By Chris Jones , Romain Lanneau , Yasha Maccanico u.a.

For at least three decades, the EU and its Member States have engaged in a process of “externalization” – a policy agenda by which the EU seeks to prevent migrants and refugees from setting foot on EU territory by externalizing (that is, outsourcing) border controls to non-EU states. The EU’s New Pact on Migration and Asylum, published in September 2020, proposed a raft of measures seeking to step up operational cooperation and collaboration to further this agenda. This report aims to contribute to public and political debate on the transparency, accountability, and legitimacy of the externalization agenda. It contains a series of case studies on three key target states for the EU – Bosnia and Herzegovina, Morocco, and Niger – based on information received in response to access to documents and freedom of information requests submitted to institutions within those countries, as well as within the EU itself.

Brüssel:  Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung European Union, December 2022. 48p.

By Center for Human Rights, The Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, University of Washington,

In recent years, local and state governments in Washington have taken important legislative and executive action to protect vulnerable residents from rights abuses. Many of these actions, such as the so-called “sanctuary” laws of Keep Washington Working (2019) and Courts Open to All (2020) Acts, seek to protect the rights of migrants by limiting the degree to which local authorities can collaborate with civil immigration enforcement by ICE or CBP. More recently, the language of “sanctuary” has also been used in the context of the right to reproductive health care at both the state and local levels. On June 30, 2022, Governor Jay Inslee issued a directive prohibiting the Washington State Patrol from “providing any cooperation or assistance whatsoever” with efforts to investigate or prosecute those seeking access to reproductive health care in our state. And some local jurisdictions have followed suit. On July 5, 2022, King County Executive Dow Constantine issued an order banning the King County Sheriff and other county agencies from providing any information or assistance with efforts to “obstruct, restrict, diminish or discourage” access to reproductive health care. On July 26, 2022, the Seattle City Council voted to bar local police from assisting in investigations or executing warrants issued by other jurisdictions that criminalize seeking or assisting in abortions. These strongly worded directives are important statements of Washington state values. Yet research conducted in Washington and elsewhere shows that data gathered by state and local law enforcement remains accessible to both law enforcement from other states, and federal immigration enforcement agencies, through interoperable databases. ICE documents show that federal immigration agents have deliberately increased their use of digital tools in recent years in direct response to the limitations created by local policies designed to limit collaboration with federal immigration enforcement. Although it remains to be seen whether out-of-state attempts to prosecute people for seeking or providing, access to abortions in Washington will pass legal muster, automatic license plate recognition (ALPR) data documenting presence at abortion clinics in our state could be deployed as a powerful tool to flaunt Washington policies. For Washington to live up to its promises to provide “sanctuary” for those exercising their lawful rights in Washington, our state and local governments must take steps to close the gaps in existing systems of digital surveillance. Towards this end, the UW Center for Human Rights has launched an effort to understand the practices of digital surveillance in our state and their potential to undermine access to the very rights protections our government has pledged to uphold. This report focuses on just one dimension of this multidimensional threat: the dangers posed by the misuse of automated license plate recognition technology by law enforcement agencies. Future reports will examine other digital tools.

Seattle: University of Washington,  CENTER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS,  HENRY M. JACKSON SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, 2022. 23p.

By Mitch Morrissey  and DJ Summers

Aurora, Colorado’s third-largest city, has made local and national headlines recently for criminal activity in apartment buildings allegedly related to members of a Venezuelan gang. City officials, media commentators, and the public have debated at length the reputed presence of the Venezuelan gang Tren de Aragua and the extent of the gang’s criminal activity across the Metro Denver area. Although crime in Aurora and Denver is still above its pre-pandemic baseline, neither has experienced city-wide elevated crime levels in the last 12 months. However, several areas throughout the cities with documented elevated migrant populations have seen dramatic upticks in crime in 2023 and 2024. Importantly, these trends are not uniform across all centers of migrant populations. The isolated crime that is being committed in the areas in question at apartments on Dallas Street, Nome Street, and 13th Avenue is borne by the surrounding areas, most of which are neighborhoods with lower socioeconomic status. There are economic costs associated with this rise in crime.

