By Anyssia S. Kokinos, Nakissa P. Jahanbani,  Jon Lewis, Devorah Margolin,

Executive Summary ● This report aims to provide a comprehensive examination of Hezbollah-affiliated activity in America by examining all publicly-known federal criminal cases from 1997 to 2020 in the United States with a concrete link to Hezbollah. The authors found evidence of 128 individuals that meet these criteria. ● The majority of cases involve small, centralized hubs of Hezbollah operatives, who engage in illegal activities in conjunction with wider criminal enterprises to create an array of networks across America. These relationships of convenience have resulted in Hezbollah operatives collaborating with financially-motivated individuals, criminals, and other nonideological actors, in furtherance of a broader operational mission. These arrangements, in turn, have allowed Hezbollah to profit financially and deepen its influence in the United States, even as many such cases display minimal direct connective links to the terrorist organization itself. ● Based on analysis of the cases, the authors identified two distinct categories of participation in Hezbollah-affiliated activity in America: individuals who provided financial support to Hezbollah (109 individuals), and those who provided operational support (19 individuals). ○ 87% of individuals provided financial or material support to Hezbollah as money launderers, bundlers, fraudsters, and goods smugglers, with many raising funds from others to be provided to Hezbollah or directly providing funds to the group themselves. This finding supports existing assessments that Hezbollah’s primary aspirations in the United States are to use it as a financial support hub. ○ 13% of individuals in the dataset engaged in operational conduct in support of Hezbollah, including as human smugglers, weapons procurers, pre-operational surveillance, and travelers who sought to join the group. Despite the prominence of Hezbollah’s financing activities in the United States, elements within Hezbollah remain intent on developing the capacity and capability to plot attacks on U.S. soil. ● The vast majority (92%) of cases involved network activities between two or more individuals. Larger geographic hubs operated out of Michigan (55 cases), California (19 cases), North Carolina (16 cases), and New York (15 cases). 90% of individuals operating in these four states and 76% of all cases in this dataset were a part of just six networks. ○ Large parts of network activity involved individuals with limited evidence to suggest a direct link to Hezbollah. As discussed above, these individuals actively collaborated with persons with an evidenced connection to the terrorist organization, and in many cases appear to be driven primarily by financial rather than ideological motivations. This in and of itself is a manifestation of Hezbollah’s activities in the United States, which sought to use local criminal actors in furtherance of their illegal activities. Further, in several significant instances, network activity often involved friends or family members engaged in organized conspiracies.

Washington, DC: George Washington University, Program on Extremism, 2022. 32p.

By Lorenzo Vidino

The Muslim Brotherhood in Europe is a controversial topic, frequently subjected to misinterpretations and manipulations. Opinions on it vary from those who argue that it does not exist and that it is bigoted and conspiratorial thinking to argue otherwise, to those who claim that it does and it is, in substance, similar to groups like al Qaeda or the Islamic State; from those who believe that it is a force that has evolved over time and now embraces democracy and the positive integration of Muslims in European society, to those who argue that it is a complex movement that, while showing a moderate façade, is in reality engaged in non-violent but nonetheless highly problematic activities (a position held by this author).  

Much of the confusion stems from the opaque and secretive nature of the Brotherhood and, consequently, the difficulty of obtaining clear and unequivocal information. As the Brotherhood was founded and operates mostly in Middle Eastern countries where local regimes have enacted various forms of repression against it, the movement has always seen dissimulation of many aspects of its structure and goals as a necessary tactic to survive. Organizations belonging to the Brotherhood’s family in the Arab world have therefore gone to great lengths to hide various aspects of their inner workings. It is a tactic that, given the context, is understandable and has ensured the movement’s survival in tough political environments for almost a century.  

Somewhat counterintuitively, the secrecy that shrouds Brotherhood networks is somewhat greater in the West, where the Brotherhood is not considered a terrorist organization and can generally operate freely within a democratic framework. Brotherhood branches in the Middle East, as said, have historically kept secret many aspects of their activities, but they have never denied their own existence. That denial is common in the West where most Brotherhood-linked activists and organizations not only shroud in secrecy their inner workings but even refuse to admit any Brotherhood connection. Brotherhood activists and sympathizers also tend to attack those who highlight the existence of Brotherhood-linked networks in Europe and their problematic nature with charges of shoddy research, conspiratorial views, and bigotry. 

