By Desmond Ang, Panka Bencsik, Jesse Bruhn, Ellora Derenoncourt

We document a sharp rise in gunshots coupled with declining 911 call volume across 13 major US cities in the aftermath of the murder of George Floyd. National survey data also indicate that victims of crime became less likely to report their victimization to law enforcement due to mistrust of police. Our results suggest that high-profile acts of police violence may erode community engagement with law enforcement and highlight the call-to-shot ratio as a natural measure of attitudes toward the police.

AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW: INSIGHTS

VOL. 7, NO. 1, MARCH 2025

By U.K. Parliament, House of Commons, Home Affairs Committee

The disorder which took place in July and August 2024 shocked the country, as did the appalling murders of Bebe King, Elsie Dot Stancombe and Alice da Silva Aguiar which preceded it. The events marked the worst disorder since 2011 and were alarming for their violence and targeted nature, with scenes of rioters trying to break into asylum hotels and attacking mosques, community centres and libraries. The level of violence meted out to police officers was deplorable. This was not protest. Those participating in disorder were not policed more strongly because of their supposed political views but because they were throwing missiles, assaulting police officers and committing arson. It was disgraceful to see the police officers who bore the brunt of this violence being undermined by baseless claims of ‘two-tier policing’. Thanks to the efforts of thousands of police officers, many of whom suffered serious injuries, the disorder was quelled swiftly, and loss of life was averted. Yet the effectiveness of welfare provisions for individual police officers varied significantly, including some police officers going without water and food for hours, and some injured officers having to convey themselves to hospital. The events also highlighted shortcomings in national policing structures, which meant that individual forces were not always able to access the support they needed, and the Government and police leaders did not always have an accurate picture of what was happening on the ground. The Government intervened in August to support police forces to respond to the disorder and has since announced a White Paper to deliver major reforms to national policing structures in England. We expect the Government to be ambitious in its proposals to increase the effectiveness of our police forces and support them to rebuild trust. But the disorder also demonstrated that effective policing relies on a supportive criminal justice system in order to prosecute crimes and imprison offenders. The Government acted in the summer to make sure that this support was in place, but wider problems remain in the courts and in the prison estate. The Government’s ambitions for reducing crime will require better long-term alignment between Home Office policies on crime and policing and those of the Ministry of Justice relating to the criminal justice system.

London: UK Parliament, 2025. 46p.

By Vicky Taylor

This report, published by the Centre for Criminology at the University of Oxford and Border Criminologies in collaboration with Humans for Rights Network, Captain Support UK and Refugee Legal Support, shows how people have been imprisoned for their arrival on a ‘small boat’ since the Nationality and Borders Act (2022) came into force. It details the process from sea to prison, and explains how this policy is experienced by those affected.

New dta shows that in the first year of implementation (June 2022 – June 2023), 240 people arriving on small boats were charged with ‘illegal arrival’ off small boats. While anyone arriving irregularly can now be arrested for ‘illegal arrival’, this research finds that in practice those prosecuted either: 1. Have an ‘immigration history’ in the UK, including having been identified as being in the country, or having attempted to arrive previously ( for example, through simply having applied for a visa), or, 2. Are identified as steering the dinghy they travelled in as it crossed the Channel.

49 people were also charged with ‘facilitation’ in addition to ‘illegal arrival’ after allegedly being identified as having their ‘hand on the tiller’ at some point during the journey. At least two people were charged with ‘facilitation’ for bringing their children with them on the dinghy. In 2022, 1 person for every 10 boats was arrested for their alleged role in steering. In 2023, this was 1 for every 7 boats. People end up being spotted with their ‘hand on the tiller’ for many reasons, including having boating experience, steering in return for discounted passage, taking it in turns, or being under duress.

Despite the Government’s rhetoric, both offences target people with no role in organised criminal gangs. The vast majority of those convicted of both ‘illegal arrival’ and ‘facilitation’ have ongoing asylum claims. Victims of torture and trafficking, as well as children with ongoing age disputes, have also been prosecuted. Those arrested include people from nationalities with a high asylum grant rate, including people from Sudan, South Sudan, Afghanistan, Iran, Eritrea, and Syria.

Humans for Rights Network has identified 15 age-disputed children who were wrongly treated as adults and charged with these new offences, with 14 spending time in adult prison. These young people have experienced serious psychological and physical harm in adult courts and prisons, raising serious questions around the practices of the Home Office, Border Force, Ministry of Justice, magistrates and Judges, the CPS, defence lawyers, and prison staff.

Oxford, UK: Border Criminologies and the Centre for Criminology at the University of Oxford , 2024. 44p.

