May Contain Markup

Edited by Helen Fein

Definitions of Genocide: The book explores various definitions of genocide, highlighting the limitations of the U.N. Genocide Conventionand proposing broader sociological definitions.

Recognition and Denial: It discusses the challenges in recognizing and labeling genocides, including the role of media and state motives in denial and misinformation.

Prevention and Punishment: The book examines approaches to preventing genocide and holding perpetrators accountable, includingreflections on historical cases and legal frameworks.

Role of Refugees: Refugees are highlighted as contemporary witnesses to genocide, with their testimonies providing crucial evidence andinsights into ongoing atrocities.

SAGE Publications, 1993, 204 pages

MCBRIDE, MEGAN K.; JENKINS, MONIQUE

From the document: "Within the public violence literature--that is, the literature on domestic terrorism, mass shootings, school shootings, and hate crimes, among others--leakage has been identified as a core warning behavior. Leakage occurs when a would be assailant communicates an intention to harm a target before committing an attack. This communication can vary in timing, level of detail, form, intentionality, and audience. Through such a communication, an individual might directly verbalize an intent to commit an act, make more subtle threats and innuendos, or share a plan via social media. Researchers have found relatively high levels of leakage associated with acts of public violence, including adolescent-perpetrated mass murders, mass shootings, political and public figure assassinations, and domestic terrorism. For this reason, leakage--which often occurs in interactions online or with loved ones--can be an important warning sign. But leakage to family, friends, or acquaintances is not the only way to detect when an individual is intending to commit an act of public violence, and over the last decade, researchers have started to examine preattack contact with system stakeholders, such as law enforcement, mental health, and education professionals. [...] We sought to advance understanding of what percentage of the violent extremist population could be 'catchable' in the sense that an individual had been in previous contact with a system stakeholder (e.g., law enforcement, mental health provider) or had been reported to a system stakeholder (e.g., by a friend or loved one to whom they had intentionally or unintentionally leaked information). To explore this issue, we leveraged a new dataset: the Domestic Terrorism Offender Level Database (DTOLD). The database includes detailed information on the 320 non-Islamist individuals who carried out terrorist attacks in the United States between January 1, 2001, and December 31, 2020. Specifically, we sought to understand what percentage of this population was known to system stakeholders at some point before they perpetrated their attacks." Further information for this document can be found here: www.cna.org/reports/2024/08/domestic-terrorists-contact-with-system-stakeholders-before-attacks

CNA CORPORATION. 2024. 4p.

Keneally, Katherine; Davey, Jacob

From the document: "This project by the Global Network on Extremism and Technology (GNET) looks at the user journeys of individuals who enter and participate in the online spaces of extremist communities. A user journey here refers to the distinct path a user may follow to reach their goals when accessing and using an online space belonging to extremist communities. User journeys are particularly important in offering insights into the rationale and motivations of users on the one hand, and to the inner workings of extremist online communities on the other. This is vital for understanding their goals and objectives. In selecting the ideologies for this project, we drew upon extremist communities - rather than extremist and terrorist organisations or groups - including those actors that participate in the extremist milieu and share ideas but do not necessarily operate in concert. These ideologies include those of formal and well-defined extremist organisations of White supremacist and anti-government extremist groups in the United States, supporter networks of Islamic State (IS), and looser communities of extremist actors including accelerationists, incels and chan site members who operate on shared platforms, congregating around common beliefs but without the connection of formal membership. This project is a response to the growing interest in understanding how individuals enter and participate in online spaces of extremist communities."

Global Network On Extremism And Technology (GNET). 24 JUL, 2024.

DREXEL, BILL; WITHERS, CALEB

From the document: "Since ChatGPT [Chat Generative Pre-Trained Transformer] was launched in November 2022, artificial intelligence (AI) systems have captured public imagination across the globe. ChatGPT's record-breaking speed of adoption--logging 100 million users in just two months--gave an unprecedented number of individuals direct, tangible experience with the capabilities of today's state-of-the-art AI systems. More than any other AI system to date, ChatGPT and subsequent competitor large language models (LLMs) have awakened societies to the promise of AI technologies to revolutionize industries, cultures, and political life. [...] This report aims to help policymakers understand catastrophic AI risks and their relevance to national security in three ways. First, it attempts to further clarify AI's catastrophic risks and distinguish them from other threats such as existential risks that have featured prominently in public discourse. Second, the report explains why catastrophic risks associated with AI development merit close attention from U.S. national security practitioners in the years ahead. Finally, it presents a framework of AI safety dimensions that contribute to catastrophic risks."

