By Aleksandar Srbinovski | Trpe Stojanovski

Ever since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, there has been concern that the conflict may act as a source of illegal arms flows into Europe, following the pattern of the Balkan conflicts in the 1990s. To be sure, the risk is significant. The conflict in Ukraine is the most protracted mechanized war in Europe since the Second World War, and materiel of all descriptions has flooded into the battlefield. There are now millions of unregistered weapons circulating in civilian Ukraine, many of which are trophy weapons collected from the battlefield, and the situation is similar in Russia, which has seen a spike in gun-related violence in regions adjoining the occupied territories.1 The prospect of these weapons falling into the hands of organized criminals in Europe and beyond is a major risk to countries’ internal security. But with this heightened attention there is a danger of tunnel vision. The conflict in Ukraine is only one risk among many. The illicit firearms market in Europe is diverse, with multiple sources, paths to market and types of weaponry for sale; from Soviet-era stockpiles to cutting-edge 3D-printed guns. This report maps out the illicit firearms dynamics in three countries to the south-east of Europe – gateways for illicit weapons into the EU and elsewhere but which have distinct ecosystems in their own right – Türkiye, Greece and Bulgaria. For organized crime, these three countries serve multiple purposes: transit routes, consumer markets and points of origin for a variety of illicit flows along the so-called ‘Balkan route’. In recent decades, the flow of illicit drugs (particularly heroin) and migrants through these countries has dominated global headlines, especially in light of the conflicts in Afghanistan, Syria and Iraq. But the movement of illegal firearms – and their threat to Europe – has been little discussed in comparison. The one exception is the issue of gas guns originating from Türkiye, which have grown in popularity among criminals in Europe because they are cheap and low risk to transport as legal unconverted weapons.2 Close to the point of sale they can be converted into lethal firearms. But as this report makes clear, converted gas and blank guns are just one issue among many in the region, each with their own criminal dynamics. This report considers the illicit arms markets of each country and how they are interconnected. This analysis is intended to complement two previous reports, ‘Smoke on the horizon’, which described trends in arms trafficking in Ukraine and assessed the marketplace for illicit weapons in Europe, and ‘Tomorrow’s fire’, which mapped how arms trafficking in Europe may develop depending on the outcome of the Ukraine conflict.3 Taken together, these three reports provide a holistic view of how the European illicit firearms market interacts with its south-eastern flank, and how it may evolve in the future. This report highlights how complex the illicit arms markets are in Bulgaria, Greece and Türkiye, and the cultural, criminal and political factors that must be taken into consideration in assessing the risk. It also spotlights the responses that these countries have formulated, including through international forums and joint operations. Finally, the report offers a series of recommendations that aim to integrate analysis of the region into the broader picture of European threats.

Geneva: Rhw Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC) 2025. 49p.

By NADINE SALMAN , SARAH MARSDEN , JAMES LEWIS

This report synthesises and critically analyses the existing research that has considered whether and how political contention and protest relate to radicalisation and terrorism. It draws on social movement theory perspectives to provide insights into what informs group and mass radicalisation and what constrains them, and what impact state responses have. AIMS This review seeks to address the following primary research questions: 1. What factors, features, or events are linked to violence, radicalisation, and terrorism in social movements? 2. What factors, features, or events constrain the potential for violence, radicalisation, and terrorism in social movements? 3. What are the mechanisms that help explain what facilitates or constrains opportunities for violence in social movements? 4. How do different state and policing responses affect the potential for violence and extremism in social movements? METHODOLOGY This research adopts a rapid evidence assessment (REA) approach, synthesising knowledge on specific topics in line with the research questions from KEY FINDINGS This REA identifies several potential drivers for violent and extremist escalation within social movements, as well as potential factors for de-escalation. The literature reviewed highlights the complex and interacting nature of movement characteristics, mobilisation contexts, and the influence of external actors, namely countermovements and state responses. Key findings identified in this review are summarised in a table for each major section, loosely based on the EMMIE framework for evidence relating to crime prevention interventions (Johnson et al., 2015). The EMMIE framework summarises the overall effect, direction, and strength of the evidence;1 the mechanisms or mediators it activates; relevant moderators or contexts, including unintended effects; implementation considerations; and economic costs/benefits (Johnson et al., 2015). Since the findings of this review are not solely concerned with interventions, the latter two considerations are not summarised here. These tables therefore highlight the factors identified, their overall effects on violence and/or extremism, any identified mechanisms and/or moderators, and the strength of the evidence from the literature base. Movements are informed by their socio-historical contexts and internal dynamics, the factors set out in the tables therefore represent general trends in the research rather than firm indicators of movement behaviour. The effects identified below should not, therefore, be interpreted as suggesting a direct causal relationship between a given factor and the likelihood of violence/ extremism, but instead as evidence of how these factors have impacted the dynamics within certain contexts and mobilisations. MOVEMENT CHARACTERISTICS Different movement characteristics, including factors relating to movement structure, resources, and composition, as well as ideological factors, may contribute to an increased potential for engaging in or rejecting violence. Understanding the characteristics of a given movement is therefore an important first step when understanding how and why violence is produced.