By Kamena Dorling and Maddie Harris

Wethersfield airfield, a remote 800-acre site in rural Essex, is the latest location for a large ‘open-prison camp’ in which the government is housing people seeking asylum. Although not described as immigration detention, Wethersfield replicates many of the features found in detention settings, including restrictions on movement, security and surveillance measures, lack of privacy and isolation from the wider community. Opened in July 2023, the camp has already caused profound and irreparable harm to many residents, harm that only intensifies the longer they are kept there. The evidence in this report, drawn from 10 detailed assessments by Helen Bamber Foundation (HBF) clinicians and interviews with and ongoing support provided to 140 individuals by Humans for Rights Network (HFRN), makes clear that being held in Wethersfield is already causing significant harm to those placed there. This includes survivors of torture and trafficking, those with severe mental health issues, and children, despite Home Office guidance making clear that these groups should not be placed there. Residents have displayed symptoms of worsening mental health following transfer to Wethersfield, including low mood, loneliness, flashbacks, reduced appetite, weight loss, feelings of despair and difficulty sleeping, and a worsening in symptoms of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. Men held there have reported anxiety and depression, suicidal ideation, intense desperation and fear, self-harm and acute sleep deprivation. The very features of Wethersfield, and similar sites such as Napier Barracks, cause significant mental distress. These include: y Isolation: Wethersfield’s remote location and restricted access exacerbates feelings of detachment from society, while lack of adequate facilities heighten tensions in the site as more men are placed there. y Detention-like setting: The camp’s resemblance to a prison, with barbed wire and surveillance, triggers traumatic experiences among residents, many of whom have had experiences of other ‘camps’, in Egypt and Libya for example. y Lack of privacy and shared facilities: Overcrowded living conditions significantly impact residents’ mental health, and increase the risk of communicable diseases spreading. y Inadequate healthcare: Healthcare services are insufficient, with concerns about the lack of trauma-focused support and barriers to accessing care. The ‘screening process’ for deciding who should be placed in Wethersfield is fundamentally flawed. In just the first three months of it being open, nearly a quarter of those placed there were moved out again because they did not meet the ‘suitability criteria’. HFRN has identified 11 children wrongly treated as adults and placed at serious risk of harm there. With over 120,000 people who have been waiting for over six months for a decision on their asylum claim, it is unclear how long the men will be kept there and what is happening with their cases, contributing to an ongoing sense of uncertainty and anxiety. No legal advice surgeries are being provided by the government in Wethersfield, and charities offering support are being denied access. Not only does keeping people in open-prison camps like Wethersfield not allow for their recovery, it does the exact opposite. It causes additional pain and trauma to people who have already experienced conflict, oppression, abuse, torture and trafficking. The Home Office intends to extend the use of the site for a further three years – this report highlights Wethersfield airfield, a remote 800-acre site in rural Essex, is the latest location for a large ‘open-prison camp’ in which the government is housing people seeking asylum. Although not described as immigration detention, Wethersfield replicates many of the features found in detention settings, including restrictions on movement, security and surveillance measures, lack of privacy and isolation from the wider community. Opened in July 2023, the camp has already caused profound and irreparable harm to many residents, harm that only intensifies the longer they are kept there. The evidence in this report, drawn from 10 detailed assessments by Helen Bamber Foundation (HBF) clinicians and interviews with and ongoing support provided to 140 individuals by Humans for Rights Network (HFRN), makes clear that being held in Wethersfield is already causing significant harm to those placed there. This includes survivors of torture and trafficking, those with severe mental health issues, and children, despite Home Office guidance making clear that these groups should not be placed there. Residents have displayed symptoms of worsening mental health following transfer to Wethersfield, including low mood, loneliness, flashbacks, reduced appetite, weight loss, feelings of despair and difficulty sleeping, and a worsening in symptoms of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. Men held there have reported anxiety and depression, suicidal ideation, intense desperation and fear, self-harm and acute sleep deprivation. The very features of Wethersfield, and similar sites such as Napier Barracks, cause significant mental distress. These include: y Isolation: Wethersfield’s remote location and restricted access exacerbates feelings of detachment from society, while lack of adequate facilities heighten tensions in the site as more men are placed there. y Detention-like setting: The camp’s resemblance to a prison, with barbed wire and surveillance, triggers traumatic experiences among residents, many of whom have had experiences of other ‘camps’, in Egypt and Libya for example. y Lack of privacy and shared facilities: Overcrowded living conditions significantly impact residents’ mental health, and increase the risk of communicable diseases spreading. y Inadequate healthcare: Healthcare services are insufficient, with concerns about the lack of trauma focused support and barriers to accessing care. The ‘screening process’ for deciding who should be placed in Wethersfield is fundamentally flawed. In just the first three months of it being open, nearly a quarter of those placed there were moved out again because they did not meet the ‘suitability criteria’. HFRN has identified 11 children wrongly treated as adults and placed at serious risk of harm there. With over 120,000 people who have been waiting for over six months for a decision on their asylum claim, it is unclear how long the men will be kept there and what is happening with their cases, contributing to an ongoing sense of uncertainty and anxiety. No legal advice surgeries are being provided by the government in Wethersfield, and charities offering support are being denied access. Not only does keeping people in open-prison camps like Wethersfield not allow for their recovery, it does the exact opposite. It causes additional pain and trauma to people who have already experienced conflict, oppression, abuse, torture and trafficking. The Home Office intends to extend the use of the site for a further three years – this report highlights why Wethersfield airfield, a remote 800-acre site in rural Essex, is the latest location for a large ‘open-prison camp’ in which the government is housing people seeking asylum. Although not described as immigration detention, Wethersfield replicates many of the features found in detention settings, including restrictions on movement, security and surveillance measures, lack of privacy and isolation from the wider community. Opened in July 2023, the camp has already caused profound and irreparable harm to many residents, harm that only intensifies the longer they are kept there. The evidence in this report, drawn from 10 detailed assessments by Helen Bamber Foundation (HBF) clinicians and interviews with and ongoing support provided to 140 individuals by Humans for Rights Network (HFRN), makes clear that being held in Wethersfield is already causing significant harm to those placed there. This includes survivors of torture and trafficking, those with severe mental health issues, and children, despite Home Office guidance making clear that these groups should not be placed there. Residents have displayed symptoms of worsening mental health following transfer to Wethersfield, including low mood, loneliness, flashbacks, reduced appetite, weight loss, feelings of despair and difficulty sleeping, and a worsening in symptoms of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. Men held there have reported anxiety and depression, suicidal ideation, intense desperation and fear, self-harm and acute sleep deprivation. The very features of Wethersfield, and similar sites such as Napier Barracks, cause significant mental distress. These include: y Isolation: Wethersfield’s remote location and restricted access exacerbates feelings of detachment from society, while lack of adequate facilities heighten tensions in the site as more men are placed there. y Detention-like setting: The camp’s resemblance to a prison, with barbed wire and surveillance, triggers traumatic experiences among residents, many of whom have had experiences of other ‘camps’, in Egypt and Libya for example. y Lack of privacy and shared facilities: Overcrowded living conditions significantly impact residents’ mental health, and increase the risk of communicable diseases spreading. y Inadequate healthcare: Healthcare services are insufficient, with concerns about the lack of traumafocused support and barriers to accessing care. The ‘screening process’ for deciding who should be placed in Wethersfield is fundamentally flawed. In just the first three months of it being open, nearly a quarter of those placed there were moved out again because they did not meet the ‘suitability criteria’. HFRN has identified 11 children wrongly treated as adults and placed at serious risk of harm there. With over 120,000 people who have been waiting for over six months for a decision on their asylum claim, it is unclear how long the men will be kept there and what is happening with their cases, contributing to an ongoing sense of uncertainty and anxiety. No legal advice surgeries are being provided by the government in Wethersfield, and charities offering support are being denied access. Not only does keeping people in open-prison camps like Wethersfield not allow for their recovery, it does the exact opposite. It causes additional pain and trauma to people who have already experienced conflict, oppression, abuse, torture and trafficking. The Home Office intends to extend the use of the site for a further three years – this report highlights why this must not happen and the Home Secretary should instead prioritise closing the site as a matter of urgency. why this must not happen and the Home Secretary should instead prioritise closing the site as a matter of urgency.

