By The National Institute for Criminal Justice Reform (NICJR) h

Police departments in the United States are charged with a broad set of responsibilities, and officers typically have little specialized training in the breadth of complex issues they encounter. Police are asked to respond to robberies and homicides, but they also enforce traffic rules and respond to noise complaints, domestic disputes, mental health crises, unhoused individuals, and more. Simply put, police are asked to do too much with too little. The National Institute for Criminal Justice Reform (NICJR) has conducted multiple studies analyzing the type and severity of calls for service (CFS; i.e., 911 calls) in a variety of police departments across the country, finding across the board that CFS are overwhelmingly for noncriminal or low-level incidents. For example, according to NICJR’s analysis of Oakland Police Department (OPD) calls for service data, between 2018– 2020, nearly 60% of calls responded to by OPD were for noncriminal matters. This amounted to more than 368,000 responses. And in Seattle, NICJR found that 79% of calls received were noncriminal or low-level events, and only 6% of calls were associated with felonies of any kind, violent or nonviolent.1 For this report, NICJR analyzed CFS data as well as police department (PD) budgets for 10 California cities and eight cities in other US states. Across all 18 cities:

Oakland, CA: The National Institute for Criminal Justice Reform (NICJR) , 2025. 56p

By Iain Britton

The Commonwealth of Massachusetts has a proud tradition of volunteers in law enforcement stretching back to colonial times (Greenberg, 2015). Until very recently many police departments, large and small, had volunteer auxiliary police. Many of which had existed essentially in their current forms since the 1940s and 1950s (Spigel, 2017). This reflects the abundant picture of tens of thousands of volunteer auxiliary and reserve police in hundreds of law enforcement agencies across most states in the USA (Dobrin and Wolf, 2016). Sadly, recent changes have seen the auxiliary model in Massachusetts almost entirely administratively swept away. What was a large, and in many ways thriving, and highly impactful, volunteer auxiliary policing model in Massachusetts, has all but gone. Changes in ‘POST’,The Massachusetts Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST) Commission1 certification standards at state level across Massachusetts, had the effect of wiping out all but a tiny number of auxiliary units. This rapid extinction event removed volunteer auxiliary police almost overnight from their communities across Massachusetts, communities that many of those individual auxiliaries had served in with dedication for decades. This represents the largest single volunteer police extinction event in the USA for decades. It serves as a worrying harbinger for volunteer policing more widely, especially in other states across the USA but also worldwide. Heralding the very real and urgent strategic threat to continuity of volunteer police programmes. Something that is resonant in the UK, as we see for the twelfth successive year an annual reduction in the number of volunteer special constables.2 Across the USA and internationally, some volunteer police models are thriving, with volunteer police impacting in a wide range of ways (Wolf and Borland Jones, 2018). Some are growing or innovating – the Netherlands, Estonia and Hungary are strong national examples, with significant scale, and interesting innovation of roles. However, many more programmes are struggling to survive (Britton, 2024). Many volunteer police programmes around the world are struggling to maintain sustainable numbers, with the combined headwinds of generational changes in reduced patterns of voluntarism, unfavourable attitudes towards police volunteers, volunteer police models with too narrow appeal and accessibility, and increasingly hostile public perceptions of policing particularly in respect of conduct, race, and misogyny. Despite strong evidence of return on investment (Britton et al., 2023) many forces are also struggling to effectively adapt and redefine the role, capability, professional identities and operating models for the volunteer police officer in a fast-changing, and ever more complex, litigious, dangerous and contested policing environment (Britton and Callender, 2018). Retention of longer-service volunteers is proving in many contexts to be a particular challenge (Britton, 2023).

London: The Police Foundation, 2025. 7p.

By Gabrielle T. Isaza, Ryan T. Motz, Hannah D. McManus, Nicholas Corsaro, and Amanda M. Shoulberg

The report “Examining Police Reforms in New Jersey: Impacts on Officer Attitudes and Self-Reported Behavior” is the first of a series of publications presenting the findings from the statewide evaluation of police use of force reform in New Jersey.