Given these dynamics, it is important to observe what entities across Europe, whose institutional mandate is to monitor potential threats to their countries, think about the movement, from its very existence to its tactics and goals. The Brotherhood is not designated as a terrorist organization by the European Union or by any individual European country. At the same time, however, the security services of virtually all European countries have long monitored the movement---a fact that is per se telling.

European security services have kept the movement under watch with different degrees of intensity. Those that have a broad institutional mandate that leads them to monitor all potential threats to their countries’ democratic and constitutional order, like Germany’s Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Verfassungsschutz, both at the federal level and in all 16 German states), have done so more extensively than some of their counterparts throughout Europe whose mandate is narrower and law enforcement-like. And in each country the degree of scrutiny of the Brotherhood varies with time, depending on factors such as the existence of more immediate security threats or input from political decisionmakers.

Yet, without exception, all European security services adopt a highly negative view of the Muslim Brotherhood on the Continent. All European security services which have publicly expressed views on the Muslim Brotherhood in Europe over the last twenty years have clearly and consistently stated that:

1. An extensive and sophisticated network linked to the Brotherhood operates covertly in Europe, both at the national and pan-European level (through its umbrella organization, FIOE/CEM, and spinoffs like FEMYSO);

2. European-based Brotherhood-linked activists have created front organizations that allow them to operate within society and advance their agenda without being easily recognizable as being part of the Brotherhood; and

3. Brotherhood networks in Europe are not engaged in terrorism but have views and goals that are problematic, subversive, undemocratic, and incompatible with basic human rights and Western society.

These views have been expressed in various terms by European security services, and some have reached more pessimistic conclusions than others. But all those that have gone on the record over the last two decades about the movement have been extremely negative and concerned about its impact on European society.

This short report has collected all publicly available statements from annual and occasional reports, testimonies in parliamentary hearings, and formal statements in court cases from the various European security services that have addressed the issue of the Muslim Brotherhood in Europe. They include all the statements the author could find, with no selections or omissions, save for repetitions (as in the case of annual reports from German security services, which in substance repeat what was reported in previous years). All documents are publicly available and unclassified. All are herewith reported with references (so that the reader can read the context) and without commentary. The report does not include media interviews by representatives of security services, as they do not constitute a direct representation of their views and manipulation/misinterpretations might have occurred.     

The assessments here reported come from the security services of Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain and Sweden. The author is not aware of any security service from any other European country having gone on the record on the matter. The main reason for this is arguably the varying levels of comfort of different security services when it comes to going on the record on any matter unless strictly necessary. In general, for example, the security services of most Southern and Eastern European countries are culturally less prone to revealing much of their views on any matter than their Central and Northern European counterparts. Moreover, issues related to Islamism in general and the Muslim Brotherhood in particular do not constitute a major issues in Eastern European countries, given their small Muslim population.

In substance, the security services of basically all the largest Western European countries (with the notable exception of Italy) have gone on the records expressing very negative views on the Muslim Brotherhood. The author is not aware of any European security service having stated anything that even slightly contradicts the assessments on the Brotherhood made by the services of the seven countries here mentioned. To the contrary, interviews conducted by the author with most European security services over the last twenty years confirm that even those that have not gone on the record (Italian security services, for example) adopt extremely negative views of the Brotherhood, in line with those that do appear on record.  

The inevitable conclusion of this reading is that the European security community has reached a firm consensus over the presence, structure, tactics, aims, and ultimately, problematic nature of the Muslim Brotherhood in Europe. That consensus has been consistent over the last twenty years and has no known deviations, and this consensus should be the basis for well-informed policymaking on the subject.

Washington, DC: George Washington University, Program on Extremism, 2023. 20p.

