By Jane Shim, and Alison Leal Parker

  Drug laws are being reformed across the United States to move away from the harsh punitive approaches of the war on drugs, but federal immigration law continues to treat drug offenses, including decades-old offenses, as grounds for deportation of immigrants. Those harmed, authorized and unauthorized immigrants alike, often have deep connections to the country, where they have formed families, attained education, and built their lives. “Disrupt and Vilify” analyzes new federal government data from 2002 to 2020, finding the US has deported 500,000 people whose most serious offense was drug-related. Of these, 240,000 were deported between 2013 and 2020, amounting to about one of every five deportations of immigrants with a criminal conviction for that period. A conviction for even minor drug offenses—for example, drug possession (including marijuana)—can carry devastating immigration consequences that far outstrip the criminal sentence imposed. Some would not be criminal offenses if committed today or involve conduct that is now legal under state law. There are significant racial disparities in the imposition of immigration penalties. One out of five noncitizens facing deportation on criminal grounds is Black. Human Rights Watch and the Drug Policy Alliance call on the US Congress to reform federal law to ensure that immigrants with criminal convictions, including drug offenses, are not subject to “one-size-fits-all” deportations. Instead, immigration judges should have the discretion to make individualized decisions. Congress should impose a statute of limitations on deportations for past offenses. Drug policy reforms should prioritize evidence-based policies rooted in public health and human rights to address the root causes of the overdose crisis and problematic drug use, and not continue the vilification of immigrants.  

 New York: Human Rights Watch, 2024. 97p.

By Mohamed Osman, and Laetitia Bader  

  Since conflict broke out in Sudan’s capital Khartoum in April 2023, between the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), both sides, particularly the RSF, have committed widespread sexual violence against women and girls, which are war crimes. Both warring parties, in violation of international humanitarian law, have attacked local responders, and obstructed aid, doubly victimizing survivors. Based on 42 interviews conducted between September 2023 and February 2024 with service providers to survivors of sexual violence, including healthcare workers, within and outside of the local responders, as well as aid workers, “Khartoum is not Safe for Women!” documents conflict-related sexual violence in Khartoum and its sister cities of Bahri and Omdurman, since April 2023. Service providers described how the warring parties have subjected women and girls, aged 9 through 60 to rape, gang rape, as well as forced and child marriages. Men and boys have also been victims of sexual violence. Despite the serious harm to the health of survivors described in the report, it finds that the actions of both warring parties have prevented survivors from accessing critical and comprehensive emergency health care. SAF has restricted humanitarian supplies imposing a de facto blockade on drugs entering RSF-controlled areas of Khartoum since October 2023, in violation of international humanitarian law. The RSF has pillaged medical supplies and occupied medical facilities. Both warring parties have intimidated and arbitrarily arrested doctors, nurses, and volunteers because of their work. The United Nations and African Union should deploy a civilian protection mission to Sudan tasked with monitoring human rights abuses, including conflict-related sexual violence and willful aid obstruction, and ensure that those responsible for rape and attacks on healthcare and local responders are held to account.   

New York: Human Rights Watch, 2024. 100p.

By Patricia Gossman  

The 26-page report, “Double Betrayal: Abuses against Afghan Policewomen Past and Present,” documents threats from Taliban authorities since August 2021 that have forced many former policewomen to go into hiding out of fear of being identified. Since the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan in August 2021, Taliban authorities have threatened Afghan women who had served in the police under the previous government. As Taliban forces carried out hundreds of revenge killings of those who had served in the former government’s security forces, many former policewomen went into hiding out of fear of being identified. Several have been killed, either by relatives who opposed their work as “shameful” or under unclear circumstances. The Taliban have not conducted credible investigations into these murders. While employed by the former government, many policewomen experienced sexual harassment and assault by their male supervisors. They described abuses including rape as well as demands from superiors for sex in exchange for promotion or avoiding dismissal. The widespread nature of these abuses was well-known since at least 2013, including among countries supporting the ngovernment, but police officers responsible for abuse were not held accountable. Women reported mental health effects from this abuse and their fear of the Taliban, but have been unable to find or afford psychosocial support. Human Rights Watch calls on the Taliban to cease all threats and abuse of policewomen and others who worked for the former government. The US and other countries that supported programs to train and hire women in the police should ensure that those seeking protection are deemed eligible on the same level as other vulnerable categories. The US, UK, Canada, and the European Union and its member states should increase Afghan refugee resettlement places, prioritizing women at risk.   