Department of Psychology, Lancaster University, Lancaster, LA1 4YF, UK.The Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats (CREST), 2025. 44p.

By Aileen van Leeuwen and Amy-Jane Gielen

Executive Summary The Dutch National Training Institute against Radicalisation (Rijksopleidingsinstituut tegengaan Radicalisering, ROR) offers a broad range of training programmes on radicalisation and extremism for first- and second-line professionals from various sectors who may encounter these phenomena in their work. The one-day introductory training is the most frequently delivered course, with over one hundred sessions held in 2023. To assess the introductory training’s longer-term impact (six months after completion), the ROR commissioned an independent impact evaluation by the International Centre for CounterTerrorism (ICCT). The evaluation targeted all participants – first- and second-line professionals from various fields – who attended ROR’s introductory training between 14 November and 21 December 2023. The final report was delivered in August 2024. The design of the impact evaluation was based on the Kirkpatrick evaluation model, which provides a framework for measuring training outcomes. Additionally, a results monitoring framework was created to provide an overview of the intended outcomes, relevant indicators for tracking change over time, the methods used to collect data for each indicator, and the frequency of data collection. The evaluation employed a mixed methods approach, combining qualitative as well as quantitative indicators and research methods. The evaluation included three measurement points: a baseline prior to the training, a post-training measurement immediately after, and a follow-up conducted six months later. Three rounds of surveys were administered (N=235, N=221, N=88), followed by interviews with former participants six months after the training (N=8). In addition, two training sessions were observed, a focus group was held with stakeholders from the ROR and the National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism (NCTV), and a document analysis was carried out by the research team. Based on this data, the evaluation was able to answer the three key research questions guiding the study. 1. What is the expected and actual impact of the ROR introductory training on participants’ foundational knowledge, perceived ability to respond to signs of radicalisation and extremism, and intention to embed knowledge within their own organisations in the longer term (6 months)? Overall, the impact evaluation shows highly positive results, indicating that expectations and learning objectives were largely met for the majority of participants. At the end of the training, 90 percent of participants reported that the course met or exceeded their expectations. Only a small minority found the training either too basic – due to extensive prior knowledge – or difficult to follow because they struggled to connect it to their daily work. Foundational knowledge Both the ROR and the participants expected the training to strengthen participants’ foundational knowledge of radicalisation and extremism. The results strongly support this. • Firstly, the findings confirm that the training reached the right target audience – namely, professionals who are not yet experts on radicalisation and extremism and have had limited prior exposure to these topics. • Secondly, the content of the training was well-aligned with participants’ knowledge levels: those with limited prior understanding found it accessible, while those with more background also gained new insights. Participants reported a better grasp of the complexity of the topic, more practical tools, and a more nuanced understanding of radicalisation. • Thirdly, a statistically significant increase in knowledge was observed among participants, which was sustained after six months. The comparative analysis revealed that participants from the security domain with a secondary vocational education background (the Dutch so-called MBO-level) had the lowest baseline knowledge and experienced the most difficulty engaging with the content. This underscores the need for tailored approaches by trainers to better match participants’ prior knowledge and learning needs. While this customisation improves accessibility, it may lead to slight variations in training delivery and, ultimately, in participants’ knowledge outcomes.

The Hague: The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT) , 2025. 9p.

By Méryl Demuynck

The intentional spread of false or misleading information to inflict harm, commonly referred to as disinformation, raises unprecedented challenges in today’s digital age. This phenomenon becomes even more concerning when strategically leveraged by violent extremist actors to disseminate hateful narratives, incite violence, and recruit followers. While both disinformation and violent extremism are widely recognised as critical global threats, their intersections have however received limited scholarly and political attention. Drawing on findings from a multiyear EU-funded project, this policy brief seeks to address this gap and raise awareness on the complex dynamics and potential harms associated with disinformation propagated by extremist actors. Building on a cross-country mapping, with a particular focus on Boko Haram factions in Nigeria, it outlines the enabling conditions, defining features, and potential harmful impacts of such disinformation. The brief concludes by offering evidence-based recommendations to enhance the capacity of policy-makers and practitioners to assess, prevent, and mitigate its adverse effects.

The Hague: The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT) , 2025. 27p.