By Omar Mohammed

The Iraqi Parliament is poised to discuss a new amnesty bill that has generated significant controversy and debate. This legislation is intended to address the issue of wrongful detentions but raises profound ethical, judicial, and societal concerns. Advocates claim the bill will rectify unjust imprisonment, particularly in the post-ISIS era. Critics, however, argue that the bill's broad language could inadvertently release individuals affiliated with ISIS, undermining ongoing counterterrorism efforts and the pursuit of justice for victims. Complicating matters further is the recent decision by the United Nations Security Council to terminate the mandate of UNITAD, a team responsible for investigating crimes committed by ISIS. This article delves into the intricacies of the proposed bill, its implications for justice and national reconciliation, and its potential impact on counterterrorism efforts in Iraq.

Washington, DC: George Washington University, Program on Extremism, 2023. 10p.

By Lorenzo Vidino 

Executive Summary • Hamas supporters have long operated in the United States. Internal Hamas documents and FBI wiretaps introduced as evidence in various federal criminal cases clearly show the existence of a nationwide Hamas network engaged in fundraising, lobbying, education, and propaganda dissemination dating back to the 1980s. • The network formalized its existence in 1988, when it created the Palestine Committee in the US. The Committee’s goals included “increasing the financial and the moral support for Hamas,” “fighting surrendering solutions,” and publicizing “the savagery of the Jews.” • The Palestine Committee spawned several public-facing organizations, most of which are based out of Chicago, Dallas, and Washington DC. They included the all-purpose Islamic Association for Palestine (IAP), the financial arm represented by the Occupied Land Fund (which later became the Holy Land Foundation, HLF), and the think tank United Association for Studies and Research (UASR). • In 1993, the FBI wiretapped a meeting of top Hamas activists in the US held in Philadelphia. The wiretaps show internal discussions on how to improve activities in support of Hamas within the US and how to shield them from the designation of Hamas as a terrorist organization. US-based Hamas activists agreed that hiding their affiliation and intentions was the best tactic to avoid negative consequences. “I swear by Allah that war is deception,” said one senior leader, “[d]eceive, camouflage, pretend that you’re leaving while you’re walking that way. Deceive your enemy.” “Let's not hoist a large Islamic flag and let's not be barbaric-talking. We will remain a front so that if the thing [the U.S. government ban on Hamas] happens, we will benefit from the new happenings instead of having all of our organizations classified and exposed.” • Over the years, US authorities have conducted several activities to clamp down on the network, including deporting and prosecuting Hamas operatives and shutting down multiple front organizations. The 2001 designation of HLF and subsequent prosecution of part of its leadership for funneling approximately $12.4 million to Hamas constitutes to date the largest successful terrorism financing prosecution in US history. • Yet, US-based Hamas networks and individuals have displayed a remarkable resilience and many of the core activists of the Palestine Committee are still engaged in various forms of support (albeit at times purely political and not material) for Hamas. 

Washington DC: George Washington University Program on Extremism, 2023. 16p.

By Bennett Clifford and Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens

 As the threat from white supremacist and Salafi-jihadist extremists to the United States grew in prominence in recent years, the two movements have become the subjects of several comparative studies. These works frequently focus on contrasting their methods of radicalization, recruitment, use of digital communications technologies, and connections to transnational extremist movements, but only a handful concern their methods of planning attacks on American soil. This report seeks to add to this emerging literature by examining what, if any, relationships there are between the tactics and targets chosen by white supremacist and Salafi-jihadist terrorists in America. In doing so, it will also contribute to our understanding of how, and indeed if, modern terrorists in America are learning from each other or from the current American counterterrorism posture. This report finds that: ● Jihadist and white supremacist attack planners in the U.S. selected different targets for their attacks. Jihadists tended towards attacking “hard targets” (for instance, military bases and law enforcement facilities) and devising plots to assassinate individuals. White supremacists erred towards “soft targets,” especially religious institutions and houses of worship. ● Jihadists were more likely than white supremacists to consider multiple targets for their attacks. ● The tactics of jihadists and white supremacists were relatively similar in frequency to one another. Both movements’ attack plotters relied heavily on plots involving firearms and explosives, but also experimented with non-conventional means such as vehicle rammings, arson, and train derailments. ● Despite some evidence of ideological cross-pollination, particularly in the form of manifestos and instructional material, evidence of direct learning between jihadist and white supremacist attack planners in the U.S. is limited. ● Independent innovation in the face of U.S. domestic counterterrorism approaches is a more likely explanation for similarities in targets and tactics between white supremacists and jihadists than cross-group tactical imitation.

