By Noor Huda Ismail

Violent extremist groups exploit societal grievances, including climate-related disasters, to gain legitimacy and recruit members by positioning themselves as the true protectors of vulnerable communities. Strategic communication, including AI driven tools, is essential to counter extremist narratives and build resilience against manipulation. There is an urgent need for proactive, transmedia storytelling approaches to address both climate change and violent extremism, ultimately strengthening trust and promoting community unity.

S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, NTU Singapore, 2025. 4p.

By Iftekharul Bashar

Hizb ut-Tahrir Bangladesh, an extremist organisation banned since 2009, is swiftly expanding by recruiting Bangladeshi youth through social media and educational institutions. The group’s recent rally in Dhaka, attended by over 2,000 supporters, underscores its resurgence and the growing challenge for the government. Bangladesh must recalibrate its response to this threat by strengthening law enforcement measures, enhancing counter-radicalisation programmes, and creating job and entrepreneurship opportunities for its youth.

S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, NTU Singapore, 2025. 4p.

By Remadji Hoinathy, Malik Samuel and Akinola Olojo

  Some Lake Chad Basin countries (Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria) have been dealing with violent extremism for over a decade. Disarmament, demobilisation, repatriation, reintegration and resettlement processes in these countries may offer useful lessons for other West African contexts, including Mali and Burkina Faso, or more recently affected countries such as Benin, Côte d’Ivoire and Togo. Such lessons include incentivising defections, coordinating at national and regional levels, gender sensitivity, appropriate legal frameworks and community engagement.

Key findings Understanding the circumstances that lead people to join and leave violent extremist groups, and their experiences in those groups, is key to crafting incentives for disengagement. The willingness to leave violent extremist groups is often clouded by uncertainty, as well as long waiting periods between disengagement and enrolment in programmes for disarmament, demobilisation, repatriation, reintegration and resettlement (DDRRR). Waves of defection from Boko Haram caught Lake Chad Basin (LCB) states unprepared. DDRRR processes were thus implemented under pressure, hindering early coordination at a regional level. Women are treated mainly as victims, despite some voluntarily joining and playing active roles in Boko Haram, including volunteering as suicide bombers. DDRRR implementation in the LCB has revealed gaps in legal frameworks that require revisions. DDRRR lacks public support in some LCB countries, as many people view it as blanket amnesty for Boko Haram members. 

Recommendations Non-military means of countering violent extremism should incorporate incentives and opportunities for associates to leave these armed groups. By depleting these groups’ human resources, their fighting capacity is reduced. To encourage defection, clear processes for screening, prosecution and integration are needed. National ownership of these processes, inclusivity, adaptation to local context and adequate resourcing are key, from inception to implementation. National ownership should not lead to isolated approaches, but rather create bridges between countries to enable a cohesive regional approach. Organisations such as the Economic Community of West African States, the Liptako-Gourma States Integrated Development Authority, the G5 Sahel and the Accra Initiative could offer relevant regional frameworks for this. Authorities in charge of DDRRR programmes should consider the diverse needs and backgrounds of ex-associates. Distinguishing individuals according to why they joined and their roles within the groups is important for providing appropriate treatment. The specific needs of women and children should be taken into account. Affected West African countries should proactively formulate relevant legal and institutional frameworks. International and regional provisions and standards should be taken into account, including the need for transparent and predictable screening, prosecution and rehabilitation processes. Due to their position connecting the LCB and West Africa, Niger and Nigeria could play a key role in sharing lessons learned from DDRRR implementation. Community organisations, platforms, and media should be used by the DDRRR authorities to raise public awareness of the reintegration process. This would help prevent perceptions of general amnesty for Boko Haram members and preconceived ideas about the disengaged from undermining the process. 

Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2023. 12p.

ByJoe Whittaker, Elizabeth Pearson, Ashley A Mattheis, Till Baaken, Sara Zeiger, Farangiz Atamuradova, Maura Conway

Drawing from interviews with 39 online extremism and terrorism researchers, this article provides an empirical analysis of these researchers’ experiences with institutional ethics processes. Discussed are the harms that these researchers face in the course of their work, including trolling, doxing, and mental and emotional trauma arising from exposure to terrorist content, which highlight the need for an emphasis on researcher welfare. We find that researcher welfare is a neglected aspect of ethics review processes however, with most interviewees not required to gain ethics approval for their research resulting in very little attention to researcher welfare issues. Interviewees were frustrated with ethics processes, indicating that committees oftentimes lacked the requisite knowledge to make informed ethical decisions. Highlighted by interviewees too was a concern that greater emphasis on researcher welfare could result in blockages to their ‘risky’ research, creating a ‘Catch 22’: interviewees would like more emphasis on their (and colleagues’) welfare and provision of concomitant supports, but feel that increased oversight would make gaining ethics approval for their research more difficult, or even impossible. We offer suggestions for breaking the impasse, including more interactions between ethics committees and researchers; development of tailored guidelines; and more case studies reflecting on ethics processes.

