By Ciarán O’Connor

This report investigates the activities of the Irish Channel, a website, and associated social media accounts that have emerged as a highly active hub of misinformation in Ireland. The website gained notoriety in June 2024 following its publication of an article containing fabricated quotes and false claims alleging election interference during the local elections.1 This ‘election interference’ narrative reflected other baseless conspiracies alleging voter fraud was a threat to election integrity in the country. The Irish Channel website is part of the Premier Content Network which is run by the Digital Publishing Company. Its primary form of content across its range of websites is embedded YouTube videos, likely with the aim of driving traffic to its site and boosting ad revenue. Yet, as this analysis details, this may violate YouTube’s terms of service. This report profiles how original content produced by the Irish Channel contains inaccuracies and falsehoods, as well as content that is supportive of far-right ideologies including hateful anti-immigrant rhetoric. Analysis by ISD also indicates some of this content appears to have been generated using AI, with basic factual errors and non-existent citations being found on more than one article on the Irish Channel website. Accounts on social media and messaging platforms linked to the Irish Channel were found to feature white supremacist conspiracy theories, antisemitic hate, and support for Adolf Hitler. Additionally, the report highlights how the Irish Channel has forged close ties with the Irish Freedom Party and has, over time, become a key media distribution and broadcasting arm for the party. Many of the most egregious instances of false, misleading, and inflammatory claims found in this analysis originated from content published in conjunction with Irish Freedom Party-linked entities and hosted and promoted by the Irish Channel. This Irish Channel case study illustrates how small, far-right political parties can use digital media platforms and social media accounts to develop alternative media networks, promote their ideology, and grow their.

London :  Institute for Strategic Dialogue 2024. 18p.

By Lucy Cooper and Kevin D. Reyes

Once considered a mere novelty app, TikTok is now a certified force in the information ecosystem.  

The short form video giant is now being used by 14% of Americans as a news platform, according to a Pew Research Centre from 2023, an amount four times more than in 2020.  The impact of the platform, once best known for dance crazes and being a tastemaker for online trends, cannot be ignored. To better understand the impact that TikTok has, in 2023 ISD analysts gathered and analyzed data on trends in hate speech and extremist content on TikTok, and how effectively they were being moderated by the platform. The results, which center on a particular moment in time, have come to inform a series of studies – the first two of which focus on white supremacist content, and anti-migrant and -refugee content. While TikTok appears to have taken measures to improve content moderation practices since ISD’s 2021 study on extremism and hate speech on the platform, this new series demonstrates that TikTok is still ineffective in removing violative content. For example, data for the white supremacy content study was collected during one week in mid-August 2023 and indicates that such content was alive and well on the platform: 70 of the 108 video samples studied were uploaded to TikTok within the most recent three months at the time of collection. Of those 108 videos, the median number of views at the time of analysis was 6,097, a significant increase from ISD’s 2021 report where the median across 1,030 videos was 503 views. The last nine months have been tumultuous for TikTok as a company. In April 2024, President Joe Biden signed a bill that could result in a nationwide ban of the app should TikTok’s parent company, the Beijing-based ByteDance, not sell the platform within 12 months. As part of an ongoing legal fight over the possible ban, the Justice Department, according to the Associated Press, this summer alleged that TikTok was gathering bulk information on users’ “views on divisive social issues like gun control, abortion, and religion,” and harvesting data in violation of children’s online privacy law. As TikTok’s future remains undecided, content moderation issues on the platform persist. In July 2024, ISD published a report detailing the millions of views garnered by a network of neo-Nazi accounts on the platform. Just a month earlier, however, TikTok had published an updated transparency report in which they claimed that in the first four months of this year, moderators proactively removed 97.7% of violative content. Of that same sample, 89.8% were removed within 24 hours, down .1% from that same period in 2023. Despite TikTok’s statements, ISD and similar organizations consistently find content in clear violation of the platform’s policies

London: Institute for Strategic Dialogue 2024. 

By Ciarán O’Connor and Jared Holt

Once considered a mere novelty app, TikTok is now a certified force in the information ecosystem.  