By J.M. Berger

This report compares two large random samples of Twitter accounts that tweet in English: one taken just before Elon Musk acquired Twitter in October 2022, and one taken three months later, in January 2023. It also examines several related datasets collected during the period following the acquisition, a period in which, the study found, new accounts were created at a record-breaking pace. Some extremist and conspiracy networks created accounts faster than the baseline rate, probably because changes to Twitter’s trust and safety policies had been announced. In the context of these policy announcements, the study examines some reinstated accounts, with mixed results. Despite the loosening of several content policies, accounts that automated the sending of tweets (‘bots’) saw activity drop sharply during the period of the study, with many bot accounts being suspended or deactivated, while others voluntarily curtailed their activity in light of the API changes announced. Deactivated accounts were dominated by sex- related content and apparent financial spam or scams, often coupled with automated tweeting.

Oxford. UK: VOX-Pol Institute, 2024. 80p.

Editors: Hans-Jakob Schindler, Senior Director, Counter Extremism Project Marcin Zaborowsk

Central Europe represents a fertile ground for extreme right-wing ideologies (XRW), some of which are openly preaching intolerance and even violence. Similar to the western part of Eurppe. Central Europe has been affected by global dynamics related to the expansion of populism and XRW to a considerable extend. There are, however, also some specific conditions in the formerly communist Central Europe that are setting the region aside from other parts of Europe. These conditions are historical, economic, and ethnic in nature. With most of the region subjected to foreign communist domination during the second half of the 20th century, nationalism, sometimes in extreme forms, remains a strong under-current within the nations of Central Europe. With interwar Czechoslovakia (1918- 1938) being historical exception, Central Europe had practically no tradition of democracy prior to 1989. Also, whilst most of Western Europe went through the period of cultural changes in the 1960s, the Communist states of Central Europe were stuck on the wrong side of the iron curtain and isolated until 1989. Finally, although Central European nations are often historically heterogeneous, there is little experience of recent migrations into the region, especially from the outside of Europe. Whilst democratic transitions in the formerly communist Central Europe were achieved relatively smoothly, these processes were considerably helped by the international context and the conditionality of NATO and EU enlargements. For much of the current post-Cold War history Central Europeans were guided through the process of post-communist transitions by externally imposed criteria and requirements. The process was entirely voluntary as Central Europeans were keen to join the EU and NATO, hence, ready to meet the conditions set out by these institutions. Most importantly, this conditionality were also supporting stability and predictability of the domestic transitions in Central European states. However, this inevitably led to some shallowness of the process with the candidate states hurriedly setting up institutions and mechanisms that would satisfy NATO and EU. Today, with these countries being members of the EU and NATO, the stabilizing role that the conditions during the accession processes played is no longer available while democratic norms and institutions remain very fragile. The combination of all these factors means that XRW ideologies have find sizable constituencies in Central Europe. The salience of the phenomenon is compounded by the relative inexperience and sometimes the lack of legal instruments to address this issue in the states of Central Europe. In this report we chose to focus on four middle and smaller size Central European nations: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia. Three of the four were formerly parts of the Austro-Hungarian empire whilst Bulgaria spent half of the previous millennium under Ottoman domination. All the four were members of the Soviet block until 1989 (Czech Republic and Slovakia as a one state) and today all are members of the EU and NATO. Although XRW movements remain outside mainstream politics in all four countries, all have powerful populist movements which tend to operate in symbiosis with the respective XRW movements.

Bratislava Slovakia : GLOBSEC, 2023. 64p.

By Stephen Reimer

Extremism and terrorism motivated by far-right ideologies has captured the attention of policymakers and much of the public as an urgent threat to peace, security and democracy across much of the Western world. This has not escaped the notice of practitioners of counterterrorism financing (CTF), many of whom see the far right as a natural extension of the global terrorist-financing threat. Although there is enthusiasm for immediately and directly applying CTF tools and responses to far-right fundraising and related financial activities, the ability of the CTF regime to suitably respond to this threat has been largely assumed. Through an analysis of the operational and organisational financing behaviours of the contemporary far right, this paper finds this financing threat to be largely incompatible with the CTF regime and identifies several shortcomings in the regime as it stands. The vast majority of far-right violence emits meagre financial signals before an attack is carried out, which is incongruous with a CTF regime that depends on financial institutions to spot overt red flags in transaction data. Further, the CTF regime’s reliance on terrorism designations and resultant sanctions to financially isolate groups is at odds with the far right, whose organisational structures are unprecedentedly fluid and adaptable to such restrictive measures. In the absence of clearer direction from states, the private sector (especially operators of online platforms) has responded to pressure to independently ‘cut off’ perceived far-right ideologues and agents from accessing their services. Although laudable in their intention, such responses have precipitated several adverse consequences, including the spoiling of opportunities to collect financial intelligence on individuals and networks that could feed into more effective disruption efforts. In recalibrating the CTF regime to make it more suitable for the far-right threat of today, this paper makes the following recommendations: • To increase the likelihood of pre-attack financial signals being identified by financial institutions and used for preventative purposes, states should broaden public–private collaboration in the form of multiagency ‘fusion cells’ involving social services, health, education, security intelligence services and financial institutions for real-time intelligence sharing on persons of interest • To maximise the near-term effectiveness of far-right terrorism designations for disrupting finance, states should provide their private sector (particularly financial institutions) with detailed lists (including names and identifying information) of real or legal persons linked to designated far-right groups to aid implementation. • In recalibrating their national CTF regimes to meet the threat posed by the far right, states should reclaim authority and safeguard freedom of expression by denying private sector actors a free pass to make decisions, largely on the basis of reputation, about what constitutes violent extremism, as opposed to merely distasteful ideology. • In building CTF regimes fit to combat far-right financing, states should include oversight mechanisms to forestall the abuse of anti-financial crime measures for authoritarian ends. Responding to far-right mobilisation using financial tools could also set dangerous precedents for authoritarian onlookers if not done transparently

London: Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) (2023), 20p.

