By Jasmine R. Hernandez and Heather J. H. Edgar

The United States is no stranger to migration across its borders. In 2020, its Southwestern border saw a drastic increase in apprehensions by the Border Patrol. While imperfect and an undercount of the true number of migration events, apprehension data is often used as a proxy to understand migration patterns. The rise in migration was coupled with an increased but unknown number of deaths along migration routes. This article focuses on the New Mexico portion of the El Paso Border Patrol Sector and the increased migrant caseload at New Mexico’s Office of the Medical Investigator (OMI) over the last few years. To the best of our knowledge, this article is the first academic study to examine migrant deaths in detail in southern New Mexico. We begin by contextualizing the changing pattern of migrant deaths in New Mexico within the broader framework of border policing strategies that have intentionally pushed migration routes to remote areas. We describe the work of the OMI, highlighting its very recent initiatives to track migrant deaths in its database. We then discuss the changes seen by the OMI in its migrant caseload from fiscal year (FY) 2009 to 2023, with the most drastic increase in cases occurring from 2022 to 2023. For instance, the data indicate that most of the identified migrants that have died in New Mexico were recovered in June and July (45 percent), crossed through Doña Ana County (66 percent), were male (60 percent), and among those identified, were from Mexico (65 percent) and between 20 and 39 years of age (69 percent). Of the 248 cases of migrant deaths, 87 percent have been identified. The most common causes of death were undetermined (46 percent) and environmental exposure (41 percent). We then explore the effects of changing governmental policies and state initiatives to curb/reduce migration in the US on OMI’s increased caseload. We discuss the impact that the rapid shift in migration deaths is having on the OMI and how OMI is working to respond and adjust to the dynamic situation. This work highlights the collateral damage of border security measures, underscored by the increasing number of deaths and challenges faced by the OMI. We consider the need for new and amended policies aimed at mitigating the humanitarian crisis that continues to unfold, emphasizing the need for the humane treatment of migrants. Finally, we suggest allocating resources to death investigating agencies. These resources would provide essential support to find, identify, and repatriate migrants, improve agencies’ abilities to collaborate with governmental agencies and programs such as Border Patrol’s Missing Migrant Program, and improve our understanding of the circumstances along the Southwestern border.

Journal on Migration and Human SecurityVolume 12, Issue 3, September 2024, Pages 226-242

By Molly Miranker

This paper explores how qualitative information may be used to enhance understanding and inform recommendations for improved accounting of migrant deaths along the Texas-Mexico border. While border crossing related deaths affect jurisdictions throughout the US’s Southwestern border states and Northern Mexican states, Texas has unique challenges that merit specific examination. In short, the management and investigation of unidentified migrant decedents in Texas is severely fragmented and often noncompliant with Texas Criminal Code Procedure. I explore a way to improve accounting of migrant deaths leveraging qualitative information, local newspaper articles from South Texas and Northern Mexico, by using descriptive summaries coupled with Sankey Diagrams and a programmatic technique, qualitative spatial representation (QSR). QSR enabled me to identify under-recognized stakeholders (South Texas locals, Mexican consulates) and under-supported counties (i.e., those with migrant deaths that do not share a border directly with Mexico). I found that local English-language newspapers obscured the prevalence of migrant deaths and that their narrative tone of “business as usual” normalized the occurrence of such deaths. The Spanish-language articles better represented the diversity of agencies and individuals that were involved in the various aspects of migrant remains management and forensic investigation, most notably residents of South Texas themselves (or situational participants who first found the remains) and Mexican consulates. Finally, I noted that the collaborations among Texas counties and between Texan and Mexican jurisdictions, when they were described in the newspapers, highlighted that the phenomenon of migrant deaths penetrates beyond the dividing line of the Rio Grande/Río Bravo River. Migrant deaths must be accounted for in a way that reflects a regional experience in which people may perish as far as ~100 miles into Texas’ interior. Considering these observations, I have two policy recommendations. First, the Office of the Texas Governor should establish funds distinct from the Operation Lone Star program for the management of unidentified human remains. Currently, grants through the Operation Lone Star Program are the only funds available in Texas to support identification of migrant decedents. However, this program is explicitly designed to further border security operations in the state of Texas, which can contradict efforts around recovery and identification. The documentation and forensic investigation of the unidentified deceased can be eclipsed or neglected under the larger deterrence aims of Operation Lone Star. Second, to improve accounting and increase documentation of migrant deaths, a Regional Identification Center should be established in South Texas. Not every county in Texas has or has access to a Medical Examiner’s office, including the means to transport and pay for autopsy or other forensic services. The Center would provide training, store extra equipment such as mobile refrigerated morgues, and hire personnel to inventory cases, and report information to the state (e.g., vital statistics) and to foreign consulates. A Regional Identification Center would counteract the challenges highlighted in the local newspaper summaries and QSR by decreasing the isolation of counties experiencing migrant deaths and serve as a documentary and communication hub for stakeholders in Texas and Mexico.