Washington, DC: George Washington University, Program on Extremism, 2022. 33p.

By Catrina Doxsee, Alexander Palmer, and Riley McCabe

Terrorism is no longer the leading international threat to the United States or its top defense priority, but challenges related to violent extremism remain. The threat from Salafi-jihadist groups such as al Qaeda and the Islamic State has declined, and ethnonationalist threats are largely contained. However, a broader patchwork of violent far-right and far-left extremist ideologies has become more prominent on the global stage. Meanwhile, terrorism continues to overlap in significant ways with strategic competition, especially via Iran's support to terrorist groups like Hamas and Hezbollah.

Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2024. 138p.

By Jens F. Binder and Jonathan Kenyon

This work is concerned with the extent and magnitude of threat related to online radicalization in the context of terrorist acts and related offending. Online influences have been depicted as major drivers for the propagation and adoption of extremist ideologies, which often contain an element of collective grievance, and subsequent acts of violence. This is most pronounced in the discussion of so-called lone actor terrorism, but extends to all forms of extremist offending, and beyond. The present work situates online radicalization leading to terrorist acts within the wider context of grievance-based beliefs and attitudes. Further, it addresses current positions and debates surrounding the relevance and mechanisms of online radicalization in terrorist offending. Recent evidence from quantitative studies is reviewed to estimate prevalence of online radicalization and the level of threat that results from it. This is followed by a discussion of plausible, but opposing, interpretations of the estimates presented. While online radicalization does occur, with and without reference to offline processes, the resulting threat is not overly high. This assessment, however, refers to the present only and is unlikely to hold for the future, given the general growth and acceleration of online activity among terrorist actors

United Kingdom: Forensic and Legal Psychology, 2022, 10p.

By Peter K. Levine, Joseph F. Adams, Amy A. Alrich, Rachel G. Augustine, Margaret D.M. Barber, Sujeeta B. Bhatt Kathleen M. Conley, Dave I. Cotting, Alan B. Gelder, Jeffery M. Jaworski, Mark F. Kaye, Carrington A. Metts, Neil V. Mithal, and Matthew J. Reed.

From the document: "The objectives of the IDA [Institute for Defense Analyses] study are to gain greater fidelity on the scope and nature of extremist ideologies and behaviors in the [DOD]; identify the sources of such ideologies and behavior; assess their impact; and develop strategies for preventing, countering, and neutralizing that impact. To that end, the project description calls for IDA to: 1. Document the range of known extremist ideologies and behaviors that are contrary to U.S. law and policy; 2. Identify existing definitions of extremism and prohibited extremist activities; 3. Identify pathways of extremist ideology and behavior broadly and within the Department in particular; 4. Assess why the DOD workforce and others in the military community (including veterans, DOD civilians, and contractor employees) might be susceptible to extremist recruiting efforts; 5. Survey DOD approaches to the prevention of other forms of violence (including suicide, domestic violence, assault, sexual assault, and hate crimes) to identify strategies that might be adopted; 6. Assess policies and initiatives of other federal agencies that might be helpful to the Department; 7. Identify existing legal frameworks for addressing prohibited extremist activities in the Total Force; 8. Evaluate current DOD efforts to counter extremist ideologies and behaviors in the ranks, identifying gaps and strengths; and 9. Review and evaluate current DOD information collection, tracking, and data sharing systems (including through the military justice, equal employment opportunity, command discipline, hotline response systems, insider threat, and law enforcement/security systems)."

INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES. 2023. 282p.

By PAYNE, KEITH B.

