By: Office of Intelligence and Analysis

The Homeland faces a complex set of threats to our public safety, border security, critical infrastructure, and economy from violent extremists, transnational criminal organizations (TCOs), adversarial nation-states, and malicious cyber actors. These threats, while varied in scope and intended purpose, at times compound one another in unexpected ways, harming our communities and generating costly disruptions to the US economy. Meanwhile, technological advances, climate change, and natural disasters have the potential to exacerbate many of the aforementioned threats.

PUBLIC SAFETY AND SECURITY: Over the next year, the terrorism threat environment in the Homeland will remain high. We are particularly concerned about a confluence of factors this year, including violent extremist responses to domestic sociopolitical developments—especially the 2024 election cycle—and international events that domestic and foreign violent extremists likely will use to justify or encourage attacks in the Homeland. Lone offenders and small groups continue to pose the greatest threat of carrying out attacks with little to no warning. Meanwhile, foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs) and their supporters will maintain their enduring intent to conduct or inspire attacks in the Homeland.

In addition, the production, trafficking, and sale of illegal drugs by transnational and domestic criminal actors will continue to pose the most lethal threat to communities in the United States. Fentanyl and other synthetic opioids remain the most lethal of drugs trafficked into the country, but small increases in overdoses linked to cocaine and methamphetamine highlight the danger from other drug types.

We expect the Homeland also will face threats to public safety from state actors using subversive tactics in an effort to influence and divide the American public and undermine confidence in our institutions. Many of these actors—in particular, the People’s Republic of China (PRC)—also target v U.S. Department of Homeland Security ethnic and religious minorities, political dissidents, and journalists in the United States to silence and harass critical voices, violating our sovereignty and the rule of law.

The 2024 election cycle will be an attractive target for many adversaries. Some domestic violent extremists (DVEs) likely view a wide range of targets indirectly and directly associated with elections as viable targets for violence with the intent of instilling fear among voters, candidates, and election workers, as well as disrupting election processes leading up to and after the November election. Nation-state-aligned foreign malign influence actors almost certainly will continue to target democratic processes with the aims of affecting US voter preferences, exacerbating social tensions, and undermining confidence in our democratic institutions and the integrity of the electoral process.

BORDER AND IMMIGRATION SECURITY: Migrant encounters at our border have declined over the last year, but migrants are still arriving in high numbers, complicating border and immigration security. As overall encounters have declined, so too have encounters with individuals in the Terrorist Screening Data Set, also known as the “terrorism watchlist,” which includes individuals associated with information indicating they may be directly engaged in or supporting terrorist activities as well as known associates of watchlisted individuals, such as family members. For several years prior to this year's decline, terrorism watchlist encounters had increased, a trend consistent with the overall increase in migrant encounters at the southwest border.

CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY: Domestic and foreign adversaries almost certainly will continue to threaten the integrity of our critical infrastructure with disruptive and destructive cyber and physical attacks, in part, because they perceive targeting these sectors will have cascading impacts on US industries and our standard of living. The PRC, Russia, and Iran will remain the most pressing foreign threats to our critical infrastructure. Most concerningly, we expect the PRC to continue its efforts to pre-position on US networks for potential cyber attacks in the event of a conflict with the United States. Nation-states, criminal hacktivists, and financially motivated criminals will likely hone their techniques to disrupt US services or to conduct espionage focused on gaining access to US networks, including critical infrastructure entities. We assess that domestic and foreign violent extremists will continue to call for physical attacks on critical infrastructure in furtherance of their ideological goals and, at times, in response to international conflicts and crises.

ECONOMIC SECURITY: Multifaceted and diverse economic threats—primarily from the PRC—will likely continue to harm US producers and consumers and degrade the competitiveness and future health of US companies and industries. The PRC likely will remain our greatest economic security threat because of its aggressive use of anticompetitive, coercive policies and theft of US intellectual property, technology, and trade secrets. Lastly, we expect our supply chains will remain vulnerable to foreign manipulation abroad, which could harm global productivity and consumer demand.

U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2024

MAY COTAIN MARKUP

By Kieran McConaghy

State Dynamics in Counter-Terrorism: The book challenges the view of the state as a unitary actor, emphasizing the importance of intra-state dynamics and the individual identities of state personnel in shapingcounter-terrorism responses.

