Edited by  Nick Lowles

The far right poses its biggest political threat in Britain since World War Two. At the ballot box, on the streets and online, the far right – in all its guises – is increasingly confident, assertive and growing. With Donald Trump returning to the Presidency of the United States and Elon Musk, the world’s richest man, financially and ideologically supporting the British far right, we can only assume that the threat will grow in 2025. REFORM UK Britain faces a genuine far-right political threat for the first time in our history, in the form of Reform UK: Reform UK received 4.2m votes in the 2024 general election, a 14.3% vote share Support for Reform UK has continued to grow since the election and now regularly tops opinion polls The party currently has 218,000 members and, with an influx of money and experienced political campaigners, is becoming an increasingly professional outfit RIOTS 2024 saw the worst race riots in 100 years, following the murder of three young girls in Southport by 18-year-old Axel Rudakubana: Violence broke out in 18 towns and cities across England While activists from known far-right organisations were involved in the trouble, most incidents emerged from localised, post-organisational far-right networks The riots were fuelled by disinformation and the widely reported claim across the entire far right that the authorities were covering up the Islamist motives of the attacker. Despite Axel Rudakubana not being a Muslim, much of the far right still refer to him as such HOPE not hate identified the man behind the Southport Wake Up Telegram group, which played a central role in stirring up the violence. He was recently imprisoned for seven years TOMMY ROBINSON Former EDL leader Stephen Lennon, better known as Tommy Robinson, continues to be the most influential far-right activist outside Reform: Lennon held a demonstration of 30,000 to 40,000 people in London in July, the largest far-right protest ever Lennon has acquired more than one million followers on X, and his tweets on the day of the big demonstration were seen by 58m people He was imprisoned for 18 months in late October for contempt of court He received support from Elon Musk, including funding RADICAL RIGHT ECOSYSTEM Fuelling the British far right is a growing, increasingly confident and well-resourced radical-right ecosystem, which spans traditional media, new media and a burgeoning number of individual actors: GB News is increasingly the mouthpiece for Reform UK A growing number of radical-right activists are leaving platforms like GB News to establish their own media outlets, backed by donations and subscriptions from supporters Academic-turned-activist Matt Goodwin is playing an increasingly important role in supporting Reform, backed by a Substack with more than 70,000 followers TERRORISM Far-right terrorism continues to pose a major threat in the UK: Twenty-three people who were far-right sympathisers were convicted under terrorist legislation A new violent cult called 764, closely linked to the nazi Satanist group Order of Nine Angles, is active in Britain A growing number of extremely violent young men are becoming increasing ideologically fluid, drawing inspiration from a diverse array of extremes in order to justify their thoughts and acts of violence. The Southport killer Axel Rudakubana is a case in point DEMOCRACY The public continue to be downbeat about the state of democracy and politics in the UK: 40% of Britons in a poll of 23,000 support a “strong and decisive leader who has the authority to override or ignore parliament” over a representative parliamentary democracy 68% do not believe that politicians listen to people like them, with just 9% believing they do The more pessimistic people are about their own lives, the more likely they are to support Reform UK, to believe multiculturalism is failing, and to oppose immigration    

London: Hope Not Hate, 2025. 140p.