Key Findings:

Aurora’s violent crime is not rising as a whole. Violent crime in both Aurora and Denver has decreased since a 2022 peak, though in 2023 annual crime remained elevated from crime in 2019.

Identifying crime trends is difficult among noncitizens, as reporting is lower. Cities are estimated to have a 6% decrease in violent crime reporting and 1% decrease in property crime reporting for every 1% increase in noncitizen residents. The recent migrant surge has resulted in a 12% increase in the number of noncitizens in the Denver metro area.

Publicly available geolocated crime maps do not show a consistent trend of rising crime in the Denver or Aurora locations known to house high numbers of migrants. However, they do show a localized spike in police-reported crime at three Aurora complexes.

The apartments at 1218 Dallas Street in Aurora have seen crimes and citations more than double since 2022, from 31 to 80.

The apartments at 1568 Nome Street in Aurora have seen crimes and citations more than double since 2022, from 33 to 76.

The apartments at 15483 E 13th Avenue Aurora have seen crimes and citations nearly double since 2022, from 29 to 44.

Elevated crime has higher costs in economically disadvantaged neighborhoods. The major crimes in 2024 at just the Dallas Street apartments alone have led to $700,000 in tangible and intangible costs. These do not include crimes not reported to police.

Greenwood Village, CO:Common Sense Institute, 2024. 10p.

By Trey Walk, and Maria Burnett,

  Since 2021, political leaders in the US state of Florida have reshaped K-12 schools through laws and policies that censor, distort, and discriminate. Such efforts include passing laws restricting classroom instruction about race in US history, sexual orientation and gender identity, banning books available to students, and setting inaccurate and misleading civics and history standards. “Why Do They Hate Us So Much?” documents the impacts on students of Florida’s denial of access to accurate information about Black history, systemic racism, and about their health, when related to sexual orientation or gender identity. Florida leads the United States in the number of books banned from classrooms and school libraries, primarily literature written by or about LGBTQ people and people of color. Students and teachers report that new legal and curriculum changes have created an environment more conducive to harassment and discrimination in the classroom on the basis of race, sexual orientation, and gender identity. Parents and teachers describe the difficulty of providing children with an education free from discrimination in the increasingly hostile environment. Human Rights Watch, Florida Rising, and Stanford Law School Rule of Law Impact Lab call on Florida to rescind its discriminatory policies and promote a curriculum that counters discrimination and prepares students to live healthy lives in a diverse society. They also call for a bold federal response to address this civil and human rights crisis in US public schools.  

New York: Human Rights Watch, 2024. 107p.

By Andreas Harsono  

  A violent attack by security forces and an ultranationalist mob on a West Papuan student dormitory in Surabaya, East Java, on August 17, 2019, prompted street protests in at least 33 cities across Indonesia. Bolstering the protests was a social media campaign called #PapuanLivesMatter, inspired by the Black Lives Matter movement in the United States seeking racial justice. The Indonesian authorities arrested hundreds for joining the anti-racism protests, and 109 people were convicted for “treason.” “If It’s Not Racism, What Is It?” finds that the protests renewed discussions on racial discrimination in Indonesia against Indigenous Papuans because of their ethnic origin, and sparked fresh demands for sovereignty for West Papua. It profiles cases of Papuan activists prosecuted after the Papuan Lives Matter protests and describes ongoing human rights violations rooted in racial discrimination, in particular, the right to education and the highest attainable standard of health. It also documents recent abuses by security forces and Papuan militants during the ongoing armed conflict in West Papua. Over the past six decades, Indonesian authorities, in countering the pro-independence movement and insurgency in West Papua, have often promoted divisiveness by describing Papuans as unruly and violent. The report calls on the Indonesian government to review regulations and practices that marginalize the community, to allow foreign journalists and international rights monitors to visit the territory, and to conduct public education to end racism against people of Papuan ethnic origin.  