From the document: "With Russia and China as heavily armed and aligned nuclear foes, Washington faces an unprecedented deterrence context and looming threats. Given this new great power alignment, more than 30 states are at increased risk, namely, those allies directly covered by the U.S. nuclear deterrent and those partners greatly affected by the credibility of that deterrent, such as Taiwan and Ukraine. Most U.S. civilian and military leaders who must pay attention to this challenge appear to recognize that the U.S. understanding of deterrence, largely based on its Cold War experience, must be reconsidered in this unprecedented context. The search for guideposts for that understanding is now ongoing. The current war in the Middle East appears to offer some tentative lessons in this regard."

NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY (U.S.). 2024. 6p.

By GANDHI, MILAN

From the document: "Focussing on current and emerging issues, this policy briefing paper ('Paper') surveys the ways in which technologies under the umbrella of artificial intelligence ('AI') may interact with democracy and, specifically, extremism, mis/disinformation, and illegal and 'legal but harmful' content online. The Paper considers examples of how AI technologies can be used to mislead and harm citizens and how AI technologies can be used to detect and counter the same or associated harms, exploring risks to democracy and human rights emerging across the spectrum. [...] Given the immense scope and potential impacts of AI on different facets of democracy and human rights, the Paper does not consider every relevant or potential AI use case, nor the long-term horizon. For example, AI-powered kinetic weapons and cyber-attacks are not discussed. Moreover, the Paper is limited in examining questions at the intersection of AI and economics and AI and geopolitics, though both intersections have important implications for democracy in the digital age. Finally, the Paper only briefly discusses how AI and outputs such as deepfakes may exacerbate broader societal concerns relating to political trust and polarisation. Although there is a likelihood that aspects of the Paper will be out-of-date the moment it is published given the speed at which new issues, rules and innovations are emerging, the Paper is intended to empower policymakers, especially those working on mis/disinformation, hate, extremism and terrorism specifically, as well as security, democracy and human rights more broadly. It provides explanations of core concerns related to AI and links them to practical examples and possible public policy solutions."

INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC DIALOGUE. 2024.

By Michael German and Kaylana Mueller-Hsia

The failure of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and other law enforcement agencies to anticipate and prepare for the January 6, 2021, attack on the U.S. Capitol by far-right insurrectionists has elicited proposals to expand the bureau’s authority to investigate domestic terrorism.1 The FBI already received expansive new powers after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and its current guidelines place few limits on agents’ ability to search broadly for potential threats. Confusion about the current scope of the bureau’s powers is understandable, however, as FBI leaders have regularly misstated their authorities in public testimony.2 These misstatements deflect FBI accountability by focusing overseers on filling perceived gaps in its authority rather than examining how the bureau uses, misuses, or fails to use the tools it already has.

New York: Brennan Center for Justice, 2022. 21p.

By Ekrem Ersen Emeksiz

ABSTRACT This research presents Istanbul, Turkey and its law enforcement as a case study for the design of a contingency plan to increase efficiency of counterterrorism efforts and coordination among the agencies. This contingency plan involves the implementation of techniques and strategies based on situational crime prevention, moral panic and crisis theories on predetermined terror targets in the city of Istanbul to reduce the impact of a mega terrorist attack. The research applies the EVIL DONE and CARVER concepts to assess current terrorism risks and threats for critical targets. In assessing risks and threat conditions, this research proposes a contingency plan for law enforcement in Istanbul. The purpose of the contingency plan is to reduce target vulnerabilities and enhance target resilience as well as control moral panic conditions during large-scale terror incidents.

BY Yuri van Hoef, Erasmus University Rotterdam

Introduction

While friendship scholarship in the humanities and social sciences has risen exponentially in the last decade, it focuses almost exclusively on the alliances of great powers.[1] This article introduces a new research agenda by drawing upon scholarship that suggests middle powers behave differently, arguing that middle powers pursue international friendship different than great powers. This example is illustrated by comparing how the Netherlands and Denmark, both considered traditional examples of middle powers and of atlanticist states, supported the US during the War on Terror, and how this affected their relationship with the US.