It describes the research team’s examination of the impact of the mandated training—including the Police Executive Research Forum’s Integrating Communications, Assessment, and Tactics (ICAT) de-escalation training and Georgetown University’s Active Bystandership for Law Enforcement (ABLE) peer intervention training—on officers’ perceptions, attitudes, and self-

reported behaviors.

The findings represent offics’ responses to training surveys immediately before, after, and one to two years following their training participation. The high response rates to the surveys—ranging from 12,623 to 17,036 responses at pre- and post-training—offer insights representative of law enforcement officers across New Jersey.

Arlington, VA: National Policing Institute, 2025. 217p.

By Andy Higgins

The Police Foundation’s Blueprints project explores the design choices made by English and Welsh police forces in the delivery of local policing – specifically in relation to the operating models they adopt to provide incident response, neighbourhood policing, local investigation and public protection. It takes as its starting point the considerable diversification and frequent change in local policing models that has occurred within and between police forces over the last one to two decades.

Project aims

Describe and (as far as possible) codify, the variety of local police operating models being practised across England and Wales, explain why they have developed and explore the rationales behind them.

Investigate what (if anything) can be concluded about the strengths and weaknesses of different approaches, based on quantitative performance

analysis (where possible) and local experiences and learning.

Look, in-depth, at the way policing models enable and constrain police practitioners working in four functional areas: incident response, neighbourhood policing, local investigation and public protection.

Explore what can be learned from the way local policing is organised in other countries.

Assess the suitability of different design options against future policing challenges, drawing on the analysis presented in the Strategic Review of Policing in England and Wales, and focusing on strategic enablers such as preventative partnership and public cooperation.

The Police Foundation, 2024. 21p.

By Jessica M. Eaglin

Much public debate circles around grassroots activists’ demand to “defund the police,” raised in public consciousness in the summer of 2020. Yet confusion about the demand is pervasive. This Essay adopts a literal interpretation of “defund” to clarify and distinguish four alternative, substantive policy positions that legal reforms related to police funding can validate. It argues that the policy debates between these positions exist on top of the ideological critique launched by grassroots activists, who use the term “defund the police” as a discursive tactic to make visible deeper transformations in government practices that normalize the structural marginalization of black people enforced through criminal law. w. By recognizing this socially contextualized meaning to the call to defund the police, this Essay offers two important insights for the public in this current moment. First, it urges the public to confront the structural marginalization of black people when evaluating legal reforms that may impact police budgets. Second, the Essay encourages the public to embrace the state of confusion produced by the demand to “defund the police” when considering social reforms going forward.

Stanford Law Review Online Volume 73 (2020-2021), 21p.

By The College of Policing (UK)

The government’s Safer Streets mission aims to reduce serious harm and increase public confidence in policing and the wider criminal justice system. This guide supports senior police leaders and police and crime commissioners to help achieve this mission. It clearly sets out the best available evidence on public confidence in the police, as well as the policing activities that are most likely to have an impact. „ Implementing neighbourhood policing – Having a targeted visible presence in crime and anti-social behaviour hot spots or places with low trust. – Community engagement to identify the crime and anti-social behaviour issues that matter to people locally. – Carrying out effective problem-solving to tackle the issues that matter the most to local people. „ Policing with procedural and distributive justice – Making fair decisions and treating people respectfully. – Not being seen to over-police and under-protect communities. „ Improving police contact with victims – Responding to the needs and concerns of victims. – Focusing as much on the process as the end result. „ Improving police contact with suspects – Minimising the number of negative experiences. – Explaining enforcement action and preserving people’s dignity. „ Tackling police wrongdoing – Working within the law and adhering to ethical and professional standards. The guide begins by providing key definitions and trends in public perceptions over the past 20 years. It ends with a summary of what else may be important to public confidence in the police.