New York: Human Rights Watch, 2024. 86p.

By Jane Buchanan, Giorgi Gogia, and Arzu Geybulla.  

The 74-page report, “‘We Try to Stay Invisible’: Azerbaijan's Escalating Crackdown on Critics and Civil Society,” documents the government’s concerted efforts to decimate civil society and silence its critics. The authorities have arrested dozens of people on politically motivated, bogus criminal charges. They have also arbitrarily enforced repressive laws that push independent groups and media to the margins of the law, heightening their vulnerability to retaliatory criminal prosecution. The groups documented 33 prominent cases of criminal prosecution, detention, and harassment. They found that Azerbaijani authorities have deliberately misused laws regulating nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to deny certain groups registration and funding, exposing people affiliated with them to criminal charges. Azerbaijani authorities continue their assault on critics and dissenting voices. They use politically motivated criminal charges to prosecute and imprison human rights defenders, journalists, and civic and political activists, and arbitrarily enforce highly restrictive laws regulating non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The crackdown has intensified in the lead-up to the November 2024 UN Climate Conference (COP29) in Baku. Among those being prosecuted are veteran human rights defender Anar Mammadli, who co-founded a climate justice NGO, prominent anti-corruption activist and academic Gubad Ibadoghlu, and media professionals with the independent outlets Abzas Media and Toplum TV. Many independent groups have had to close, and activists have had to go into exile or continue their legitimate work on the margins of the law, at great personal risk. “We Try to Stay Invisible” is based on over 40 interviews with NGO leaders, lawyers, journalists, youth activists, and others, as well as in-depth analysis of laws and regulations used to target or constrain NGOs. The report documents the government’s concerted efforts to silence critical voices in the country. Human Rights Watch and Freedom Now call on the Azerbaijani government to immediately and unconditionally release those held on politically motivated charges, end the crackdown against civil society and independent media, and ensure that civil society groups and independent media can operate without undue hindrance before, during and after COP29. They should also amend repressive laws regulating NGOs. It calls on Azerbaijan’s international partners to set clear expectations for human rights improvements and impose concrete policy consequences should those requirements not be met.  

New York: Human Rights Watch, 2024. 80p.