Journal on Migration and Human SecurityVolume 12, Issue 3, September 2024, Pages 204-225

By Daniel E. Martínez, Sam Chambers, Geoff Boyce and Jeremy Slack 

Immigration at the US-México border has drastically changed since the mid-2010s. Instead of adult undocumented Mexican men, generally migrating for economic purposes, there are now large numbers of men, women, unaccompanied minors, and families from diverse countries seeking asylum in the United States, as they are allowed to do under US and international law. In response to these changes, the US federal government leveraged multiple strategies to impede access to the country’s asylum system, including relying on Title 42 “expulsions.” Title 42, a COVID-19-era health measure, prevented migrants from initiating an asylum claim. Instead, asylum-seekers were typically immediately expelled to the closest port of entry in México. The use of public health as a pretext to control the border placed these migrants at risk and led many to attempt repeat border crossings. Given this policy context, we ask: what, if any, is the association between Title 42 expulsions and migrant deaths in southern Arizona? We address this question by drawing on records of recovered undocumented border crosser (UBC) remains investigated by the Pima County Office of the Medical Examiner (PCOME) in Tucson, Arizona. We examined differences in the number and demographic characteristics of UBC remains recovered between what prior studies have characterized as the “Localized Funnel Effect” Era of border enforcement in southern Arizona (i.e., October 1, 2013–March 19, 2020; N = 851), and the “Title 42” Era (i.e., March 20, 2021–September 30, 2023; N = 709). We also assessed how, if at all, the geography of recovered UBC remains shifted between these eras. We found that migrant deaths rose from an annual mean of 133 during the Localized Funnel Effect (LFE) Era to 198 in the Title 42 (T42) Era, representing a 48 percent increase. Compared to the earlier era, remains recovered during the T42 Era clustered closer to the border and near the cities of Nogales and Agua Prieta, Sonora, having shifted from west to east in southern Arizona. Additionally, we found that Title 42 disproportionately affected Mexican and Guatemalan nationals both in terms of expulsions as well as deaths. We propose several policy recommendations based on our study’s findings intended to reduce unnecessary suffering and increase human security:

• The US federal government should not impede or limit migrants’ access to the asylum system. Policymakers should instead create clear pathways and procedures that obviate the need for migrants to undertake dangerous journeys and overcome barriers to fair consideration of their claims.

• The US government must expand its ability to address these claims, as continued attempts to block asylum seekers will result in additional loss of life and increased violence. It should increase its capacity to screen asylum seekers at the US-México border. We propose an increase in USCIS Asylum Officers to carry out this duty. US Customs and Border Protection agents should not screen asylum seekers, nor should they assume the responsibility of serving as asylum officers, given the agency’s extensively documented record of persistently dehumanizing and mistreating migrants.

• The US federal government must take measures to eliminate the backlog of asylum cases in the immigration courts. These measures need to include reforms in the underlying immigration system and in the removal adjudication system, such as greater access to legal counsel and changes to the law that offer legal pathways to imperiled migrants who do not meet the narrow definition of asylum. Absent these reforms, the asylum case backlog will grow, and many asylum seekers with strong claims to remain will be removed after living for years in the United States.

Journal on Migration and Human SecurityVolume 12, Issue 3, September 2024, Pages 182-203

By Abby Córdova, Jonathan Hiskey, Mary Malone and Diana Orcés

U.S. efforts to control unauthorized crossings of its southwest border have long rested on the idea of deterrence — if migrants know that a border is dangerous to cross and the likelihood of deportation is high, they will be dissuaded from trying in the first place. Despite the seemingly intuitive logic of this strategy, and the billions of dollars invested in it, deterrence efforts largely have failed, with the number of border crossings in recent years exceeding those of 30 years ago. To understand why this decades-old, bipartisan deterrence strategy has proven ineffective, we focus on individuals from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras who have previous migration experience, with a vast majority of them seeking entry into the U.S. These individuals have direct knowledge of the difficulties and dangers a border crossing poses, yet many report plans to try to cross the border again. To understand why they persist, we rely on survey data specifically collected to better understand the root causes of international migration. We find that citizens with previous migration experience are significantly more likely to report plans to emigrate, in particular women, younger cohorts, and those at the bottom of the economic ladder. In contrast, family reunification does not appear to play a significant role in driving the migration intentions of those with a prior migration experience. Further, deportation does not deter migrants from trying again, as individuals who have been deported are just as likely to report plans to emigrate again as those who returned to their home countries voluntarily and those who never reached their destination. Most importantly, our research indicates that human insecurity is at the core of why Central Americans who have migrated in the past are more likely to report migration plans for the future. Both the threat of violence and food insecurity are central drivers of their persistent predisposition to embark on the journey again. Individuals remain undeterred in their efforts to escape their country because upon returning to that country, they confront the same conditions that led them to attempt to flee in the first place. We draw two main policy implications from our research. First, the U.S. government should continue its prioritization of investments in tackling the root causes of forced migration through the empowerment of civil society organizations and the channeling of foreign aid to marginalized communities affected by human insecurity, such as those suffering food insecurity or fearing violence. The main objective of these investments should be to improve the living conditions of individuals, giving them a viable option of remaining in their country. Second, the U.S. must invest greater resources in its immigration system to reduce the current backlog of asylum cases, and expand H2-a and -b visa programs to provide a more expansive legal path to migration. Facilitating a legal pathway to immigrants who face heightened human insecurity, like the potential repeat migrants in our study, would prevent further deaths that lay at the hands of a border policy focused on deterrence.