By Hans-Jakob Schindler

.The report outlines the current mechanisms set up in Germany to mitigate the risks emanating from the financing of terrorism, violent extremism, and non-violent extremism. These present three basic challenges for investigators: a restrictive legal basis and significant administrative limits on the ability of the security authorities to collect and analyze information concerning the financial operations of extremist entities; gaps in financial transparency and a wide distribution of relevant data; administrative and investigative silos as well as competing investigative priorities. The example of the Muslim Brotherhood-linked entities in Germany demonstrates that these challenges result in a lack of available information concerning the underlying financial structures of extremist entities. The report concludes with a range of policy recommendations to adjust the current legal and administrative mechanisms, increase financial transparency concerning associations and non-profit entities and establish more cooperation and coordination mechanisms.

berlin: Institute for Strategic, Political, Security and Economic Consultancy (ISPSW) 2023. 15p.

By Alexander Ritzmann

Key Findings  Research conducted by CEP Germany in September 2022 shows that a large portion of the “who’s who” of the (violence-oriented) German extreme-right are still present and active on Facebook, Instagram and YouTube. They use those platforms to promote their merchandise stores, martial arts associations, music labels, bands, and prepper organizations to fund their extremist activities, reach new customers, and recruit new members. These key actors are the foundation of the (transnational) violence-oriented right-wing extremist (VRWE) milieus in Germany.  The terms of service of Facebook, Instagram and YouTube state that they will “not allow” white supremacy actors to use and benefit from their platforms.  This research builds on a CEP policy report from November 2021, which documented that many of the key right-wing extremist actors in Germany are active on major social media platforms. These key actors are pursuing a strategy of “extreme normalization,” where they no longer carry out explicitly illegal activities on mainstream social media to avoid being permanently blocked from the platforms.  CEP provided their research findings to Facebook and YouTube directly 13 months ago. The same global social media companies publicly commit to work against hate speech, extremism and terrorism e.g. at the EU Internet Forum, the Christchurch Call To Action, and the United We Stand Summit.  Why is this a serious problem? The described key right-wing extremist actors do not only promote dangerous conspiracy narratives like the “Great Replacement” or “White Genocide”, which postulates that a Jewish-led elite seeks to destroy the “white race” by means of mass migration of “non-whites”, feminism and LGTBQI+ rights. They also build the “Erlebniswelten” (spaces for collective experiences) like music concerts and festivals or mixed martial arts tournaments to further expand the reach of extreme-right milieus in Germany, which can lead to increasing political violence and stochastic terrorism. .

New York, Berlin, London: Counter Terrorism Project, 2022. 6p.

By William Allchorn, Nigel Bromage, Bethan Johnson, Alexander Ritzmann, and Hans-Jakob Schindler

This study outlines and analyzes the financial strategies and activities of key right-wing extremist (RWE) organizations and actors in the United Kingdom (UK) and in Germany. The research focused on legal as well as (potentially) illegal financial activities and on key actors (individuals/ groups) with systemic relevance to the UK’s and Germany’s RWE milieus who have been active for a significant amount of time and have a significant track record of (being suspected or convicted) of relevant crimes as well as individuals who are likely to operate across national borders. 2. As identified in a 2020 CEP report1 on the transnational connectivity of key RWE actors in six countries, right-wing extremists apply various strategies for generating income streams. These can be classified as: 1) self-financing/ donations/crowdfunding/membership fees/ cryptocurrencies, 2) concerts and music festivals, 3) commercial activities like merchandise stores/web-shops, 4) combat sports events, 5) purchase of real estate for investment purposes and to establish “safe spaces,” and 6) organized/ financially motivated crimes, including money laundering. 3. Some of these financial strategies do generate significant amounts of income, as shown in another CEP report on RWE financing patterns and networks in 2021.2 A significant portion of the generated funds are in cash. In this context, illegal activities such as tax evasion or money laundering could present a weakness in these financial activities that offer potential opportunities for disruption by law enforcement and tax authorities if investigative priorities are set appropriately. 4. The objective of this study is to inform policymakers and practitioners working on the prevention and countering of right-wing extremism/ terrorism as well as financial crime with the goal of enhancing the understanding of the RWE financial strategies and to encourage further cooperation between relevant government agencies and civil society organizations.