CENTER FOR A NEW AMERICAN SECURITY. UN, 2024. 42p.

By Simon Greipl, Julian Hohner, Heidi Schulze, Patrick Schwabl, Diana Rieger

Social media messages can elicit emotional reactions and mobilize users. Strategic utilization of emotionally charged messages, particularly those inducing fear, potentially nurtures a climate of threat and hostility online. Coined fear speech (FS), such communication deliberately portrays certain entities as imminently harmful and drives the perception of a threat, especially when the topic is already crisis-laden. Despite the notion that FS and the resulting climate of threat can serve as a justification for radical attitudes and behavior toward outgroups, research on the prevalence, nature, and context of FS is still scarce. The current paper aims to close this gap and provides a definition of FS, its theoretical foundations, and a starting point for (automatically) detecting FS on social media. The paper presents the results of a manual as well as an automated content analysis of three broadly categorized actor types within a larger radical German Telegram messaging sphere (2.9 million posts). With a rather conservative classification approach, we analyzed the prevalence and distribution of FS for more than five years in relation to six crisis-specific topics. A substantial proportion between 21% and 34% within the observed communication of radical/extremist actors was classified as FS. Additionally, the relative amount of FS was found to increase with the overall posting frequency. This underscores FS's potential as an indicator for radicalization dynamics and crisis escalation.

Journal of Quantitative Description: Digital Media. Vol. 4, 2024.

KATULIS, BRIAN

From the document: "[1] The Biden administration set forth five main objectives in reaction to the Oct. 7 Hamas attack against Israel and ensuing war in the Gaza Strip: [a.] Support Israel's self-defense and objective of eliminating the threat posed by Hamas; [b.] Secure the safe return of hostages; [c.] Prevent a wider regional war; [d.] Protect civilians and respond to a growing humanitarian crisis in Gaza; and [e.] Create a post-war plan for reconstruction leading to a two-state solution and wider regional normalization efforts in coordination with regional and international partners. [2] Six months into the Israel-Hamas war, the Biden administration has not achieved enough progress toward these goals, although it has avoided some of the worst-case scenarios. Success is hampered in part by tensions stemming from the fact that some of the tactics and policy approaches are at odds with each other."

MIDDLE EAST INSTITUTE (WASHINGTON, D.C.). 1014. 9p.

United States. Department Of State.

From the document: "The United States seeks to work with allies, partners, and stakeholders across the globe to shape the design, development, governance, and use of cyberspace and digital technologies to advance economic prosperity and inclusion; enhance security and combat cybercrime; promote and protect the exercise of human rights, democracy, and the rule of the law; and address transnational challenges. The United States believes in the critical role that the responsible uses of digital technologies and interconnected networks play in empowering people, and that an open, interoperable, secure, and reliable Internet enables new solutions to global challenges. Autocratic states and other actors, however, have used cyber and digital tools to threaten international peace and stability, harm others, exert malign influence, and undermine the exercise of human rights. An innovative, rights-respecting international cyberspace and digital technology policy strategy is foundational to U.S. strategic, security, economic, and foreign policy interests. Leadership in cyberspace, the digital economy, and emerging digital technologies is central to advancing the U.S. vision set forth in the October 2022 National Security Strategy (NSS) of a 'free, open, secure, and prosperous world.' As the lead foreign policy agency for the United States, the Department of State is advancing the 2023 National Cybersecurity Strategy (NCS) and its objectives of forging international partnerships to build an open, resilient, defensible, and rights-respecting digital ecosystem."