Journal on Migration and Human SecurityVolume 12, Issue 3, September 2024, Pages 160-181

By Donald Kerwin and Daniel E. Martínez

The International Organization of Migration has characterized the US-Mexico border as the world’s deadliest land migration route. By August 2024, a minimum of 5,405 persons had died or gone missing along this border since 2014, with record high numbers since 2021. Migrant deaths occur despite decades of: US Border Patrol search and rescue initiatives; public education campaigns targeting potential migrants on the dangers of irregular migration; dozens of academic publications and reports highlighting the root causes of these deaths; efforts by consular officials, local communities, and humanitarian agencies to locate, identify, and repatriate human remains; and desperate attempts by families to learn the fate of their missing loved ones. This paper introduces a special edition of the Journal on Migration and Human Security (JMHS), which draws on original research and the expertise of medical examiners, forensic anthropologists, social scientists, and humanitarian organizations to examine this persistent human tragedy. Many of the authors investigate migrant deaths in their professional capacities. They identify the dead, return remains to family members, and champion reforms to prevent deaths and better account for the dead and missing. This JMHS special edition represents a collaboration between the University of Arizona’s Binational Migration Institute, the Center for Migration Studies of New York (CMSNY), and the Working Group on Mapping Migrant Deaths along the US Southwest Border. The Working Group includes scholars and practitioners from California, Arizona, New Mexico, Texas, and New York who have met monthly since October of 2021. The special edition examines in granular detail the causes of migrant deaths, US border enforcement strategies and tactics, migrant death statistics, and the resource and capacity challenges faced by US counties along and leading from the US-Mexico border in investigating these deaths. The US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and many public officials attribute the deaths to the predations of human smugglers, the victims’ ignorance or assumption of risk, and the harsh “natural” conditions to which migrants finally succumb. This special issue also documents the underlying non-natural causes of this enduring tragedy, and offers both overarching and more targeted solutions to preventing and minimizing migrant deaths. The issue builds upon and extends seminal research on migrant deaths first featured in CMSNY publications more than two decades ago.Section I introduces the issue of migrant deaths by posing the question: Why should we care? Section II describes the genesis of “prevention through deterrence”—a border enforcement theory and strategy—and its evolution through subsequent Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and US Border Patrol strategic plans. It describes the immense enforcement infrastructure built around this idea by successive administrations and Congresses, and it explains why it has failed to stem irregular migration and how it has contributed to migrant deaths. Section III reviews the main causes of migrant deaths—forced migration, the combined effects of prevention through deterrence and border enforcement tactics, the denial of access to asylum, the border wall, the “naturalization” of migrant deaths, and the dominant vision of the border as a site of danger and exclusion. Section IV reviews the legislative standards for identifying, investigating, and reporting on migrant decedents. It also details the deficiencies of Border Patrol and county-level sources of data on deaths, and it outlines ways to strengthen data collection. Section V discusses the burdens placed on communities along and leading from the border in investigating deaths and their need for greater resources and capacity to address this problem. Section VI outlines the anomalies and challenges related to the Border Patrol’s migrant rescue program. Section VII describes international legal standards to guide the investigation of migrant deaths and two model programs. Section VIII sets forth policy recommendations to prevent migrant deaths and to honor and account for the dead.Journal on 

Journal on Migration and Human SecurityVolume 12, Issue 3, September 2024, Pages 127-159

By Nicole Hallett

The border has never played a larger role in the American psyche than it does today, and yet it has never been less legally significant. Today, a noncitizen’s place of residence tells you less about what rights and privileges they enjoy than it ever has in the past. The border has migrated inward, affecting many aspects of non-citizens’ lives in the United States. The divergence between the physical and legal border is no accident. Instead, it is a policy response to the perceived loss of control over the physical border. But the physical border remains porous despite these legal changes. People keep migrating even as we continue to draw boundaries within communities, homes, and workplaces far away from the border. This paper explores how U.S. law has evolved to render the border superfluous, even as its symbolic importance has grown, and how it might further evolve in the future.