London: Helen Bamber Foundation and Human for Rights Network , 2023. 22p.

By Anna Kotova with Rachel Cordle

This report reviews key research on intergenerational offending, defined as the observed phenomenon whereby children with a parent or parents who offend, go on to offend themselves. It focuses on questions such as whether any differences between maternal and paternal offending exist, differential impacts according to the child’s gender, and evidence of interventions to reduce intergenerational offending. Key findings are: • There is a strong correlation between parental offending and child offending, established across numerous longitudinal studies across different jurisdictions. • There is clear evidence to suggest that children with a parent in prison are at risk of poor outcomes (in terms of mental health, behaviour, wellbeing etc.). However, the extent to which parental imprisonment is a specific cause of these poorer outcomes is unclear (i.e., poor outcomes may result from other factors such as socio-economic disadvantage). • There are complex reasons why children with an offending parent are at higher risk of offending. These encompass both intrafamilial (e.g. parental supervision of the child, addiction) and socio-economic (e.g., economic deprivation) factors, meaning a multi-faceted approach is needed. • Recent research has found the effect of parental offending on children differs according to the gender of parents and children. Having a convicted mother was linked to an increased risk of a daughter offending, but having a convicted father was not linked to an increased risk of the daughter offending. However, the number of girls who offend is generally small, which might explain this finding, as noted by the authors. There was a strong link between having a convicted father and boys’ offending, and the same trend in the context of boys and convicted mothers. However, in-depth analysis suggests a direct link between fathers’ offending and their sons’ offending, whereas the link between mothers and sons is not direct and is instead mediated via factors such as the father’s drug-taking. • Longer periods of parental imprisonment are associated with an increased risk of the child offending. • Type of offence is an additional factor. The children of people who commit violent offences are more likely to commit violent offences also. • There are very few external evaluations of interventions aimed at reducing intergenerational offending. Equally, there appears to be very few interventions that explicitly state that an aim of the intervention is to reduce intergenerational offending. • Several protective factors exist which are linked to improved child outcomes. For example, the resident carer coping well is one such factor, as is the child’s mental wellbeing and having a forum in which they can express their needs and emotions.

London: UK Ministry of Justice, 2025. 33p.