UNITED STATES. DEPARTMENT OF STATE. 6 MAY, 2024

UNITED STATES. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE. CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER

From the document: "Fulcrum represents the Department's ambitious Information Technology (IT) advancement strategy designed to leverage the power of technology to drive transformative change and serves as a tipping point for catalyzing digital modernization for the warfighter. To propel the Department forward, we must ensure continued success and relevance in the digital age. Fulcrum will enable achievement of the DoD mission and strategic objectives with unparalleled efficiency and effectiveness. [...] The DoD Chief Information Officer's (DoD CIO) mission is to 'connect', 'protect', and 'perform'. Fulcrum outlines a vision guided by four lines of effort (LOEs) representing a strategic shift that embraces technology as a mission enabler. [...] Fulcrum features the DoD CIO's IT goals and objectives for Fiscal Years (FYs) 2025-2029 that provide essential support to the priorities in the National Defense Strategy (NDS), and the supporting DoD Strategic Management Plan (SMP)."

UNITED STATES. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE. 6 JUN, 2024

By Emily Corner and Helen Taylor

Acts of extreme or mass violence perpetrated by lone offenders have become increasingly common in liberal democracies over the past 20 years. Some describe these acts as politically motivated, while others attribute them to mental disorder or criminal intent. This has led to the development of distinct research and practice areas focusing on either violent extremism, mass murder, fixation, stalking, or familial and intimate partner homicide. However, there is increasing understanding that the distinction between political ideology, criminal intent and personal motivation is blurred, and that the violence carried out by these individuals is better understood using the broader concept of grievance-fuelled violence. This work is the first to empirically consolidate the existing research in these distinct areas, employing a multifaceted analytical approach to develop a holistic model of the processes of grievance development among those who commit grievance-fuelled violence.

Research Report no. 27. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology. 2023. 95p.

By Timothy Cubitt and Heather Wolbers

Risk assessment for violent extremism plays a critical role in understanding the threat posed by radicalised offenders and determining how these individuals are managed both in correctional settings and in the community. The Australian Institute of Criminology (AIC) was engaged by the Department of Home Affairs’ Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Branch to conduct a review of the use of risk assessments for violent extremism in Australia.

The aim of this review was to:

• identify and describe violent extremism risk assessment tools currently available to support risk assessments of convicted terrorist offenders;

• assess each tool’s suitability to assist an expert to conduct an assessment of the risk to the community from an offender, when a court is considering whether to issue a control order under Division 104 or a post-sentence order under Division 105A of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Criminal Code); and

• review current risk assessment frameworks, including the use of Structured Professional Judgement, to assess the risk of violent extremist offending and consider how violent extremism risk assessment tools might be improved.

A review of relevant peer-reviewed and grey literature was undertaken alongside semi-structured interviews with a group of experts in violent extremism risk assessment. Findings from this review are organised according to the Terms of Reference.

Special reports. no 14. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology. 2023. 70p.

By Oluwole Ojewale, et al.

This report details the findings of the research study that examined the plausibility between terrorism and banditry towards shedding new light on the dynamics of the country’s security challenges especially in northwest and north central Nigeria, within the focal context of Kaduna, Katsina, Niger and Zamfara States. Nigeria faces a plethora of security challenges ranging from the Boko Haram religious/violent extremism cum insurgency in the northeast to farmer-herder conflict and banditry in the northcentral and northeast, a revived secessionist movement in the southeast, police repression, piracy, and more recently attacks the nexus between banditry and terrorism; highlight the strategies and actions required by various stakeholders at various levels to counter the spread of banditry and terrorism in these focal states. Predominantly, the report utilises both qualitative and descriptive methods, generated from primary and secondary data gotten through desk review, and a consolidation of findings with feedback from consultations with stakeholders in selected focal states. The report undertook qualitative research in the focal states, documenting the experiences of some critical stakeholders through key on security installations, among others. In spite of government efforts, the security situation in Nigeria is deteriorating. The report thus explores the question of whether banditry and terrorism are the alternate side of the same coin and the security and policy implications of conflating both. The purpose of this report is to ascertain informant interviews. These interviews were cluster-based to provide a better context to the literature and systemically present the experiences of stakeholders. The report finds that while banditry gravely endangers public safety and security in the focal states, there are contextual differences in the origin, evolution, and manifestations of banditry in the focal states. Understanding these local variations is important to deploying effective and sustainable solutions to this spectre of banditry that defines governance in the states. The report also notes that there is no discernible ideological persuasion underpinning banditry beyond theft, extortion, and wanton violence. Bandits are primarily motivated by the alluring prospects of wealth in a region blighted by poverty and poor socioeconomic outcomes. However, this does not exclude the fact that fundamentalist Islamist groups operate in the same space as bandits. There is the possibility that some bandit groups might have adopted more of a religious modus operandi on their initiative or through limited contact with extremist groups. While the report notes the dearth of studies investigating in detail the theoretical and functional nature of the relationship between banditry and terrorism in these four states, the preliminary evidence points to the existence of both environmental and operational convergence between bandits and Islamist fundamentalist groups in the focal states.