University of Chicago Legal Forum: Vol. 2023, Article 6.

By César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández

Borders do not exist. They are made and remade. At every step, the law creates, moves, reforms, reproduces, and reinforces the border. Focusing on the boundary that México and the United States share, this essay critiques the U.S. Supreme Court’s privileging of the sovereign prerogative to control access to the nation’s territory. In their efforts to control movement across and near the border, legal doctrine permits Executive officials to deviate from ordinary legal constraints on the use of violence. This creates a modern version of the sovereign that Carl Schmitt described a century ago: extra-constitutional in origin and subject to law only on its own terms. Urging an end to the law of border exceptionalism, the essay argues that the Schmittian sovereignty that exists in the borderlands is neither justified by the facts on the ground nor required by the very legal principles that the Supreme Court points to.

Ohio State Legal Studies Research Paper No. 820

University of Chicago Legal Forum: Vol. 2023, Article 5

By Matthew Lisiecki and Gerard Apruzzese

In 2017, the Center for Migration Studies (CMS) analyzed the effects of a mass deportation program for undocumented immigrants proposed by then-President Donald Trump (Warren & Kerwin 2017). With now-candidate Trump reintroducing a similar proposal as a key element of his platform, CMS has conducted a new analysis using the most recent available data: the 2022 American Community Survey microdata, released by the US Census Bureau (Ruggles et al. 2024). In this report, we highlight the devastation of mass deportation on both undocumented residents and their US citizen and legal noncitizen families and communities. We discuss individual, household, and family characteristics of the 10.9 million undocumented residents living in the US, and 4.7 million households with both undocumented residents and residents with permanent legal status (referred to henceforth as “mixed status” households). We investigate the economic effect of the deportation on US citizens and undocumented residents, as well as the negative fiscal impact on the broader economy should mass deportation be carried out.

Key findings of the updated analysis include:

• 5.8 million US households are home to at least one undocumented resident. Of those, 4.7 million households are home to undocumented residents and US citizens or others with legal status. Therefore, mass deportation threatens to break up nearly 5 million American families.

• Over half of the US undocumented population is woven into American life, having been in the country for at least 10 years; their deportation would damage long-standing communities.

• Mass deportation would push nearly 10 million US citizens into economic hardship. Median household income for mixed-status households would drop from $75,500 to $39,000 (a drop of over 48 percent).

• 5.5 million US-born children live in households with at least one undocumented resident, including 1.8 million living in households with two undocumented parents.

• The monetary cost of paying to complete the upbringing of these US-born children in the event of mass deportation is estimated to be at least $116.5 billion.

• Undocumented workers contribute an estimated $96.7 billion in federal, state, and local taxes; their removal from the workforce would have a substantial impact on local economies.

This report is one of several CMS publications outlining the negative impacts of a mass deportation policy for undocumented immigrants. In 2017, we analyzed the social and economic impacts of mass deportation using Census Bureau data from 2014 (Warren & Kerwin 2017). Earlier in 2024, we explored other immediate and downstream impacts of the Trump campaign’s proposed mass deportation policy, including the moral, legal, and public safety crisis caused by implementing a mass search-and-seizure operation across the nation.

New York: Center for Migration Studies, 2024. 7p.

