MAY COTAIN MARKUP

Edited by Ozgur Nikbay & Suleyman Hancerli

Understanding TerrorismThis section delves into the psychological profiles of terrorists, theuse of the internet by terrorists, the potential threat of bioterrorism, and the socio-economic factors contributing to terrorism. It emphasizes the importance of education in combating terrorism and understanding the true motives behind terrorist acts.

Suicide Attacks, Radical Terrorism, and Case StudiesThis part examines the characteristics and motivations behind suicide attacks, the rise of radical Islam in post-Soviet states, and includes case studies of terrorist incidents. It also explores the financing of terrorism through narcoterrorism and the spatial patterns of terrorist incidents.

Strategies and Tactics for Dealing with Terrorist Hostage Sieges, Hijackings, andKidnappingsThis section discusses various strategies and tactics for handling terrorist hostage situations, including negotiation strategies, the psychological aspects of kidnappings, and the importance of proper training and preparation for law enforcement agencies.

Counter-Terrorism Policies: Lessons for the FutureThe final section explores different counter-terrorism policies and strategies, such as situational crime prevention, democratic policing, the role of intelligence in counter-terrorism, and the need for international cooperation. It emphasizes the importance of maintaining public trust and preventing the radicalization of individuals.

IOS Press, 2007, 431 pages

Keneally, Katherine; Davey, Jacob

From the document: "This project by the Global Network on Extremism and Technology (GNET) looks at the user journeys of individuals who enter and participate in the online spaces of extremist communities. A user journey here refers to the distinct path a user may follow to reach their goals when accessing and using an online space belonging to extremist communities. User journeys are particularly important in offering insights into the rationale and motivations of users on the one hand, and to the inner workings of extremist online communities on the other. This is vital for understanding their goals and objectives. In selecting the ideologies for this project, we drew upon extremist communities - rather than extremist and terrorist organisations or groups - including those actors that participate in the extremist milieu and share ideas but do not necessarily operate in concert. These ideologies include those of formal and well-defined extremist organisations of White supremacist and anti-government extremist groups in the United States, supporter networks of Islamic State (IS), and looser communities of extremist actors including accelerationists, incels and chan site members who operate on shared platforms, congregating around common beliefs but without the connection of formal membership. This project is a response to the growing interest in understanding how individuals enter and participate in online spaces of extremist communities."

Global Network On Extremism And Technology (GNET). 24 JUL, 2024.

By Holger Anders

  This Briefing Paper looks at sources and pathways through which al-Qaeda- and Islamic State-linked extremists in Mali obtain their arms, ammunition, and explosives. This review includes an analysis of the materiel’s origins, types, and ages. The Briefing Paper presents the author’s assessment of some 800 arms and 12,000 ammunition casings that national and international authorities recovered and granted access to following extremist attacks in Mali from 2015 to 2022. Introduction -  By 2022, Mali had faced more than a decade of armed violence perpetrated by violent extremists. Since 2015, this violence has also spread from northern to central and southern parts of Mali, resulting in thousands of victims among national and international armed forces, UN peacekeepers, and civilians. This Briefing Paper investigates the arms, ammunition, explosives, and other material used by al-Qaeda- and IslamicState linked extremists (‘extremists’) as ‘tools of violence’ used in their attacks from 2015 to 2022. It provides an update on findings previously published by the Small Arms Survey concerning the proliferation and trafficking of illicit materiel in northern Mali prior to 2015. Specifically, this Briefing Paper focuses on military materiel legally produced and transferred by state actors before being diverted to extremist use in Mali.2 In so doing, the Briefing Paper examines three topics: 1. continuity in extremist procurement of their ‘tools of violence’; 2. changes in illicitly trafficked materiel and their sources; and 3. extremist network connections identified by the monitoring of this material. A confidential database maintained by the author provides the basis for the technical information concerning extremist-used arms and other material in this Briefing Paper.3 That database contains information about some 400 extremist attacks occurring across Mali between 2015 and 2022 from sites in which national and international authorities recovered extremist-used materiel that was made available for inspection by the author. The database also contains some 200 entries of extremist propaganda claims—documented in videos and texts on social media—relating to extremist attacks in Mali from 2012 to 2022. Interviewees included in this Briefing Paper are not uniformly identified for reasons of security and confidentiality. All information presented in graphs, illustrative maps, and tables is based on the author’s work and information contained within the database. The Briefing Paper first looks at security developments in Mali since 2015.5 It then looks at extremist-held armaments in Mali prior to 2015 and at continuity and change in these armaments after that. The discussion is supplemented with insights into network connections between extremist groups in Mali.6 Key findings Extremists continue to have access to arms and other materiel—including material of recent production— through capture from armed forces and illicit trafficking from the subregion. Libya remains a prominent source for illicitly trafficking military materiel to Mali; however, other sub-regional sources exist. These sources include components for commercial explosives used in improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in Mali. Established extremist groups use materiel to support the creation of new cells, which is a key mechanism in the spread of violent extremism in Mali.

Geneva, SWIT: Small Arms Survey. 2024, 16pg

By Bàrbara Molas, Anne Craanen, Sabrina Tripodi, Kacper Rękawek, andThomas Renard

Anti-Government Extremism (AGE) presents a complex and evolving security challenge, particularly in the transatlantic space. AGE is characterised by anti-system sentiments, and adherents propagate notions of an evil elite controlling societal mechanisms, adapting global conspiracy theories to local grievances. While predominantly non-violent, it harbours the potential for violence, posing a significant policy challenge. This report contributes a comprehensive exploration of AGE by utilising original data, including interviews with security officials and an exploration of AGE spaces online, focusing on Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United States. Through thematic comparative analysis, it unveils the nature of anti-government groups and individuals, elucidating their transnational linkages both online and offline. By shedding new light on AGE’s manifestations, severity, and responses across jurisdictions, this research illuminates whether AGE constitutes a standalone security concern. Furthermore, it offers insights into practical strategies for addressing AGE, especially in the context of existing policies for preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE). The recommendations provided are tailored to the differing characteristics of AGE groups, individuals, and networks, ensuring a nuanced and effective response to this emerging threat, both online and offline.

The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT). 2024, 48pg

By Ángel Gómez , Mercedes Martínez , Francois Alexi Martel , Lucía López-Rodríguez , Alexandra Vázquez , Juana Chinchilla , Borja Paredes , Mal Hettiarachchi , Nafees Hamid , and William B Swann 

We distinguish two pathways people may follow when they join violent groups: compliance and internalization. Compliance occurs when individuals are coerced to join by powerful influence agents. Internalization occurs when individuals join due to a perceived convergence between the self and the group. We searched for evidence of each of these pathways in field investigations of former members of two renowned terrorist organizations: the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) (Study 1) and Islamist radical groups (Study 2). Results indicated that ex-fighters joined LTTE for reasons associated with both compliance and internalization but that ex-fighters joined Islamist radical groups primarily for reasons associated with internalization. When compliance occurred, it often took the form of coercion within LTTE but involved charismatic persuasion agents within Islamist groups. This evidence of systematic differences in the reasons why fighters enter violent groups suggests that strategies for preventing radicalization and fostering de-radicalization should be tailored to particular groups.

Front Psychol. 2021 Jan 7