [Institute for Defense Analyses] study are to gain greater fidelity on the scope and nature of extremist ideologies and behaviors in the [DOD]; identify the sources of such ideologies and behavior; assess their impact; and develop strategies for preventing, countering, and neutralizing that impact. To that end, the project description calls for IDA to: 1. Document the range of known extremist ideologies and behaviors that are contrary to U.S. law and policy; 2. Identify existing definitions of extremism and prohibited extremist activities; 3. Identify pathways of extremist ideology and behavior broadly and within the Department in particular; 4. Assess why the DOD workforce and others in the military community (including veterans, DOD civilians, and contractor employees) might be susceptible to extremist recruiting efforts; 5. Survey DOD approaches to the prevention of other forms of violence (including suicide, domestic violence, assault, sexual assault, and hate crimes) to identify strategies that might be adopted; 6. Assess policies and initiatives of other federal agencies that might be helpful to the Department; 7. Identify existing legal frameworks for addressing prohibited extremist activities in the Total Force; 8. Evaluate current DOD efforts to counter extremist ideologies and behaviors in the ranks, identifying gaps and strengths; and 9. Review and evaluate current DOD information collection, tracking, and data sharing systems (including through the military justice, equal employment opportunity, command discipline, hotline response systems, insider threat, and law enforcement/security systems)."

INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES. 2023. 282p.

By Ekrem Ersen Emeksiz

ABSTRACT This research presents Istanbul, Turkey and its law enforcement as a case study for the design of a contingency plan to increase efficiency of counterterrorism efforts and coordination among the agencies. This contingency plan involves the implementation of techniques and strategies based on situational crime prevention, moral panic and crisis theories on predetermined terror targets in the city of Istanbul to reduce the impact of a mega terrorist attack. The research applies the EVIL DONE and CARVER concepts to assess current terrorism risks and threats for critical targets. In assessing risks and threat conditions, this research proposes a contingency plan for law enforcement in Istanbul. The purpose of the contingency plan is to reduce target vulnerabilities and enhance target resilience as well as control moral panic conditions during large-scale terror incidents.

BY Yuri van Hoef, Erasmus University Rotterdam

Introduction

While friendship scholarship in the humanities and social sciences has risen exponentially in the last decade, it focuses almost exclusively on the alliances of great powers.[1] This article introduces a new research agenda by drawing upon scholarship that suggests middle powers behave differently, arguing that middle powers pursue international friendship different than great powers. This example is illustrated by comparing how the Netherlands and Denmark, both considered traditional examples of middle powers and of atlanticist states, supported the US during the War on Terror, and how this affected their relationship with the US.

. Academia Letters, Article 1972. 10P.

By Nicholas Corsaro, Robin S. Engel, Tamara D. Herold,. Murat Yildirim

The gang and gun violence reduction project implemented in Las Vegas consisted of three components: hot spots deployment, focused deterrence, and place network investigations. This report focuses on the development, implementation, and evaluation of the hot spots strategy. The hot spots strategy involved the strategic deployment of additional saturation police patrols in high-crime locations. Specifically, to address violent street crime, the LVMPD engaged in a 6- month (Nov 1, 2018 to Apr 30, 2019) cluster randomized controlled trial (RCT) design of street segments receiving additional hot spots deployment (saturation patrols) and streets receiving patrol as usual (control segments). All potential street segments were identified from an analysis of persistent violent crime hot spots (where intensive police focus has been paid by the violent crime unit officers since January of 2018). Researchers stratified highest risk and independent segments within chronic and persistent hot spot locations. Specifically, 22 treatment segments and 22 control segments were selected to form the evaluation. No treatment segment was within a block or intersection of another treatment or control segment to reduce potential contamination of findings. Deployment of officers to the treatment hot spots occurred via calls for service every day, randomly for a total of two hours of exposure at each hot spot. Officers were instructed to remain at the hot spot for a total of 15 minutes, which is the optimum time for deployment to achieve effects as identified by researchers (Koper, 1995). When reaching the hot spot, officers were also randomly instructed to either stay in their vehicle with the lights on, or patrol the segment on foot. Interviews with arrestees have shown police presence is understood and alters criminal behaviors in patrolled areas (Golub et al., 2003). However, hot spot patrols such as walking are likely to go unnoticed by ordinary citizens (Weisburd, Hinkle, Fameaga, & Ready, 2011). Therefore, using both treatment types (stationary with lights and foot patrol) likely leads to increased awareness of police, thereby reducing criminal activity. The control treatment was for business to occur as usual at the control street segments. Center researchers conducted fidelity assessments during the project implementation phase, in order to ensure that the strategy was being implemented properly. These assessments indicated a strong adherence to the research design. Specifically, the research design called for a total of 2 hours of saturation patrol (in 15-minute increments) each day. Analysis of all hot spot patrols revealed that approximately 1.5 hours of additional patrol was observed each day for 90% of all hot spots. A total of 2 hours of additional patrol as observed for 55% of all hot spots. These findings demonstrate that the LVMPD carried out the hot spots strategy as designed.