By Heather Rolfe, Sunder Katwala and Steve Ballinger

The Ipsos MORI immigration attitudes tracker offers one of the most authoritative and rigorous sources on what the public thinks about immigration, conducted in 12 waves to date across the last seven years. This latest wave of the tracker was a nationally representative survey of 4,000 adults across Great Britain aged 18+, conducted online between 18 June and 10 July 2021. It examines public attitudes across a range of issues, with some questions having been asked in each wave of research since 2015 to enable comparison. Immigration attitudes have softened significantly over the last seven years, with public sentiment becoming more positive after the 2016 EU referendum and sustaining at that level ever since. The public is now more likely to see the contribution of immigration as positive (46%) than negative (28%) overall, in a reversal of the pattern when this tracker series began in 2015. There is an opportunity for more light and less heat in the immigration debate, though different political challenges remain for both sides of the political spectrum. Anyone seeking to affect change will need to engage with the politics and attitudes of immigration as they are now in 2021, in this new context, and this tracker report offers useful insight. A changing debate The latest Ipsos MORI Issues Index, which measures the issues of greatest concern to the UK public, found that immigration had slid to eighth position as of August 2021. Only 12% of people now regard it as a key issue of concern, but salience has been falling steadily over the last four years. Around four in ten people (42%), however, still feel that we don’t talk about immigration enough. A quarter (25%) feel that it’s discussed the right amount, and 17% say we talk about it too much. Since the immigration attitudes tracker began in 2015, it has asked respondents to give a 0-10 score to indicate whether they feel immigration has had a positive or negative impact on Britain. The scores in this latest wave continue a trend of positive sentiment, with 47% giving a positive score of 6-10, compared to the 28% who give a negative score of 0-4. The survey taken at the time of the May 2015 general election, by comparison, found only 35% were positive and 42% were negative. Respondents to each wave of the survey have also been asked if they would prefer immigration to the UK to be increased, decreased or to remain the same. Reflecting these gradually warming attitudes, this latest survey found the lowest ever support for reducing immigration and the highest ever support for immigration to be increased. While 45% would still prefer reductions in immigration, some 29% would prefer it to stay at the current levels and 17% would like it to increase  Public satisfaction with the current Government’s performance on immigration remains very low, with only 1 in 8 (12%) saying they are satisfied with how the Government is dealing with immigration – the same proportion as in November 2020 (and a similar level of satisfaction to that of the two previous governments). More than half the public (55%) say they are dissatisfied. The immigration debate over the last few parliaments was focused on numbers, with repeated failures to meet the government’s net migration target. With that target now dropped there is an opportunity to move the debate on. Our survey asked whether people would prefer an immigration system that prioritises control, regardless of whether numbers go up or down; or whether they would prefer an approach that focuses on reducing immigration numbers. It found that people were almost twice as likely to prioritise control (44%) over reducing numbers (24%). Survey respondents were also asked about the EU Settled Status scheme, which was put in place allow European citizens, who arrived before December 31st 2020, to continue to live and work in the UK post-Brexit. The deadline for applications for Settled Status lapsed at the end of July this year. Almost half (48%) of respondents say that eligible EU citizens should be allowed to make a late application, while just under a third (32%) would not support late applications being accepted.  

Lonson: British Future, 2021. 47p.

By Sunder Katwala, Steve Ballinger, Heather Rolfe and Jake Puddle

Conducted straight after the general election, this report examines shifting public attitudes to immigration and asylum, including the differences in attitudes between Labour, Conservative, Lib Dem and Reform voters and what that means for the politics of immigration in the new parliament.

The research also examines public attitudes on a series of key issues:

• The role of immigration in the 2024 general election.

• Public priorities for the new government.

• Public trust in the main political parties on immigration, and trust in leading politicians on the issue.

• Public perceptions of immigration: do people think net migration will fall or increase? Which flows do people think make up most immigration to the UK?

• Public satisfaction with the government’s handling of immigration.

• Do people want immigration numbers to reduce, increase or stay the same?

• Attitudes to migration to fill different roles: would people cut the numbers of doctors, care workers, lorry drivers or hospitality staff coming to the UK?

• Asylum, Channel crossings and legal routes

London: British Future, 2024. 74p.

By: Jennifer Vallentine, Roberto Forin, and Bram Frouws  

Migrant-receiving countries are increasingly focusing on return and reintegration as central elements of migration management. This briefing paper outlines key messages from research MMC has carried out on the experience of returning migrants in Asia, Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, and Europe, since 2017

Geneva: Mixed Migration Centre, 2024. 8p.

By James Cockayne, Sophia Kagan, Fiona Ng

This report highlights significant modern slavery risks faced by temporary migrant workers in agriculture, horticulture and meat processing in rural and regional NSW. The modern slavery risks identified include debt bondage, deceptive recruiting, forced labour and, in extreme cases, servitude, sexual servitude and even human trafficking. The report examines significant vulnerabilities faced by both Pacific workers and backpackers concerning working conditions, wages and entitlements; accommodation, transport and living conditions; gendered violence and healthcare access and isolation and social marginalisation. It also highlights growing indicators that the burden of supporting these exploited migrant workers is falling on local communities and community service providers that are not adequately resourced for this task.

Recommendations 

1. Urgently initiate a trauma-informed and worker-centred investigation of modern slavery risks faced by Pacific Australia Labour Mobility workers and other temporary migrant workers working in agriculture, horticulture and meat processing in rural and regional NSW.