The short-form video giant is now being used by 14% of Americans as a news platform, according to a Pew Research Centre from 2023, an amount four times more than in 2020.  The impact of the platform, once best known for dance crazes and being a tastemaker for online trends, cannot be ignored. To better understand the impact that TikTok has, in 2023 ISD analysts gathered and analyzed data on trends in hate speech and extremist content on TikTok, and how effectively they were being moderated by the platform. The results, which center on a particular moment in time, have come to inform a series of studies – the first two of which focus on white supremacist content, and anti-migrant and -refugee content. While TikTok appears to have taken measures to improve content moderation practices since ISD’s 2021 study on extremism and hate speech on the platform, this new series demonstrates that TikTok is still ineffective in removing violative content. For example, data for the white supremacy content study was collected during one week in mid-August 2023 and indicates that such content was alive and well on the platform: 70 of the 108 video samples studied were uploaded to TikTok within the most recent three months at the time of collection. Of those 108 videos, the median number of views at the time of analysis was 6,097, a significant increase from ISD’s 2021 report where the median across 1,030 videos was 503 views. The last nine months have been tumultuous for TikTok as a company. In April 2024, President Joe Biden signed a bill that could result in a nationwide ban of the app should TikTok’s parent company, the Beijing-based ByteDance, not sell the platform within 12 months. As part of an ongoing legal fight over the possible ban, the Justice Department, according to the Associated Press, this summer alleged that TikTok was gathering bulk information on users’ “views on divisive social issues like gun control, abortion, and religion,” and harvesting data in violation of children’s online privacy law. As TikTok’s future remains undecided, content moderation issues on the platform persist. In July 2024, ISD published a report detailing the millions of views garnered by a network of neo-Nazi accounts on the platform. Just a month earlier, however, TikTok had published an updated transparency report in which they claimed that in the first four months of this year, moderators proactively removed 97.7% of violative content. Of that same sample, 89.8% were removed within 24 hours, down .1% from that same period in 2023. Despite TikTok’s statements, ISD and similar organizations consistently find content in clear violation of the platform’s policies.  

London Institute for Strategic Dialogue (2024). . 15p.

By Luke Baumgartner

Tracing its origins back to the 19th century, the Black Hebrew Israelite (BHI) movement is ideologically and organizationally highly fragmented. At its core, it believes that modern African Americans are descendants of the Israelites in the Bible’s Old Testament, but some currents adopt variations of BHI ideology. While most adherents to the movement are peaceful, over the last few years, several individuals associated with BHI ideology participated in high-profile violent crimes targeting Jews in the United States, including the targeting of the JC Kosher Supermarket in Jersey City, New Jersey,[1] and a Hanukkah celebration in Monsey, New York, in December 2019.[2] While the attackers had little to no formal or institutional participation in the movement, their extremist interpretation of BHI’s core beliefs contributed to their radicalization, mobilization of violence, and, ultimately, their target selection. Moreover, violent attacks by adherents of the BHI ideology stretch back as far as 1974, when Marcus Wayne Chenault, a student of Hananiah E. Israel, shot Alberta Williams King–the mother of slain civil rights activist Martin Luther King Jr.[3] In 2022, the Program on Extremism released a report–one of the first of its kind–analyzing BHI’s ideology and relations to violence.[4] Despite its ample use of social media and track record of violence, little is known about how the broader BHI movement uses the internet to spread its message. In light of this research gap, this report examined 180 Facebook pages with large followings close to the more extreme sections of the BHI movement, further evaluating their scope, reach, longevity, activity, geographic location, typology, and major narratives. This study finds that: • Facebook pages are an especially popular way for extremist adherents of the BHI movement to reach a significant audience without being subject to content removal, takedowns, and strict service enforcement. Facebook’s record of success has several discrepancies, especially regarding enforcement against broader antisemitic narratives beyond Holocaust denial and with lesser-known hate groups and movements. • BHI extremist pages examined in this study are administrated across four continents and, on average, can maintain a presence on Facebook and avoid account removal for over five years, allowing them ample time and opportunity to accrue thousands of followers. The ability to establish a long-term presence on a major platform like Facebook increases the potential for audience engagement and opportunities to recruit and radicalize new members. • BHI pages consistently publish a range of antisemitic content and narratives, the most common of which consistently refers to white Jews as “impostors,” emphasizes the connection between Jews and Satan and adds a modern twist on traditional conspiracies of blood libel, arguing Jews are responsible for large-scale organ trafficking operations—among others. While the number of BHI pages posting antisemitic content decreased after October 7, the overall popularity of these pages continued to increase. These contradictory changes signal an improvement in Facebook’s ability to take down easily recognizable antisemitic content, such as Jews worship Satan, or recycled Nazi propaganda. Still, Facebook struggles to remove content that excludes explicit calls to violence or, alludes to conspiracies of blood libel or comparing Jews to rats, parasites, and others. • The frequency, longevity, and large follower bases of BHI extremist pages that publish antisemitic and other hateful content targeting protected classes such as the LGBTQ+ community suggest gaps in Facebook’s enforcement of its Community Standards, particularly its anti-hate speech and Dangerous Organizations and Individuals (DOI) policies. These findings suggest that antisemitic content congruent with extremist interpretations of the BHI ideology has a haven on Facebook–a social media platform with over 3 billion active monthly users.[5]  