Coventry, UK: College of Policing Limited (2025) 23p.

By George Shaler, Alison Grey, Lucy Tumavicus, Tara Wheeler, Clare Murray, Robyn Dumont

In the immediate aftermath of George Floyd’s killing four years ago, many people campaigned for police reform to hold law enforcement more accountable for their actions. At the same time, many law enforcement supporters pushed back, maintaining that in the midst of the pandemic and surge in crime that followed, a more robust law enforcement presence was needed. In response to the demand for greater accountability, various legislative and policy proposals were put forth. Most notably, in June 2020, the George Floyd Justice in Policing Act, H.R. 7120, was introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives. The bill would have held law enforcement officers accountable for misconduct in court, improved transparency through data collection, and reformed police training and policies. It would have required federal uniformed officers to wear body-worn cameras (BWCs) and would have required state and local law enforcement to use existing federal funds to ensure the use of those cameras.

While this legislation passed the House in both the 116th and 117th Congress, it failed to gain passage in the Senate each time and was not enacted. Despite this failure, among police reform initiatives, the use of body-worn cameras has received the most widespread bipartisan support. While some reformers would like to quicken the pace, the adoption of BWCs by local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies continues to increase. Here in Maine, local, state, and federal funding has enabled agencies to purchase BWCs and implement their use.

Today, when high-profile events occur, there is often both an expectation that video footage exists and public pressure on law enforcement officials to release that footage. Civilians view the mere presence of a body-worn camera as the most important tool in the evaluation of allegations of use of force in police-civilian encounters. However, citizen access to BWC video depends on location. Each state has its own public records law that determines when and how the public may have access to BWC footage. Some states, like Maine, have not addressed BWC footage specifically. Therefore, the laws governing the release of BWC footage in Maine are aligned with existing public record laws and exemptions that are open to interpretation.

Maine Statistical Analysis Center, University of Southern Maine., 2024. 75p.

By SteVon Felton

The 1991 beating of Rodney King and the subsequent acquittal of the Los Angeles police officers responsible for the attack sparked massive riots and protests across the nation. Following an investigation by the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) Civil Rights Division, Congress granted the attorney general the power to investigate “a pattern or practice of conduct by law enforcement officers that violates Constitutional or federal rights.” In cases of a proven pattern or practice of police misconduct, the court may use a federal, court-enforced order, known as a consent decree, as a mechanism to force police departments to address institutional failures. Under such orders, a law enforcement agency and the Justice Department, overseen by an independent monitor, negotiate and establish concrete benchmarks to determine which reforms will constitute the successful end of the decree. Since the first consent decree in 1994, the Civil Rights Division of the Justice Department has conducted over 65 investigations and entered into 40 reform agreements with police departments across the country. According to the Division, these negotiations are most effective when they can “ensure accountability, transparency and the flexibility to accomplish complex institutional reforms.” Indeed, a number of studies have now confirmed that consent decrees helped resolve management and oversight issues in cities such as Pittsburgh, Los Angeles and Cincinnati.4 However, while federal consent decrees have their place in promoting systemic policy change, they consistently fail to effect local and cultural change within departments. Several factors contribute to this phenomenon. For starters, as is often the case, centralized models like federal consent decrees cannot adequately adjust to localized systems of knowledge and regional distinctions between departments. Because they target local governments rather than individuals, the reform agreements reached by the DOJ and local law enforcement agencies often fail to sustain cultural change.5 Moreover, within some police departments, consent decrees lack the very thing that is perhaps most important to their success—the support of officers. Without buy-in from individual officers, police departments often disregard best practices that they view as externally forced upon them. And because policing is a profession that allows substantial discretion, in some departments officers openly ignore state and federal policies.6 Given the localized nature of police-citizen interactions, a top-down approach to police reform is virtually guaranteed to be unsuccessful. In light of these failures, the New Orleans Police Department’s Ethical Policing is Courageous (EPIC) program provides an alternative structure that begins with officers’ localized knowledge level and ends with systemic change. By allowing officers to police themselves, EPIC utilizes them and their experiences as resources to promote meaningful change

R STREET SHORTS NO. 70 April 2019

Washington, DC: R Street, 2019. 5p.