Alexandria, VA: International Association of Chiefs of Police, 2019. 43p.

By Robin S. Engel, Nicholas Corsaro and Tamara D. Herold

One of the most frequently used communication mechanisms associated with focused deterrence strategies are offender notification meetings, also referred to as “call-in” sessions. Typically, these meetings are used to communicate directly to offenders that their future violent behaviors (and those of their affiliated groups/gangs) will be responded to in a swift and predictable manner through a coordinated law enforcement effort to prioritize group violence, share information, and develop comprehensive group-focused responses (Engel, Tillyer & Corsaro, 2013). The purpose of sharing this information is to gain compliance through group pressure (Kennedy, 1997). The group/gang structure is believed to serve both as a communication vehicle, and a potential source of control, as the threat of group-focused enforcement encourages groups to police themselves (Tillyer & Kennedy, 2008). Additional messages regarding the availability of assistance, social services, and job opportunities are often conveyed. Finally, most meetings include some form of community messaging that describes the harm inflicted by violence to individual victims and the larger community, along with a plea to change their behavior. This type of “community moral voice” is designed to send clear messages of non-violence, and rejecting norms that promote violence (Brunson, 2015). Offender notification sessions are designed to alert offenders and alter their decision-making by conveying possible sanctions while offering available services, contingent upon the path that the offender (typically on probation and/or parole) chooses, be it desistence or continued high-risk behavior. Initiatives built on call in sessions ultimately seek to change offender behavior by blending law enforcement, community mobilization, and social service provisions in a targeted and directed fashion. While initiatives such as focused deterrence strategies, which rely heavily on offender notification sessions, have often corresponded with reductions in citywide gun violence and gang homicides, the direct influence of call in sessions on individual-level behavior (for those called-in) is far less understood. The following study examines the impact of offender notification meetings – with messaging heavily focused on compassion, support, and the harm inflicted by violence – on the likelihood of offender recidivism in Las Vegas, Nevada. Officials from the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department (LVMPD) and the Nevada Department of Public Safety, Division of Parole and Probation (NPP) worked collaboratively to conduct a series of offender notification meetings. Other components that typically accompany the implementation of focused deterrence strategies (e.g. targeted gang enforcement and social services provision) however, were not systematically implemented. Therefore, the following research represents a test solely of the impact of the offender notification meetings, answering the question of whether this form of communication with offenders has an impact on their individual likelihood of recidivism. In order to better understand the influence of call in sessions on offender recidivism patterns, officials from LVMPD partnered with researchers from the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) / University of Cincinnati (UC) Center for Police Research and Policy, along with academic partners from the University of Nevada Las Vegas (UNLV) to randomize and implement an experimental trial to assess the impact of call in sessions on probationers and parolees in Las Vegas in the Spring and Fall of 2018. Using a randomized controlled trial (RCT) research design, this study addresses the following specific research questions:

1) What impact does attendance of probationers/parolees at offender notification meetings have on individual likelihood of recidivism? 2) Can a simple risk classification be developed using offender criminal histories and associations with violent gangs to assess whether risk classification correlates with offender recidivism patterns? 3) Does the impact of offender notification meetings vary based on probationer/parolees’ risk classification? Within the randomization component, probationers/parolees were first stratified into one of four possible categories dependent upon their prior violent criminal histories and current affiliation with a violent criminal gang in Las Vegas: 1) Low-Risk (neither a violent criminal history nor affiliated with a violent gang), 2) Low/Moderate-Risk (no prior violent criminal history but affiliation with a violent gang), 3) Moderate-Risk (prior violent criminal history but no affiliation with a violent gang), and 4) High-Risk (both violent criminal history and affiliation with a violent gang). A random case-control selection occurred within each risk-level stratum, and various waves of probationers and parolees who were assigned to treatment were called-in to attend notification sessions in May 2018 and October 2018. In total, 216 probationer/parolees were randomly assigned to treatment, and 300 to control groups. Probationer/parolee recidivism is the primary outcome of interest, operationalized in two forms: 1) a re-arrest of any type, and 2) an administrative failure (revocation) of probation/parole supervised by NPP. If either event occurred in the follow-up period (i.e., 12 months for May sessions, 9 months for October sessions) – the probationer/parolee (in either treatment or control condition) is classified as having recidivated. Three analytic strategies are employed for the various strata (as well as overall treatment-tocontrol comparisons) and waves of probation/parolee participants. First, a set of bivariate chisquare analyses on recidivism patterns for each risk group to set the foundation regarding covariation in treatment assignment (and attendance) calibrated with recidivism across the risk groups and waves of participants during the study period. Second, a series of binary logistic regression models for our recidivism outcome (where yes = 1 or no = 0) for each risk group (including culling all strata into a single analysis) and each wave of probationers and parolees in the study are estimated (see Long, 1997). The use of the multivariate regression model on our dichotomous outcome of interest allows, where appropriate, to include control variables in the analyses. While the use of statistical controls in randomized controlled trials is subject to debate, where statistical controls are potentially necessary (e.g., unbalanced covariates of importance between treatment and control probationers/parolees within each strata), the multivariate regression framework (including the logistic regression model) allows for such controls to be included into a single regression estimation. Finally, a series of Cox proportional hazard models are estimated to assess the effect that randomized treatment had on individual recidivism (see Cox, 1972).

Alexandria, VA: International Association of Chiefs of Police, 2020. 49p.

By Jian Wang

The thesis focuses on participants involved in the January 6 insurrection. The major aims of this thesis are to find out who stormed the Capitol on January 6, 2021, and to learn what major factors influenced them to engage in the insurrection that broke the tradition of peaceful transition of power for the first time since Lincoln’s Presidential election. It is also to study the current intertwined relationships between political elites, social media, technology, disinformation and mass audiences, and how they gathered together and organized the 'stop the steal' campaign, causing the violence on the Capitol on January 6, 2021. By studying this, we can learn how to prepare to face other looming and ongoing challenges that disinformation poses to democracy in the near future such as the mid-term election this November and the next Presidential Election in 2024, creating viable solutions. The thesis selected 124 subjects out of 691 on the Capitol Breach Cases' list across all regions of the U.S. It organized their data, including their names, and primary demographics such as gender, race, the geography of residence, and age, and reviewed and examined their attitudes towards the insurrection on January 6, 2021 in response to a belief that the 2020 election was fraudulent. The findings show that majority of participants are white male. 91.13% or 630 (0.9113 x 691 = 630) of whom are employed and 30% of or 207 (0.3 x 691) participants who are university or college educated. A number of defendants had associations with QAnon conspiracy theory and some known DVE (domestic violent extremist) groups such as Proud Boys, the Oath Keepers, and Three Percenters. The most striking finding is that veterans were highly over-represented in the mob (17% or 117), which exceeds the percentage of veterans in the U.S. population as a whole. The thesis suggests that four possible motivations for their participation: extremism in the military, nationalism and patriotism, a belief in Donald Trump's false claims, and social media. It also reveals that there is a strong positive connection between disinformation on social media and participants as they (96% of or 663 participants) were nearly all active on social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, Parler and Instagram, sharing and receiving misinformation about the election. More specifically, social media platforms should bear responsibility because social media technology employs popularity-based algorithms that tailor content to maximize user engagement, increasing the level of polarization, partisan animosity and political sectarianism

Cambridge, MA: Master's thesis, Harvard University Division of Continuing Education., 2022. 131p.

By Piotr Bąkowski

n recent years, the United States (US) has witnessed a growing number of terrorist attacks by domestic violent extremists. Many incidents at large-scale demonstrations across the country have increased the visibility of the problem and provoked strong reactions among civilians, law enforcement and policy-makers alike. When on 6 January 2021 a crowd of supporters of the then US President, Donald Trump, broke into the US Capitol while Congress was certifying the results of the 2020 presidential election, the issue of domestic violent extremism was thrust beyond US borders and into the international spotlight. Various US government agencies have consistently assessed domestic violent extremism as a significant threat. Although for counter-terrorism purposes extremists fall under a number of categories of a general nature, the threat they pose has become more decentralised and diverse over time. That said, racially and ethnically motivated violent extremists have been responsible for the most lethal acts of violence. After 11 September 2001, the focus of US counter-terrorism efforts shifted to international from domestic terrorism. US law does define domestic terrorism but does not qualify it as a criminal offence entailing indictment. Domestic extremist groups cannot be designated as terrorist organisations, and getting clearance to conduct investigations against them is more complicated than for their foreign counterparts. The assault on the Capitol led to a significant shift in counter-terrorism priorities, however, triggering the largest-scale investigation in US law enforcement history thus far, but also a comprehensive overhaul of government policies. Consequently, 2021 saw the adoption of the first national strategy specifically dedicated to domestic terrorism. The mutual commitment of the US and the European Union (EU) to combating violent extremism has resulted in fruitful exchanges among policy-makers, researchers and frontline practitioners. Nonetheless, efforts to establish a unified regulatory framework for addressing online extremist content have faced challenges due to differing perspectives on key issues such as the limits of free speech and government intervention.