By Carl Davis, Marco Guzman, & Emma Sifre

Key Findings

Undocumented immigrants paid $96.7 billion in federal, state, and local taxes in 2022. Most of that amount, $59.4 billion, was paid to the federal government while the remaining $37.3 billion was paid to state and local governments. Undocumented immigrants paid federal, state, and local taxes of $8,889 per person in 2022. In other words, for every 1 million undocumented immigrants who reside in the country, public services receive $8.9 billion in additional tax revenue. More than a third of the tax dollars paid by undocumented immigrants go toward payroll taxes dedicated to funding programs that these workers are barred from accessing. Undocumented immigrants paid $25.7 billion in Social Security taxes, $6.4 billion in Medicare taxes, and $1.8 billion in unemployment insurance taxes in 2022. At the state and local levels, slightly less than half (46 percent, or $15.1 billion) of the tax payments made by undocumented immigrants are through sales and excise taxes levied on their purchases. Most other payments are made through property taxes, such as those levied on homeowners and renters (31 percent, or $10.4 billion), or through personal and business income taxes (21 percent, or $7.0 billion). Six states raised more than $1 billion each in tax revenue from undocumented immigrants living within their borders. Those states are California ($8.5 billion), Texas ($4.9 billion), New York ($3.1 billion), Florida ($1.8 billion), Illinois ($1.5 billion), and New Jersey ($1.3 billion). In a large majority of states (40), undocumented immigrants pay higher state and local tax rates than the top 1 percent of households living within their borders. Income tax payments by undocumented immigrants are affected by laws that require them to pay more than otherwise similarly situated U.S. citizens. Undocumented immigrants are often barred from receiving meaningful tax credits and sometimes do not claim refunds they are owed due to lack of awareness, concern about their immigration status, or insufficient access to tax preparation assistance. Providing access to work authorization for undocumented immigrants would increase their tax contributions both because their wages would rise and because their rates of tax compliance would increase. Under a scenario where work authorization is provided to all current undocumented immigrants, their tax contributions would rise by $40.2 billion per year to $136.9 billion. Most of the new revenue raised in this scenario ($33.1 billion) would flow to the federal government while the remainder ($7.1 billion) would flow to states and localities.

Washington, DC:  Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy, 2024. 42p.

By Julia Litzkow 

This study examines factors of resilience and vulnerability to exploitation and trafficking of people who fled Ukraine to Berlin, Bern and Warsaw after Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022. Conducted in partnership with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) it is based on desk research, quantitative data from 1,602 surveys collected with displaced Ukrainians and non-Ukrainians in 2023 and qualitative data from 57 key informant interviews (KII) conducted between 2023 and 2024. It also includes 8 illustrative case studies. In the research conducted across three cities, instances of potential forced labour and labour trafficking were reported at relatively low levels by survey respondents.1 Specifically, 6% of respondents (104/1,602) noted experiencing some form of workplace abuse, while 2% of respondents (35 out of 1,602) either experienced or observed others who fled Ukraine facing workplace conditions that could suggest potential trafficking for forced labour. The majority of these accounts were based on observations rather than personal experience. Common issues reported included unpaid or underpaid wages, misleading information about the nature of the job, excessively long working hours, unsafe working environments, and deception about their employer’s identity. While key informants corroborated the low occurrence of potential forced labour and trafficking, they also emphasized widespread violations of labour laws. A smaller proportion of survey respondents (2.5%) reported witnessing or learning about displaced Ukrainians engaged in prostitution or sex work. Of these, seven individuals believed the prostitution was forced, reflecting a 0.4% prevalence of forced prostitution, potentially signalling trafficking for sexual exploitation. None of the 1,602 respondents indicated experiencing sexual exploitation in prostitution themselves. The relatively low incidence of potential forced labour, labour trafficking and sexual exploitation reported by survey respondents and key informants among people who fled the war in Ukraine may be attributed to the visa-free travel, temporary protection status, and robust anti-trafficking measures implemented in destination countries. However, it may also be due to cases that have yet to be identified. It is important to recognize that despite the presence of temporary protection, visa-free travel and the anti-trafficking response implemented, there are specific situations where personal, situational, and contextual factors intersect to create potential increased risk of exploitation and trafficking for individuals fleeing Ukraine. The following is a summary of key findings on factors of resilience and vulnerability to exploitation and trafficking in the cities examined under this study, which aim to contribute to a better understanding of the experiences of people who fled the war in Ukraine and offer insights for designing interventions by United Nations (UN) organizations, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), and national authorities. Factors of vulnerability to exploitation and trafficking • Financial pressure: Economic hardships and the need to support oneself and family members can increase the urgency for people displaced from Ukraine to find work quickly and can lead them to accept precarious working conditions. When asked whether their financial situation meets their household needs, 44% of respondents in Berlin, 44% of respondents in Bern and 43% of respondents in Warsaw said they were only partially covered. • Limited access to decent work: Barriers like language skills, non-recognition of qualifications, and financial hardships can push refugees into low-skilled, often exploitative jobs. Lack of skills in the local language was mentioned as the top barrier to accessing a decent job, cited by 86% of respondents in Berlin, 80% of respondents in Bern and 67% of respondents in Warsaw. • Difficulties accessing information about the law and their rights: Lack of knowledge about local labour laws and rights, exacerbated by lack of knowledge of the local language can increase vulnerability and make it difficult for people who fled the war in Ukraine to protect themselves from exploitative situations. • Insecure housing: Dependence on employer-provided accommodation, dependence on and limited monitoring of private accommodation providers and in collective centres can increase exploitation risks. • Challenges accessing temporary protection status: Bureaucratic hurdles and legal status challenges particularly affect non-Ukrainian Third Country Nationals (TCNs) and Ukrainian citizens of Roma ethnicity, making them potentially more vulnerable to exploitation and trafficking in informal work arrangements. • Decreasing solidarity: Growing negative perceptions of Ukrainians within host communities can lead to increased risks of exploitation as refugees feel less supported and more isolated. Factors of resilience to exploitation and trafficking • Visa-free travel and temporary protection status2: Rapid access to legal status, combined with access to social security, significantly protects against exploitation and trafficking. The EU’s visa-free travel approach for Ukrainian citizens and temporary protection status enable refugees to travel legally and rapidly access work and social benefits, reducing their dependence on potentially exploitative coping mechanisms. • Social support networks: Social networks within the Ukrainian community can serve as a crucial factor of resilience. These networks provide familiarity and support, helping refugees navigate employment and housing options. • Political will and solidarity: Initial strong political commitment and societal support for Ukrainian refugees enhanced their resilience. Quick legislative and administrative responses and comprehensive support systems have positively impacted the integration and protection of refugees who fled the war in Ukraine. However, political will and the level of support can vary based on the perceived nationality or ethnicity of people who fled the war in Ukraine. • Anti-trafficking responses: Large-scale anti-trafficking measures, particularly efforts to raise awareness, were adopted by national and local authorities, as well as civil society organizations, likely building resilience against exploitation. 