By Susan Olzak

Though it has had a long history, the recent social movement aimed at stopping police violence against minorities has consistently endorsed policies designed to make police conduct more accountable. This paper analyzes the effects of protest in cities on the establishment of Citizen Review Boards (CRBs) in recent decades. It also examines whether or not the presence of a CRB influences subsequent rates of police-involved fatalities in cities.

Preprint, 2020.

By Lars Trautman and Camille Infantolino

As with so many facets of American life, the arrival of the COVID-19 pandemic hit the criminal justice system like a tsunami, upending existing practices and forcing leaders to rapidly consider new approaches. The fast-spreading, deadly contagion added new urgency to long-festering issues, especially the problems associated with the sheer number of individuals contained within and processed through the system. To protect those working within jails and prisons or those facing the prospect of becoming confined, jurisdictions adopted new policies to reduce the number of individuals entering the system altogether, or at least its correctional facilities. One of the primary ways in which jurisdictions grappled with that priority was by instituting new alternatives to arrest. Across the country, jurisdictions expanded citations in lieu of arrest, deprioritized police stops for minor transgressions, and changed how they received and responded to certain civilian complaints. In each of these instances, the policy shifts suited the COVID-19 situation especially well because of their propensity to reduce unnecessary human contact, particularly in close quarters. Of course, whether jurisdictions retain and even expand these measures, or whether additional jurisdictions follow suit, will depend on more than simply their immediate health benefits. In addition to considering how well the policies lived up to their promises of saving resources, avoiding unproductive police encounters and reducing government interference in individuals’ lives, local authorities will have to weigh the political and public reaction to their introduction. Indeed, one obstacle to alternatives to arrest that has existed since long before the pandemic is fear about how the public will respond to their adoption. Accordingly, the present brief addresses some of these concerns by delving into COVID-19- inspired shifts in alternatives-to-arrest policy and examines how these changes were received in the popular press.

R STREET SHORTS NO. 98 December 2020, 4p.

By: Federico del Castillo

In the broad context of Uruguay’s police reform, the Ministry of Interior is implementing a pilot Problem-Oriented Policing (POP) program in Montevideo since late 2012. This research examined the obstacles confronted by the program throughout its implementation. Using a grounded theory approach, qualitative data was collected through 20 semi-structured interviews with members of the Uruguay National Police (UNP) of different ranks. Findings were analyzed based on the following categories: a) contextual factors; b) theoretical and practical inaccuracies; c) characteristics, skills and actions of project managers; d) resistance and motivational issues; e) resources; f) external support and cooperation. Consistent with research conducted on POP in other settings, findings suggest the program confronted a diverse set of obstacles over its implementation corresponding to all but one of the proposed categories. The study concludes with a series of recommendations to inform future POP endeavors by the UNP.

November 2017

By SHEYLA A. DELGADO, GINA MORENO, FIDEL OSORIO, RICHARD ESPINOBARROS, JEFFREY A. BUTTS JOHN JAY COLLEGE RESEARCH AND EVALUATION CENTER

Researchers at the John Jay College Research and Evaluation Center (JohnJayREC) investigated transit fare evasion in subway stations and station complexes throughout New York City between 2018 and 2023. The study was conducted as part of the New York City Police Reform and Reinvention Collaborative Plan, overseen by the New York City Mayor's Office of Criminal Justice (MOCJ). The research team analyzed associations between fare evasion and arrests reported by the New York City Police Department (NYPD) and considered the social and economic characteristics of the neighborhoods surrounding each transit station. The study found no statistically significant associations between fare evasion enforcements and total arrests for felonies and misdemeanors. Fare evasion enforcement, however, was most prevalent in stations whose neighborhoods were characterized by high socioeconomic disadvantage. The statistical interaction of crime rates, fare evasion enforcement, and socioeconomic disadvantage underscores the role of social factors in public safety.