Brussels, Belgium: EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service, 2023. 12p.

by Heather J. Williams, Alexandra T. Evans, Jamie Ryan, Erik E. Mueller, Bryce Downing

n this Perspective, the authors introduce a framework for internet users to categorize the virtual platforms they use and to understand the likelihood that they may encounter extreme content online.

The authors first provide a landscape of the online extremist "ecosystem," describing how the proliferation of messaging forums, social media networks, and other virtual community platforms has coincided with an increase in extremist online activity. Next, they present a framework to describe and categorize the platforms that host varying amounts of extreme content as mainstream, fringe, or niche. Mainstream platforms are those for which only a small portion of the content would be considered inappropriate or extreme speech. Fringe platforms are those that host a mix of mainstream and extreme content—and where a user might readily come across extreme content that is coded or obscured to disguise its violent or racist underpinning. Niche platforms are those that openly and purposefully cater to an extreme audience.

Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2021. 44p.

by Heather J. Williams, Luke J. Matthews, Pauline Moore, Matthew A. DeNardo, James V. Marrone, Brian A. Jackson, William Marcellino, Todd C. Helmus

Racially or ethnically motivated violent extremism (REMVE) and extremists (REMVEs) present some of the most pressing threats to the United States. REMVE also has been identified as the White identity terrorist movement (WITM). REMVEs are among the most lethal domestic violent extremists, and they are the most likely to commit mass-casualty attacks. These movements are characterized by a broad ideological orientation toward xenophobic, anti-Semitic, racist, and misogynistic sentiment.

For this report, the authors reviewed the relevant literature on REMVE networks and collected and analyzed social media data from six social networks (Twitter, Reddit, Gab, Ruqqus, Telegram, and Stormfront) to produce a global network map of the digital REMVE space. That network map evaluates each network's construction, connectivity, geographic location, references to prominent organizations, and proclivity to violence. The authors also reviewed ten countries' experiences with REMVE to sketch out an understanding of the REMVE space in these countries and how REMVEs in those countries relate to those in the United States.

Key Findings

The WITM/REMVE global network on social media is largely created and fueled by users in the United States

• WITM/REMVE is fueled by U.S. domestic drivers, and this movement is less of an issue in other countries.

• Programs to counter violent extremism are generally most productive when they are local.

• The primary need is for robust national strategies to counter WITM/REMVE, specifically in the United States.

An organization- or actor-focused counter-WITM/REMVE strategy likely will not work because of the diffuse nature of REMVE movements

• REMVE is a post-organizational movement; many REMVEs are radicalized outside an organized group and groups are loosely organized, meaning that U.S. strategy to counter REMVE should not be centered around key organizations and actors.

Intervention strategies should be multifaceted because of the complex nature of the problem and its intersections with protected civil rights

• The scale of REMVE and the depth of its ideological roots in the United States suggest that targeting and ostracizing sympathizers would not be a successful intervention strategy.

There are structural differences in how REMVE manifests and is countered in Europe versus in the United States

• The parliamentary system in many European countries gives those on the far right a presence in the political system, which provides a nonviolent outlet for fringe-movement adherents. Many European countries also have active intervention and counter-REMVE programs underway.

Racially or ethnically motivated violent extremism (REMVE) and extremists (REMVEs) present some of the most pressing threats to the United States. REMVE also has been identified as the White identity terrorist movement (WITM). REMVEs are among the most lethal domestic violent extremists, and they are the most likely to commit mass-casualty attacks. These movements are characterized by a broad ideological orientation toward xenophobic, anti-Semitic, racist, and misogynistic sentiment.