Geneva: Mixed Migration Centre,  2024. 46p.

By Colleen Putzel-Kavanaugh and Ariel G. Ruiz Soto

For the just-ended 2024 fiscal year, the Biden administration turned the tide at the U.S.-Mexico border after two years of record levels of irregular crossings, by deepening its carrot-and-stick approach alongside increased immigration enforcement throughout the Western Hemisphere, especially from Mexico. For the full fiscal year that ended September 30, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) reported 2.1 million encounters at and between ports of entry along the Southwest border—a 14 percent decrease from the nearly 2.5 million encounters recorded in FY 2023. The month of September represented the lowest monthly encounters of migrants crossing the U.S.-Mexico border without authorization seen during this administration—with 54,000 encounters a steep drop from the all-time monthly high of 250,000 encounters recorded in December 2023. The September tally also represents the lowest level of irregular arrivals since September 2020, at the tail end of the Trump administration. An additional 199,000 encounters were recorded at the U.S.-Canada border during FY 2024, for a total at all borders of 2.3 million. The Biden playbook rests on narrowing asylum eligibility for migrants who cross the border illegally, expanding the use of lawful migration pathways, and encouraging Mexico, Panama, Costa Rica, and other regional partners to increase their migration controls and enforcement. Unauthorized crossings of the U.S. Southern border began to fall steadily in January as Mexico further stepped up its enforcement. Irregular crossings dropped even more sharply following the administration’s June implementation of the Secure the Border rule. This rule suspends asylum eligibility at the border when crossings reach a seven-day average of 2,500; the bar remains in place until encounters drop below 1,500 for 28 consecutive days. At the same time, options for lawful migration pathways—such as the Cuban, Haitian, Nicaraguan, and Venezuelan (CHNV) parole program; use of the CBP One app to schedule an appointment to be screened for entry at a port; and Safe Mobility Offices (SMOs) that allow migrants to be considered for protection or other pathways far earlier in their journeys—have led to more migrants arriving at ports of entry to be paroled into the country and as refugees.

Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2024.

Edited by Lara Momesso, Polina Ivanova

This edited volume fills a gap in current research on asylum seekers and refugees. By focusing on two East Asian countries, Japan and Taiwan, this volume offers material for comparison and reflection on an area of the world in which this theme is still relatively underdeveloped. By approaching the theme through the different perspectives of human rights, social construction through media representation and public opinion, and lived experiences, the book offers a multifaceted and sophisticated analysis of the phenomenon. The main aim of this collection is to expand current scholarship on refugee studies and offer policy recommendations on the timely topic of refugees and asylum seekers in East Asia.

Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan, 2024. 

Edited by: Stephan Conermann , Youval Rotman , Ehud R. Toledano and Rachel Zelnick-Abramovitz

 Over the last two decades, social scientists, legal scholars, human rights activists, and historians, have sought common conceptual grounds in the study of enslavement, thus forging a new perspective that comprises historical and contemporary forms of slavery. This has also intensified awareness of enslavement as a global phenomenon. In this volume, the authors give tentative answers to the question on what global enslavement means.

Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter, 2023. 223p.

By Felix Lösing

The British and American Congo Reform Movement (ca. 1890-1913) has been praised extensively for its ›heroic‹ confrontation of colonial atrocities in the Congo Free State. Its commitment to white supremacy and colonial domination, however, continues to be overlooked, denied, or trivialized. This historical-sociological study argues that racism was the ideological cornerstone and formed the main agenda of this first major human rights campaign of the 20th century. Through a thorough analysis of contemporary sources, Felix Lösing unmasks the colonial and racist formation of the modern human rights discourse and investigates the historical work of racism at a crossroads between imperial power and the white crisis.

