By CLARA BROEKAERT, COLIN P. CLARKE, MICHAELA MILLENDER, ANNIKA SCHARNAGL, AND JOSEPH SHELZI

The horrific attacks by Hamas on October 7, 2023, fundamentally shifted the security posture of the Middle East, while also having severe humanitarian consequences and ripple effects in countries throughout the globe, including many in the West. This TSC Special Report, generously sponsored by the Airey Neave Trust, aims to explore how October 7 impacted several Western countries, including the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Italy. While the conflict remains ongoing – and indeed will reverberate long after the fighting actually ends — this report attempts to take the pulse of five Western countries just shy of the one-year anniversary marking the attack.

Perhaps unsurprisingly, and in line with trends that have been unfolding in recent years, there has been a spike in both Islamophobic and antisemitic incidents across all five countries — it is not an either/or phenomena. Still, the data underpinning these incidents remains challenging, limited, and frequently incomplete, often collected by civil society groups or non-profit organizations with different definitions of the terms. Government data varies on how it is collected, if it is recorded at all, across local, state, and federal levels. This makes it exceedingly difficult to compare the data rigorously and make generalizable conclusions with confidence. The data that is available, however, does suggest that extremist groups are leveraging the conflict to promulgate and amplify preexisting antisemitic and Islamophobic narratives. In other words, the terrorist attacks of October 7 and the Israeli response provide an opportunity to promote their hateful narratives and repackage them for the moment, often inciting their followers to wreak havoc and pushing their supporters to engage in violence.

New York: The Soufan Center, 2024.63p.

By Guri Nordtorp Mølmena and Jacob Aasland Ravndal

How does the internet affect the radicalisation of extreme-right lone actor terrorists? In the absence of an established theoretical model, this article identifies six mechanisms seen as particularly relevant for explaining online radicalisation. Having first reviewed a larger set of relevant lone actor terrorists, the study traces the mechanisms in three selected cases where the internet was reportedly used extensively during radicalisation. The findingsshow that the internet primarily facilitated radicalisation through information provision, as well as amplifying group polarisation and legitimising extreme ideology and violence through echoing.In all three cases, radicalisation was also affected considerably byoffline push-factors that through their presence made extreme online messages more impactful. The results challenge the view that offline interaction is necessary for radicalisation to occur but also the view that online influence itself is sufficient

BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES OF TERRORISM AND POLITICAL AGGRESSION 2023, VOL. 15, NO. 4, 463–487

RISIUS, MARTEN; NAMVAR, MORTEZA; AKHLAGHPOUR, SAEED; XIE, HETIAO (SLIM)

The following excerpt from the document contains multiple links embedded in the original text: "'Content Warning: This insight contains antisemitic, racist, and hateful imagery.' [...] Extremists exploit social media platforms to spread hate against minority groups based on protected attributes such as gender, religion, and ethnicity. Platforms and researchers have been actively developing AI tools to detect and remove such hate speech. However, extremists employ various forms of implicit hate speech (IHS) to evade AI detection systems. IHS spreads hateful messages using subtle expressions and complex contextual semantic relationships instead of explicit abusive words, bringing challenges to automatic detection algorithms. Common forms of IHS include dog whistles, coded language, humorous hate speech, and implicit dehumanisation. Moreover, the forms and expressions of IHS evolve rapidly with societal controversies (e.g., regional wars). Identifying and tracking such changes in IHS is crucial for platforms trying to counter them. In this Insight, we report and analyse 'Substitution' as a new form of IHS. Recently, we observed extremists using 'Substitution' by propagating hateful rhetoric against a target group (e.g., Jews) while explicitly referencing another label group (e.g., Chinese). We show that Substitution not only effectively spreads hate but also exacerbates engagement and obscures detection."

GLOBAL NETWORK ON EXTREMISM AND TECHNOLOGY (GNET). 24 JUN, 2024. 8p.