Africa: Goodluck Jonathan Foundation (GJF) 2021. 43p.

By Jessica Katzenstein

Six years after the germinal United States protests against anti-Black police violence in Ferguson, MO, and months after the 2020 police killings of George Floyd and Breonna Taylor, police in mine-resistant vehicles have once again occupied both the streets and mass public attention. In 2014, images from the Ferguson protests—of snipers pointing semi automatic rifles into crowds and officers tear-gassing unarmed civilians—prompted activists and politicians to compare the St. Louis suburb to occupied Gaza, Ukraine, or Iraq.2 During the summer of 2020, as the U.S. witnessed its largest public uprisings since the 1960s, police militarization again came under scrutiny. The Department of Homeland Security flew surveillance aircraft over protests in 15 cities, as officers on the ground deployed flash-bang grenades, sound cannons, rubber bullets, and tear gas against peaceful demonstrators.3 Since protests began, at least 14 local law enforcement agencies in 10 states have received free mine-resistant vehicles built for the U.S. military.4 In response, some lawmakers have revived efforts to curtail such transfers of military equipment.5 Reform groups are advocating to demilitarize the police by limiting when and how they can use armored vehicles and camouflage uniforms.6 In this moment of potential transformation, we must analyze both the deep roots and the recent upsurge of police “militarization” in order to grasp what calls for “demilitarizing” the police could mean. This paper argues that today’s high level of police militarization is one of the cruel, complex domestic costs of recent American wars abroad. Police militarization is in a sense as old as U.S. policing itself, yet it has exploded since September 11, 2001 and its intensification must be counted among the costs of this country’s post-9/11 wars.

Providence, RI: Brown University, Watson Institute, 2020. 20p.

By U.S. Government Accountability Office; 

  On January 6, 2021, thousands of demonstrators surrounded the U.S. Capitol Building. Demonstrators attacked and injured law enforcement officers and eventually breached the building. The Capitol Police is responsible for protecting the Congress, its Members, staff, visitors, and facilities. The Capitol Police Board oversees the Capitol Police. GAO was asked to review the Capitol Police’s physical security efforts for January 6. This report addresses the Capitol Police and the Board’s: (1) physical security planning for January 6; (2) response to that day’s events, including the procedures for obtaining outside assistance; and (3) process for assessing and mitigating physical security risks. GAO reviewed Capitol Police plans, procedures, hearing statements, timelines, and other documents related to the planning and response on January 6 and how the Capitol Police assesses security risks. GAO also interviewed officials from the Capitol Police Board, the Capitol Police, the Architect of the Capitol, and other federal, state, and local agencies. What GAO Recommends GAO is making four recommendations to the Capitol Police Board and the Capitol Police, including finalizing and documenting procedures for obtaining outside assistance in an emergency, addressing security risks, and considering security recommendations. The Capitol Police Board did not take a position on GAO’s recommendations. The Capitol Police agreed with GAO’s recommendations.  

Washington DC: GAO. 2022, 68pg

Elizabeth Pearson, Joe Whittaker, Till Baaken, Sara Zeiger, Farangiz Atamuradova, and Maura Conway

“This report presents findings from the REASSURE (Researcher, Security, Safety, and Resilience) project’s in-depth interviews with 39 online extremism and terrorism researchers. Based at universities, research institutes, and think tanks in Europe and North America, the interviewees studied mainly, albeit not exclusively, far-right and violent jihadist online activity. The report catalogues for the first time the range of harms they have experienced, the lack of formalised systems of care or training, and their reliance therefore on informal support networks to mitigate those harms.”