New Media & Society Online First, February 28, 2025

By Noor Huda Ismail

The concept of asabiyya – group solidarity – originally articulated by Ibn Khaldun, has been hijacked by extremist groups in Southeast Asia to create division and promote radical ideologies. Reclaiming asabiya is crucial, redefining it as a tool for social cohesion and unity by drawing on cultural values that foster mutual respect and collective responsibility. Regional cooperation and digital counter-narratives are essential in countering extremism and fostering long-term peace in the region.

S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, NTU Singapore, 2025. 4p.

By Flore Berger, Lyes Tagziria and Aziz Mossi

As the infiltration of communities in northern Benin by violent extremist organisations (VEOs) has intensified since 2021, the number of kidnapping incidents has surged. This research identifies four main types of kidnapping by VEOs – forced recruitment, intelligence gathering, punishment and intimidation – all of which are closely linked to conflict dynamics and group expansion. Kidnapping is used as a strategic tool for infiltration into new territories. Key findings l An effective protection programme for defectors, key targets for abductions, should be developed. This would preserve an important source of intelligence while also incentivising further defections. l Explore amnesty programmes for individuals who have joined the ranks of the VEOs. Dialogue should be made an important feature in counterterrorism strategy. l Reinforce local infrastructure to bolster community resilience towards kidnapping and other forms of violence. This should include telephone network coverage and road infrastructure, among others. l Kidnapping incidents should be incorporated into ECOWAS and national early warning mechanisms. The pervasiveness of kidnapping can be used as a barometer of VEO entrenchment in a given area. l Rebuilding international cooperation structures with neighbouring countries is crucial. The Benin government should immediately seek a resolution to current diplomatic stand-offs.

Pretoria: South Africa: OCWAR-T: Organised Crime: West African Response to Trafficking , 2024. 34p.

By Noor Huda Ismail

The fall of Damascus to Syrian rebels has sparked a ripple effect in Southeast Asia, with figures like Indonesia’s Mas'ud Izzul Mujahid using apocalyptic prophecies to fuel extremism. However, the region's diverse Islamic practices, shaped by unique historical and socio-political contexts, show that a universal eschatological (end of the world) narrative does not resonate everywhere. Religious scholars can counter extremist ideologies and reclaim prophetic teachings for peace in Southeast Asia’s pluralistic society by offering inclusive interpretations of prophecy and addressing local grievances.

Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), 2024. 4p.

By Timothy Cubitt and Anthony Morgan

Using a large, national survey of online Australians, we measured unintentional and intentional exposure to fringe or radical content and groups online.

Two in five respondents (40.6%) reported being exposed to material they described as fringe, unorthodox or radical. One-quarter of these respondents (23.2%) accessed the content intentionally. One-third (29.9%) said the content they had seen depicted violence.

Fringe or radical content was often accessed through messages, discussions and posts online. Mainstream social media and messaging platforms were the platforms most frequently used to share fringe or radical content. Being a member of a group promoting fringe or radical content was associated with increased sharing of that content with other internet users.

Efforts to restrict access to radical content and groups online, especially on mainstream platforms, may help reduce intentional and unintentional exposure to and sharing of that content.

Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology. 2024. 17p.

By Camden Carmichael, Brooke Buxton, Seamus Hughes, and Clara Braun

Despite a rapid increase in domestic terrorism investigations in the United States, the threat that domestic terrorism poses to the homeland remains unclear. This is due to a lack of a comprehensive domestic terrorism legal framework that fully encompasses the variety of ideological groups present in the US. Using a sample of twenty-six QAnon and eighteen incel cases that have been federally prosecuted, our team examined how the US prosecutorial system utilises non-terrorism-related charges in addressing domestic violent extremism (DVE) cases. We propose a more inclusive DVE legal framework that expands the categorisation of VE ideologies, identifies specific DVE charges, and requires the engagement of the prosecutorial and probationary offices. By recognising Misogyny Motivated Violent Extremists (MMVEs) and Conspiracy Theory Motivated Violent Extremists (CTMVEs) as their own threat categories, it would allow researchers and practitioners to gain a deeper understanding of how pervasive the threat posed by these ideologies is.