New York, Berlin, London: Counter Terrorism Project: 2023. 31p.

By Hans-Jakob Schindler, Alexander Ritzmann and Marco Macori

In an in-depth study in 2020, the Counter Extremism Project (CEP), commissioned by the Federal Foreign Office of Germany, analysed the transnational connectivity of the violent rightwing extremist (vXRW) and terrorist movement in five European countries and the US.1 It argued that in particular since 2014 a new leaderless apocalyptic transnational vXRW and terrorist movement emerged, which is responsible for a growing amount of violence in all countries at the centre of the study. The study also outlined that all governments had developed a variety of countermeasures, ranging from prevention and countering violent extremist (P/CVE) approaches, approaches with a focus on executive and intelligence-led measures to mixed strategies which integrated P/CVE with an increase in executive capacities as well as legal and administrative changes. However, the study argued that due to the growing transnational connectivity of right-wing extremist and terrorist networks, both offline in physical networking hubs as well as online through specific online ecosystems, transnational measures and mechanisms would be an effective, complementary tool to national strategies and tactics. From the analysis of the study, five main issue areas emerge, in which further transnational cooperation and coordination could be achieved to mitigate the threat emanating from this movement: (1) The further development of a common understanding and legal concepts, better capturing the terrorist nature of this developing threat. (2) Development of a deeper and more nuanced understanding of the various online ecosystems that underpin and connect the networks within this transnational movement and the deployment of already existing capacities, which are currently geared to counter Islamist terrorism online. (Topic of this briefing paper) (3) More in-depth analytics concerning the financial activities and transnational commercial connections of the vXRW and terrorist movement to allow for the potential adjustment of existing global counter terrorism financing mechanisms. (4) Greater awareness and the development of appropriate countermeasures focusing on the training activities within the vXRW movement, in particular paramilitary training. (5) The further development of P/CVE approaches and concepts on a local, national and transnational level, based on lessons learned. Throughout 2021, CEP, in cooperation with the Federal Foreign Office of Germany, will address these issues in a series of virtual events, bringing together relevant national and multilateral policy stakeholders. These events will be accompanied by a series of short reports, outlining the main operational and policy issues. Building on the discussions with relevant stakeholders, these papers will contain a range of concrete policy recommendations.

CEP Policy Brief

New York, Berlin, London: Counter Terrorism Project: 2021. 16p.

By Alexander Ritzmann, Dr Hans-Jakob Schindler, Dr Thorsten Hindrichs, Maximilian Kreter

The financial structures of violent right-wing extremist organisations and actors in Germany are broad and multifaceted. Currently, there is a lack of up-to-date and in-depth analyses of the various financial strategies employed by these groups and individuals as well as their different sources of income. It seems like the “follow the money” approach, which has been successfully deployed against organised crime and in the prevention and fight against Islamist extremism and terrorism, has not been adopted with regard to violent right-wing extremism. A part of the violent right-wing extremist milieu, in particular those actors that are closely integrated into wider transnational networks, seem to have professionalised their financial strategies. Interestingly, a superficial analysis of publicly available data concerning the business models and legal formats chosen by violent right-wing extremist entrepreneurs may give the impression that a discernible strategy is absent. However, it is important to note that large segments of the violent right-wing extremist milieu, especially those that are transnationally linked, are highly networked with discernible structures connecting the various nodes. Deploying the “Administrative Approach”, developed by the European Union to fight organised crime, could be an effective tool in the fight against right-wing extremist organised crime. This methodology targets the interface between illegal and supposedly legal activities and income of criminal actors and networks. For example, local authorities could carry out coordinated tax audits as well as controls concerning the adherence with building codes and fire protection regulations targeting companies and businesses of right-wing extremist entrepreneurs that are directly linked to convicted felons who are part of the same ideological network. The study identified 38 relevant business entities in Germany that are involved in the production and dissemination of violent right-wing extremist music. Interestingly, although the overall music market in Germany is characterised by high levels of competition, this subsegment does not seem to display economic or ideological conflicts and functions in a cooperative manner, with various stakeholders linked to each other. Right-wing rock concerts are both lifestyle events as well as marketplaces and function as central networking hubs of the overall movement. Therefore, a clear distinction between the social networks of the right-wing rock music scene and those of the violent right-wing extremist scene can only be made in a very abstract sense. Due to the intricate and opaque business relationships on both the national and transnational levels of the (legal) German right-wing rock music market, it is of utmost importance to further investigate the key stakeholders within this milieu. These actors should be conceptualised not as individual economic entities or individual perpetrators but as representatives of the right-wing terrorist networks that operate in the background. Extremist right-wing rock music can be a profitable business in Germany due to the increasing professionalisation of production, dissemination and event management. These financial structures will continue to thrive so long as they are led by professional entrepreneurs who are not effectively confronted by government authorities.