Vox Pol. REASSURE. 2023. 138p

By Caroline Logan, Randy Borum, and Paul Gill

Violent extremism has galvanized public fear and attention. Driven by their concerns, the public has pushed for law enforcement and mental health systems to prevent attacks rather than just respond to them after they occur. The prevention process requires guidance for practitioners and policymakers on how best to identify people who may be at risk, to understand and assess the nature and function of the harm they may cause, and to manage them to mitigate or prevent harm. Violent Extremism provides such guidance.

Over 10 chapters, prepared by leading experts, this handbook illuminates the nature of violent extremism and the evolution of prevention-driven practice. Authors draw on the literature and their experience to explain which factors might increase (risk factors) or decrease (protective factors) risk, how those factors might operate, and how practitioners can prepare risk formulations and scenario plans that inform risk management strategies to prevent violent extremist harm.

Each chapter is crafted to support thoughtful, evidence-based practice that is transparent, accountable and ultimately defensible. Written for an international audience, the volume will be of interest to law enforcement and mental health professionals, criminal justice and security personnel, as well as criminologists, policymakers and researchers.

London, UCL Press. 2023, 319pg

By Michelle Sydes, Lorelei Hine, Angela Higginson, James McEwan, Laura Dugan, Lorraine Mazerolle

Background: Criminal justice agencies are well positioned to help prevent the radicalisation of individuals and groups, stop those radicalised from engaging in violence, and reduce the likelihood of terrorist attacks. This Evidence and Gap Map

(EGM) presents the existing evidence and gaps in the evaluation research. Objectives: To identify the existing evidence that considers the effectiveness of criminal justice interventions in preventing radicalisation, violent extremism and terrorism.

Search Methods: We conducted a comprehensive search of the academic and grey literature to locate relevant studies for the EGM. Our search locations included the Global Policing Database (GPD), eight electronic platforms encompassing over 20 academic databases, five trial registries and over 30 government and nongovernment websites. The systematic search was carried out between 8 June 2022 and 1 August 2022.

Selection Criteria: We captured criminal justice interventions published between January 2002 and December 2021 that aimed to prevent radicalisation, violent extremism, and/or terrorism. Criminal justice agencies were broadly defined to include police, courts, and corrections (both custodial and community). Eligible populations included criminal justice practitioners, places, communities or family members, victims, or individuals/groups who are radicalised or at risk of becoming radicalised. Our map includes systematic reviews, randomised controlled trials, and strong quasi‐experimental studies. We placed no limits on study outcomes, language, or geographic location.

Data Collection and Analysis: Our screening approach differed slightly for the different sources, but all documents were assessed in the systematic review software program DistillerSR on the same final eligibility criteria. Once included, we extracted information from studies using a standardised form that allowed us to collect key data for our EGM. Eligible systematic reviews were assessed for risk of bias using the AMSTAR 2 critical appraisal tool.

United States, Campbell Collaboration. 2023, 53pg

By Joanna Dawson

This paper describes the recent history and present status of proscribed organisations under the Terrorism Act 2000 (the “2000 Act”). Prior to the 2000 Act, proscription was exclusively concerned with terrorism connected with the affairs of Northern Ireland. Under the 2000 Act, proscription was extended to include organisations concerned with both domestic and international terrorism. The Home Secretary may proscribe an organisation if they believe it is “concerned in terrorism”. If the Home Secretary believes that an organisation meets this statutory test, they must then decide whether to proscribe the organisation. In doing so, they must take into account various policy considerations. Consequences of proscription The 2000 Act sets out a number of proscription offences. These include belonging to or inviting support for a proscribed organisation; arranging or assisting with the arrangement of a meeting that supports a proscribed organisation; addressing such a meeting; or wearing clothing or displaying articles in public which arouse suspicion of membership or support of a proscribed organisation. It is also possible to impose financial sanctions on proscribed organisations.   Current proscribed organisations As of September 2023 there were 79 international terrorist groups proscribed under the Terrorism Act 2000 and 14 organisations in Northern Ireland proscribed under previous legislation. In November 2021 the Home Secretary announced that the Government had laid an instrument to proscribe Hamas in its entirety, ending the distinction between different wings of the organisation. In September 2023 the Government laid an instrument to proscribe Wagner Group, a private military organisation which has acted as a proxy for the Russian state. The Government considers it to involved in committing acts of terrorism, including in relation to its involvement in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The Annex to this paper includes a current list of proscribed organisations and a description of their activities. Criticisms of the proscription regime Proscription has been characterised as a powerful deterrent, a way of tackling lower-level support for terrorism, and a signal of rejection by society. But questions have also been raised as to its utility in combating terrorism and its compatibility with the rule of law. The former Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation (IRTL), Lord David Anderson KC, repeatedly recommended the introduction of time limits for proscription orders, as have his successors, Max Hill QC and the current IPTL, Jonathan Hall KC. However, the Government has so far declined to follow these recommendations and currently deproscription is done by way of application only. As a consequence, groups that no longer meet the statutory requirements for proscription continue to be proscribed, a situation described by Lord Anderson as “an affront to the rule of law”.