New York: Human Rights Watch, 2024. 34p.

By Dorothy Kronick 

Some theories predict that profits facilitate peace in illegal markets, while others predict that profits fuel violence. I provide empirical evidence from drug trafficking in Venezuela. Using original data, I compare lethal violence trends in municipalities near a major trafficking route to trends elsewhere, both before and after the counternarcotics policy in neighboring Colombia increased the use of Venezuelan transport routes. For thirty years before this policy change, lethal violence trends were similar; afterward, outcomes diverged: violence increased more along the trafficking route than elsewhere. Together with qualitative accounts, these findings illuminate the conditions under which profits fuel violence in illegal markets. 

Journal of Conflict Resolution 2020, Vol. 64(7-8) 1499-1523 ª The Author(s) 2020 

By Juan Camilo Castillo and Dorothy Kronick

Drug traffickers sometimes share profits peacefully. Other times they fight. We propose a model to investigate this variation, focusing on the role of the state. Seizing illegal goods can paradoxically increase traffickers’ profits and higher profits fuel violence. Killing kingpins makes crime bosses short-sighted, also fueling conflict. Only by targeting the most violent traffickers can the state reduce violence without increasing supply. These results help explain empirical patterns of violence in the drug war, which is less studied than interstate or civil war but often as deadly 

American Political Science Review (2020) 114, 3, 874–887 

By Max Smeets

This report is based on chapter one of Max Smeets’ book titled “Ransom War: How Cyber Crime Became a Threat to National Security,” forthcoming with Oxford University Press and Hurst Publishers. Historically, discussions on cyber conflict have primarily centered on the involvement of state-sponsored or affiliated groups. Yet, the growing prominence of criminal actors – specifically, ransomware groups – now demands a shift in attention. Ransomware, a type of malicious activity where hackers lock access to files or systems until a ransom is paid, increasingly threatens both citizen safety and global stability. In 2022, the majority of the U.K’s government's crisis management “Cobra” meetings were convened in response to ransomware incidents rather than other national security emergencies. According to Sami Khoury, the head of the Canadian Center for Cyber Security, the threat from nation-states remains significant but cybercrime, of which ransomware is the most disruptive form, is “the number one cyber threat activity affecting Canadians.” The Swiss National Cybersecurity Centre warns that ransomware could pose an “existential threat” to businesses and government agencies. This report discusses significant milestones in the development of ransomware, and what turned them into a significant threat to human and national security. It starts with the adoption of better encryption techniques by criminals, enabling them to effectively hold data for ransom. The use of botnets subsequently expanded their operational reach, while there was also a shift away from prepaid card systems in favor of crypto currencies such as Bitcoin, which provided anonymity and ease of transaction. Following these developments, the emergence of Ransomware as a Service (RaaS) allowed for a better division of tasks within the cybercriminal community, making it easier for newcomers to participate. Tactics evolved further to include double extortion, where attackers threaten to publish stolen data unless a ransom is paid. The final shift saw the professionalization of ransomware groups. It also increased their intent and capability to target major organizations, maximizing their ransom potential. I refer to the ransomware groups at the forefront of this troubling trend in the criminal ecosystem as ransom war groups. 

Zürich: Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zürich 2024. 18p.

By Merve Betül Gökçe, Murat Güray Kirdar:

This study investigates the impact of the Syrian civil war and refugee status on the risk of physical intimate partner violence (IPV) among Syrian women in Jordan, the country with the second-highest refugee-to-native ratio worldwide. We analyze data from the 2017-18 Jordan Population and Family Health Survey, which includes a nationally representative sample of Syrian refugees. Using the information on the timing of first violence after marriage within a discrete-time duration analysis, we examine the hazard rates of IPV exposure across different periods: prewar Syria, postwar Syria, and refugee status. Our findings demonstrate that war and refugee status increase the risk of IPV, and these findings persist for women who were married before the civil war. Additionally, the rise in IPV after the refugees' arrival in Jordan diminishes over time. The study identifies the economic strain resulting from lower household wealth and refugee husbands' employment losses as a driver of the rise in IPV. Moreover, our innovative approach utilizing GPS locations of refugee households to calculate refugee density reveals that greater social isolation, indicated by reduced proximity to other refugees, significantly exacerbates the risk of IPV among these women. In addition, we explore whether the civil war and refugee status alter marriage patterns, which could contribute to the observed effects on IPV. Both the civil war and forced migration lower the marriage age and increase the incidence of non-cousin marriages at the expense of cousin marriages—both of which are associated with a higher risk of IPV.