By Center for Neighborhood Engaged Research & Science

Gun violence—a key driver of premature death and racial disparities in life expectancy in the US—remains especially damaging to Chicagoans, who face consistently higher per capita rates of gun violence than residents of other large US cities. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY In response to this persistent challenge, Metropolitan Peace Initiatives (MPI), a division of Metropolitan Family Services, convened eight community-based organizations in Chicago in 2017 to form a CVI coalition called Communities Partnering 4 Peace (CP4P). The coalition’s goal is to reduce gun violence stemming from interpersonal and group conflicts among the individuals most likely to be involved. To achieve this, CP4P organizations provide participants with conflict mediation and deescalation, mentorship, case management, and referrals to direct services, including legal advocacy, employment support, educational opportunities, and trauma-informed behavioral health counseling. The Center for Neighborhood Engaged Research and Science (CORNERS) served as CP4P’s research partner to evaluate the coalition’s violence reduction efforts. CORNERS used an engaged research process to co-design a multi-method evaluation in partnership with MPI and CP4P leadership. This report builds on previous interim reports on the coalition’s individual and communitylevel impact. CORNERS’ research and evaluation strategy is focused on assessing the following three key aspects related to CP4P’s reach and impact: The ability of CP4P to reach and provide services to individuals most acutely impacted by and involved in gun violence. 1. The impact of CP4P services on individual-level participant outcomes, including involvement in gun violence and service use. 2. CP4P’s potential impact on gun violence at the community-level. 3. To answer these questions, CORNERS built a multi-method research design that captures the experiences and perspectives of CP4P participants through focus groups, periodic surveys, and in-depth interviews. CORNERS also conducted quasi-experimental statistical analyses that demonstrate CP4P’s impact on gunshot victimization among its participants and within its coverage area.

Ebanston, IL: Center for Neighborhood Engaged Research & Science (CORNERS), 2023. 32p.

By Center for Neighborhood Engaged Research & Science (CORNERS)

Communities Partnering 4 Peace (CP4P) is an innovative consortium of Chicago community violence intervention (CVI) organizations coordinating their activities towards a common goal: reducing gunshot victimization among individuals who are most likely to be involved in gun violence, neighborhood disputes, and group conflicts. CP4P launched in 2017 after a severe uptick in homicides in 2016. Since then, the collaboration has expanded to include 14 organizations covering 27 different community areas. CP4P’s model relies on street outreach workers to strengthen relationships throughout their respective communities and serve as front-line violence preventionists who mediate gang and interpersonal conflicts, monitor emergent activities and areas for community violence, and mentor those at highest risk of violence involvement. CP4P partner organizations also provide participants with direct services including legal advocacy, employment support, educational opportunities, housing assistance, and trauma-informed behavioral health counseling. Although CVI initiatives such as CP4P direct much of their programmatic efforts toward individuals, CVI organizations also intend to impact neighborhood levels of gun violence by penetrating social networks and group conflicts most involved [1], [2]. The need for both individual and neighborhood-level violence reduction efforts only increased during the startling surge in gun violence that emerged alongside the COVID-19 pandemic. CP4P’s innovative model was developed prior to these dual pandemics and was able to quickly respond and adapt its existing infrastructure in response to increased demand [3]. This research brief summarizes the results of a quasi-experimental evaluation of CP4P’s impact on neighborhood-level rates of homicides and nonfatal shootings from the start of the program to December 2021.

Evanston, IL: Corners (The Center for Neighborhood Engaged Research and Science), 2023. 7p

.By Alon Steinberg , Dhilan Patel , Amanda Frugoli

Introduction: Prone restraint by law enforcement has come under scrutiny due to its association with in-custody deaths and subsequent civil litigation. The true incidence, risk factors, and physiological mechanisms contributing to these fatalities remain poorly understood. This study aims to assess prone restraint-related death occurrences and identify associated risk factors by analyzing legal case records.

Methods: This retrospective study examined United States legal records from the National Legal Database, LexisNexis, covering 2010 to 2019. Cases were identified using the MeSH term "prone restraint cardiac arrest." Data extracted included demographic and case-specific variables such as age, gender, body mass index (BMI), duration of prone restraint, application of additional body weight, race, use of a conducted electrical weapon (CEW), presence of body camera footage, reports of excited delirium, drug intoxication, settlement amounts, and documented statements of "I can't breathe."

Results: A total of 229 cases met the inclusion criteria for analysis. The majority of subjects (98 %) were male, with an average age at death of 37 years. Among cases with available data, 38 % were African American, 33 % had obesity, and 64 % involved recreational stimulant drug use. In 58 % of cases, death occurred after one to 5 min of prone restraint. Additional body weight was applied in 80 % of cases, while CEWs were used in 39 %. Excited delirium was reported in 31 % of cases. More than 20 % of individuals were recorded saying, "I can't breathe." The average reported settlement in resolved cases was $2.5 million.

Conclusion: This study represents the largest case series of 229 reported prone restraint-related deaths to be reported in the medical literature, yet the true incidence remains uncertain. Further research is essential to better understand the prevalence, contributing risk factors, and potential mitigation strategies. Collaboration among the medical and forensic communities, law enforcement agencies, and policymakers is critical to accurately assess the scope of this issue and implement measures to reduce fatalities associated with prone restraint.