KATULIS, BRIAN

From the document: "[1] The Biden administration set forth five main objectives in reaction to the Oct. 7 Hamas attack against Israel and ensuing war in the Gaza Strip: [a.] Support Israel's self-defense and objective of eliminating the threat posed by Hamas; [b.] Secure the safe return of hostages; [c.] Prevent a wider regional war; [d.] Protect civilians and respond to a growing humanitarian crisis in Gaza; and [e.] Create a post-war plan for reconstruction leading to a two-state solution and wider regional normalization efforts in coordination with regional and international partners. [2] Six months into the Israel-Hamas war, the Biden administration has not achieved enough progress toward these goals, although it has avoided some of the worst-case scenarios. Success is hampered in part by tensions stemming from the fact that some of the tactics and policy approaches are at odds with each other."

MIDDLE EAST INSTITUTE (WASHINGTON, D.C.). 1014. 9p.

By Timothy Cubitt and Heather Wolbers

Risk assessment for violent extremism plays a critical role in understanding the threat posed by radicalised offenders and determining how these individuals are managed both in correctional settings and in the community. The Australian Institute of Criminology (AIC) was engaged by the Department of Home Affairs’ Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Branch to conduct a review of the use of risk assessments for violent extremism in Australia.

The aim of this review was to:

• identify and describe violent extremism risk assessment tools currently available to support risk assessments of convicted terrorist offenders;

• assess each tool’s suitability to assist an expert to conduct an assessment of the risk to the community from an offender, when a court is considering whether to issue a control order under Division 104 or a post-sentence order under Division 105A of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Criminal Code); and

• review current risk assessment frameworks, including the use of Structured Professional Judgement, to assess the risk of violent extremist offending and consider how violent extremism risk assessment tools might be improved.

A review of relevant peer-reviewed and grey literature was undertaken alongside semi-structured interviews with a group of experts in violent extremism risk assessment. Findings from this review are organised according to the Terms of Reference.

Special reports. no 14. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology. 2023. 70p.

By Oluwole Ojewale, et al.

This report details the findings of the research study that examined the plausibility between terrorism and banditry towards shedding new light on the dynamics of the country’s security challenges especially in northwest and north central Nigeria, within the focal context of Kaduna, Katsina, Niger and Zamfara States. Nigeria faces a plethora of security challenges ranging from the Boko Haram religious/violent extremism cum insurgency in the northeast to farmer-herder conflict and banditry in the northcentral and northeast, a revived secessionist movement in the southeast, police repression, piracy, and more recently attacks the nexus between banditry and terrorism; highlight the strategies and actions required by various stakeholders at various levels to counter the spread of banditry and terrorism in these focal states. Predominantly, the report utilises both qualitative and descriptive methods, generated from primary and secondary data gotten through desk review, and a consolidation of findings with feedback from consultations with stakeholders in selected focal states. The report undertook qualitative research in the focal states, documenting the experiences of some critical stakeholders through key on security installations, among others. In spite of government efforts, the security situation in Nigeria is deteriorating. The report thus explores the question of whether banditry and terrorism are the alternate side of the same coin and the security and policy implications of conflating both. The purpose of this report is to ascertain informant interviews. These interviews were cluster-based to provide a better context to the literature and systemically present the experiences of stakeholders. The report finds that while banditry gravely endangers public safety and security in the focal states, there are contextual differences in the origin, evolution, and manifestations of banditry in the focal states. Understanding these local variations is important to deploying effective and sustainable solutions to this spectre of banditry that defines governance in the states. The report also notes that there is no discernible ideological persuasion underpinning banditry beyond theft, extortion, and wanton violence. Bandits are primarily motivated by the alluring prospects of wealth in a region blighted by poverty and poor socioeconomic outcomes. However, this does not exclude the fact that fundamentalist Islamist groups operate in the same space as bandits. There is the possibility that some bandit groups might have adopted more of a religious modus operandi on their initiative or through limited contact with extremist groups. While the report notes the dearth of studies investigating in detail the theoretical and functional nature of the relationship between banditry and terrorism in these four states, the preliminary evidence points to the existence of both environmental and operational convergence between bandits and Islamist fundamentalist groups in the focal states.

Africa: Goodluck Jonathan Foundation (GJF) 2021. 43p.