2. Ensure relevant NSW Government frontline agencies undertake suitable training in modern slavery, as envisaged by section 19(3)(a) of the Modern Slavery Act 2018.

3. Advocate for the Federal Government to review the visa settings and protection requirements for temporary migrant workers in the PALM and Working Holiday Makers programs.

4. Complement the work of the new Migrant Workers Centre to be established in NSW, with regional migrant centre hubs.

5. Ensure funding and support to local actors, including to create a more active role in the monitoring of conditions and support to temporary migrant workers.

Office of the NSW Anti-slavery Commissioner, 2024. 33p.

By The American Immigration Council

In recent months, leading politicians and policymakers have renewed calls for mass deportations of immigrants from the United States. While similar promises have been made in the past without coming to fruition—during the 2016 presidential campaign, for example, Donald Trump pledged to create a “deportation force” to round up undocumented immigrants —mass deportation now occupies a standing role in the rhetoric of leading immigration hawks. To cite just one example, former U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) director Tom Homan has promised “a historic deportation operation” should a hawkish administration return to power. While some plans have envisioned a one-time, massive operation designed to round up, detain, and deport the undocumented population en masse, others have envisioned starting from a baseline of one million deportations per year. Given that in the modern immigration enforcement era the United States has never deported more than half a million immigrants per year—and many of those have been migrants apprehended trying to enter the U.S., not just those already living here—any mass deportation proposal raises obvious questions: how, exactly, would the United States possibly carry out the largest law enforcement operation in world history? And at what cost? Using data from the American Community Survey (ACS) along with publicly available data about the current costs of immigration enforcement, this report aims to provide an estimation of what the fiscal and economic cost to the United States would be should the government deport a population of roughly 11 million people who as of 2022 lacked permanent legal status and faced the possibility of removal. We consider this both in terms of the direct budgetary costs—the expenses associated with arrest, detention, legal processing, and removal—that the federal government would have to pay, and in terms of the impact on the United States economy and tax base should these people be removed from the labor force and consumer market. In terms of fiscal costs, we also include an estimate of the impact of deporting an additional 2.3 million people who have crossed the U.S. southern border without legal immigration status and were released by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) from January 2023 through April 2024. We consider these fiscal costs separately because we don’t have more recent ACS data necessary to estimate the total net changes in the undocumented population past 2022, or the larger impact on the economy and tax base of removing those people, an impact that is therefore not reflected in this report. In total, we find that the cost of a one-time mass deportation operation aimed at both those populations—an estimated total of at least $315 billion. We wish to emphasize that this figure is a highly conservative estimate. It does not take into account the long-term costs of a sustained mass deportation operation or the incalculable additional costs necessary to acquire the institutional capacity to remove over 13 million people in a short period—incalculable because there is simply no reality in which such a singular operation is possible. For one thing, there would be no way to accomplish this mission without mass detention as an interim step. To put the scale of detaining over 13 million undocumented immigrants into context, the entire U.S. prison and jail population in 2022, comprising every person held in local, county, state, and federal prisons and jails, was 1.9 million people. To estimate the costs of a longer-term mass deportation operation, we calculated the cost of a program aiming to arrest, detain, process, and deport one million people per year—paralleling the more conservative proposals made by mass deportation proponents. Even assuming that 20 percent of the undocumented population would “self-deport” under a yearslong mass-deportation regime, we estimate the ultimate cost of such a longer operation would average out to $88 billion annually, for a total cost of $967.9 billion over more than a decade. This is a much higher sum than the one-time estimate, given the long-term costs of establishing and maintaining detention facilities and temporary camps to eventually be able to detain one million people at a time—costs that could not be modeled in a short-term analysis. This would require the United States to build and maintain 24 times more ICE detention capacity than currently exists. The government would also be required to establish and maintain over 1,000 new immigration courtrooms to process people at such a rate. Even this estimate is likely quite conservative, as we were unable to estimate the additional hiring costs for the tens of thousands of agents needed to carry out one million arrests per year, the additional capital investments necessary to increase the ICE Air Operations fleet of charter aircraft to carry out one million annual deportations, and a myriad of other ancillary costs necessary to ramp up federal immigration enforcement operations to the scale necessary.