New York: JOHN JAY COLLEGE RESEARCH AND EVALUATION CENTER, 2024. 15p.

By Jason Johnson and Sean Kennedy

Consent decrees are a blunt instrument for enacting police reform. The approach has proven ill-suited at enacting effective change in law enforcement agencies. These coercive reforms face institutional resistance from departments and their personnel and fall victim to mission creep from the unaccountable lawyers, judges, and bureaucrats who oversee the design and later the implementation of the reforms. The situation worsened significantly as the Obama Administration increased the use of consent decrees, a policy resumed under the Biden Department of Justice. Often built on limited and flimsy evidence, the Justice Department’s allegations against police agencies put local jurisdictions in a near impossible position to contest civil rights violations findings. Additionally, the Justice Department frequently injects its policy preferences into the required remedies that do not reflect urgent or even necessary changes, but policy agenda of the Civil Rights Division and the White House. Subject jurisdictions are often compelled to accept settlements with unachievable compliance goals and required to spend vast sums to remedy problems outside the scope of the statutory requirements. Consent decrees are not a quick, easy, or inexpensive fix. And this type of settlement can have consequences – higher crime, lower police morale, ballooning costs, drifting timelines, and dissatisfied residents. In many cases, consent decrees prove to be damaging boondoggles rather than bolstering effective and constitutional policing. Federal intervention for some agencies may still be necessary but less onerous and more effective tools exist for enacting necessary reforms. Those alternatives should be preferred where possible. The Justice Department’s interventions in law enforcement agencies should be precise in their methods and practicable in their goals. This paper examines:

• the origins and process of police consent decrees;

• the increasing use of consent decrees to enact police reform policies;

• the consequences of police reform by consent decree; and

• the alternative approaches to improving American policing.

Alexandria, VA: Law Enforcement Legal Defense Fund, 2023. 24p.

By Robin S. Engel, Hannah D. McManus, and Gabrielle T. Isaza

In post-Ferguson America, police departments are being challenged to implement evidence-based changes in policies and training to reduce fatal police-citizen encounters. Of the litany of recommendations believed to reduce police shootings, five have garnered widespread support: body-worn cameras, de-escalation training, implicit bias training, early intervention systems, and civilian oversight. These highly endorsed interventions, however, are not supported by a strong body of empirical evidence that demonstrates their effectiveness. guided by the available research on evidence-based policing and informed by the firsthand experience of one of the authors in implementing departmental reforms that followed the fatal shooting of a civilian by an officer, this article highlights promising reform strategies and opportunities to build the evidence base for effective use-of-force reforms. We call upon police executives to engage in evidence-based policing by scientifically testing interventions, and we call on academics to engage in rapid research responses for critical issues in policing.

Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 687(1), 146–165. 2020

By Joanna C. Schwartz

For decades, scholars have debated the extent to which financial sanctions cause government officials to improve their conduct. Yet little attention has been paid to a foundational empirical question underlying these debates: When a plaintiff recovers in a damages action against the government, who foots the bill? In prior work, I found that individual police officers virtually never pay anything toward settlements and judgments entered against them. But this finding prompts another question: Where does the money come from, if not from individual officers? The dominant view among those who have considered this question is that settlements and judgments are usually paid from jurisdictions’ general funds with no financial impact on the involved law enforcement agencies, and some have suggested that agencies would have stronger incentives to improve behavior were they required to pay settlements and judgments from their budgets. But, beyond anecdotal information about the practices in a few large agencies, there has been no empirical inquiry into the source of funds used by governments to satisfy suits involving the police.