The Hague: The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT) , 2024. 21p.

By Danny Klinenberg

Why do people join domestic violent extremist organizations? This paper from Danny Klinenberg, an IGCC nonresident fellow, examines an understudied reason: organizational outreach. Klinenberg studies how the inflow of new members to the Oath Keepers, America’s largest paramilitary organization, is affected when the group’s leadership employs three tactics: showcasing their ideological zeal through armed standoffs with the government, membership discounts, and sports sponsorships. Using a variant of the synthetic control method, he finds that standoffs increase new memberships by 150 percent, discounts increase new memberships by over 60 percent, and sports sponsorships decrease new memberships. Membership is less responsive in counties with higher income inequality, but is more responsive in politically conservative counties. The findings provide new insights into ways extremist groups attract potential recruits.

La Jolla, CA: UC Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, WORKING PAPER NO. 10, 2024. 42p.

By The National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine

For nearly eight decades, the world has been navigating the dangers of the nuclear age. Despite Cold War tensions and the rise of global terrorism, nuclear weapons have not been used in conflict since Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. Efforts such as strategic deterrence, arms control and non-proliferation agreements, and the U.S.-led global counterterrorism have helped to keep nuclear incidents at bay. However, the nation's success to date in countering nuclear terrorism does not come with a guarantee, success often carries the risk that other challenges will siphon away attention and resources and can lead to the perception that the threat no longer exists.

This report found that U.S. efforts to counter nuclear or radiological terrorism are not keeping pace with the evolving threat landscape. The U.S. government should maintain a strategic focus and effort on combatting terrorism across the national security community in coordination with international partners, State, Local, Tribal and Territorial authorities, the National Laboratories, universities and colleges, and civil society. Developing and sustaining adequate nuclear incident response and recovery capabilities at the local and state levels will likely require significant new investments in resources and empowerment of local response from Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), working with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Environmental Protection Agency, Department of Energy, and National Institutes of Health

Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. 2024. 158p.

Metropolitan Police Department, Washington D.C.

On the morning of Monday, September 16, 2013, Aaron Alexis entered Building 197 at the Washington Navy Yard, where he served as an independent contractor, and carried out the most deadly workplace mass shooting in the Nation’s Capital in recent memory.

Over the course of 69 minutes, Alexis terrorized thousands of employees of Naval Sea Systems Command, firing indiscriminately from a shotgun he had legally purchased two days earlier and a handgun he had taken from a security guard after mortally wounding the guard. He would also get into multiple shooting engagements with responding law enforcement officers, seriously injuring a Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) officer. In his final confrontation with police, Alexis ambushed and fired upon another MPD officer. Fortunately, the officer was saved by his protective vest and was able to return fire, killing Alexis and ending his rampage. When it was over, Alexis had shot and killed twelve people and injured several others.

*****

In the aftermath of the incident, the members of MPD first and foremost want to remember and honor the twelve people who lost their lives. Twelve people went to work that Monday, but did not return home to their loved ones. It is truly a senseless tragedy beyond comprehension, and there are no words adequate enough to express our condolences. Our thoughts remain with the victims’ families and friends.

Metropolitan Police Department, Washington D.C. 2014.. 84p.

Mark S. Hamm and Ramon Spaaij

This research offers the largest and most comprehensive database ever created on lone wolf terrorism, along with a theory-informed case study component based on direct contact with imprisoned lone wolf terrorists, and a comparative analysis distinguishing lone wolves from those who undergo radicalization in a group setting. Strictly in terms of lethality, the data indicate that lone wolf terrorism in America is not on the rise. Although lone wolf terrorism may not be increasing, it is undergoing two important changes in modus operandi. First, uniformed police and military personnel have become the primary target of lone wolf terrorists. Second, consistent with the relaxation of U.S. gun laws since the 1990s and the recent trend in mass shootings, the lone wolf’s preferred weaponry is now a staggering range of high-velocity firearms. While there is no standard profile of the lone wolf terrorist, most of them are unemployed, single white males with a criminal record. Compared to members of terrorist groups, lone wolves are older, less educated and more prone to mental illness.