New York, Berlin, London: 2021. 41p.

By Alexander Ritzmann

This paper aims at informing governments on a federal, state and local level that want to investigate the financial strategies and networks of extremist key actors in a targeted and comprehensive manner. The main objective of implementing a "Follow The Money" strategy in this context is to investigate if illegal activities, such as tax evasion or money laundering are being conducted.

New York, Berlin, London : Counter-Extremism Project, 2024. 7p.

By Kateira Aryaeinejad and Thomas Leo Scherer

In 2012, the National Institute of Justice’s (NIJ) Domestic Radicalization to Terrorism program began funding research on issues related to domestic radicalization and terrorism in the United States. A component of this portfolio is focused specifically on evaluations and assessments of terrorism prevention programs implemented across different populations. This report synthesizes these efforts, reviewing shared and singular lessons from NIJ-sponsored evaluations of terrorism prevention and terrorism prevention-relevant programming and focusing on both evaluation findings and processes. The projects reviewed for this report vary notably in their timelines, methods, programmatic focuses, and audiences. As such, the lessons drawn from them are not necessarily scientifically comparable or generalizable. However, important lessons emerge from this research, underscoring shared insights from NIJ-sponsored evaluative efforts and illuminating important areas for consideration in future programmatic and evaluative endeavors. First, findings from NIJ-sponsored evaluations emphasize the importance of gaining community buy-in and assuring program relevance for participants before implementing terrorism prevention or terrorism prevention-relevant programs. Although this may vary based on the intended program audience (e.g., youth, communities, law enforcement), the findings overall suggest that to ensure program fidelity, utility, relevance, and buy-in, programs should be developed in close consultation and cooperation with the audiences for which they are constructed. Doing so can also help alleviate concerns regarding the perceived stigmatization or targeting of specific communities in which terrorism prevention efforts take place and help address concerns about and issues in associating specific communities or demographics with national security threats. Second, programs for terrorism prevention and preventing/countering violent extremism can yield benefits beyond meeting terrorism prevention goals. They can also be complementary to and even carried out within public health or community resilience initiatives. The utility of incorporating terrorism prevention into these frameworks may vary based on the intended program audience and outputs. Careful attention should be paid in framing program activities and language when they are implemented via these larger frameworks. Indeed, if violent extremism awareness and prevention efforts are not appropriately integrated into a public health or community resilience model, participants may be confused as to the purpose, goals, and nature of the activities in which they are participating, to the detriment of short- and long-term programmatic goals and awarenessraising activities. Third, evaluative efforts in general face programmatic and methodological challenges that limit their ability to assess the impact of a program and the generalizability and veracity of their findings. NIJ-sponsored evaluations went to commendable lengths to address issues associated with data availability, generalizability, validity, and determinations of impact; however, certain challenges — including participant attrition rates and lack of available data — limited their ability to do so. These challenges offer important lessons for future evaluations of terrorism prevention programs. These evaluation findings suggest that several activities should be considered in addressing challenges that may arise during the evaluation process. These activities could include implementing formative evaluations or evaluability assessments prior to program implementation and evaluation, implementing strategies to limit participant attrition in the interest of maintaining appropriate sample sizes, and ensuring adequate resourcing for continued engagement in terrorism prevention initiatives. In addition, NIJ-sponsored evaluation findings suggest that program evaluators should consider incorporating control or comparison groups to assess programmatic impact on individual attitudes, behaviors, and outcomes, along with comparative analysis focused on assessing the outcomes and impact of programs replicated in different communities and settings to increase the generalizability, validity, and utility of evaluation findings. More information about NIJ-sponsored efforts to incorporate these elements is detailed in this report. Looking forward, findings from this review suggest important gaps and considerations that should be addressed by and incorporated in future programmatic and evaluation decisions. These include evaluating the long-term impact of programs through follow-up assessments, incorporating additional indicators for measuring and assessing potential behavioral change and knowledge retention, and assessing the comparability of programs’ impact on different forms of terrorism across different ideological spectrums. Finally, further consideration should be given to determining the appropriate approach, strategy, and goals for terrorism prevention activities based on the audiences they are geared toward. Based on the evaluation findings, in some cases it may be beneficial to explore and test efforts aimed at incorporating terrorism prevention activities and programs within a broader portfolio of public health and violence reduction-focused efforts. Future programmatic, research, and policy-oriented activities might consider further exploration of the benefits and potential issues associated with doing so in addressing radicalization to terrorism within the United States

Washington, DC: U.S. National Institute of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, 2024. 33p.

By Arianna Vedaschi and Chiara Graziani

While states and terrorists have always used emerging technology in their endeavours, there has seldom been an emerging technology with the reach, implications, and possibilities of AI. In this masterful book, Vedaschi and Graziani skilfully merge law, computer science, psychology and more to provide the authoritative account of how AI enables terrorist actors, promises security, and challenges the rule of law.’

Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2025. 168p.

By Claudia Lanza, Abdelkader Lahmadi, and Jérôme François

This book presents the development of a classification scheme to organize and represent ransomware threat knowledge through the implementation of an innovative methodology centered around the semantic annotation of domain-specific source documentation. By combining principles from computer science, document management, and semantic data processing, the research establishes an innovative framework to organize ransomware data extracted from specialized source texts in a systematic classification system. Through detailed chapters, the book explores the process of applying semantic annotation to a specialized corpus comprising CVE prose descriptions linked to known ransomware threats. This approach not only organizes but also deeply analyzes these descriptions, uncovering patterns and vulnerabilities within ransomware operations. The book presents a pioneering methodology that integrates CVE descriptions with ATT&CK frameworks, significantly refining the granularity of threat intelligence. The insights gained from a pattern-based analysis of vulnerability-related documentation are structured into a hierarchical model within an ontology framework, enhancing the capability for predictive operations. This model prepares cybersecurity professionals to anticipate and mitigate risks associated with new vulnerabilities as they are cataloged in the CVE list, by identifying recurrent characteristics tied to specific ransomware and related vulnerabilities. With real-world examples, this book empowers its readers to implement these methodologies in their environments, leading to improved prediction and prevention strategies in the face of growing ransomware challenges.

Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2024. 113p.

By Norman Abrams

During the protests that roiled campuses throughout the United States (2023-2025), many students and student organizations have extolled the Hamas organization and praised its violent attack on Israel on October 7, 2023.

Since 1997, Hamas has been officially designated under U.S. law as a “foreign terrorist organization.” Providing “material support” to a foreign terrorist organization is a serious crime under the federal criminal code.

The fact that Hamas is a designated foreign terrorist organization and occupies a central place in the student protests raises two key questions: Does praise and advocacy in support of a foreign terrorist organization amount to “providing material support” under the relevant federal criminal statutes? Would attaching criminal penalties to such utterances violate the First Amendment?

To date, the federal statutes that criminalize the providing of material-support-to-a-foreign-terrorist-organization have been reviewed by the U.S. Supreme Court only once, in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project (2010). The main burden of this article is to examine those statutes and the Holder decision and its legal and practical implications for the student protest statements.

In light of the foregoing, recommendations are made: a) whether there is a legal basis and a need for a federal law enforcement investigation, and b) the general form it might take. These recommendations reflect concerns both about the possibility that a foreign terrorist organization is manipulating U.S. campus discourse and maintaining campuses as bastions of free speech, debate and tolerance of diverse opinions.

Keywords: Student protests, demonstrations, encampments, campus free speech, First Amendment, foreign terrorist organization, material support offenses

Journal of National Security Law and Policy (forthcoming), UCLA School of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 25-18, 31p.

By Jessica Davis

Illicit actors in Afghanistan, including drug traffickers, warlords, terrorist groups, and even former government officials, exploit the country to achieve their own political and economic objectives. Historical and contemporary sources demonstrate that there are patterns in how these actors raise, manage, store, move, and obscure money. This paper provides a historical and contemporary overview of illicit financing activities in Afghanistan. It uses a terrorist financing framework to explain the various mechanisms involved in how illicit actors raise, use, move, store, manage, and obscure their funds. Specific jurisdictions used for illicit finance and global financial vulnerabilities that illicit actors with a nexus to Afghanistan exploit in their financial activities are discussed, outlining the threat-agnostic capabilities that could tackle some of these illicit financial challenges.

To raise funds, illicit actors engage in the production and trafficking of narcotics, taxation and extortion activities, illegal mining and timber production, and any other activities that can generate revenues. Depending on the actor in question, management of the acquired funds might be centralised, within the purview of a financial head, or decentralised, with control vested within several stakeholders. Illicit actors store some of their funds in cash within Afghanistan and use hawalas and banks to both store and transfer wealth out of the country. Since the Taliban takeover, international sanctions have largely ended the ability of banks to transact with most aspects of the global financial sector, with the exception of regional banking relationships that remain intact. Therefore, in addition to hawalas, common methods of moving money out of Afghanistan include bulk cash couriers, the transfer of precious metals and stones, and trade-based money laundering schemes. Wealth is moved out of Afghanistan to several key jurisdictions. Much of it makes its way to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) where funds are invested in businesses and real estate. Funds are also moved to Pakistan, Turkey, and to a lesser extent Iran and other neighbouring or proximate countries.

The stability of illicit financing mechanisms over time and across illicit actors presents opportunities for detection and disruption. However, this also applies to limitations of disruption opportunities. Since illicit actors in Afghanistan raise most of their funds within the country, there are few opportunities to disrupt internal Afghan revenue sources in the post-August 2021 context. As such, other detection and disruption opportunities that can be used to combat illicit financing with a nexus to Afghanistan must be examined. The policy options elaborated in this report include: enhancing the monitoring of aid and donor funding entering the country, facilitating the adoption of foreign asset and beneficial ownership tracing, introducing reforms to the hawala and banking sectors, and addressing deficiencies in international sanctions regimes.