 American Immigration Council, 2024. 52p.

By The University of Washington, Center for Human Rights 

Documents provided to UWCHR under FOIA reveal that despite voicing concerns about cleanliness at the NWDC multiple times over three years, ICE chose never to sanction GEO for failing to comply with its contract to operate the Northwest Detention Center. This, cross-referenced with other ICE and GEO documents UWCHR has reviewed, reveals that despite receiving credible information about conditions at the facility that threatened the health and well-being of those detained, and despite the complaints of its own employees, ICE repeatedly failed to invoke its contract enforcement mechanisms to force GEO to comply with basic cleanliness standards. Records show the situation persisted for three years and resulted in what ICE employees deemed an unsafe working environment. If ICE’s employees felt unsafe, it is unsurprising that the people forced to live in that environment have repeatedly expressed grave concern  

Seattle: The University of Washington Center for Human Rights , 2023. 9p.  

By: Sarah J. Eckman and Karen L. Shanton

Federal law prohibits certain types of intimidation of or interference with election workers, including intimidation to discourage serving as a poll watcher or election official or in response to such service; interference by members of the Armed Forces with election officials' exercise of their duties; and intimidation for helping voters register or cast a vote. Many states have laws that address other threats to election workers, such as through privacy protections for election commissioners. More general laws, such as prohibitions against voter intimidation or harassing or threatening interstate communications, might also apply to some conduct. Some state and local officials have responded to recent reports of threats to election workers with administrative action or legislative proposals. Election officials have included local law enforcement in poll worker trainings, for example, and implemented new security measures in their offices. State legislators have established new prohibitions or protections, such as a New Hampshire law that prohibits intimidating election officials to interfere with their work and an Oregon law that extends existing privacy protections to election workers.

Library of Congress, Sep 9, 2024

Edited by Krista Lynes, Tyler Morgenstern, and Ian Alan Paul

In recent years, spectacular images of ruined boats, makeshift border camps, and beaches littered with life vests have done much to consolidate the politics of movement in Europe. Indeed, the mediation of migration as a crisis has worked to shore up various forms of militarized surveillance, humanitarian response, legislative action, and affective investment. Bridging academic inquiry and artistic and activist practice, the essays, documents, and artworks gathered in Moving Images interrogate the mediation of migration and refugeeism in the contemporary European conjuncture, asking how images, discourses, and data are involved in shaping the visions and experience of migration in increasingly global contexts.

Bielefeld : Transcript, [2020]

By The American Immigration Council

Temporary Protected Status (TPS) is a temporary immigration status provided to nationals of certain countries experiencing problems that make it difficult or unsafe for their nationals to be deported there.1 TPS has been a lifeline to hundreds of thousands of individuals already in the United States when problems in a home country make their departure or deportation untenable. This fact sheet provides an overview of how TPS designations are determined, what benefits TPS confers, and how TPS beneficiaries apply for and regularly renew their status.

Washington DC: American Immigration Council, 2024. 8p.