By Elie Cavigneaux

Defeating terrorism and saving art: fighting the same battle

In a world where chaos and political instability plague many countries in the Middle East and North Africa, a lesser-known crime has emerged: the trafficking of cultural goods. This phenomenon, often overshadowed by more prominent issues, poses a significant global threat. But why is the trafficking of art and antiquities so concerning?

1. Financing Terrorism: Cultural goods trafficking is not merely a trade—it’s a critical source of funding for terrorism. Security Council resolutions, UNESCO, the European Union, and financial investigation units have all documented this link. The self-proclaimed “Islamic State” even institutionalized this trade, issuing excavation permits and organizing the sale of stolen pieces to market countries.

2. Hidden Threats: Although these looted artifacts may not flood the markets immediately, history shows that they can resurface years later. Works looted by the Nazis during World War II, for instance, have reappeared after decades of concealment.

3. Beyond Terrorism: Yet, the interest in this analysis extends beyond terrorism financing. The resale of “blood antiquities” reveals another dimension: money laundering, fraud, and tax evasion. This criminal activity affects not only the antiques market but also the broader art market.

4. Investing for Tomorrow: To combat this multifaceted threat, we must invest in detecting and preventing crimes related to cultural and art objects. Whether in times of war or peace, our ability to safeguard culture and heritage depends on proactive measures.

Working Paper. Paris: Groupe d’études géopolitiques, 2021. 13p

Edited by Petra Terhoeven

How does terrorism affect our picture of the history of terrorism then, if the victims are moved centre stage? If the focus is put on their suffering? The contributions to this edition of the European History Yearbook will examine such questions in a broad range of historical case studies and methods, including visual history.

Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter, 2018. 172p.

By Nsirimovu Okwuwada

There have been several agitations in Nigeria, but none have degenerated into the current barbaric, horrendous, heinous, and despicable dimensions of carnage, massacres, and bloodletting orchestrated by terrorists, bandits, kidnappers, and other organized violent crime syndicates. This study takes a holistic approach using secondary data sources to examine the root causes of the modern-day prevalence of kidnapping, banditry, terrorist attacks, and other organized criminal activities in Nigeria. The study finds that unemployment, excess supply of young people, neglect of certain regions in the distribution of national wealth, lack of government visibility, lack of equal economic opportunity for all, uncontrolled influx of firearms, poverty, and religious fanaticism contributes to the increasing rate of violent crime in Nigeria. The article finds that the nature of banditry, kidnapping, and terrorist attacks are similar, and the modes of attacks on civilian and government installations are also related. The government should thus become proactively visible throughout the nation via its security agencies and economic development agenda. Additionally, the government should educate local officials and traditional councils on contemporary methods for reporting and addressing violent groups in their communities.

MPRA Paper No. 117671, Munich: MPRA, 2023. 46p.

MAY CONTAIN MARKUP

Julia Boya & Angelika Patel

Hidden deep in the Bavarian mountains lies the picturesque village of Oberstdorf—a place where for hundreds of years people lived simple lives while history was made elsewhere. Yet even this remote idyll could not escape the brutal iron grip of the Nazi regime.

From the author of the international bestseller Travelers in the Third Reich comes A Village in the Third Reich, shining a light on the lives of ordinary people. Drawing on personal archives, letters, interviews and memoirs, it lays bare their brutality and love; courage and weakness; action, apathy and grief; hope, pain, joy, and despair.

Within its pages we encounter people from all walks of life – foresters, priests, farmers and nuns; innkeepers, Nazi officials, veterans and party members; village councillors, mountaineers, socialists, slave labourers, schoolchildren, tourists and aristocrats. We meet the Jews who survived – and those who didn’t; the Nazi mayor who tried to shield those persecuted by the regime; and a blind boy whose life was judged "not worth living."

This is a tale of conflicting loyalties and desires, of shattered dreams—but one in which, ultimately, human resilience triumphs. These are the stories of ordinary lives at the crossroads of history.

London. Elliott and Thompson. 2022. 420p.

Edited by Tanya Mehra, Thomas Renard and Merlina Herbach with contributions from Marc Hecker and Sofia Koller.