J Forensic Leg Med, 2025 May:112:102862.

doi: 10.1016/j.jflm.2025.102862. Epub 2025 Mar 31

By Noy Assaraf, Alejandro Mouro, Donald M. Papy, Noel Castillo & Barak Ariel

Objectives

Research on police body-worn cameras (BWCs) draws attention to the need for suspects to be aware of the devices for them to exert a deterrent, “civilising effect”, which can manifest as a reduction in the use of force in police-public interactions. This awareness can be manipulated audibly, visually, or both, yet no trials exist to test a visual stimulus that increases awareness of BWCs relative to BWCs without this function. In this field experiment, we test the effect of a visual warning of BWCs on use-of-force incidence.

Methods

A six-month cluster-randomised controlled trial involving spatiotemporal police units was conducted in Miami Beach, USA. The units were randomly assigned to the experimental group, which included officers who wore BWCs featuring multiple yellow stickers and “VIDEO & AUDIO” logo (used as a visual warning). Officers in the control group were equipped with BWCs without yellow stickers. Neither group was required to announce the presence of the BWCs, thus isolating the visual warning from the audial warning. Poisson regression models estimate the treatment effect, with confirmatory subgroup analyses based on the proactive versus reactive interactions.

Results

Statistically significant differences in the use of force by officers, but in the contrary direction: higher rate of use of force due to equipping officers with BWCs with yellow stickers relative to BWCs without the yellow stickers. Relative change analysis indicates that yellow stickers cause an increase in the rate of use of force in incidents involving proactive policing, with a less pronounced increase in reactive policing.

Conclusion

Without contextualising their use to citizens, raising awareness of the presence of BWCs can aggravate police-public encounters.

Journal of Experimental Criminology, 2024, 23p.

By Stewart Scott

US cybersecurity policy has a critical blind spot: the absence of reliable outcome metrics that can inform policymakers about whether the digital ecosystem is becoming more secure and which interventions are driving progress most effectively. Despite years of strategies, regulations, and best-practices campaigns, the field of cybersecurity metrics has room to grow, and policymakers still lack answers to fundamental questions. How much harm are cybersecurity incidents causing? Are things getting better or worse? Which policies deliver the greatest return on investment for reducing realized harm and the risk of future harm? This report identifies two core problems holding back progress: first, the unknown state of the system, meaning policymakers cannot empirically describe how secure or insecure the digital landscape currently is; and second, unmeasured policy efficacy, which prevents policymakers from comparing which interventions are most effective at improving security and reducing harm. The result is a policymaking environment heavily reliant on intuition, anecdote, incomplete data, and proxy measures—all unsustainable for a domain with such systemic and escalating risks and so much security investment. To address these challenges, the report proposes a reframing of cybersecurity metrics along two dimensions: 1. Treating cybersecurity as a complex system—acknowledging that incident outcomes result from dynamic, probabilistic interactions between policies, technologies, adversaries, and users. 2. Focusing on harm as the key outcome metric—shifting emphasis from internal system attributes (e.g., the number of vulnerabilities discovered) to the real-world impacts of cyber incidents, such as financial losses, operational disruptions, and physical damage. The report then explores the current limitations of available metrics, illustrating how wide-ranging estimates of incident costs and inconsistent data collection methods hamstring policymakers. It outlines the difficulty of measuring and interpreting harm data at scale due to factors such as silent failures, complex indirect costs, and underreporting, but it argues that such challenges are not insurmountable and that a desire for perfect metrics cannot impede progress toward better ones. Finally, the paper offers two actionable recommendations for near-term progress: 1. Strengthen existing reporting requirements (e.g., CIRCIA, SEC disclosures) to include consistent, updated measures of incident impact. 2. Centralize responsibility under a single federal entity to aggregate, analyze, interpret, and publish cybersecurity harm data across sectors. While perfection in cybersecurity metrics may be impossible, measuring harms is the most direct way to track progress and guide investment and the most critical metric to bolster policymakers’ toolkit. Without such measurement, the United States risks continuing to navigate a complex, evolving system with an incomplete map

Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, 2025. 25p.

By Kathleen Doherty and Annie Chen

In 2013, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (SDNY) ruled that stop and frisk practices employed by the NYPD were unconstitutional, specifically violating the Fourth Amendment protections against search and seizure as well as the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protections under the law due to the discriminatory nature of the stops. A Monitor was installed to oversee compliance, and in 2021, CUNY ISLG was brought in to conduct a study using information captured on body-worn cameras (BWCs).

The CUNY ISLG study examined police encounters recorded by BWCs over a two-month period in 2022 to assess how frequently stops were constitutional. The study also assessed whether police were appropriately documenting stops. The overarching goal of the study was to provide information on the NYPD’s compliance with court-ordered reforms in three primary focus areas. See the executive summary and full report for the complete findings, but select findings, by focus area, are:

Constitutionality of stops and frisks. The study assessed how frequently officers who conduct stops violate the Fourth Amendment, examined the conditions in which unconstitutional stops occur, and identified the reasons a stop was unconstitutional.

Seventy-two percent of the stops were constitutional and 19 percent unconstitutional. The remaining 9 percent had either no consensus or insufficient information.

Unconstitutional stops were particularly prevalent among stops conducted by officers assigned to a Neighborhood Safety Team (NST), which are special units tasked with securing illegal guns. Thirty-five percent of stops were unconstitutional when an NST officer was present compared to 16 percent of stops without one.