. Academia Letters, Article 1972. 10P.

by Heather J. Williams, Luke J. Matthews, Pauline Moore, Matthew A. DeNardo, James V. Marrone, Brian A. Jackson, William Marcellino, Todd C. Helmus

Racially and Ethnically Motivated Violent Extremism: The Basics

Racially and ethnically motivated violent extremism (REMVE) refers to a loosely organized movement of individuals and groups that espouse some combination of racist, anti-Semitic, xenophobic, Islamophobic, misogynistic, and homophobic ideology. REMVE actors see their race or ethnicity under threat and promote the use of or engage in violence against a given population group. The majority of REMVE actors are motivated by cultural nationalism or White supremacy—beliefs that Caucasian or "Aryan" peoples represent superior races, and that "White culture" is superior to other cultures. Many REMVE actors also are motivated by White nationalism, which overlaps with White supremacy: Adherents espouse the belief that the White race is superior to others, and White nationalism emphasizes defining a country or region by White racial identity and promoting the interests of White people exclusively and at the expense of non-White populations.

More-common terms related to REMVE include far-right extremism, right-wing terrorism, radical right, or extreme right, which are used more frequently in literature and by other countries. Although these terms are not synonymous, they are used somewhat interchangeably and often without precise definitions. These terms also can be applied to political parties and movements that participate in political systems and do not engage in violence directly, particularly in Europe, where many parliamentary systems have formal far-right parties that participate in elections.

The U.S. State Department commissioned the RAND Corporation to produce a comprehensive network analysis of the White Identity Terrorist Movement (WITM) and REMVE in response to a congressional requirement from the 2021 National Defense Authorization Act.[2] The analysis—which sought to identify key actors, organizations, and supporting infrastructure and the relationships and interactions between them—is intended to inform a U.S. government strategy to counter REMVE.

Rand. 2022. 8p.

By John Jenkins, Dmon L. Perry and Paul Stott

The Prevent counter-terrorism strategy is perhaps the most controversial government policy most people have never heard of. Public recognition of it is generally low, but opposition from Britain’s raucous Islamist scene, near total. From there, opposition has spread to sections of the far-left, and those parts of academia where Islamism and the revolutionary left intersect. This report, written by three experts on Islamism, outlines the campaign against Prevent, and argues that this is not an exceptional campaign against a uniquely flawed policy – the groups opposing Prevent have tended to criticise pretty much any counter-terrorism policy, in sine cases for a generation. The same names and campaign groups appear time after time regardless of the colour of the government of the day.

Disappointingly, ministers and officials have tended to shy away from some of these debates, allowing misinformation, and even conspiracy theory, to flourish. The forthcoming Prevent review by William Shawcross risks being dead on arrival if this continues. The authors call for a Centre for the Study of Extremism to give Ministers the tools to properly push back against campaigners, with a separate communications unit to disseminate rebuttal, and a due diligence unit. The latter is needed to ensure that government departments and the public sector are choosing their friends wisely. Too often anti-Prevent campaigners are able to grandstand against government counter-terrorism policies, whilst at the same time receiving government patronage and engagement. It should no longer be possible to run with the fox, and hunt with the hounds.

London: Policy Exchange, 2022.' 89p,

By Hanny Purnama Sari and Muhammad Syauqillah

This research aims to compile data and information that will contribute to understanding the online radicalization phenomenon through translation. There are many studies on using the internet and propaganda in a terrorism context. However, only a handful studied the correlation between translation and terrorism propaganda, especially in Indonesia. There was little discussion on the role of translation in bridging communication between different nations, cultures, and languages and using it to propagate radical/propaganda narratives worldwide and amplify those messages to its target audience. The research method is descriptive qualitative using primary and secondary data; the sample is taken from the book of Nadharat Fi Al Ijma' Al Qath'i and previous findings and news. This research revealed at least ten roles of translation in the online radicalization phenomenon; among others, translation in the target language can be used to identify the target audience of the propagandist, and many terrorist sympathizers were willing to volunteer to translate the propaganda. However, although the translation is used to leverage the spread of propaganda, it can also assist law enforcement officers in combating terrorist/propaganda narratives. Indonesian law enforcement officers may use translation to counter-terrorism as Indonesia has hundreds of vernacular languages that can be used to 'encrypt' and disseminate their extremist narratives.