The involvement of women in terrorism is not new, but it has gained more attention with the rise of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), which attracted many women to its so-called caliphate. Initially perceived as victims or harmless, these women progressively became a growing subject of attention and concern for security services. In 2017, the Dutch intelligence service (AIVD) already indicated that the threat emanating from female jihadis should not be underestimated, while recognising knowledge gaps about the role(s) these women played in jihadi movements or the threat they posed.1 The same year, the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2396 (2017) stressed that women who were affiliated with terrorist organisations “may have served in many different roles, including as supporters, facilitators, or perpetrators of terrorist acts” and urged states to pay special attention to this as women “require special focus when developing tailored prosecution, rehabilitation and reintegration strategies.”2 Yet, in spite of more attention from counter-terrorism services, and a growing body of literature on female terrorists, there is still a considerable lack of data-driven, empirical research on female violent extremist offenders (VEOs). This book seeks to inform practitioners and policy-makers on how to manage female VEOs through the criminal justice system in a rule of law and human rights compliant manner through four case studies in Europe.

The Hague: The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT: 2024. 223p.

Elizabeth Pearson, Joe Whittaker, Till Baaken, Sara Zeiger, Farangiz Atamuradova, and Maura Conway

“This report presents findings from the REASSURE (Researcher, Security, Safety, and Resilience) project’s in-depth interviews with 39 online extremism and terrorism researchers. Based at universities, research institutes, and think tanks in Europe and North America, the interviewees studied mainly, albeit not exclusively, far-right and violent jihadist online activity. The report catalogues for the first time the range of harms they have experienced, the lack of formalised systems of care or training, and their reliance therefore on informal support networks to mitigate those harms.”

Vox Pol. REASSURE. 2023. 138p

By  Vincenzo Bove,  Georgios Efthyvoulou,  and Harry Pickard

Numerous studies demonstrate that terrorism causes strong public reactions immediately after the attack, with important implications for democratic institutions and individual well-being. Yet, are these effects short-lived? We answer this question using a quasi-experimental design and data on three successful and three foiled terrorist attacks in the United Kingdom. We find that heightened risk perceptions and emotional reactions in the wake of successful attacks do not dissipate in the very short run but are sustained over time and up to 130 days after the attacks. We also find that, whereas large-scale attacks cause a long-lasting shift in risk assessments and emotions, the corresponding effect of smaller-scale terrorism incidents appears to subside within one month. Interestingly, foiled attacks can also affect public perceptions, which, however, quickly return to normal levels. We argue that the extent of media coverage is partly responsible for the duration of these effects.

United Kingdom: United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research, 2022, 19p.

By Jens F. Binder and Jonathan Kenyon

This work is concerned with the extent and magnitude of threat related to online radicalization in the context of terrorist acts and related offending. Online influences have been depicted as major drivers for the propagation and adoption of extremist ideologies, which often contain an element of collective grievance, and subsequent acts of violence. This is most pronounced in the discussion of so-called lone actor terrorism, but extends to all forms of extremist offending, and beyond. The present work situates online radicalization leading to terrorist acts within the wider context of grievance-based beliefs and attitudes. Further, it addresses current positions and debates surrounding the relevance and mechanisms of online radicalization in terrorist offending. Recent evidence from quantitative studies is reviewed to estimate prevalence of online radicalization and the level of threat that results from it. This is followed by a discussion of plausible, but opposing, interpretations of the estimates presented. While online radicalization does occur, with and without reference to offline processes, the resulting threat is not overly high. This assessment, however, refers to the present only and is unlikely to hold for the future, given the general growth and acceleration of online activity among terrorist actors

United Kingdom: Forensic and Legal Psychology, 2022, 10p.