London: UK Parliament, House of Commons Library, 2024, 70p.

By Peter K. Levine, Joseph F. Adams, Amy A. Alrich, Rachel G. Augustine, Margaret D.M. Barber, Sujeeta B. Bhatt Kathleen M. Conley, Dave I. Cotting, Alan B. Gelder, Jeffery M. Jaworski, Mark F. Kaye, Carrington A. Metts, Neil V. Mithal, and Matthew J. Reed.

From the document: "The objectives of the IDA [Institute for Defense Analyses] study are to gain greater fidelity on the scope and nature of extremist ideologies and behaviors in the [DOD]; identify the sources of such ideologies and behavior; assess their impact; and develop strategies for preventing, countering, and neutralizing that impact. To that end, the project description calls for IDA to: 1. Document the range of known extremist ideologies and behaviors that are contrary to U.S. law and policy; 2. Identify existing definitions of extremism and prohibited extremist activities; 3. Identify pathways of extremist ideology and behavior broadly and within the Department in particular; 4. Assess why the DOD workforce and others in the military community (including veterans, DOD civilians, and contractor employees) might be susceptible to extremist recruiting efforts; 5. Survey DOD approaches to the prevention of other forms of violence (including suicide, domestic violence, assault, sexual assault, and hate crimes) to identify strategies that might be adopted; 6. Assess policies and initiatives of other federal agencies that might be helpful to the Department; 7. Identify existing legal frameworks for addressing prohibited extremist activities in the Total Force; 8. Evaluate current DOD efforts to counter extremist ideologies and behaviors in the ranks, identifying gaps and strengths; and 9. Review and evaluate current DOD information collection, tracking, and data sharing systems (including through the military justice, equal employment opportunity, command discipline, hotline response systems, insider threat, and law enforcement/security systems)."

INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES. 2023. 282p.

By Baklitskiy, Andrey

From the document: "The space dimension is crucial in nuclear relations between the US and Russia. Space systems support vital functions like early warning, communication, reconnaissance, and targeting directly connected to strategic stability. However, shifting geopolitics and the disappearance of arms control agreements put the space dimension under strain. The Russian invasion of Ukraine showcases modern warfare's reliance on space assets. It also influences space dynamics and US-Russian relations. Although the current impact on strategic stability is limited, it is important to consider it. The most essential element of strategic stability in the space domain--the taboo against kinetic satellite attacks--endures, but there are reasons for concern. The broad use of civilian satellites for military purposes, Russia's evolving stance regarding targeting space objects, cyber-attacks against space infrastructure, the disappearance of provisions for noninterference with space assets, and sanctions affecting space industry--all of these in their separate ways could lead to crisis and undermine strategic stability. On top of this, the lack of dedicated channels for US-Russian dialogue on space security diminishes prospects for crisis prevention or mitigation."

CNA Corporation. 2023. 34p.

By Kleemann, Aldo

From the document: "Deception and media manipulation have always been an integral part of wartime propaganda. But never before has it been so easy to create high-quality fabrications of images as well as sound and video recordings. The tendency to react emotionally to these media opens up a whole new possibility for abuse by their creators. A call to surrender by President Volodymyr Zelensky, which was immediately exposed as a deepfake, is the first attempt to use the new technology in an armed conflict. The quality of such fabrications is improving, detecting them is becoming increasingly complex and there is no end in sight to these developments. Banning deepfakes would be futile. It is therefore time to look at current and potential applications and possible counter-strategies."

German Institute For International And Security Affairs. 2023. 6p.