Case Studies: It provides comparative analyses of Spain, France, and theUnited Kingdom, highlighting how state responses to terrorism are influenced by historical and cultural contexts.

Emotional and Political Impetus: The book discusses how emotional reactions and political motivations of state personnel impact counter-terrorism strategies, sometimes leading to actions driven by revenge or political gain.

Recommendations for Future Research: It suggests that future studies on counter-terrorism should consider the complexities of the state and the emotional and organizational factors that influence stateactions.

Springer, Aug 22, 2017, 182 pages

MAY COTAIN MARKUP

Edited by Ozgur Nikbay & Suleyman Hancerli

Understanding TerrorismThis section delves into the psychological profiles of terrorists, theuse of the internet by terrorists, the potential threat of bioterrorism, and the socio-economic factors contributing to terrorism. It emphasizes the importance of education in combating terrorism and understanding the true motives behind terrorist acts.

Suicide Attacks, Radical Terrorism, and Case StudiesThis part examines the characteristics and motivations behind suicide attacks, the rise of radical Islam in post-Soviet states, and includes case studies of terrorist incidents. It also explores the financing of terrorism through narcoterrorism and the spatial patterns of terrorist incidents.

Strategies and Tactics for Dealing with Terrorist Hostage Sieges, Hijackings, andKidnappingsThis section discusses various strategies and tactics for handling terrorist hostage situations, including negotiation strategies, the psychological aspects of kidnappings, and the importance of proper training and preparation for law enforcement agencies.

Counter-Terrorism Policies: Lessons for the FutureThe final section explores different counter-terrorism policies and strategies, such as situational crime prevention, democratic policing, the role of intelligence in counter-terrorism, and the need for international cooperation. It emphasizes the importance of maintaining public trust and preventing the radicalization of individuals.

IOS Press, 2007, 431 pages

By Gonzalo Saiz and Stephen Reimer

Concern about the so-called ‘crime–terror nexus’, a centrepiece of discussion, debate and research in the counterterrorism field, has yielded a vast body of academic and policy literature regarding the nature of symbiotic relationships between organised criminal formations and terrorist organisations. Recognising a spectrum of possible synergies – including direct interactions between criminals and terrorists, the adoption of criminal tactics by terrorists, and even the merging of these artificial categories altogether in certain cases – regard for the ‘crime–terror nexus’ has largely ignored the question of whether and how relationships between crime and terrorism may yield opportunities for terrorist financing, particularly in the European context. Such uncertainty risks giving way to speculation about the true extent of what might be called ‘crime-enabled terrorist financing’ (CETF), speculation driven in part by contemporary examples of petty criminality having played a significant role in the financing of violent terrorist attacks in Europe in the recent past. Should distinct linkages between crime and terrorist financing be identified, entry points for disruption by law enforcement may arise, and it is for this purpose that the research for this paper was conducted. The paper queries the nature and extent of CETF in Europe, including the importance of this financing stream in relation to others. In doing so, the paper also evaluates the present policy and law enforcement response to CETF, and endeavours to assess whether it is properly calibrated to the degree and character of the threat. The paper finds that terrorists and their financiers do indeed exploit European criminal markets for acquiring important materiel and raising funds, but that CETF is not a dominant form of terrorist financing for most actors, though not all. Specific foreign-based terrorist organisations that use Europe as an economic staging ground to finance violence committed overseas were revealed as the most likely to engage in CETF in Europe, and the most competent at doing so. That these groups typically do not (and are unlikely to) launch violent attacks within Europe means a prime motivator for countering their CETF activity is lacking, which along with other conditions poses a challenge to law enforcement agencies. Overall, Europe’s CETF problem is not its dominant terrorist-financing threat, though a proportionate reconfiguration of its counterterrorist financing response is needed to preclude terrorist organisations from abusing Europe’s economy to finance destabilising operational activity in its near neighbourhood.