Differences by race and ethnicity. To assess compliance with the Fourteenth Amendment, the study examined differences in constitutionality by race and ethnicity, including by conducting statistical analysis to assess differences in the constitutionality of a stop.

Among all stops, 21 percent and 19 percent of the stops of Black and Hispanic individuals were rated as unconstitutional, respectively, compared to 11 percent of the stops of all other races.

Black and Hispanic individuals constituted 97 percent of self-initiated stops. Self-initiated stops of Black and Hispanic individuals were unconstitutional at 48 and 46 percent, respectively, compared to 15 percent of the self-initiated stops of individuals of all other races.

Full and accurate documentation of stops. The study assessed the prevalence of unreported stops and the conditions in which officers most often fail to document stops appropriately in the field.

Among encounters that are low-level (i.e. officers did not indicate that a stop, arrest, or summons occurred), 2 percent of individuals were in fact stopped but not documented by police with a stop report. While this number is small in percentage terms, it indicates a large number of unreported stops because low-level encounters (not labeled as including a stop, arrest, or summons) are extremely numerous (approximately 650,000 recordings or 200,000 encounters).

New York: CUNY Institute for State & Local Governance , 2025. 92p.

By MICHAEL SKIDMORE

Fraud has become the single biggest form of crime affecting people in the UK and yet our policing institutions have not caught up with the scale of that change. We have a 1960s local policing structure trying to fight a 21st century cyberenabled cross border crime. As a result, the police are achieving limited success and victims are receiving too little by way of service. In 2024 4.1 million people were victims of fraud which alone constituted 43 per cent of all crime affecting those aged over 16 in England and Wales (ONS, 2025). The UK government’s National Fraud Strategy1 estimates that fraud costs UK society £6.8 billion a year (UK Government, 2023). Fraud is not a ‘victimless crime’. According to a recent Police Foundation survey 58 per cent of fraud victims in two police force areas felt worried, 56 per cent experienced stress, 46 per cent felt vulnerable and unsafe and 18 per cent experienced depression. Taking the above statistics into account, the police response to fraud does not match the level of threat to the public. In England and Wales less than a third of frauds are reported to the police. Of those that are reported just 3.5 per cent are deemed suitable for a police investigation (Doig et al., 2024). Most victims reporting fraud to the police receive no service at all. In a 2025 survey2 of police officers and staff carried out for this paper, we found that: • 67 per cent of police workers surveyed said that businesses (e.g., banks, retailers, online platforms) hold the most responsibility for reducing fraud. • 88 per cent of police workers surveyed disagreed with the statement – “Police officers have sufficient resources (time, personnel, budget) to tackle fraud”. • 44 per cent of police workers surveyed don’t think the police are doing a good job when it comes to tackling fraud. • Half (51 per cent) don’t believe police officers have the skills to investigate fraud. • 5 per cent agreed fraud was a victimless crime provided no money was lost. • 67 per cent agreed fraud should be handled by a single national policing body. • 37 per cent aren’t clear which agency should be investigating fraud cases. • 41 per cent of police workers surveyed think fraud is low priority for UK police forces compared to other crimes. The police response to fraud is hampered by: 1. A lack of resources. As of March 2021 there were just 866 economic crime officers in English and Welsh police forces, including regional asset recovery teams. This constitutes a mere 0.64 per cent of the total police workforce to respond to 42 per cent of crime. 2. A predominantly local response to a cross-border crime. While fraud has become a cross border ‘distance crime’, often originating overseas, the operational response to it remains largely local. In practical terms there are limits to what local forces can do to investigate complex fraud. Fraud cases are also rarely prioritised over other local crimes such as sexual and violent crimes. 3. A lack of an ability to identify harm and seriousness. Fraud cases are disseminated on the basis of the viability of a potential investigation rather than because of an assessment of the harm caused to the victim. There is currently no common framework which would allow the police to triage and prioritise fraud cases based on harm 4. A lack of skills. The police workforce currently lacks the skills to properly investigate fraud. In 22 out of 32 police forces surveyed, generalist local investigation teams dealt with all or most fraud investigations, despite 86 per cent of officers believing fraud should be dealt with by specialists. 5. The response remains too focused on arrests and prosecutions. In a world where most fraud originates overseas there needs to be more to the law enforcement approach than trying to achieve traditional criminal justice outcomes. In particular more should be done to proactively disrupt the organised crime networks perpetrating fraud. 6. There is a lot of data on fraud but insufficient insight is being generated from it. From the volumes of crimes reported to a variety of different agencies and the wealth of data that exists in the private sector in relation to fraud there is a vast amount of intelligence that could be used to help inform the police response, support investigations and target proactive operations. Yet while there have been improvements in data sharing this could go much further. The report makes the several recommendations to tackle these problems:

London: Police Foundation, 2025. 28p.