By Emily M. Brown

The Temporary Protected Status (TPS) program protects migrants from deportation when their native countries have been struck by armed conflict, environmental disaster, or other extraordinary upheaval. Enacted by Congress in 1990, the program largely escaped attention and controversy for many years as presidential administrations of both parties designated, extended, and terminated TPS designations at similar rates. However, beginning in 2017, then-President Trump tried to end TPS protections for 300,000 beneficiaries—more than 95% of the total. His efforts were blocked in federal district courts, and President Biden has since rescinded the terminations and issued many new designations, expanding the program to its largest size ever and protecting hundreds of thousands of vulnerable migrants. Nonetheless, the future of TPS is more uncertain than ever now that it has become as politically polarizing as many other aspects of the national immigration debate. Many TPS holders have now held the temporary status for over two decades, and they deserve a solution to enable them to reside permanently in the U.S. Some scholars have proposed legislative reforms to enable long-time TPS holders to qualify for green cards while also making modest adjustments to the program that would make it more temporary in nature for the future. But efforts to provide a path to permanent residence for long-time TPS holders through legislation are unlikely to be fruitful in the current political climate. Meanwhile, newer TPS beneficiaries, who are fleeing armed conflict and civil strife in countries like Afghanistan, Haiti, and Venezuela, are plagued by slow processing times of their applications, keeping them out of the formal labor market, and they often remain stuck in immigration removal proceedings, which is unnecessary, costly, and could put them in greater danger of removal if a future administration terminates their TPS designation. This Article argues that this and future administrations should build on the accomplishment of extending humanitarian protection to hundreds of thousands of new beneficiaries by taking additional executive actions to benefit both long-time and new TPS beneficiaries, including designating and redesignating more countries for TPS, terminating removal proceedings for those who are eligible for TPS, and creating a parole program that will help longtime TPS holders eventually attain permanent residency.

Ohio State Legal Studies Research Paper No. 879, Buffalo Law Review, Volume 72, pp. 101-168, 

By National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and MedicineNational Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine

Individuals from minoritized racial and ethnic groups continue to face systemic barriers that impede their ability to access, persist, and thrive in science, technology, engineering, mathematics, and medicine (STEMM) higher education and workforce. Without actively dismantling policies and practices that disadvantage people from minoritized groups, STEMM organizations stand to lose much needed talent and innovation as well as the ideas that come from having a diverse workforce. A new report from the Board on Behavioral, Cognitive, and Sensory Sciences examines the backdrop of systemic racism in the United States that has harmed and continues to harm people from minoritized groups, which is critical for understanding the unequal representation in STEMM. The report outlines actions that top leaders and gatekeepers in STEMM organizations, such as presidents and chief executive officers, can take to foster a culture and climate of antiracism, diversity, equity, and inclusion that is genuinely accessible and supportive to all.

Washington, DC: National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, 2023. 342p

By Heizler (Cohen), Odelia, Israeli, Osnat

Dramatic events can evoke feelings of compassion, fear, or threat, and can affect public opinion regarding controversial issues. Such an event was the drowning of 3-year-old Alan Kurdi, a Syrian boy whose body washed up on a Turkish shore, and was photographed, producing an iconic image that was seen worldwide. The image evoked empathy and compassion that neuroscience and psychological research associate with a motivation to help. This paper examines the impact of this event on four different aspects of attitudes toward immigration, some of which are more closely linked to pro-social behavior than others. The timing of the European Social Survey in Portugal allowed us to use this tragic event as a natural experiment. Our results show that Kurdi's drowning had a significant effect on emotion-related sentiments, but no such impact was detected on other attitudes. The results suggest that the event did not change the respondents' opinion regarding the possible negative consequences of immigration on the host country's economy, crime level, or culture, nor did it change their perception of the skills required by immigrants. On the other hand, the empathy induced by the tragic event increased their willingness to have a less restrictive immigration policy and their openness to having close social relationships with immigrants.

Bonn: Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), 2024. 34p.

By The University of Washington, Center for Human Rights

2019’s Keep Washington Working (KWW) Act and 2020’s Courts Open to All Act (COTA) place Washington state at the forefront of national efforts to protect immigrant rights through state law. Yet the mere passage of these laws doesn’t mean they’re actually being enforced. After 18 months of research evaluating the implementation of KWW and COTA through the analysis of practices in 13 priority counties, this first report of the University of Washington Center for Human Rights (UWCHR) “Immigrant Rights Observatory” shares several key findings. Because the local police and sheriffs have historically played a significant role in bringing Washingtonians into contact with federal immigration enforcement, this report focuses on the ways in which law enforcement agencies and jails have implemented KWW. Key findings include the following:

• Law enforcement agencies across our state are dedicating energy and effort to KWW implementation—though not, for the most part, using the Attorney General Office’s model policies designed to provide guidance to local agencies on this process.