Washington DC:  Program on Extremism at George Washington University, 2024. 52p.

By: Jennifer Tang, Tiffany Saade, and Steve Kelly

Cutting-edge advances in artificial intelligence (AI) are taking the world by storm, driven by a massive surge of investment, countless new start-ups, and regular technological breakthroughs. AI presents key opportunities within cybersecurity, but concerns remain regarding the ways malicious actors might also use the technology. In this study, the Institute for Security and Technology (IST) seeks to paint a comprehensive picture of the state of play— cutting through vagaries and product marketing hype, providing our outlook for the near future, and most importantly, suggesting ways in which the case for optimism can be realized.

The report concludes that in the near term, AI offers a significant advantage to cyber defenders, particularly those who can capitalize on their "home field" advantage and firstmover status. However, sophisticated threat actors are also leveraging AI to enhance their capabilities, making continued investment and innovation in AI-enabled cyber defense crucial. At this time of writing, AI is not yet unlocking novel capabilities or outcomes, but instead represents a significant leap in speed, scale, and completeness.

This work is the foundation of a broader IST project to better understand which areas of cybersecurity require the greatest collective focus and alignment—for example, greater opportunities for accelerating threat intelligence collection and response, democratized tools for automating defenses, and/or developing the means for scaling security across disparate platforms—and to design a set of actionable technical and policy recommendations in pursuit of a secure, sustainable digital ecosystem.

The Institute for Security and Technology, October 2024

By Hannah E. Meyers, Ilya Shapiro, Tim Rosenberger

Just as Ku Klux Klan members used white hoods to conceal their identities and terrorize their targets, modern activists are using keffiyehs, Guy Fawkes masks, balaclavas, and other inherently intimidating face coverings. Indeed, face-masking is pervasive among participants in demonstrations that are growing in frequency and disruptiveness. Most recently, the pro-Hamas “protests” that have proliferated across college campuses and city streets involve activists who cover their faces explicitly to make it impossible to determine who is engaged in violence, intimidation, and property destruction. Just as masks emboldened KKK activity a century ago, they are a central feature in the 360% surge in antisemitic incidents since Hamas’s attack on Israel last year.1 New York City experienced about 2,000 protests in the half-year following October 7—including incidents involving more than 10,000 participants illegally blocking bridges and major infrastructure.2 Cities across the country seem to be struggling to maintain order and check the growing number of attacks associated with these events on Jewish owned businesses and other institutions.  There is an obvious and simple answer to protesters’ growing aggressiveness, an answer that proved effective against their forebears in the KKK: denying intimidating and violent protesters the right to conceal their identities via face coverings. Hamas supporters, Antifa, Patriot Front, and others act boldly so long as they can remain anonymous. Stripped of this anonymity and the intimidating power of the keffiyeh and black bandanna, they will be far less likely to engage in criminal behavior.

New York: The Manhattan Institute, 2024. 5p.