Bielefeld: transcript Verlag, 2020. 396p.

By Catherine Wihtol de Wenden

This open-access short reader investigates how migration has become an increasingly important issue in international relations since the turn of the 21st century. It investigates specific aspects of this migration diplomacy such as double citizenship or bilateral agreements on border controls which can become important tools for bargain or pressure. This short reader also discusses the intersections between migration and international relations concerning issues of global governance such as conflicts and refugees, development and mobility, or environmental migration. The book thereby shows the extent of bargaining involved in migration and international relations, the so-called “soft diplomacy of migrations” as seen in the EU/Turkish agreement on borders in 2016, or the EU negotiations with Maghreb or Sub-Saharan countries on readmissions against development programs and visas. As such this reader provides a must-read to students, academics, researchers policy makers, and everyone who wants to learn more about the international relations aspects of migration governance.

Cham: Springer Nature, 2023. 98p.

By Jose Miguel Pinto dos Santos

Homicide : forced and violent opening of a vacancy that cannot be filled—we are all irreplaceable, even Mr. Costa; the act of a man killing another man; includes suicide, regicide, presidentialicide, politicide, parricide, ministicide, matricide, infanticide (which includes feticide or induced abortion), fratricide and euthanasia; in the past, in white heteropatriarchal societies where gender discrimination was practiced, the act of a man killing another woman was distinguished from feminicide; although fratricide is generally considered a category within homicide, there are those who defend the opposite opinion, such as Father Mário Centavo, in his Opera Omnia , vol. 49, p. 444, “all homicide is fratricide”; Like everything that is irreversible, homicide is a sunk cost and all the bureaucracy that follows it, established in the Penal and Criminal Procedure Codes, is for the exclusive benefit, income and employment of the legal professions; homicide was formerly considered a crime and severely punished in white heteropatriarchal societies, but it has gradually, and in phases (the famous ramp ), been liberalized and deregulated in our country within the scope of the profound structural reforms underway carried out by the government party in an effort to make our society more just, advanced, compassionate and humane under the progressive & galvanizing motto “liberalize crime, criminalize weapons”; a recent leak of information, which went unnoticed in the national press, revealed that a reform of the Penal Code is being planned in which, within the scope of the ongoing deregulation, a new classification of homicide into three categories is proposed: criminal, justifiable and commendable; Generally well-informed sources added that it is expected that, in the near future, homicide will only be punishable when committed against members of the PSD, and that anything committed by them will always be commendable. A proposal to transfer homicide from the scope of criminal law to civil law has been shelved for now.

Observador - Jun 10, 2022

By Chris Jones , Romain Lanneau , Yasha Maccanico u.a.

For at least three decades, the EU and its Member States have engaged in a process of “externalization” – a policy agenda by which the EU seeks to prevent migrants and refugees from setting foot on EU territory by externalizing (that is, outsourcing) border controls to non-EU states. The EU’s New Pact on Migration and Asylum, published in September 2020, proposed a raft of measures seeking to step up operational cooperation and collaboration to further this agenda. This report aims to contribute to public and political debate on the transparency, accountability, and legitimacy of the externalization agenda. It contains a series of case studies on three key target states for the EU – Bosnia and Herzegovina, Morocco, and Niger – based on information received in response to access to documents and freedom of information requests submitted to institutions within those countries, as well as within the EU itself.

Brüssel:  Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung European Union, December 2022. 48p.

By Center for Human Rights, The Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, University of Washington,