The study validates a series of commonalities associated with pathways to radicalization for lone wolf terrorists. The radicalization model indicates that lone wolf terrorism begins with a combination of personal and political grievances which form the basis for an affinity with online sympathizers. This is followed by the identification of an enabler, followed by the broadcasting of terrorist intent. The final commonality is a triggering event, or the catalyst for terrorism. The ability of law enforcement and intelligence communities to detect and prevent lone wolf terrorism demands a clear understanding of these radicalization processes. Such insight may provide investigators with a sort of detection system, or “signatures”—as minimal as they may appear—that an individual with a terrorist intent will demonstrate in preparing for an attack. Crucial to this understanding is the broadcasting of intent. While lone wolves physically isolate from society, at the same time they seek recognition for their causes through spoken statements and threats, manifestos, e-mail messages, texting and videotaped proclamations. Focusing on this kind of immediate objective of radicalization among lone wolves, rather than on their underlying grievances, may sharpen our focus on the dangers posed by lone wolf terrorism.

U.S. Department of Justice.. February 2015. 28p.

By Committee On Homeland Security House Of Representatives

The hearing focuses on improving information sharing across intelligence and law enforcement agencies following the Fort Hood attack.

• Major Nidal Hasan, the suspect, communicated with terrorist Anwar al-Awlaki, raising red flags that were missed by authorities.

• The FBI and the Department of Defense had pieces of information that, if combined, might have prevented the attack.

• The Webster Commission investigated the FBI’s handling of the case and found shortcomings in policy guidance and technology.

• Recommendations included enhancing data management, training, and policies for counterterrorism leads.

• The Commission emphasized the need for better information sharing and technology to prevent future attacks.

• The ISE works to improve information sharing while protecting privacy and civil liberties.

• The hearing highlighted the importance of addressing information-sharing gaps to enhance national security.

One Hundred Twelfth Congress Second Session, September 14, 2012. 54p.

By The Committee on Assessing and Improving Strategies for Preventing, Countering, and Responding to Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism: Chemical Threats; Board on Chemical Sciences and Technology; Division on Earth and Life Studies; National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine

Domestic and foreign violent extremist organizations, or terrorist groups, have caused a greater amount of harm with chemical agents than with biological or radiological weapons. The United States capacity and capability to identify, prevent, counter, and respond adequately to chemical threats is established by the strategies, policies, and laws enacted across multiple levels of government. While the number of chemical terrorism incidents has risen and fallen over time, there is no empirical or analytical indication that the threat is disappearing. This report comes at a time when the nation's highest-level strategies have shifted from focusing primarily on violent extremist organizations to focusing more on Great Power Competition. This shift in relative perceived threat and consequent prioritization will impact efforts against chemical terrorism, and in turn, affect funding priorities. Revised risk assessments are needed to reprioritize risks guided by new strategies, so that strategy-aligned budgets can be created. The report recommends weapons of mass destruction budgets be aligned with evolving priorities and incentivize activities that transition promising research to operations.

National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2024, 209 pages

May Contain Mark-Ups

Edited by Joshua D. Freilich and Rob T. Guerette

The book“Migration, Culture Conflict, Crime and Terrorism,”edited by Joshua D. Freilichand Rob T. Guerette, is part of the Advances in Criminology series. It explores the complex interactions between migration, cultural conflicts, crime, and terrorism through a collection of scholarly works. Published by Ashgate in 2006, the book is divided into four parts, each addressing different aspects of these issues.

Part I: Migration, Religion, Culture, and Terrorism

1.Terrorism Rediscovered: Hans-Heiner Kühne examines the political motivations behind terrorism, emphasizing the need to distinguish between acts of war and criminal acts.

2.Culture or Conflict?: Roland Eckert discusses how conflicts generate collective identities and the role of migration in these conflicts.

3.The 21st-Century Kulturkampf: Shlomo Giora Shoham provides a historical and cultural analysis of the clash between fundamentalist Islam and Western culture,advocating for dialogue and mutual respect.

4.Post-9/11 Legislative Changes: Joshua D. Freilich, Matthew R. Opesso, and Graeme R. Newman compare the legislative and policy changes in the UnitedStates, Canada, and Australia following the 9/11 attacks, focusing on operations abroad, detainment of alleged terrorists, border security, and internal measures.

Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2006, 235 pages

May Contain Mark-Ups

Edited by Mustafa Ozguler, Ph.D., Ali Ozdogan, Ph.D., Ekrem Mus, Halim Iltas, & A. Sait Yayla, Ph.D.