In this Article, I report the results of the first nationwide study to examine how cities, counties, and states budget for and pay settlements and judgments in cases against law enforcement. Through public records requests, interviews, and other sources, I have collected information about litigation budgeting practices in one hundred jurisdictions across the country. Based on the practices in these one hundred jurisdictions, I make two key findings. First, settlements and judgments are not always—or even usually—paid from jurisdictions’ general funds; instead, cities, counties, and states use a wide range of budgetary arrangements to satisfy their legal liabilities. All told, half of the law enforcement agencies in my study financially contribute in some manner to the satisfaction of lawsuits brought against them.

Second, having a department pay money out of its budget toward settlements and judgments is neither necessary nor sufficient to impose a financial burden on that department. Some law enforcement agencies pay millions from their budgets each year toward settlements and judgments, but the particularities of their jurisdictions’ budgeting arrangements lessen or eliminate altogether the financial impact of these payments on these agencies. On the other hand, smaller agencies that pay nothing from their budgets toward lawsuits may nevertheless have their very existence threatened if liability insurers raise premiums or terminate coverage in response to large payouts.

63 UCLA L. Rev. 1144 (2016)

By Emilee Green, Brian Kuczynski, Morgan McGuirk and Jessica A. Reichert

Repeated and deadly encounters between law enforcement officers and Black Americans have given way to mounting calls for police reform. Reformers have proposed reallocating funds from policing to communities and social services, rethinking police use of force policies, and improving measures for officer accountability. This literature review briefly describes the impetus for police reform, reviews proposed police reforms, and examines available research on the effectiveness of police reforms. Overall, research indicates police agencies should not only focus on reducing crime, but also protecting and fostering the relationship between the public and police.

Chicago: Illinois 2022. 20p.

By Ian Loader

The question of the police mission – ‘what are the police for?’ – is a recurring and contested one in British public life. So much so that there are good reasons to be weary of another ride over this well-trodden ground. The debate has long circled around the same set of dilemmas, the same binary oppositions. Are the police a law enforcement, crime-fighting agency or are they a 24/7 social service doing whatever is necessary to maintain and repair order? Should they focus on reacting to calls for assistance (so-called fire brigade policing) or be proactively engaged in and with communities seeking to prevent crime and safeguard the vulnerable? Are the police the thin-blue-line that delineate order from chaos and keep the ‘law-abiding majority’ safe or do their powers present an ever-present risk to minority rights and require constant oversight and tight cabining within the rule of law? Debate between these alternatives recurs with seemingly little hope of progress or satisfactory resolution, but rather, it seems, repetitive back and forth between adherents of one pole or another. The value of a further foray into this barren territory is not therefore self-evident. It stands in need of justification. Within police circles, this sense of weary repetition tends to prompt one of two responses. The first is to default to a list of all the tasks that the police are unavoidably called upon to undertake. Such a list typically includes emergency response, crime prevention, criminal investigation, keeping the peace, social service, reassurance, national security, regulating public protest, traffic control and, these days, safeguarding vulnerable groups. This is arguably the approach taken by the 1962 Royal Commission on the Police, who categorised police functions in the following terms: 1. The maintenance of law and order and protection of persons and property. 2. The prevention of crime. 3. The detection of criminals. 4. Controlling of road traffic and advising local authorities on traffic questions. 5. Carrying out certain duties on behalf of government departments. 6. Befriending anyone who needs help and being available at any time to cope with minor or major emergencies

London: Police Foundation, 2020. 20p.

By Cynthia Lum, Christopher S. Koper, and Xiaoyun Wu

The protests following the killing of George Floyd in the summer of 2020 led to contentious discussions and debates in many cities about policing, with some calling to “defund the police.” However, this debate has generally proceeded without adequate research about either the scale or nature of issues that the police handle and the potential consequences of the proposed reform efforts. To respond to this research gap, we analyze millions of 911 calls for service across nine U.S. agencies. We report on the types of calls for service that the police handle, including how frequently different calls arise, how much time agencies spend on different categories of calls, and the outcomes of those calls. We find that the amount and types of incidents for which people call the police are voluminous, with the vast majority not obviously transferable to other organizations or government sectors without significant resource expenditures or adjustments. However, if the police retain these responsibilities, they also need to reconsider how they can more effectively address community concerns.