In recent years, local and state governments in Washington have taken important legislative and executive action to protect vulnerable residents from rights abuses. Many of these actions, such as the so-called “sanctuary” laws of Keep Washington Working (2019) and Courts Open to All (2020) Acts, seek to protect the rights of migrants by limiting the degree to which local authorities can collaborate with civil immigration enforcement by ICE or CBP. More recently, the language of “sanctuary” has also been used in the context of the right to reproductive health care at both the state and local levels. On June 30, 2022, Governor Jay Inslee issued a directive prohibiting the Washington State Patrol from “providing any cooperation or assistance whatsoever” with efforts to investigate or prosecute those seeking access to reproductive health care in our state. And some local jurisdictions have followed suit. On July 5, 2022, King County Executive Dow Constantine issued an order banning the King County Sheriff and other county agencies from providing any information or assistance with efforts to “obstruct, restrict, diminish or discourage” access to reproductive health care. On July 26, 2022, the Seattle City Council voted to bar local police from assisting in investigations or executing warrants issued by other jurisdictions that criminalize seeking or assisting in abortions. These strongly worded directives are important statements of Washington state values. Yet research conducted in Washington and elsewhere shows that data gathered by state and local law enforcement remains accessible to both law enforcement from other states, and federal immigration enforcement agencies, through interoperable databases. ICE documents show that federal immigration agents have deliberately increased their use of digital tools in recent years in direct response to the limitations created by local policies designed to limit collaboration with federal immigration enforcement. Although it remains to be seen whether out-of-state attempts to prosecute people for seeking or providing, access to abortions in Washington will pass legal muster, automatic license plate recognition (ALPR) data documenting presence at abortion clinics in our state could be deployed as a powerful tool to flaunt Washington policies. For Washington to live up to its promises to provide “sanctuary” for those exercising their lawful rights in Washington, our state and local governments must take steps to close the gaps in existing systems of digital surveillance. Towards this end, the UW Center for Human Rights has launched an effort to understand the practices of digital surveillance in our state and their potential to undermine access to the very rights protections our government has pledged to uphold. This report focuses on just one dimension of this multidimensional threat: the dangers posed by the misuse of automated license plate recognition technology by law enforcement agencies. Future reports will examine other digital tools.

Seattle: University of Washington,  CENTER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS,  HENRY M. JACKSON SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, 2022. 23p.

By Mitch Morrissey  and DJ Summers

Aurora, Colorado’s third-largest city, has made local and national headlines recently for criminal activity in apartment buildings allegedly related to members of a Venezuelan gang. City officials, media commentators, and the public have debated at length the reputed presence of the Venezuelan gang Tren de Aragua and the extent of the gang’s criminal activity across the Metro Denver area. Although crime in Aurora and Denver is still above its pre-pandemic baseline, neither has experienced city-wide elevated crime levels in the last 12 months. However, several areas throughout the cities with documented elevated migrant populations have seen dramatic upticks in crime in 2023 and 2024. Importantly, these trends are not uniform across all centers of migrant populations. The isolated crime that is being committed in the areas in question at apartments on Dallas Street, Nome Street, and 13th Avenue is borne by the surrounding areas, most of which are neighborhoods with lower socioeconomic status. There are economic costs associated with this rise in crime.

Key Findings:

Aurora’s violent crime is not rising as a whole. Violent crime in both Aurora and Denver has decreased since a 2022 peak, though in 2023 annual crime remained elevated from crime in 2019.

Identifying crime trends is difficult among noncitizens, as reporting is lower. Cities are estimated to have a 6% decrease in violent crime reporting and 1% decrease in property crime reporting for every 1% increase in noncitizen residents. The recent migrant surge has resulted in a 12% increase in the number of noncitizens in the Denver metro area.

Publicly available geolocated crime maps do not show a consistent trend of rising crime in the Denver or Aurora locations known to house high numbers of migrants. However, they do show a localized spike in police-reported crime at three Aurora complexes.

The apartments at 1218 Dallas Street in Aurora have seen crimes and citations more than double since 2022, from 31 to 80.

The apartments at 1568 Nome Street in Aurora have seen crimes and citations more than double since 2022, from 33 to 76.

The apartments at 15483 E 13th Avenue Aurora have seen crimes and citations nearly double since 2022, from 29 to 44.

Elevated crime has higher costs in economically disadvantaged neighborhoods. The major crimes in 2024 at just the Dallas Street apartments alone have led to $700,000 in tangible and intangible costs. These do not include crimes not reported to police.

Greenwood Village, CO:Common Sense Institute, 2024. 10p.

By Trey Walk, and Maria Burnett,

  Since 2021, political leaders in the US state of Florida have reshaped K-12 schools through laws and policies that censor, distort, and discriminate. Such efforts include passing laws restricting classroom instruction about race in US history, sexual orientation and gender identity, banning books available to students, and setting inaccurate and misleading civics and history standards. “Why Do They Hate Us So Much?” documents the impacts on students of Florida’s denial of access to accurate information about Black history, systemic racism, and about their health, when related to sexual orientation or gender identity. Florida leads the United States in the number of books banned from classrooms and school libraries, primarily literature written by or about LGBTQ people and people of color. Students and teachers report that new legal and curriculum changes have created an environment more conducive to harassment and discrimination in the classroom on the basis of race, sexual orientation, and gender identity. Parents and teachers describe the difficulty of providing children with an education free from discrimination in the increasingly hostile environment. Human Rights Watch, Florida Rising, and Stanford Law School Rule of Law Impact Lab call on Florida to rescind its discriminatory policies and promote a curriculum that counters discrimination and prepares students to live healthy lives in a diverse society. They also call for a bold federal response to address this civil and human rights crisis in US public schools.  

New York: Human Rights Watch, 2024. 107p.