By The National Institute for Criminal Justice Reform (NICJR) h

Police departments in the United States are charged with a broad set of responsibilities, and officers typically have little specialized training in the breadth of complex issues they encounter. Police are asked to respond to robberies and homicides, but they also enforce traffic rules and respond to noise complaints, domestic disputes, mental health crises, unhoused individuals, and more. Simply put, police are asked to do too much with too little. The National Institute for Criminal Justice Reform (NICJR) has conducted multiple studies analyzing the type and severity of calls for service (CFS; i.e., 911 calls) in a variety of police departments across the country, finding across the board that CFS are overwhelmingly for noncriminal or low-level incidents. For example, according to NICJR’s analysis of Oakland Police Department (OPD) calls for service data, between 2018– 2020, nearly 60% of calls responded to by OPD were for noncriminal matters. This amounted to more than 368,000 responses. And in Seattle, NICJR found that 79% of calls received were noncriminal or low-level events, and only 6% of calls were associated with felonies of any kind, violent or nonviolent.1 For this report, NICJR analyzed CFS data as well as police department (PD) budgets for 10 California cities and eight cities in other US states. Across all 18 cities:

Oakland, CA: The National Institute for Criminal Justice Reform (NICJR) , 2025. 56p

By Dennis P. Rosenbaum

Calls for police reform play an integral part in the evolution of modern policing. But what truly needs reform is how police agencies evaluate their performance. Rather than determining effectiveness exclusively through crime-fighting statistics, police agencies must also incorporate assessments of how community members are treated. Evidence-based policing must acknowledge a large body of research on procedural justice and recognize the critical role it plays in determining police legitimacy. To implement effective reforms within this framework, the definition of “good policing” must be reimagined, as well as the metrics used to evaluate it. This Ideas in American Policing essay examines previous reform concepts and their shortfalls. It explores how human behavior is heavily influenced by incentives and disincentives and whether a strong enough reward system is in place to truly move officers from the “warrior” to the “guardian” mentality. Lastly, it examines what police leaders, government officials, and policing scholars will need to do to implement, successfully evaluate, and achieve lasting reform within the communities being served.

Ideas in American Policing 2024/

Arlington, VA: National Policing Institute, 2024. 18p.

By Thomas E. Christoff, Shelby Hickman, Zoë Thorkildsen, Monique Jenkins, Jennifer Lafferty, Melissa Gutierrez and Heleana Melendez

Police departments have evolved since the advent of modern policing in the early 19th century, with their roles and purposes constantly changing to meet the needs of the communities they serve. In that time, technology (defined here as tools or systems that enhance law enforcement’s ability to perform its duties) has also evolved, particularly since the 1990s, and police departments are increasingly incorporating modern technology into their daily functions. One of the earliest instances of technology use by police departments was the adoption of the police radio, which allowed officers to have constant communication with one another while patrolling different beats. Since the adoption of the police radio, technology has advanced in ways that benefit not only officers but also the public. Technology provides police departments with the ability to improve accountability and transparency, improve the quality of investigations, effectively allocate resources, and improve levels of trust with their communities. However, given the rapid pace of technological advancement in policing, a review of the various tools presently used in police departments is needed to better understand what is effective in achieving common goals. Using a systematic review framework, the CNA team searched relevant literature examining police, technology and innovation, public safety, crime reduction, and community relationships and identified 1,500 articles for initial review. These articles included academic research, government publications, unpublished studies, and other grey literature. The team completed a more in-depth review of the identified articles, using nine criteria to determine eligibility for this systematic review. The in-depth review yielded 98 articles eligible for the final review. These 98 studies examined police departments’ use of various technologies such as body-worn cameras (BWC), information technology (IT) (e.g., CompStat), closed-circuit television (CCTV) cameras, spatial analysis software, uncrewed aircraft systems (UAS, often called drones), license plate readers (LPR), social media and other public websites, mobile phones or computers, and gunshot detection. Final review included literature coding, which identified the following information from the articles: • Department or agency discussed • Agency type • Research question • Data source • Sample or respondents • Technology (category and specific) • Study type • Evaluation type • Research approach • Research methods • Study included cost-benefit analysis (CBA) • Outcomes (category and specific) The purpose of the present study is to provide a guide for employing any new technology, discuss insights on technologies currently being used in law enforcement agencies in the United States, and summarize findings and outcomes from the articles reviewed. It also provides a broader discussion on lessons learned for agencies implementing a new technology, including how to determine a need for technology, positive practices when implementing the technology, and anticipated benefits for modern technologies. In addition, it discusses how law enforcement can use technology as a tool to improve crime prevention, investigations and case clearances, accountability and transparency, and community relations. Technology has the potential to aid crime analysts in identifying crime trends, detectives in making arrests, and agencies in maintaining officer standards and building a stronger level of trust between communities and the officers who serve them. Both researchers and police departments therefore have the responsibility to take initiative in reviewing tools and practices to ensure department resources are effectively used.

Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services. 2024.68p.

By Camello, M., Gomez Cardoso, A., Krebs, C., Planty, M

The Criminal Justice Technology Adoption and Implementation Guide is a resource for criminal justice decision-makers who want to assess agency challenges and understand potential solutions. The guide provides criminal justice decision-makers with a resource to consider the technical, operational, and governance factors that accompany adoption and implementation of technology solutions. The guide is designed for a broad range of criminal justice decision-makers, including those in law enforcement, corrections, community supervision, and courts.