Bonn: IZA – Institute of Labor Economics, 2024. 61p.  

By Michele Riccardi & Peter Reuter

Two images dominate the discussion of money laundering. Investigative journalists and politicians stress the variety and sophistication of methods that have been used to launder the money of corrupt officials and white-collar offenders. The research literature, largely dependent on criminal cases, emphasizes how unsophisticated and routine are the laundering methods used by drug dealers and other illegal market participants. The discrepancy may reflect the incapacity of police to detect sophisticated money laundering but it may also represent the reality; that different groups of offenders choose different methods. This paper presents a theoretical framework to explain how offenders choose to launder their criminal earnings. Specifically, it asks: what determines the sophistication of the method chosen? Among the variables that we suggest influence the choice are: (a) the type of predicate crime and of crime proceeds, (b) the type of offender (age, education, social status), (c) his/her motivations, (d) the AML environment and the level of AML controls. The paper provides arguments from criminological and economic theory for how these variables might play a role. Without claiming that individual cases can test the theory, we offer some case narratives to suggest the plausibility of the factors that we propose.

European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research, Volume 30, pages 333–358, (2024)

By Steven Dudley, María Fernanda Ramírez, Anastasia Austin and Gavin Voss

This report aims to better understand the criminal dynamics in Durán. Located in the southwest coastal province of Guayas, Durán is a municipality, or cantón, as they are known in Ecuador, of over 300,000 inhabitants, the vast majority of whom live in the city bearing the same name.1 It has long been known as a commercial hub and small industrial center. But it is also home to a chaotic mix of shrimp farms, poorly-planned residential developments and favela-like land invasions, and unzoned areas of factories and warehouses that produce and store goods, many of which leave Guayaquil’s various maritime ports en route to all corners of the world. More recently, Durán has become a violent epicenter of criminal activity. Criminal groups use the municipality as a staging area for cocaine exiting on cargo ships through Guayaquil’s ports, while also peddling drugs on a local level. Systemic corruption, underdevelopment, and extreme poverty have facilitated this rise in criminality. More than half of Durán’s residents do not have running water or plumbing. The municipality is bereft of schools and a public university. And recent efforts to revive Durán have waned amid local and national neglect and a series of economic crises. To many residents, Durán is but a ciudad dormitorio (sleeping quarters): They work, shop, and relax in neighboring Samborondón and Guayaquil, returning to Durán to spend the night. Part of what keeps them away these days is insecurity: Durán’s homicide rate reached 147 per 100,000 in 2023 — its highest recorded rate — as crime has metastasized. Once a bustling railroad depot and industrial hub, Durán is now the poster child for the country’s rapid decline into the criminal abyss. Major Findings • Many social, economic, and political factors have converged to make Durán a violent criminal hub. Rapid, uncontained population growth, coupled with widespread corruption and malfeasance, has left a good portion of the municipality bereft of basic services such as potable water and a working sewage system. Unplanned, informal, and criminal urban development has scarred the area and jaded its residents, who have few civil society and religious organizations upon which they can channel their grievances and even fewer political options. And, like so many other parts of the country, the municipality lacks security, judicial, and regulatory forces that can effectively prosecute high-impact criminal activities. • Durán has two primary criminal organizations: the Chone Killers and the Latin Kings. These two engage in an increasingly violent battle for the municipality’s territory and its criminal economies, which include local and international drug trafficking activities. Their ties to transnational criminal networks, however, appear to be sporadic and opportunistic, rather than systemic and long-lasting. Perhaps more alarming is their penetration of the municipal government, where at least one of these groups secured public works contracts, as well as control of key government institutions that preside over everything from land tenure issues to traffic tickets. • Land trafficking is at the core of Durán’s criminal ecosystem. The illegal seizure and development of urban and rural land, often with the direct participation of corrupt officials, offers a deep well of potential profit, ranging from the sale of property to the administration of various public services. Illegal settlements also serve as staging areas for various criminal activities, including transnational drug trafficking, retail drug sales, as well as kidnapping, robbery, and extortion. Legalizing illegal settlements brings with it lucrative government contracts and the opportunity for corrupt officials to profit from kickbacks and criminal actors to launder their dirty money. It also leads to violence, including against public officials. • Ecuador’s growing role in transnational drug trafficking has significantly impacted Durán’s criminal, political, and economic landscape. By serving larger national drug trafficking networks, local gangs have gained access to substantial financial resources. Drawing from this new revenue stream, gang leaders have acquired legitimate businesses such as laundromats, hair salons, and construction companies. This interplay of criminal, economic, and political capital has also changed the political landscape, offering local gangs an entry point into the municipal government via campaign contributions, as evidenced by their systematic penetration into key government posts and public works contracts. • Durán’s gangs have a complex and varied relationship with the local communities where they operate. While some gangs exploit residents, the most sophisticated gang leaders offer them protection and other social and economic services, filling the void left by absent, corrupt, or inept state institutions, and providing a semblance of security and opportunity. This calculated approach engenders support that allows them to operate in relative safety, as well as use the community infrastructure and draw employees from a vast pool of recruits. • Homicide trends in Durán largely follow patterns seen in Ecuador over the last several years, including the type of victim, weapons employed, and the place where the murders occur. And, in some ways, Durán is a reflection of the extreme swings in violence in cities along the country’s coast. But Durán’s record 2023 homicide spike was more extreme, in part due to local events, like the murders of key criminal power brokers and the rise of a wayward, volatile new leader. These factors point to gang violence as the primary driver of homicides in the municipality   