International Journal of Science and Society, 4(4), 319-336.

By Moustafa Ayad, Nadeem Khan and Aymenn al-Tamimi

his report highlights the networks, supporters, and the platforms of Islamic State disinformation disseminators, focusing on popular social media platforms as well as encrypted messaging applications. These disinformation networks are creating self-branded media outlets with followers in the tens of thousands, and often with innocuous names like “Global Happenings,” “DRIL” and “Media Center,” to evade moderation and takedowns. These same networks use coded language and a codebook of emojis to spread Islamic State “news” to other networks of supporters, who similarly evade moderation. These ‘alternative news outlets’ are trying to outcompete narratives publicized by government officials as well as independent mainstream media and individual journalists – groups that were also heavily targeted by Islamic State.

London: IDS - Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2022. 22p.

Edited by Adam Henschke, Alastair Reed, Scott Robbins and Seumas Miller

his open access book brings together a range of contributions that seek to explore the ethical issues arising from the overlap between counter-terrorism, ethics, and technologies. Terrorism and our responses pose some of the most significant ethical challenges to states and people. At the same time, we are becoming increasingly aware of the ethical implications of new and emerging technologies. Whether it is the use of remote weapons like drones as part of counter-terrorism strategies, the application of surveillance technologies to monitor and respond to terrorist activities, or counterintelligence agencies use of machine learning to detect suspicious behavior and hacking computers to gain access to encrypted data, technologies play a significant role in modern counter-terrorism. However, each of these technologies carries with them a range of ethical issues and challenges. How we use these technologies and the policies that govern them have broader impact beyond just the identification and response to terrorist activities. As we are seeing with China, the need to respond to domestic terrorism is one of the justifications for their rollout of the “social credit system.” Counter-terrorism technologies can easily succumb to mission creep, where a technology’s exceptional application becomes normalized and rolled out to society more generally. This collection is not just timely but an important contribution to understand the ethics of counter-terrorism and technology and has far wider implications for societies and nations around the world.

Cham: Springer, 2021. 231p.

Edited By Olivier J. Walther, William F.S. Miles

Since the end of the Cold War, the monopoly of legitimate organized force of many African states has been eroded by a mix of rebel groups, violent extremist organizations, and self-defence militias created in response to the rise in organized violence on the continent. African Border Disorders explores the complex relationships that bind states, transnational rebels and extremist organizations, and borders on the African continent. Combining cutting edge network science with geographical analysis, the first part of the book highlights how the fluid alliances and conflicts between rebels, violent extremist organizations and states shape in large measure regional patterns of violence in Africa. The second part of the book examines the spread of Islamist violence around Lake Chad through the lens of the violent Nigerian Islamist group Boko Haram, which has evolved from a nationally-oriented militia group, to an internationally networked organization. The third part of the book explores how violent extremist organizations conceptualize state boundaries and territory and, reciprocally, how do the civil society and the state respond to the rise of transnational organizations. The book will be essential reading for all students and specialists of African politics and security studies, particularly those specializing on fragile states, sovereignty, new wars, and borders as well as governments and international organizations involved in conflict prevention and early intervention in the region.

London: Routledge, 2018. 230p

Edited by Julia M. Eckert

This book addresses two developments in the conceptualisation of citizenship that arise from the »war on terror«, namely the re-culturalisation of membership in a polity and the re-moralisation of access to rights. Taking an anthropological perspective, it traces the ways in which the trans-nationalisation of the »war on terror« has affected notions of »the dangerous other« in different political and social contexts, asking what changes in the ideas of the state and of the nation have been promoted by the emerging culture of security, and how these changes affect practices of citizenship and societal group relations.

\Bielefeld, Transcript Verlag, 2008. 197p.