By Paul M. Barrett

The main finding of this report is that social science research reveals that social media platforms can be—and often are—exploited to facilitate political intimidation and violence. Certain features of social media platforms make them susceptible to such exploitation, and some of these features should be changed to reduce the danger. “ The main finding of this report is that social science research reveals that social media platforms can be—and often are— exploited to facilitate political intimidation and violence. ” Based on a review of more than 400 studies published by peer-reviewed journals and think tanks, the report provides a platform-by-platform survey focusing on the particular features of each site that make it susceptible to exploitation by extremists promoting intimidation and violence and/or seeking recruits for their various causes. The report emphasizes that neither subjective observation nor social science research indicates that social media platforms are the sole or even primary cause of political intimidation and violence. Other media and irresponsible political leaders play crucial roles. However, the use of social media can enable or facilitate violence in a fashion that deserves attention and mitigation. Most of this problem—extremism and occasional use of force for political ends—occurs on the political right. But the left is not immune to these pathologies. The platforms discussed in the following pages range from some of the best known, like Facebook and YouTube, to the more recently ascendant TikTok to those on the right-wing fringe, such as Gab, Parler, and 4chan. Among the features, we examine are: • Facebook’s Groups, which helped the sometimes-violent QAnon to grow into a full-blown movement devoted to the delusion that former President Donald Trump has secretly battled “deep state” bureaucrats and Satanic pedophiles.1 • Instagram’s comments function, which has allowed the Iranian government to threaten dissidents with sexual assault and death as a way of silencing them.2 • TikTok’s powerful recommendation algorithm, which in one experiment promoted violent videos, including incitement of students to launch attacks at school.3 After a case study of January 6 by our collaborators at Tech Policy Press, the report concludes with recommendations for industry and government.

NYU Stern Center for Business and Human Rights Leonard N. Stern School of Business 2024. 32p.  

By Cristina Cretu-Adatte, Renaud Zbinden, Luca Brunoni, Hazel Bunning, Josselin Wilfred Azi & Olivier Beaudet-Labrecque

This article delves into the intricacies of managing illicit financial gains among Ivorian cyber fraudsters, shedding light on the findings of a field study conducted in Côte d’Ivoire by Swiss and Ivorian research teams. The study involved interviews with cyber criminals, law enforcement officials, and subject matter experts, to answer a specific question: What strategies do Ivorian cyber fraudsters use to manage and launder the criminal proceeds originating from romance scams and sextortion? The results explore the tactics employed by cyber fraudsters to obfuscate illicit financial flows, their organizational structures, and the strategies they employ in managing and using their gains. It confirms certain elements from the scientific literature, in addition to introducing new insights for a better understanding of the processes of money laundering and the use of illicit funds. The article also unravels the multifaceted challenges encountered within the anti-money laundering framework in the context of cybercrime and raises avenues for further reflection and future work to enhance the fight against this scourge.

Eur J Crim Policy Res 30, 359–378 (2024).

By Kristy E. Williams, U.S. Government Accountability Office

Domestic and child abuse can result in devastating consequences for military service members and their families. It also can reduce mission readiness. In fiscal year 2023, DOD recorded 26,978 reports of domestic and child abuse incidents, of which 14,110 met the DOD definition of abuse. House Report 117-397 includes a provision for GAO to review the policies and regulations governing IDCs and the use of decision notification letters. This report (1) describes how military commanders, abuse victims, and alleged abusers may use IDC decisions; and (2) assesses the extent to which the military services have established processes to notify commanders, abuse victims, and alleged abusers of IDC decisions. GAO conducted site visits at four military installations; analyzed random samples of IDC notifications and incident case logs; reviewed DOD and military service guidance; and interviewed DOD, military service, and civilian officials. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends DOD clarify its guidance and expectations on incident determination notification methods and content based on its identification and analysis of associated risks. DOD concurred with GAO’s recommendation.    

Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2024. 49p.

By Hannah E. Meyers, Ilya Shapiro, Tim Rosenberger

 Just as Ku Klux Klan members used white hoods to conceal their identities and terrorize their targets, modern activists are using keffiyehs, Guy Fawkes masks, balaclavas, and other inherently intimidating face coverings. Indeed, face-masking is pervasive among participants in demonstrations that are growing in frequency and disruptiveness. Most recently, the pro-Hamas “protests” that have proliferated across college campuses and city streets involve activists who cover their faces explicitly to make it impossible to determine who is engaged in violence, intimidation, and property destruction. Just as masks emboldened KKK activity a century ago, they are a central feature in the 360% surge in antisemitic incidents since Hamas’s attack on Israel last year. New York City experienced about 2,000 protests in the half-year following October 7—including incidents involving more than 10,000 participants illegally blocking bridges and major infrastructure. Cities across the country seem to be struggling to maintain order and check the growing number of attacks associated with these events on Jewish-owned businesses and other institutions  There is an obvious and simple answer to protesters’ growing aggressiveness, an answer that proved effective against their forebears in the KKK: denying intimidating and violent protesters the right to conceal their identities via face coverings. Hamas supporters, Antifa, Patriot Front, and others act boldly so long as they can remain anonymous. Stripped of this anonymity and the intimidating power of the keffiyeh and black bandanna, they will be far less likely to engage in criminal behavior

New York: The Manhattan Institute, 2024. 5p.