Washington, DC: Insight Crime, 2024. 74p.

By Paulo J Murillo-Sandoval1, Steven E Sesnie2, Manuel Eduardo Ordoñez Armas3, Nicholas Magliocca4, Beth Tellman5, Jennifer A Devine6, Erik Nielsen7 and Kendra McSweeney8,*

We assess how much of Central America is likely to be agriculturally suitable for cultivating coca (Erythroxylum spp), the main ingredient in cocaine. Since 2017, organized criminal groups (not smallholders) have been establishing coca plantations in Central America for cocaine production. This has broken South America's long monopoly on coca leaf production for the global cocaine trade and raised concerns about future expansion in the isthmus. Yet it is not clear how much of Central America has suitable biophysical characteristics for a crop domesticated in, and long associated with the Andean region. We combine geo-located data from coca cultivation locations in Colombia with reported coca sites in Central America to model the soil, climate, and topography of Central American landscapes that might be suitable for coca production under standard management practices. We find that 47% of northern Central America (Honduras, Guatemala, and Belize) has biophysical characteristics that appear highly suitable for coca-growing, while most of southern Central America does not. Biophysical factors, then, are unlikely to constrain coca's spread in northern Central America. Whether or not the crop is more widely planted will depend on complex and multi-scalar social, economic, and political factors. Among them is whether Central American countries and their allies will continue to prioritize militarized approaches to the drug trade through coca eradication and drug interdiction, which are likely to induce further expansion, not contain it. Novel approaches to the drug trade will be required to avert this outcome.

Environ. Res. Lett. 19 (2024) 104068  

By The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)