By Joanna Dawson

This paper describes the recent history and present status of proscribed organisations under the Terrorism Act 2000 (the “2000 Act”). Prior to the 2000 Act, proscription was exclusively concerned with terrorism connected with the affairs of Northern Ireland. Under the 2000 Act, proscription was extended to include organisations concerned with both domestic and international terrorism. The Home Secretary may proscribe an organisation if they believe it is “concerned in terrorism”. If the Home Secretary believes that an organisation meets this statutory test, they must then decide whether to proscribe the organisation. In doing so, they must take into account various policy considerations. Consequences of proscription The 2000 Act sets out a number of proscription offences. These include belonging to or inviting support for a proscribed organisation; arranging or assisting with the arrangement of a meeting that supports a proscribed organisation; addressing such a meeting; or wearing clothing or displaying articles in public which arouse suspicion of membership or support of a proscribed organisation. It is also possible to impose financial sanctions on proscribed organisations.   Current proscribed organisations As of September 2023 there were 79 international terrorist groups proscribed under the Terrorism Act 2000 and 14 organisations in Northern Ireland proscribed under previous legislation. In November 2021 the Home Secretary announced that the Government had laid an instrument to proscribe Hamas in its entirety, ending the distinction between different wings of the organisation. In September 2023 the Government laid an instrument to proscribe Wagner Group, a private military organisation which has acted as a proxy for the Russian state. The Government considers it to involved in committing acts of terrorism, including in relation to its involvement in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The Annex to this paper includes a current list of proscribed organisations and a description of their activities. Criticisms of the proscription regime Proscription has been characterised as a powerful deterrent, a way of tackling lower-level support for terrorism, and a signal of rejection by society. But questions have also been raised as to its utility in combating terrorism and its compatibility with the rule of law. The former Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation (IRTL), Lord David Anderson KC, repeatedly recommended the introduction of time limits for proscription orders, as have his successors, Max Hill QC and the current IPTL, Jonathan Hall KC. However, the Government has so far declined to follow these recommendations and currently deproscription is done by way of application only. As a consequence, groups that no longer meet the statutory requirements for proscription continue to be proscribed, a situation described by Lord Anderson as “an affront to the rule of law”.

London: UK Parliament, House of Commons Library, 2024, 70p.

By the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Lauren Richards, Peter Molinaro, John Wayne. et al.

Operationally defining the lone offender terrorist is challenging, as the nature of terrorism is both highly political and contextually dependent. Over the years, there has been disagreement over the classification of violent acts under the label of “terrorism.” While an argument can be made that the infliction of fear upon a targeted group or the public is sufficient to classify an act as terrorism, the FBI definition of terrorism requires a purported motivation that goes beyond exclusively personal motivations and attempts to influence change in furtherance of extremist ideologies of a social, political, religious, racial or environmental nature. The focus of the current study examined offenders who carried out their attacks independent of any direction from a terrorist group or organization.Lone offender terrorism continues to pose a threat as violent ideological groups and terrorist organizations place emphasis on inspiring lone offender-style attacks. Additionally, individuals who view violence as an accessible and justified method for advancing their own ideological goals can independently mobilize toward violent action. While attacks directly coordinated by terrorist organizations are generally more lethal globally, the United States departs from this trend: lone offender attacks in the United States are more deadly, possibly due to strong U.S. counterterrorism capacity for disrupting.The current report provides an overview of the data, exploring the various topics encompassed within the coding protocol, including bystander observations, offenders’ backgrounds, family and social networks, behavioral characteristics, radicalization, and attack planning. Predicting lone offender terrorism incidents is not possible, but prior research and operational experience support the conclusion that acts of targeted violence, including lone offender terrorist attacks, may be preventable through early recognition and reporting of concerning behavior. The report aims to inform broader goals of enhancing bystander education and awareness, as well to aid the prevention efforts of law enforcement and multi-disciplinary threat assessment teams working to counter targeted violence threats every day. To work toward this objective, the authors examine relevant contextual factors and analyze the statements and behaviors offenders exhibited before carrying out their attacks.

Washington, DC: U.S. FBI, 2019. 80p.

ByJoshua D. Freilich, Steven M. Chermak, Rachael A. Arietti, and Noah D. Turner

This review focuses on terrorism and extremist crimes, including ideologically motivated hate crimes. Research on these topics has become more rigorous in recent decades, and more scholars have engaged in original data collection. Our assessment found a burgeoning literature that increasingly includes the application of integrated theories, but gaps remain as few studies examine life-course and critical approaches. Our review of the policing of terrorism found a limited evidence base for counterterrorism initiatives. We also found that court/sentencing issues are understudied. We suggest improving data quality in these areas by creating a national data collection protocol on these crimes, enhancing the rigor of offender and victim self-report studies, and requiring more transparency from open-source research efforts. We propose that government agencies fund rigorous evaluations of policing strategies in the terrorism context. Finally, it is hoped that increased access to federal court documents will lead to more scholarly attention on sentencing issues.