A regionally coordinated policy approach to counter illicit financing from Afghanistan can reduce the ability of illicit actors to access their wealth and fund their activities. However, without access to a cooperative government in Afghanistan, there are limits to what can be achieved. Nonetheless, many of the policy and disruption opportunities available to counter illicit Afghan finance also serve to strengthen the integrity of the global financial system, address existing policy gaps in other jurisdictions, and can generally serve to enhance international cooperation on counter-illicit financing.

SOC ACE Research Paper No 11.

Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham, 2022. 32p.

By The Counter Extremism Project, Global Strategies to Combat Extremism

In recent years, the U.S. sanctions regime has targeted the world’s most egregious human rights violators. It has done so based on the 2016 Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (the Magnitsky Act) and the 2017 Executive Order (E.O.) 13818, which empower the U.S. government to impose “tangible and significant consequences on those who commit serious human rights abuse or engage in corruption, as well as to protect the financial system of the United States from abuse by these same persons.” Since then, the White House has used sanctions to target government organizations, officials, corporations, and private individuals engaged in the systematic violation of human rights around the globe. Such sanctions have been enacted against entities in Europe, the Middle East, Asia, and beyond. Unfortunately, the crimes committed against the Yemeni people by the Houthi rebels have gone largely overlooked. Fewer than 15 Houthi officials have been sanctioned in total, and the majority of those targeted are military officials who have been sanctioned for their role in destabilizing Yemen (E.O. 13611), with minimal attention paid to Houthi violations committed against the population under their rule. This report will focus on the Houthis’ systematic abuse of women and journalists. While these are tragically common phenomena in Houthi-controlled areas, they remain poorly documented. In addition to clearly documenting these abuses, the report will also map out the Houthi mechanics of repression: from the security forces responsible for unjustly arresting and harassing vulnerable individuals to those officials in the justice and prison systems responsible for subjecting the victims to torture and sham trials. The aim of this report is to raise awareness of Houthi human rights violations and provide informational support for efforts to penalize those who can and should be targeted with sanctions for their crimes.

New York: The Counter Extremism Project, Global Strategies to Combat Extremism, 2023. 16p.

By Laura Winkelmuller-Real, Kacper Rekawek, Thomas Renard

How do counter-terrorism services assess the threat in Europe? What trends do they notice? What are their most pressing concerns? Experts and observers regularly discuss the evolution of the terrorist threat, but what do counter-terrorism professionals have to say about this? This report aims to bring to the fore the perspectives of those that are in the first line to assess or respond to terrorism. Compared with some other initiatives focused on key terrorism trends (such as terrorism databases or indexes),1 this report focuses more strictly on a counter-terrorism perspective. While some reports on counter-terrorism already exist, they are largely drafted by and for governments. This includes notably the assessments conducted by the UN Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate (UN CTED), which are unfortunately not in the public domain. In Europe, Europol’s TE-SAT annual reports constitute a very useful publicly available resource, although very much focused on a law-enforcement perspective. This report constitutes, therefore, an innovative attempt to monitor counter-terrorism efforts, with a focus on European Union (EU) Member States. It focuses on original sources, such as reports published by security services, a treasure of information largely neglected by scholars. It covers various dimensions, namely: 1. National threat levels (related to terrorism and/or extremism); 2. Discussion on the main types of terrorist and extremist threats perceived; 3. National security contexts in which the aforementioned threat levels and threat assessments were produced; 4. New legislative efforts designed and introduced to help CT and P/CVE efforts; 5. Main challenges to CT or P/CVE activities encountered by the EU MS; 6. Major CT operations conducted in Europe; 7. Main efforts in countering the financing of terrorism by different EU MS; 8. Key developments with regard to terrorism sanctions and proscriptions; 9. Communication and transparency efforts related to CT and P/CVE; To conduct this research, the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT) compiled and analysed more than 70 official counter-terrorism and security reports published by the EU Member States (MS) in 2024 and 2023, which it combined with a survey distributed among European counter-terrorism officials. More details on the methodology of this report are available in the appendix. By combining practitioner perspectives gathered through the survey with detailed, structured narratives from national security documents, the report captures both operational realities and strategic priorities.  . These insights were used to develop specific themes for analysis, and to effectively describe the state of terrorism and counter-terrorism in Europe, as described by security services themselves. Overall, this report, while combining new material with data from the aforementioned secondary sources, offers original insights into the secretive world of counter-terrorism and highlights interesting trends. Furthermore, it could serve as a basis for further investigations into counterterrorism efforts, in Europe or elsewhere, including with a view to their being evaluated.   

The Hague: The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT) 2025. 34p.