• Everyday policing still blurs into opportunities for federal immigration enforcement. Despite KWW’s prohibitions on the sharing of non-public information about immigrant Washingtonians with ICE/CBP for purposes of civil immigration enforcement, some local police and sheriff’s deputies continued to summon federal agents to the scene of traffic stops, to provide tips about the location of specific individuals, and to participate in multi-agency task force operations that include civil immigration arrests.

• Washington jails and prisons remain key points in the pipeline to immigration detention and deportation. In the booking process, some jails continued to request place of birth information that the law bars them from gathering, and to share it—as well as other information—with ICE/CBP. Detainers, or “immigration holds” which request jails keep custody of individuals beyond their release date to facilitate their apprehension by ICE/CBP, continued to be honored in multiple jurisdictions.

• Jail contracts in flux. KWW mandates Washington’s jails to cease holding immigrants in civil detention under contract with ICE/CBP by December 2021; in anticipation of this date, at least two jails have already terminated the practice. However, one other jail has indicated it expects to continue its contract with CBP beyond that date, using probable cause statements from CBP to justify the detention as criminal rather than civil detention.

• Areas unaddressed by the law remain cause for concern. These include regular DOC-ICE release notifications, local/federal database interoperability, and other ways in which immigrants with criminal recormcnairds—not necessarily even convictions—experience law enforcement and the justice system in dramatically different ways than other Washingtonians, solely because of their citizenship.

Seattle: University of Washington, Center for Human Rights. 2021

By The University of Washington, Center for Human Rights

In 2019, the Washington state legislature passed a landmark “sanctuary” law aimed at safeguarding immigrant rights, the Keep Washington Working Act (KWW). In doing so, it prohibits many once-routine practices that, in the past, funneled many Washington state residents into contact with federal immigration enforcement. While many migrant justice organizations worked hard to secure the law’s passage, in achieving victory they also faced an important challenge. The law’s requirements are sweeping, but the provisions for its enforcement – its “teeth” – are quite modest. Unlike the Sanctuary Promise Act subsequently passed in Oregon, Keep Washington Working does not task any agency with monitoring or responding to violations of the law. And it does not contain a private right of action, which would incentivize efforts to secure compliance by allowing individuals or organizations to recover damages from jurisdictions that violate the law. Indeed,  in the early days of the law, some jurisdictions openly indicated their intention to flout its provisions, signaling that implementation challenges were likely ahead. Since 2020 the UWCHR has examined the law’s implementation, both in policy and practice, across Washington. In this context, it is not easy to know whether the law has accomplished the changes it promised for Washington’s communities. For this reason, since 2020 the UWCHR has examined the law’s implementation, both in policy and practice, across Washington. While real-time monitoring of conditions in communities across the state exceeds our capacity, we conducted this work by sampling areas and practices identified as high priority concerns by partner organizations, including the Washington Defender Association, Northwest Immigrant Rights Project, ACLU of Washington, Columbia Legal Services, OneAmerica, and Washington Immigrant Solidarity Network, and using public records requests to document patterns of concern.6 We also rely on analysis of quantitative data obtained from ICE through requests and litigation under the federal Freedom of Information Act to track enforcement trends in our state in ways that shed light on shifting practices. (We anticipate publication of a full report on those trends in the weeks ahead.) Our first report on KWW’s impact, “Protecting Immigrant Rights: Is Washington’s Law Working?”, was published in August 2021, and identified areas of progress as well as concern. Today, we offer an update on the law five years after its entry into force. While concerns about lack of compliance remain, and we note some of these below, we also highlight some of the behind-the-scenes ways that advocates in civil society and government have acted to ensure the law is effectively securing protections for the rights of migrants in Washington. 

Seattle: The University of Washington Center for Human Rights 2024. 20p.