By The United State Secret Service, National Threat Assessment Center

Averting Targeted School Violence: A U.S. Secret Service Analysis of Plots Against Schools examines 67 plots to conduct a school attack that were averted in the United States from 2006 to 2018. The report was released in conjunction with a virtual presentation to more than 13,000 registered education stakeholders representing all 50 states and 64 countries. U.S. Secret Service Director James Murray welcomed participants, and noted specifically to participants the role that everyone has to play in preventing the next tragedy. “The takeaway from this report, and the 67 cases you are about to examine, is that when people come forward to report concerning behaviors, they can and do save lives,” said Director Murray. “That’s the bottom line, here. Bystanders save lives, and the Secret Service stands ready to support you and your communities in helping to reduce targeted violence in the years to come.” Secretary of Homeland Security Alejandro Mayorkas also addressed participants during the event. “Ensuring the safety of children while they are at school is our utmost responsibility,” said Secretary of Homeland Security Alejandro Mayorkas. “It requires us working together through our law enforcement and community partnerships. Many of the tragedies that have occurred in schools could have been prevented, that is why it is so important to establish targeted violence prevention programs, including those that the Secret Service recommends.”

The report identified numerous qualitative key findings and commonalities across the 67 incidents:

• Targeted school violence is preventable, if communities can identify warning signs and intervene.

• Schools should seek to intervene with students before their behavior warrants legal consequences.

• Students were most often motivated to plan a school attack because of a grievance with classmates.

• Students are best positioned to identify and report concerning behaviors displayed by their classmates.

• The role of parents and families in recognizing concerning behavior is critical to prevention.

• School resource officers (SROs) play an important role in school violence prevention.

• Removing a student from school does not eliminate the risk they might pose to themselves or others.

• Students displaying an interest in violent or hate-filled topics should elicit immediate assessment and intervention.

• Many school attack plots were associated with certain dates, particularly in the month of April.

• Many of the student plotters had access to weapons, including unimpeded access to firearms.

“The National Threat Assessment Center has been studying targeted violence for over 20 years to help our public safety partners stop violence in their communities,” said National Threat Assessment Chief Dr. Lina Alathari. “The research and guidance we publish is focused on prevention, with a particular focus on preventing targeted school violence, and the report released today builds even further on the work we do every day to best position community and school leaders to effectively intervene before the next potential tragedy.” Since the 1990s, the Secret Service NTAC has been conducting research, training, consultation, and information sharing on threat assessment and the prevention of targeted violence. NTAC has studied attacks directed at government agencies and officials, workplaces, schools, colleges, universities, and other public spaces. This systematic approach identifies individuals who may be exhibiting threatening or concerning behavior and assesses the risk posed by the individual. The academic research-based approach to studying the behaviors associated with acts of violence supports the Secret Service's protective mission and our nation's effort to better protect our communities. The Secret Service will continue to build on our threat assessment methodology and provide research findings and guidance to public and private sectors, to enhance the prevention efforts of those charged with safeguarding our nation.

Washington, DC: United States Secret Service, 2021. 64p.

By The Alliance for Youth Justice

Developed through consultation with our members and informed by evidence from children and young people,1 this briefing sets the youth justice agenda for the incoming government. We present the changes new Ministers must prioritize to work towards a society that promotes social justice and enables all children to reach their full potential. The incoming government must be ambitious about reimagining what ‘justice’ means for children, to achieve a safeguarding response to children at risk, promote racial justice, and ensure the use of custody is a last resort. Only then will the costly cycle of harm and offending be stopped, enabling all children to thrive. • A change in oversight and accountability is required to ensure children in or at risk of involvement in the justice system are treated as children. • Resources should be invested in local communities to support their children and aid prevention and desistance from crime, rather than in costly crisis intervention and punitive responses. • Clear strategies are needed to drive policy and practice change to keep children safe, end the imprisonment of children, and target and tackle racial disparities. This briefing provides a short overview of the issues and solutions to them, and we offer our ongoing support in further developing these much-needed reforms through engagement with our expert members.  

London: The Alliance for Youth Justice (AYJ): 2024. 32p.   