Understanding the changing dynamics of heroin and methamphetamine flows from Afghanistan, through southwest Asia to Eastern and Southern Africa, continues to be important, particularly in light of the Taliban’s drug ban in Afghanistan and the harmful effects drugs have on the populations along the route. In order to improve information sharing and to help build connections between countries and International Organisations and to strengthen regional co-operation, UNODC held an Expert Working Group in Maputo, Mozambique during 10th-11th October 2023. Topics discussed at the EWG included an update on the current drug situation in Afghanistan, the opiate and methamphetamine flows from southwest Asia to Eastern and Southern Africa, regional drug seizures, the nature of organized crime groups and a summary of the drug demand situation in the region. The findings of the EWG are published in this report. This EWG report covers the flow and distribution of heroin along the Southern Route, highlighting key trends and vulnerabilities. Exploration of the routes utilized for drug trafficking sheds light on movements from Afghanistan into Eastern and Southern Africa, within Africa, and towards other destination countries. Moreover, an overview of the demand for illicit drugs in the region offers insights into the societal impact and challenges faced by communities. Insight into the fragmented groups and the critical role played by brokers, as well as the strong presence of criminal networks, provides valuable context on the organized crime landscape. Furthermore, the EWG discussed the regional cooperation efforts aimed at addressing drug trafficking challenges and promoting collective action underscores the importance of collaborative approaches in responding to the drug trade in the region. An examination of the policy and law enforcement responses implemented by affected countries provides valuable insights into national efforts to address the supply and demand dynamics. Analysis of the various modus operandi and trafficking methods employed by organized crime groups, including poly drug trafficking and links to other crime types, enhances understanding of the operational tactics used in the region. Finally, recommendations for policy interventions and follow-up actions aim to enhance counter-trafficking efforts and promote regional security and stability. Through a comprehensive examination of these topics, this report seeks to provide valuable insights and inform stakeholders on the complexities of drug trafficking along the Southern Route, with the ultimate goal of fostering effective strategies and initiatives to combat illicit drug trade in the region.   

 Vienna:  UNODC  2024. 36p.

By Marie Lynam, David Keatley, Garth Maker, John Coumbaros

Little is known about the prevalence of incapacitating substances present in drug-facilitated sexual assaults (DFSA). Presented here is a literature review conducted to provide background information, such as symptoms, exacerbations, and drug interactions, on drugs typically implicated in DFSA, namely gamma-hydroxybutyrate (GHB), gamma-butyrolactone (GBL), 1,4-butanediol (1,4-BD), ketamine, diazepam, oxycodone, methamphetamine, and alcohol. Literature found through Scopus and Pubmed was reviewed to determine the current prevalence of these substances in DFSA with a focus on Australian data. The global literature revealed that there is a wide variety of substances used in DFSA and the prevalence varies by country. For example, it was found that in Northern Ireland, opioids were most prevalent whereas in France, benzodiazepines were most prevalent. In Australia, the review revealed a lack of contemporary data with the most recent report in Victoria using data collected during 2011–2013. The literature also revealed there can be an important difference between self-reported substance use and substances discovered via toxicological analysis. This can be due to the challenges of biological detection, reliability of self-reporting, and the possibility of a substance being introduced to a person’s food or drink without their knowledge. This review highlights the need for the collection and analysis of current data about DFSA reports and the drugs detected, and due to the constantly evolving picture of both licit and illicit drug use, an assessment of the role of prescription medications in DFSA due to drug-drug interactions as well as potential to incapacitate is warranted.  

Forensic Science International: Synergy 9 (2024) 100545  

By Saurabh Thakur, Monika Roszkowska

General Findings. Organized Criminal Networks (OCNs) operating in the Eastern Indian Ocean are predominantly hierarchical in their organizational structure with individuals or a network of individuals at the helm of operations. The geographical location, proximity to two major drug-producing regions in Asia, and the vast shoreline have aided the transit of illicit drugs in the Maldives and Sri Lanka through the Southern Route. The transnational drug smuggling in the region is mostly transactional, carried out through a series of patron-client networks. Other modes include freelancing and family and community-based networks. . The involvement of the local population is driven by both push and pull factors, including profit motive, patronage, protection, poverty, addiction, street masculinity, involvement of family members, peer influence, and social media influence. Corruption within law enforcement and legal institutions was listed as a key problem in both countries. The broken chain of custody and complicity of government officials in illicit activities have affected the prosecution rates in both countries. The socio-cultural factors (i.e. ethnic, national, or family ties) form the basis for building trust and loyalty within the organized drug trafficking networks, establishing working relationships and promotions within networks. Emerging routes in Maldives and Sri Lanka seem to deviate towards the lesser-patrolled areas in the southern part of the Indian Ocean as the criminal networks continue to adapt to the enhanced maritime enforcement measures in the region. 8 The ability of new elements to enter the market can depend on various factors, including existing power dynamics between various local gangs, local political connections, law enforcement efforts, the adaptability of new entrants, and institutional corruption. However, an increase in the trafficking of synthetic drugs and a rise in local consumption were reported as factors that are likely to impact these existing market dynamics. The maritime route holds the largest share in illicit drug trafficking in the Maldives and Sri Lanka, especially larger consignments, but there has been a noticeable rise in the share of the air routes and postal methods post-COVID-19 restrictions.  

Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime; 2024 44p.

By Nicholas R. Magliocca , Diana S. Summers , Kevin M. Curtin , Kendra McSweeney, Ashleigh N. Price

Cocaine traffickers, or ‘narco-traffickers’, successfully exploit the heterogeneous landscapes of Central America for transnational smuggling. Narco-traffickers successfully adapt to disruptions from counterdrug interdiction efforts by spatially adjusting smuggling routes to evade detection, and by doing so bring collateral damages, such as deforestation, corruption, and violence, to new areas. This study is novel for its integration of landscape suitability analysis with criminological theory to understand the locations of these spatial adaptations by narco-traffickers as intentional, logical, and predictable choices based on the socio-environmental characteristics of Central America’s landscapes. Multi-level, mixed effects negative binomial regression models predict the suitability of landscapes for cocaine trafficking across 17 departments (the unit of analysis) in Costa Rica, El Sal vador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama from 2007 to 2018. Informed by long-term research in the region, independent variables included proximity to roads, country borders, international ports, indigenous territories, population density, and protected areas. The year of peak interdiction (measured by kg of cocaine seized) in each department was used to analyze spatial shifts in landscape suitability before and after maximum counterdrug interdiction pressure. We find that areas with lower population density and closer proximity to international borders became more suitable following peak interdiction—i.e, they are more likely to be sought out by traffickers seeking to avoid further disruptions from counter-narcotic efforts. Additionally, indigenous territories were disproportionately exploited as cocaine trafficking routes following significant interdiction activities by law enforcement. While interdiction may reduce the suitability of targeted locations, it can also unintentionally increase the attractiveness of other locations. Our study pushes criminological theory through its application to a unique space/time context, and it advances land system science by considering landscape suitability for logistical rather than productive uses. Policy implications are clear. Since interdiction resources are limited relative to the overall amount of trafficking activity, knowing which landscape features are viewed as  suitable by traffickers can in the short term guide interdiction deployment strategies, and in the longer term build strategies to mitigate associated harms from trafficking where they are most likely  

Landscape and Urban Planning Volume 221, May 2022, 104359

By Bryce Westlake, Russell Brewer, Kellie Toole, Tom Daly, Thomas Swearingen, Scott Fletcher, Franco Ucci and Katie Logos

Transitioning to cloud-based infrastructure (CBI) for processing child sexual abuse material (CSAM) collected during police investigations could address resource challenges agencies currently face. While CBI provides quantifiable scalability and budgetary and interagency collaborative advantages, potential risks associated with data security, data sovereignty, and various legal and regulatory concerns may make agencies hesitant to make this transition. However, this paper demonstrates how a ‘shared responsibility model’ approach to cloud security can minimize risks, allowing investigators to take advantage of CBI benefits. In partnership with Oracle Corporation, we demonstrate how this could be implemented and continually monitored for new vulnerabilities within a CSAM context over time.   

Trends & issues in crime and criminal justice no. 699. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology. 2024. 

By Isabel García Domínguez, Tom Vander Beken

Abstract Aporophobia, the rejection of poor people, is a major social problem with known harmful consequences, especially for the most excluded in our society, i.e., homeless people. However, this phenomenon has been only rarely studied using testable means on the ground. This article reports on empirical research conducted on a sample of homeless people in Ghent, Belgium. The principal objective was to analyze aporophobic discriminatory incidents and hate crimes which were experienced by around 50% of the respondents. The most common offenses were property crimes, particularly thefts, and robberies, with the belief being that the perpetrators were motivated to perform these crimes as they saw this particular demographic group as more helpless and vulnerable. Moreover, the victims usually experienced more than one crime and different typologies. Unfortunately, underreporting was pronounced. It is, therefore, necessary to increase the visibility of these crimes and the reporting rate, as well as to reduce victimization. To this end, it is essential to know the real scope of such crimes and their characteristics.