The book“Terrorism: A Global Perspective,”edited by Mustafa Ozguler, Ali Ozdogan, A. SaitYayla, Ekrem Mus, and Halim Iltas, is a comprehensive compilation of presentations from the 2nd Istanbul Conference on Democracy and Global Security held in June 2007. The book is divided into three parts:“Terrorism: A Global Problem,” “Terrorism and CivilSociety,”and“Issues in Terrorism.”Each section addresses different aspects of terrorismand global security, ranging from the global and local dimensions of terrorism, the role of civil society in counter-terrorism efforts, to specific issues such as the use of biometrics incounter-terrorism and the financing of terrorist organizations through cigarette smuggling.The book emphasizes the importance of international cooperation, understanding local factors, and addressing core issues to effectively combat terrorism and enhance global security.Key topics include the framing of terrorist threats by different countries, the impact of globalization on terrorism, the fundamental causes of terrorism such as social injustice and political conflicts, and the role of media in counter-terrorism. The book also exploresthe psychological profiles of suicide bombers, the evolution of right-wing violence in Japan,and the strategic use of small-scale terrorist attacks. Additionally, it proposes new community protection initiatives, such as “Building Terrorism Resistant Communities,”to enhance local resilience against terrorism. Overall, the book provides a multifaceted analysis of terrorism, combining theoretical insights with practical recommendations for policymakers, law enforcement, and civil society

The Turkish Institute for Security and Democracy, 2009, 357 pages

May Contain Mark-Ups

By Joshua D. Freilich & Graeme R. Newman

The book “Reducing Terrorism Through Situational Crime Prevention,” edited by Joshua D.Freilich and Graeme R. Newman, explores how situational crime prevention (SCP) techniques can be applied to reduce terrorism. The central theme is that strategies proven effective in preventing conventional crimes can also mitigate terrorism by manipulating environmental factors to block opportunities for terrorist acts. The book includes various case studies and theoretical discussions that illustrate how SCP can be tailored to address specific types of terrorism, such as bioterrorism, hostage-taking, and insurgent attacks.Each chapter delves into different aspects of SCP, such as increasing the effort required to commit a terrorist act, increasing the risks for terrorists, reducing the rewards, and removing excuses for terrorism.One notable case study in the book is the analysis of the 23 Korean hostages inAfghanistan, which demonstrates how SCP measures can be applied in real-world scenarios to prevent terrorist kidnappings. The book also discusses the importance of understanding the terrorists decision-making processes and the situational factors that influence their actions. By integrating SCP with script theory, the authors provide a detailed procedural map of terrorist activities, which can help in developing targeted prevention strategies. Overall, the book emphasizes a practical, evidence-based approach to counter-terrorism, highlighting the need for continuous adaptation and learning to effectively combat evolving terrorist threats

Criminal Justice Press, 2009, 244 pages

May Contain Mark-Ups

By Patricia Marchak

"God’s Assassins: State Terrorism in Argentina in the 1970s"by PatriciaMarchak, in collaboration with William Marchak, delves into the harrowing period of state terrorism in Argentina from 1976 to 1983[^1^][1]. During this time, an estimated 30,000 people disappeared under the military junta, with many being tortured and murdered[^2^][2]. The book provides a comprehensive analysis through interviews with a diverse range of participants, including military officers, priests, survivors, and journalists. These personal accounts, combined with historical documents and media reports,offer a multifaceted view of the causes and processes of state terrorism in Argentina.The narrative is structured to interweave historical context with personal stories, revealing the complex and often contradictory nature of the period.The book explores the roles of various institutions, such as the Catholic Church and the military, and their involvement in the repression. It also addresses the broader social and political dynamics, including the influence of Peronism, unionism, and guerrilla movements. Through these detailed interviews and analyses, Marchak uncovers the deep-seated ideologies and motivations behind the brutal regime, providing a nuanced understanding of this dark chapter in Argentine history.

McGill-Queen's Press, 1999, 393 pages

MAY COTAIN MARKUP

By Kieran McConaghy

State Dynamics in Counter-Terrorism: The book challenges the view of the state as a unitary actor, emphasizing the importance of intra-state dynamics and the individual identities of state personnel in shapingcounter-terrorism responses.

Case Studies: It provides comparative analyses of Spain, France, and theUnited Kingdom, highlighting how state responses to terrorism are influenced by historical and cultural contexts.

Emotional and Political Impetus: The book discusses how emotional reactions and political motivations of state personnel impact counter-terrorism strategies, sometimes leading to actions driven by revenge or political gain.

Recommendations for Future Research: It suggests that future studies on counter-terrorism should consider the complexities of the state and the emotional and organizational factors that influence stateactions.

Springer, Aug 22, 2017, 182 pages