Research Triangle Park, NC: RTI International., 2025. 13p.

By Shute, R., & Mecray, M.

Service weapon activity, including instances where an officer’s firearm is drawn, pointed, or discharged, plays an important role in understanding events transpiring during a police–public encounter. Detection, documentation, and communication of these events in a way that is accurate, timely, and dependable is vital for enhancing transparency and accountability of law enforcement service weapon use. About this Report - The National Institute of Justice (NIJ) requested the Criminal Justice Technology Testing and Evaluation Center (CJTTEC) to investigate the landscape of commercially available and emerging technologies that could meet this need. CJTTEC conducted a review of technologies capable of detecting when a service weapon has been unholstered, pointed, or discharged; documenting when a law enforcement officer discharges their service weapon (or initiating documentation such as body-worn camera (BWC) recordings in such incidents); and communicating the information to dispatchers. CJTTEC’s methodology to understand this technology landscape included secondary research (e.g., reviewing patents, trade literature, press releases, news articles, and publications) and primary research with technology experts, product representatives, and researchers. This brief provides a high-level summary of technology systems capable of documenting, detecting, and communicating service weapon activity, focusing specifically on technology integrated into or onto the weapon, in a holster, in a BWC, in a wearable device, or in environmental sensing tools. Conclusion Although no single commercially available tool is capable of detecting, documenting, and communicating service weapon activity, law enforcement agencies may be able to rely on a suite of products to help them address these needs.

Research Triangle Park, NC: RTI International 2024. . 15p.

By Camello, M., Gomez Cardoso, A., Planty, M., Ruiz, C., & Cramer, J

Real-time crime centers (RTCCs) are centralized hubs that integrate data from various sources to provide law enforcement agencies and their officers with actionable intelligence and enhanced situational awareness in real-time. This report defines RTCCs, describes the activities that RTCCs support, outlines the technology workflow of an effective RTCC, and examines the technical, operational, and governance considerations for implementation.

Research Triangle Institute, NC: Criminal Justice Technology Testing and Evaluation Center; RTI International , 2024. 24p.

By The National Policing Institute

The purpose of accreditation in law enforcement agencies is to establish a foundation of policies, procedures, and practices that promote optimal outcomes in policing. Consistent internal review of an agency’s policies and procedures, combined with third-party validation, supports the delivery of high-quality public safety services, and promotes a culture of accountability in policing. Stated simply, accreditation provides a roadmap for constitutional policing and ensures police agencies continuously consider legal standards, best practices, scientific evidence, and innovation. Many resources are available to law enforcement executives seeking to implement evidence informed and best practices in their agencies as part of the accreditation process. Model policies, training standards, and empirical research can all provide valuable information to inform police practice. National-level guidance on constitutional policing practices, however, can be particularly valuable. Indeed, the settlement agreements, including consent decrees, that the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) engages in with law enforcement agencies following “pattern or practice” investigations are presumed to outline important aspects of 21st Century Policing. The changes implemented by law enforcement agencies to address these agreements should, therefore, demonstrate aspects of constitutional policing in practice. Despite the value of the documentation surrounding these settlement agreements, there has been limited empirical examination of the organizational conditions and practices that precede formal intervention by the DOJ. The systematic identification of the factors contributing to DOJ involvement can provide critical insights for law enforcement executives who seek to be proactive in reviewing and enhancing their agency’s policies, training, and practices. In this vein, the Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies contracted the services of the National Policing Institute (hereafter the Institute) in 2022 to review recent pattern or practice investigations conducted by the DOJ to identify: • The events and organizational factors that precede an investigation; • The issues most commonly examined by pattern or practice investigators; • The investigative process and methodological approaches used to identify patterns or practices of unconstitutional policing; • The evidence cited to support observations of unconstitutional policing; and • The remedial measures outlined by the DOJ to address unconstitutional policing practices. Between 2010 and 2022, the DOJ initiated 27 pattern or practice investigations into law enforcement agencies. In this report, the Institute research team presents findings from a qualitative examination of the 19 pattern or practice investigations that had investigative reports and/or findings letters available for review. Specifically, content analysis was conducted on 21 documents, including 11 investigative reports and 10 findings letters, that were available for review across these investigations. The analysis of these documents identifies the reported process, findings, and recommendations produced from 19 DOJ pattern or practice investigations of law enforcement agencies The remainder of this report is organized as follows: Section 02 provides background on the authority of the DOJ to conduct pattern or practice investigations and the context surrounding those investigations. Section 03 presents the results of the research team’s content analysis. Section 04 provides a discussion of the findings and conclusion of the report. The methodology used to identify the sample of pattern or practice investigations and analyze the content of the investigative reports and findings letters for those investigations is outlined in Appendix A

Arlington VA: The National Policing Institute, 2023. 40p.

By The National Policing Institute

This guide, created by the National Policing Institute, is intended for law enforcement personnel or representatives who actively develop annual reviews to summarize their agency’s use of force. We encourage law enforcement executives to provide this document to their staff so that they may review and use the guide as a framework. This document was developed specifically for law enforcement agencies in New Jersey but may benefit others in the field.

Arlington, VA: The National Policing Institute, 2024. 18p.