Brussels; London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies RUSI, 2023. 54p

By Megan K. McBride, Kaia Haney, Michelle Strayer, and Jessica Stern

Despite the focus on suicide terrorism over the past 20 years—particularly by media outlets, policy-makers, and academics—scholarship regarding suicidality in domestic terrorism remains sparse. The post-9/11 research related to suicidality in terrorism has largely focused on the suicide terrorism of Islamist extremists. The research that touches on domestic terrorism, however, is both limited and inconclusive. Lankford, for example, has argued that suicidality is one of three key similarities between perpetrators of suicide terrorism and perpetrators of mass shootings. But a 2017 article by Freilich et al., whose research focused on far-right and jihadi attacks in the US, found that suicide attackers were no more likely than non-suicide attackers to have previously attempted suicide. By contrast, suicidality among those who carry out public shootings is well documented. Jillian Peterson and James Densley, leveraging The Violence Prevention Project’s (TVPP’s) Mass Shooter Database, found that 70 percent of the 197 individuals who committed mass shootings over the past 60 years either had a history of suicidality or intended to die carrying out their attack. Retrospective research by the US Secret Service on school shooters from 1974 to 2000 found that at least 78 percent had experienced suicidal thoughts or engaged in suicidal behavior before their attack. And an analysis leveraging the Columbia Mass Murder Database found that nearly half of all mass shooters died by suicide at the scene of their attack. Mass shootings, as Peterson and Densley have noted, may in fact be “crimes of despair.” We leveraged a new dataset—the Domestic Terrorism Offender Level Database (DTOLD)—to explore whether domestic terrorism attacks may also be crimes of despair. The database captures publicly available information (e.g., media reporting, court records) on the life histories of 320 individuals who carried out a non-Islamist terrorist attack in the United States between January 1, 2001, and December 31, 2020. Our data suggest that domestic terrorists in general may be more suicidal than the general population but significantly less suicidal than mass shooters except when domestic terrorists kill four or more people (notably, four is the number of deaths required for a shooting to meet the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s definition of a mass shooting). DTOLD contains three variables relevant to the question of suicidality: history of suicidality (including suicide attempts and suicidal ideation), intention to die while committing a terrorist attack, and death by suicide during or immediately after a terrorist attack. Collecting data on suicidality is difficult, but 19.3 percent (62) of the individuals in DTOLD have been coded positively for at least one of the three indicators of suicidality. This rate is notably higher than the rate calculated by the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, which is 4.37 percent for men (89 percent of those in DTOLD are men). This rate is still lower, however, than TVPP’s rate of 70 percent among mass shooters.

Arlington, VA: CNA, 2024. 4p

By Megan K. McBride and Monique Jenkins

Within the public violence literature—that is, the literature on domestic terrorism, mass shootings, school shootings, and hate crimes, among others—leakage has been identified as a core warning behavior. Leakage occurs when a would be assailant communicates an intention to harm a target before committing an attack.1 This communication can vary in timing, level of detail, form, intentionality, and audience.2 Through such a communication, an individual might directly verbalize an intent to commit an act, make more subtle threats and innuendos, or share a plan via social media.3 Researchers have found relatively high levels of leakage associated with acts of public violence, including adolescents perpetrated mass murders,4 mass shootings,5 political and public figure assassinations,6 and domestic terrorism.7 For this reason, leakage—which often occurs in interactions online or with loved ones—can be an important warning sign. But leakage to family, friends, or acquaintances is not the only way to detect when an individual is intending to commit an act of public violence, and over the last decade, researchers have started to examine preattack contact with system stakeholders, such as law enforcement, mental health, and education professionals. For example, one study found that 40 percent* of violent extremists had engaged in a crime before their act of extremist violence.8 Another study reported differences in system contact for lone and group-affiliated actors among American far-right extremists who committed fatal attacks. Specifically, it found that 61.7 percent of lone actors, but just 51.1 percent of group-affiliated extremists had prior arrests.9 In addition, multiple case studies exploring the personal histories of small populations of violent extremists have included information on system contact.10 However, comprehensive research exploring previous contact between system stakeholders and individuals engaged in domestic terrorism is relatively scarce. We sought to advance understanding of what percentage of the violent extremist population could be “catchable” in the sense that an individual had been in previous contact with a system stakeholder (e.g., law enforcement, mental health provider) or had been reported to a system stakeholder (e.g., by a friend or loved one to whom they had intentionally or unintentionally leaked information). To explore this issue, we leveraged a new dataset: the Domestic Terrorism Offender Level Database (DTOLD). The database includes detailed information on the 320 non-Islamist individuals who carried out terrorist attacks in the United States between January 1, 2001, and December 31, 2020. Specifically, we sought to understand what percentage of this population was known to system stakeholders at some point before they perpetrated their attacks. 