Annual Review of Criminology, Volume 7, Page 187 - 209

By Ekrem Ersen Emeksiz

ABSTRACT This research presents Istanbul, Turkey and its law enforcement as a case study for the design of a contingency plan to increase efficiency of counterterrorism efforts and coordination among the agencies. This contingency plan involves the implementation of techniques and strategies based on situational crime prevention, moral panic and crisis theories on predetermined terror targets in the city of Istanbul to reduce the impact of a mega terrorist attack. The research applies the EVIL DONE and CARVER concepts to assess current terrorism risks and threats for critical targets. In assessing risks and threat conditions, this research proposes a contingency plan for law enforcement in Istanbul. The purpose of the contingency plan is to reduce target vulnerabilities and enhance target resilience as well as control moral panic conditions during large-scale terror incidents.

By John Jenkins, Dmon L. Perry and Paul Stott

The Prevent counter-terrorism strategy is perhaps the most controversial government policy most people have never heard of. Public recognition of it is generally low, but opposition from Britain’s raucous Islamist scene, near total. From there, opposition has spread to sections of the far-left, and those parts of academia where Islamism and the revolutionary left intersect. This report, written by three experts on Islamism, outlines the campaign against Prevent, and argues that this is not an exceptional campaign against a uniquely flawed policy – the groups opposing Prevent have tended to criticise pretty much any counter-terrorism policy, in sine cases for a generation. The same names and campaign groups appear time after time regardless of the colour of the government of the day.

Disappointingly, ministers and officials have tended to shy away from some of these debates, allowing misinformation, and even conspiracy theory, to flourish. The forthcoming Prevent review by William Shawcross risks being dead on arrival if this continues. The authors call for a Centre for the Study of Extremism to give Ministers the tools to properly push back against campaigners, with a separate communications unit to disseminate rebuttal, and a due diligence unit. The latter is needed to ensure that government departments and the public sector are choosing their friends wisely. Too often anti-Prevent campaigners are able to grandstand against government counter-terrorism policies, whilst at the same time receiving government patronage and engagement. It should no longer be possible to run with the fox, and hunt with the hounds.

London: Policy Exchange, 2022.' 89p,

By HM Inspectorate of Probation, Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services and HM Inspectorate of Prisons (UK)

His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Probation has led an inspection, alongside HM Inspectorate of Constabulary, Fire & Rescue Services (HMICFRS), and HM Inspectorate of Prisons – looking at the work of the Probation Service’s National Security Division (NSD) and multi-agency arrangements for the management of terrorist offenders in the wake of terrorist attacks.

In response to terrorist attacks in 2019 and 2020, by known terrorist offenders who were subject to licence supervision, the NSD was created as a separate division of the Probation Service, working alongside police Counter Terrorism Nominal Management (CTNM) arrangements. Together with existing prison and probation services, these bodies are responsible for managing those convicted of terrorist offences or suspected of potential terrorist activity, even if they have no related convictions.

What we found

• This inspection looked at the management and progress of the strategy to supervise these offenders. It found:

• NSD, probation, police and prison services worked well together and are approaching managing counter terrorism cases collectively

• supervision within the community was robust overall, balancing rehabilitative needs with tight risk management

• probation practitioners within NSD were well trained specialist officers, holding a small and restricted caseload, delivering high quality case assessment and supervision

• terrorist offenders were subject to additional oversight throughout their sentences

• the arrangements to protect others from harm from terrorist cases in custody were effective

• there has been significant financial investment to improve services dealing with counter terrorism, and staffing levels were appropriate

• prison governors and directors were clear about the terrorist risk posed in their prisons and were actively managing this

• leadership across the NSD and CTNM was strong, and there were clear lines of accountability, enhanced by national multi-agency governance arrangements.

Manchester: His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Probation, 2023. 65p.