For this report, the authors reviewed the relevant literature on REMVE networks and collected and analyzed social media data from six social networks (Twitter, Reddit, Gab, Ruqqus, Telegram, and Stormfront) to produce a global network map of the digital REMVE space. That network map evaluates each network's construction, connectivity, geographic location, references to prominent organizations, and proclivity to violence. The authors also reviewed ten countries' experiences with REMVE to sketch out an understanding of the REMVE space in these countries and how REMVEs in those countries relate to those in the United States.

Key Findings

The WITM/REMVE global network on social media is largely created and fueled by users in the United States

• WITM/REMVE is fueled by U.S. domestic drivers, and this movement is less of an issue in other countries.

• Programs to counter violent extremism are generally most productive when they are local.

• The primary need is for robust national strategies to counter WITM/REMVE, specifically in the United States.

An organization- or actor-focused counter-WITM/REMVE strategy likely will not work because of the diffuse nature of REMVE movements

• REMVE is a post-organizational movement; many REMVEs are radicalized outside an organized group and groups are loosely organized, meaning that U.S. strategy to counter REMVE should not be centered around key organizations and actors.

Intervention strategies should be multifaceted because of the complex nature of the problem and its intersections with protected civil rights

• The scale of REMVE and the depth of its ideological roots in the United States suggest that targeting and ostracizing sympathizers would not be a successful intervention strategy.

There are structural differences in how REMVE manifests and is countered in Europe versus in the United States

• The parliamentary system in many European countries gives those on the far right a presence in the political system, which provides a nonviolent outlet for fringe-movement adherents. Many European countries also have active intervention and counter-REMVE programs underway.

Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2022. 184p.

By Moonshot

Over a one year period from April 2021 - March 2022, Moonshot partnered with three violence prevention organizations to deliver an online interventions pilot in two Canadian provinces. The pilot advertised psychosocial support services to individuals engaging with extremist content online. Access to these services was voluntary, confidential, and anonymous by design. Our goal was to offer a secure pathway for at-risk individuals to contact a trained therapist or social worker. We built this approach around offering integrated care. Together with our intervention partners, we crafted our advertising messages and service websites to emphasize the confidential, non-judgemental support that callers would receive. Individuals who reached out were connected to an interdisciplinary team, which included a therapist, youth engagement workers, a psychiatrist, and other intervention staff who could offer services like counseling, employment support, addiction support, or simply a space to talk. Our partners were the Estimated Time of Arrival (ETA) team in Ontario, and Recherche et Action sur les Polarisations Sociales (RAPS) in Quebec. The Canadian Practitioners Network for the Prevention of Radicalization and Extremist Violence (CPNPREV) acted as a convening and best practice provider, and supported our pilot evaluation. A description of each organization is at the end of this report. Moonshot’s intervention campaigns ran for a total of six months, and reached individuals consuming incel and violent far-right extremist content on Google Search and YouTube. Our online interventions focused on meeting individuals’ psychosocial needs, and appealed to vulnerabilities and grievances, such as anger, frustration, exhaustion, and isolation. Executive summary Key outcomes Moonshot redirected 786 at-risk individuals to our intervention partners’ websites. 22 initiated a conversation with a counselor. Four individuals formally registered and engaged with a service provider for several months, in addition to those who accessed virtual counselling without going through the registration process. At least one person who initially shared violent impulses has been able to find positive, hopeful alternatives for the future. Moonshot’s ads reached users engaging with harmful content on Google and YouTube 44,508 times. Among the hundreds of users redirected to ETA and RAPS’ websites, 26 were watching influential incel YouTube channels and 39 had searched Google for high-risk keywords related to incel and violent far-right ideology (“looksmax org”; “1488 tattoos”). Moonshot, ETA, RAPS, and CPN-PREV established an effective multi-sectoral partnership. During our pilot program, we co-designed support pathways and risk escalation procedures for each service area, built teams’ capacity to deliver online interventions safely and effectively, and engaged at-risk audiences online. This pilot provides a blueprint for future interventions to reach and engage at-risk internet users. New iterations of this work can reach larger audiences by expanding advertising beyond the pilot platforms, strengthening and expanding cross-sectoral partnerships, and testing new ways to reach often-isolated internet users.

Washington, DC: Moonshot, 2023. 13p.

By John Jenkins, Dmon L. Perry and Paul Stott

The Prevent counter-terrorism strategy is perhaps the most controversial government policy most people have never heard of. Public recognition of it is generally low, but opposition from Britain’s raucous Islamist scene, near total. From there, opposition has spread to sections of the far-left, and those parts of academia where Islamism and the revolutionary left intersect. This report, written by three experts on Islamism, outlines the campaign against Prevent, and argues that this is not an exceptional campaign against a uniquely flawed policy – the groups opposing Prevent have tended to criticise pretty much any counter-terrorism policy, in sine cases for a generation. The same names and campaign groups appear time after time regardless of the colour of the government of the day.