Police Quarterly 2022, Vol. 25(3) 255–280

By Charles Fain Lehman

In 2019, the Chicago Police Department (CPD)—one of the most controversial police departments in the nation—was placed under a federally enforced consent decree that mandates sweeping reforms and subjects the department to the supervision of a court-appointed independent monitor. Although implementation of the decree is still ongoing, this report reviews the preliminary evidence of its effects. Across a variety of indicators, it seems that the consent decree has not had an appreciable effect on police conduct or public perception of the department. And there is at least some evidence that the process leading up to the consent decree exacerbated Chicago’s already-substantial crime problem. While prior research on consent decrees suggests that they can sometimes have an effect, that outcome is far from certain, casting further doubt on the prospects of Chicago’s decree. Why is the consent decree having little or no measurable impact? It may be the result of unwillingness on the part of CPD and the city to embrace reform. Alternatively, the consent decree’s ineffectiveness may be attributed to preexisting reforms that CPD had already implemented on its own before the decree took effect. Both of these explanations, however, cast doubt on the viability of the federal investigation and consent decree process as a tool for achieving police reform.

New York: The Manhattan Institute, 2023. 21p.

By Roman Gabriel Rivera

There is growing demand for reforms to the U.S. criminal justice system. Nevertheless, there are significant questions and relatively few answers. This dissertation studies multiple U.S. criminal justice system issues using detailed administrative data from Cook County, Illinois: Does policing the police increase crime? Does the composition of a police officer's academy cohort influence their future outcomes? Is pretrial electronic monitoring an attractive alternative to pretrial release and detention? To answer these questions, I use administrative data from Chicago and Cook County, Illinois, on the Chicago Police Department, Cook County Jail, and Circuit Court of Cook County, and a range of econometric methods.

In Chapter 1, I study the effect of pretrial electronic monitoring (EM) as an alternative to pretrial release and pretrial detention (jail) in Cook County, Illinois. EM often involves a defendant wearing an electronic ankle bracelet that tracks their movement and aims to deter pretrial misconduct. Using the quasi-random assignment of bond court judges, I estimate the effect of EM versus release and EM versus detention on pretrial misconduct, case outcomes, and future recidivism. I develop a novel method for the semiparametric estimation of marginal treatment effects in ordered choice environments, with which I construct relevant treatment effects. Relative to release, EM increases new cases pretrial due to bond violations while reducing new cases for low-level crimes and failures to appear in court. Relative to detention, EM increases low-level pretrial misconduct but improves defendant case outcomes and reduces cost-weighted future recidivism. Finally, I bound EM's pretrial crime reduction effect. I find that EM is likely an adequate substitute for pretrial detention. However, it is unclear that EM prevents enough high-cost crime to justify its use relative to release, particularly for defendants who are more likely to be released.

Chapter 3, joint with Bocar Ba, studies and differentiates between the effects of oversight and outrage on policing. Previous studies estimating the impact of police oversight on crime rely on major policing scandals as shocks to examine the impact of oversight on crime. We argue that the simultaneous effect of public outrage on officer behavior and crime contaminates these results, and we provide a conceptual framework that distinguishes between oversight and outrage. We identify two events relating to unexpected court rulings in Chicago that increased oversight and caused a decline in reported misconduct but had virtually no public reaction. Despite the decrease in reported misconduct, crime and officer activity were unaffected. We contrast this with a major policing scandal, after which we find both a rise in crime rates without an equivalent increase in arrests and a decline in officer stops and use of force. Our results suggest that police oversight can reduce misconduct without increasing crime.

New York: Columbia University, 2023. 299p.