By Clarissa

The Child Labour: Action-Research-Innovation in South and South-Eastern Asia (CLARISSA) programme uses Action Research (AR) to understand the dynamics which drive the worst forms of child labour (WFCL), and to generate participatory innovations which help to shift these underlying dynamics and mitigate their worst effects. Through 13 Action Research Groups (ARGs) in Bangladesh and 12 groups in Nepal, the programme is generating a rich understanding – particularly through children’s lived experiences – of the complex underlying drivers of harmful work and working children and their employers are themselves defining, piloting and evaluating their innovative actions that aim to increase children’s options to avoid WFCL.  

Bangladesh Action Research Group 13 Brighton: Institute of Development Studies

By: Carlton W. Reeves, Luis Felipe Restrepo, Laura E. Mate, Claire Murray, Claria Horn Boom, John Gleeson, Candice C. Wong, Patricia K. Cushwa, and Scott A.C. Meisler

The use of cyber technologies, such as cryptocurrency and the dark web, provides new and evolving means to commit crimes and avoid detection. These technologies are used to commit a variety of federal offenses. The dark web is sometimes used to create, hide, or access websites containing child pornography. Illegal drugs and firearms are sometimes sold through dark websites. Cryptocurrency is sometimes used to facilitate these crimes. [...] Regardless of the type of crime involved, the relative anonymity these technologies provide to their users creates challenges for the investigation and prosecution of the crimes committed with them. The use of cyber technology to commit crimes transcends national borders. As Interpol has found, this causes investigative and legal challenges that can be difficult to overcome. United States government agencies, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, have reported on the increasing threats from these technologies and estimated yearly losses in the billions from the crimes committed with these technologies. There has been little analysis on the individuals sentenced for a federal offense who use these technologies for illegal purposes, the offenses they committed, and trends in these areas over time. In developing this report, the United States Sentencing Commission ('the Commission') collected information on individuals sentenced for offenses using cryptocurrency, the dark web, and hacking for fiscal years 2014 through 2021."

United States Sentencing Commission Sep. 2024

By James Jaehoon Lee and Jeffrey Layne Blevins

 Informed by critical theory, this book employs Social Network Analysis (SNA) to examine the ever-increasing impact that social media has on politics and contemporary civic discourse. In just the past decade, social media platforms have been at the forefront of political discord that played out in the January 6th insurrection, the expulsion of a US President from major social media platforms, the attempted regulation of social media in various states, and the takeover of Twitter (now “X”) by one of the richest and (arguably) most financially influential persons in the world. This book examines these phenomena through a comprehensive and in-depth exploration of their meaning and implication for democratic society. Informed by SNA, James Jaehoon Lee and Jeffrey Layne Blevins examine several types of social and political commentary on one of the most influential social media networks and argue that the use of emotional appeals in these posts about social and political topics degrades the quality of civic discourse and encourages the abandonment of reasoning in democratic self-governance. A timely and vital text for upper-level students and scholars in a variety of disciplines from media and communication studies, journalism, and digital humanities to social network analysis, political science, and sociology. 

 New York; London: Routledge, 2023. 161p.

Edited by Maya Avis, Daniel Marciniak and Maria Sapignoli   

Recent discussions on big data surveillance and artificial intelligence in governance have opened up an opportunity to think about the role of technology in the production of the knowledge states use to govern. The contributions in this volume examine the socio-technical assemblages that underpin the surveillance carried out by criminal justice institutions – particularly the digital tools that form the engine room of modern state bureaucracies. Drawing on ethnographic research in contexts from across the globe, the contributions to this volume engage with technology’s promises of transformation, scrutinise established ways of thinking that become embedded through technologies, critically consider the dynamics that shape the political economy driving the expansion of security technologies, and examine how those at the margins navigate experiences of surveillance. The book is intended for an interdisciplinary academic audience interested in ethnographic approaches to the study of surveillance technologies in policing and justice. Concrete case studies provide students, practitioners, and activists from a broad range of backgrounds with nuanced entry points to the debate.

London; New York: Routledge, 2025. 201p.