Arlington VA: CNA, 2024. 4p

By CLARA BROEKAERT, COLIN P. CLARKE, MICHAELA MILLENDER, ANNIKA SCHARNAGL, AND JOSEPH SHELZI

The horrific attacks by Hamas on October 7, 2023, fundamentally shifted the security posture of the Middle East, while also having severe humanitarian consequences and ripple effects in countries throughout the globe, including many in the West. This TSC Special Report, generously sponsored by the Airey Neave Trust, aims to explore how October 7 impacted several Western countries, including the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Italy. While the conflict remains ongoing – and indeed will reverberate long after the fighting actually ends — this report attempts to take the pulse of five Western countries just shy of the one-year anniversary marking the attack.

Perhaps unsurprisingly, and in line with trends that have been unfolding in recent years, there has been a spike in both Islamophobic and antisemitic incidents across all five countries — it is not an either/or phenomena. Still, the data underpinning these incidents remains challenging, limited, and frequently incomplete, often collected by civil society groups or non-profit organizations with different definitions of the terms. Government data varies on how it is collected, if it is recorded at all, across local, state, and federal levels. This makes it exceedingly difficult to compare the data rigorously and make generalizable conclusions with confidence. The data that is available, however, does suggest that extremist groups are leveraging the conflict to promulgate and amplify preexisting antisemitic and Islamophobic narratives. In other words, the terrorist attacks of October 7 and the Israeli response provide an opportunity to promote their hateful narratives and repackage them for the moment, often inciting their followers to wreak havoc and pushing their supporters to engage in violence.

New York: The Soufan Center, 2024.63p.

May Contain Markup

Edited by Helen Fein

Definitions of Genocide: The book explores various definitions of genocide, highlighting the limitations of the U.N. Genocide Conventionand proposing broader sociological definitions.

Recognition and Denial: It discusses the challenges in recognizing and labeling genocides, including the role of media and state motives in denial and misinformation.

Prevention and Punishment: The book examines approaches to preventing genocide and holding perpetrators accountable, includingreflections on historical cases and legal frameworks.

Role of Refugees: Refugees are highlighted as contemporary witnesses to genocide, with their testimonies providing crucial evidence andinsights into ongoing atrocities.

SAGE Publications, 1993, 204 pages

MCBRIDE, MEGAN K.; JENKINS, MONIQUE

From the document: "Within the public violence literature--that is, the literature on domestic terrorism, mass shootings, school shootings, and hate crimes, among others--leakage has been identified as a core warning behavior. Leakage occurs when a would be assailant communicates an intention to harm a target before committing an attack. This communication can vary in timing, level of detail, form, intentionality, and audience. Through such a communication, an individual might directly verbalize an intent to commit an act, make more subtle threats and innuendos, or share a plan via social media. Researchers have found relatively high levels of leakage associated with acts of public violence, including adolescent-perpetrated mass murders, mass shootings, political and public figure assassinations, and domestic terrorism. For this reason, leakage--which often occurs in interactions online or with loved ones--can be an important warning sign. But leakage to family, friends, or acquaintances is not the only way to detect when an individual is intending to commit an act of public violence, and over the last decade, researchers have started to examine preattack contact with system stakeholders, such as law enforcement, mental health, and education professionals. [...] We sought to advance understanding of what percentage of the violent extremist population could be 'catchable' in the sense that an individual had been in previous contact with a system stakeholder (e.g., law enforcement, mental health provider) or had been reported to a system stakeholder (e.g., by a friend or loved one to whom they had intentionally or unintentionally leaked information). To explore this issue, we leveraged a new dataset: the Domestic Terrorism Offender Level Database (DTOLD). The database includes detailed information on the 320 non-Islamist individuals who carried out terrorist attacks in the United States between January 1, 2001, and December 31, 2020. Specifically, we sought to understand what percentage of this population was known to system stakeholders at some point before they perpetrated their attacks." Further information for this document can be found here: www.cna.org/reports/2024/08/domestic-terrorists-contact-with-system-stakeholders-before-attacks

CNA CORPORATION. 2024. 4p.