Disappointingly, ministers and officials have tended to shy away from some of these debates, allowing misinformation, and even conspiracy theory, to flourish. The forthcoming Prevent review by William Shawcross risks being dead on arrival if this continues. The authors call for a Centre for the Study of Extremism to give Ministers the tools to properly push back against campaigners, with a separate communications unit to disseminate rebuttal, and a due diligence unit. The latter is needed to ensure that government departments and the public sector are choosing their friends wisely. Too often anti-Prevent campaigners are able to grandstand against government counter-terrorism policies, whilst at the same time receiving government patronage and engagement. It should no longer be possible to run with the fox, and hunt with the hounds.

London: Policy Exchange, 2022.' 89p,

By Hanny Purnama Sari and Muhammad Syauqillah

This research aims to compile data and information that will contribute to understanding the online radicalization phenomenon through translation. There are many studies on using the internet and propaganda in a terrorism context. However, only a handful studied the correlation between translation and terrorism propaganda, especially in Indonesia. There was little discussion on the role of translation in bridging communication between different nations, cultures, and languages and using it to propagate radical/propaganda narratives worldwide and amplify those messages to its target audience. The research method is descriptive qualitative using primary and secondary data; the sample is taken from the book of Nadharat Fi Al Ijma' Al Qath'i and previous findings and news. This research revealed at least ten roles of translation in the online radicalization phenomenon; among others, translation in the target language can be used to identify the target audience of the propagandist, and many terrorist sympathizers were willing to volunteer to translate the propaganda. However, although the translation is used to leverage the spread of propaganda, it can also assist law enforcement officers in combating terrorist/propaganda narratives. Indonesian law enforcement officers may use translation to counter-terrorism as Indonesia has hundreds of vernacular languages that can be used to 'encrypt' and disseminate their extremist narratives.

International Journal of Science and Society, 4(4), 319-336.

By Moustafa Ayad, Nadeem Khan and Aymenn al-Tamimi

his report highlights the networks, supporters, and the platforms of Islamic State disinformation disseminators, focusing on popular social media platforms as well as encrypted messaging applications. These disinformation networks are creating self-branded media outlets with followers in the tens of thousands, and often with innocuous names like “Global Happenings,” “DRIL” and “Media Center,” to evade moderation and takedowns. These same networks use coded language and a codebook of emojis to spread Islamic State “news” to other networks of supporters, who similarly evade moderation. These ‘alternative news outlets’ are trying to outcompete narratives publicized by government officials as well as independent mainstream media and individual journalists – groups that were also heavily targeted by Islamic State.

London: IDS - Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2022. 22p.

Edited By Olivier J. Walther, William F.S. Miles

Since the end of the Cold War, the monopoly of legitimate organized force of many African states has been eroded by a mix of rebel groups, violent extremist organizations, and self-defence militias created in response to the rise in organized violence on the continent. African Border Disorders explores the complex relationships that bind states, transnational rebels and extremist organizations, and borders on the African continent. Combining cutting edge network science with geographical analysis, the first part of the book highlights how the fluid alliances and conflicts between rebels, violent extremist organizations and states shape in large measure regional patterns of violence in Africa. The second part of the book examines the spread of Islamist violence around Lake Chad through the lens of the violent Nigerian Islamist group Boko Haram, which has evolved from a nationally-oriented militia group, to an internationally networked organization. The third part of the book explores how violent extremist organizations conceptualize state boundaries and territory and, reciprocally, how do the civil society and the state respond to the rise of transnational organizations. The book will be essential reading for all students and specialists of African politics and security studies, particularly those specializing on fragile states, sovereignty, new wars, and borders as well as governments and international organizations involved in conflict prevention and early intervention in the region.

London: Routledge, 2018. 230p

Edited by Julia M. Eckert

This book addresses two developments in the conceptualisation of citizenship that arise from the »war on terror«, namely the re-culturalisation of membership in a polity and the re-moralisation of access to rights. Taking an anthropological perspective, it traces the ways in which the trans-nationalisation of the »war on terror« has affected notions of »the dangerous other« in different political and social contexts, asking what changes in the ideas of the state and of the nation have been promoted by the emerging culture of security, and how these changes affect practices of citizenship and societal group relations.

\Bielefeld, Transcript Verlag, 2008. 197p.