By Elinor Carmi

"Forget everything you know about spam. Now, let's talk about spam. Digital Distortions is about the power behind producing deviant media categories. This book explores the politics behind categories we take for granted such as spam and noise, and what this power means for our broader understanding of media. Despite being an inseparable part of our lives, we know very little about these media categories. The book synthesizes approaches such as media theory, sound studies, feminist technoscience and software studies into a new composition to explore media power. Through the concepts of processed listening and rhythmedia, Digital Distortions draws on sound and sound's ability to cross boundaries as a conceptual framework to think and examine media power more productively. Drawing on repositories of legal, technical and archival sources, Digital Distortions amplifies three stories about media distortions. The book shows that spam received different names in different periods; it is part of a larger project to influence the way people think, understand, and engage with media. The book starts in the early 20th century with Bell Telephone's production of noise. The next story jumps several decades to the web metric standardization in the European Union and the production of spam. The final story focuses on the 2010s and the way Facebook constructs unwanted behaviours. These stories show how deviant categories re-draw boundaries between human and non-human, public and private spaces, and, importantly, social and antisocial"--

New York : Peter Lang, [2020] 270p.

By Jesuit Social Services

This paper focuses on how governments can support a greater understanding of perpetration and a strengthening and acceleration of current efforts to end men’s violence against women and children. It affirms the need to build on Australia’s current approaches to prevention and considers whether they need to be further adapted or refined. Recommendations are based on practice experience, research, and the lived experience of participants. 

Recommendations

1. Investment in the collection of more and better data on the extent of perpetration, and its dynamics and drivers.

2. Identification of emerging opportunities to intervene early to prevent violence against women and children.

3. A “stocktake” of existing prevention and early intervention work taking place across the country, including consideration of evidence where it exists, to promote more specific discussions regarding the merits of various practice approaches.

4. Development of an evidence framework for prevention and early intervention, including standards of evidence.

5. A workforce capability building approach which views a range of work as prevention, including work with people of all genders who can influence men and boys across settings.

6. An online deterrence/early intervention campaign which draws on international best practice.

7. Investment in digital tools to support parents and critical workforces to confidently foster discussions with men and boys about gender norms and use of violence, and to counter negative influences.

8. Exploring in-prison behaviour change approaches, in parallel with changes to prison conditions and culture.

Australia: Jesuit Social Services, 2024. 39p.

By Nina Jankowicz, Isabella Gomez-O’Keefe, Lauren Hoffman

Technology facilitated gender-based violence (TFGBV) is not an in­tractable problem. But it must no longer be the responsibility solely of women’s advocacy groups. Others – technology companies, governments, civil society organizations, law enforcement, businesses, schools – must step up and work in unison to combat TFGBV in order to reflect its main­streamed effects on society. 

This report, drawing on a case study around the online harassment of Australian eSafety Commissioner Julie Inman Grant, assesses the state of research on TFGBV as well as recent global policy progress made on this issue, and offers a number of practical solutions to make women and girls safer online.

The authors argue that TFGBV must be mainstreamed to be mitigated, centering women’s experiences in broader policy debates. Technology companies, governments, civic tech organizations, law enforcement, employers, schools, and others must mainstream their work to combat TFGBV to reflect its mainstreamed effects on society. To this end, the authors recommend a number of practical solutions to the specific and pressing issues that women and girls face online today. Addressing the urgent changes described here will not only make women and girls safer and ensure their voices are heard, but also improve the safety and free expression for everyone who uses the internet, building more robust, representative democracies.

The recommendations are presented under the following themes:

• Ensuring platform accountability and action

• Urgently addressing deepfake image-based sexual abuse

• Supporting victims and survivors of TFGBV

• Deepening research and mainstreaming advocacy.

New York: Institute of Global Politics, 2024. 41p.

By Jason Payne and Anthony Morgan

In this study we used criminal history data for three birth cohorts in New South Wales to estimate the prevalence of recorded family and domestic violence offending. Using an accelerated longitudinal design, we estimate that 6.3 percent of people born in New South Wales had been proceeded against by police for a family and domestic violence offence by age 37. The rate was significantly higher for men: 9.6 percent of men— one in 10—had been proceeded against for a family and domestic violence offence, compared with 3.0 percent of women (one in 33). Overall, 1.2 percent of people born in New South Wales were responsible for more than 50 percent of recorded family and domestic violence offences. Further, family and domestic violence offenders accounted for nearly half of all recorded offences by people in the birth cohort. This is the first estimate of the prevalence of recorded family and domestic violence offending in a population sample in Australia. This is an important step towards increasing the visibility of family and domestic violence perpetrators.

Trends & issues in crime and criminal justice no. 701. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology. 2024. 18p.