By André Duffles, Teixeira Araneg and Ariel Faccioli Fernandes

Grounded on an extensive literature review derived from evidence-based studies (e.g., scientific articles, institutional and technical reports, journalistic evidence, academic books, and book chapters), our article develops a qualitative analysis to address the following question: to what extent do the strategic motivations of states and organized crime groups converge/diverge in the context of the current Russo-Ukrainian conflict? This article is divided into three parts. The initial section delves into the interconnections between illicit markets and armed conflicts. Secondly, after acknowledging the background of organized crime in both countries and the emergence of the current Russo-Ukrainian war, it highlights the implications of this conflict on the dynamics of illicit markets. Finally, it analyzes the strategic motivations of states and organized crime within this setting, as well as its points of convergence and divergence. This research potentially explores the frequently wicked ties of (inter)national politics and criminal adaptation during (post-)war times in Eastern Europe and within the international system.

Journal of Illicit Economies and Development, 6(2): pp. 48–60. 2024.

By  Lisa N. Sacco

The federal government defines domestic terrorism (DT) as ideologically driven crimes committed by individuals in the United States that are intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population or influence the policy or conduct of a government. Federal definitions of DT are found in the USA PATRIOT Act (18 U.S.C. §2331), the Homeland Security Act (6 U.S.C. §101), and Title 28 of the Code of Federal Regulations (§0.85). Aside from the statutory and regulatory definitions of DT, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has historically emphasized particular qualities inherent to the actors who engage in DT. According to the FBI, domestic terrorists are Americans who commit violence to achieve their goals that stem from domestic, extremist ideological influence and lack of foreign direction or influence. This conceptualization excludes ideologically driven crimes committed in the United States by individuals whose actions are directed or motivated by foreign groups. Analyst in Illicit Drugs and Crime Policy How the federal government defines conceptualizes and shapes the nation’s understanding of it as criminal conduct and as a policy issue. Domestic terrorists (and the crimes they commit) are labeled as such because their actions are directed against the civilian population and/or U.S. government within the boundaries of the United States. Like foreign terrorism, domestic terrorism involves ideologically driven criminal acts aimed at influencing the government or coercing the population. Unlike foreign terrorism, the federal government does not have a mechanism to formally charge an individual with DT, which sometimes makes it difficult (and occasionally controversial) to formally characterize someone as a domestic terrorist. Further, domestic terrorists may adhere to the ideologies of certain extremist movements or belong to hate or extremist groups, but unlike the formal process involved in designating foreign terrorist organizations, DT movements and groups are not officially labeled as such by the federal government, thereby making it difficult to categorize the threat presented by any group or movement as a DT threat. While some observers may look to terrorism-related incidents, investigations, and arrests to help understand the scope of the DT threat, these data are limited. DT incidents have a low occurrence rate but a high impact, and the federal government has a significant role in combatting the threat of DT. In 2021, the FBI and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued the nation’s first national strategy for countering the DT threat. The strategy identifies DT threats to include potentially unlawful use or threats of force or violence in furtherance of ideological agendas from racially or ethnically motivated violent extremists, anti-government or anti-authority violent extremists (further broken down to include militia violent extremists, anarchist violent extremists, and sovereign citizen violent extremists), animal rights/environmental violent extremists, and abortion-related violent extremists. How the government defines and combats DT and extremism is complicated for many reasons. Believing in or expressing extremist ideals and/or vocalizing support for DT incidents are not violations of federal law. If an individual in the United States espouses extremist beliefs, such as anarchy or the superiority of the white race, that behavior is generally protected speech under the First Amendment. Expressions of these beliefs sometimes precede DT incidents, and in hindsight, some may question why these incidents could not be prevented. Crossing the line from First Amendment-protected activity, such as a peaceful protest, to DT-related violence can happen quickly; however, there is often little law enforcement can do in response to extremist but protected speech. Despite the statutory definition of DT in Title 18 of the U.S. Code, no federal criminal provision expressly prohibits “domestic terrorism.” While DT is defined in federal statute, the term domestic terrorist is not used to officially label any group (as it is with foreign terrorist organizations). However, federal law enforcement has referred (in some instances such as congressional testimony) to individuals as domestic terrorists and their crimes as DT. Going forward, Congress may consider any number of legislative options regarding the federal government’s approach to defining and confronting DT, including (1) enactment of a DT charging statute; (2) the utility and consequences of applying the DT label in federal policy; (3) allocation of additional, less, or equivalent appropriations to address DT; and (4) adjustments to DT data collection requirements for federal agencies.  

Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 2023. 27p.