European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research (2024) 30:649–671

By J.M. Tamarit Sumalla, P. Romero Seseña, L. Arantegui Arràez, A. Aizpitarte

Sexual violence in an intimate relationship is a less studied phenomenon than other forms of intimate partner violence, despite data pointing to a high prevalence. Studies on how the cases are sentenced are scarce. Until recently, many laws did not allow marital rape to be punished as a crime of rape, and some studies showed a tendency for the courts to punish these cases less severely. The present study is based on an analysis of 964 rape cases of adult women in Spain. All the information was extracted from sentences of the Provincial Courts issued between 2015 and 2022. Results showed that significantly lower conviction rates and less severe penalties were imposed when the rape was committed by the intimate partner compared to other rape cases where the offenders were not partners (family members, acquaintances, or unknown strangers). The practical implications of these results in several areas are discussed. 

European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research,  Volume 30, pages 567–587,

By Néstor García-Barceló, Miguel Ángel Alcázar Córcoles, Javier Revuelta Menéndez, Penny Woolnough, José Luis González Álvarez 

The study explores in depth the relationship between missing persons’ psychosocial and criminological characteristics/circumstances and violent-fatal outcomes (suicide and homicide). A relational analytical explicative study of 929 cases and controls was designed using a retrospective and stratified design. Data gathering was conducted through the content analysis of judicial and police information, as well as the development of psychological autopsy techniques and semi-structured interviews with the persons involved in the missing person cases including offenders in prison. Bivariate and multivariate statistical techniques were utilized for analyses. The findings showed that there are different risk and protective factors which can distinguish between a good state of health, suicide, and homicide outcomes. This research entails implications for prevention and police risk assessment systems.. 

European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research (2024) 30:545–565 

By Jorge Santos-Hermoso, José Luis González-Álvarez, Miguel Ángel Alcázar-Córcoles, Enrique José Carbonell-Vayá 

This investigation studied the interaction between seven risk factors included in the police risk assessment of the VioGén System and found that these factors formed groups based on the dimensions of violence and psychopathology. The 171 femicides analyzed were categorized into four groups: normalized (23.4%), violent (25.7%), pathological (18.7%), and pathological/violent (32.2%). These groups exhibited significant differences concerning their psychosocial profile and relationship dynamics. One of the main findings is the identification of the pathological type that had not been detected in previous typologies, thus highlighting the importance of the psychological factor when classifying the perpetrators of femicide. These results have important practical implications, as the classification of the aggressor could be a preliminary step taken before the risk assessment, which would make it possible to individualize predictions and improve the protection of the victims as well as the therapies and intervention programs. 

European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research (2024) 30:521–543 

By Marta Capinha, Daniel Rijo, Marco Pereira, Marlene Matos

Intimate partner violence (IPV) is a major concern across the world, and its prevalence assessment has been a priority in numerous countries. However, data about IPV prevalence in Portugal is scarce and not up-to-date. This study aims to estimate IPV prevalence in Portugal. A community sample of 1392 adults (77.4% female, mean age=34.95 years, SD=12.80) was collected through a web-based survey, between March and June of 2020. Participants completed a socio-demographic questionnaire and the Conflict Tactic Scales-2 (CTS-2). Accounting for all forms of IPV, a past-year prevalence of 64.4% and 64.6% were found, for victimization and perpetration, respectively. Regarding gender or sexual orientation, no significant differences were found in the past-year or the lifetime prevalence, nor concerning frequency. Directionality and dyadic concordance types were analyzed and showed that most violence was bidirectional. Having perpetrated violence in previous intimate relationships was the most influential factor when predicting past-year perpetration or victimization. Other significant predictors were age, being victimized before 15 years old, cohabitation with an intimate partner, and drug use, but the last two were only significant for victimization. Findings support the idea that IPV is a relevant phenomenon, regardless of gender and sexual orientation. It is the first nationwide, gender-inclusive study to do so in Portugal. Studies based on different samples might provide important evidence to prevent hasty conclusions about IPV prevalence and patterns and to guide empirically driven policies. 

European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research (2024) 30:503–520