By Susan Fratzke, Meghan Benton, Andrew Selee, Emma Dorst, Samuel Davidoff-Gore 

  The territorial asylum system at the heart of the global protection regime has proven itself to be a blunt tool with which to address the protection challenges of the 21st century. New crises, protracted displacement situations, and expanding norms about who merits protection have created a significant and growing population of individuals in need of international protection. In addition, growing mobility pressures due to demographic change, economic inequality, and climate change have found an outlet in asylum systems, providing an avenue of entry even for those who do not technically qualify for protection. Meanwhile, national governments have struggled to reconcile their international protection responsibilities with their domestic responsibilities to maintain security and order and to foster public trust. Asylum adjudication systems have become unwieldy and unable to keep pace with the demands placed on them, particularly when confronted with rapid changes or complex needs. These failures have had serious consequences. For individuals, the absence of large-scale alternatives to territorial asylum means that access to protection often depends on taking extreme risks or enduring hardships in order to reach the territory of a country where they can seek protection, journeys that may not be possible for the most vulnerable. For states, territorial asylum places governments in a largely reactive position, only responding to protection needs once their hand is forced by the arrival of people seeking protection on their territory. And at the global level, the lack of tools to facilitate the legal mobility of individuals in search of protection and of opportunities for displaced persons to move to a country other than their country of first asylum has concentrated protection responsibilities in a small number of countries, most of them low- or middle income. According to estimates by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) nearly 40 percent of the world’s refugees and individuals in refugee-like situations were hosted by just five countries as of mid-2023. To answer these challenges, there is an urgent need to shift the focus of protection responses away from an exclusive reliance on territorial asylum and toward a diversified set of policy tools. Territorial asylum will, and should, remain accessible as a safety valve, but states should seek to proactively facilitate access to protection as soon after and close to a displacement crisis as possible—and well before dangerous journeys become necessary. At the same time, policy approaches should recognize the agency of refugees and displaced persons—and the mobility pressures this can create—and provide legal avenues for individuals to move within and outside of their country of first asylum to join family and other connections through family reunification or sponsorship channels and to pursue education, work, or other opportunities. Aside from the benefits for displaced persons, such approaches would help transit and destination countries to reduce disorder at their borders and, by capitalizing on the resiliency and resourcefulness of displaced individuals in locating and securing solutions for themselves, to better allocate scarce resources to assist those who are most vulnerable. Policy approaches should also be responsive to the specificities of each crisis or situation. This may mean adopting expedited procedures or flexible forms of status in order to enable faster access to  status, prevent processing backlogs, or respond to legitimate needs that are not recognized in existing legal frameworks.    

Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2024.  33p.

By Fiona Robertson, Hui Yin Chuah, Abdullah Mohammadi, and Jennifer Vallentine

  Migration within and towards Southeast Asia is a dynamic, mixed and enduring phenomenon influenced by historical, socio-cultural, economic, and geopolitical factors. From the Mekong region to movements between Indonesia and Malaysia, these migration practices are rooted in the region’s history and continue to evolve today.11 Significant events such as the large-scale displacement during the 1950s–70s Vietnam War, persistent systemic persecution of Rohingya, and the recent conflicts in Myanmar have accentuated the complexity of mixed migration in the region. Uneven economic development across Southeast Asia has further fuelled migration, attracting workers from lower-income countries to larger economies that offer greater opportunities. Additionally, climate change and environmental disasters have increasingly influenced migration patterns in the region.22 Combined, these factors contribute to both regular and irregular migration patterns, with porous borders and limited access to regular pathways exacerbating the prevalence of irregular migration. Bangladesh, one of world’s largest migrant sending countries, accounting for 7.4 million migrants living abroad as of 20203 and host to 989,585 Rohingya refugees as of July 2024, faces economic pressures and protracted displacement that drive many individuals towards irregular migration. The route from Bangladesh to Malaysia, particularly via boat across the Bay of Bengal, is a prominent irregular migration pathway. Similarly, Indonesia is a major migrant-sending country, especially of migrant workers, with 4.6 million migrants globally as of 2020.5 The Indonesia-Malaysia migration corridor, which 55 per cent of Indonesian migrants travelled in 2017, is characterised by a high degree of irregularity, with nearly half lacking legal status.6 Malaysia and Thailand, known for their relative economic and political stability, comparatively welldeveloped economies and established diaspora communities, are key destination countries in Southeast Asia. However, they face distinct challenges related to irregular migration. Economic opportunities, especially in low-skilled sectors, attract migrants from neighbouring countries across porous borders, making both countries host to large populations of migrants in irregular situations. As of 2017, the World Bank estimated that Malaysia hosts approximately 1.23–1.46 million migrant workers who are in irregular situations, predominantly from Bangladesh and Indonesia.7 Malaysia also hosts 190,370 registered refugees and asylum seekers, 88 percent of whom are from Myanmar.8 Thailand, which hosts 4.9 million migrants, serves as a primary destination for migrant workers from neighbouring Southeast Asian countries and a transit and destination point for asylum seekers and refugees.9 As of 2018, Thailand hosted approximately 811,437 migrant workers in irregular situations from Cambodia, Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR), Myanmar, and Viet Nam,10 in addition to 86,539 refugees, including about 5,500 urban refugees, as of November 2024.11 Both Malaysia and Thailand are central to understanding the dynamics of irregular migration and the effectiveness of policies aimed at promoting safe and regular migration pathways. However, while there are estimates of the number of migrants in irregular situations across Southeast Asia, the often-covert nature of irregular migration makes accurate and timely estimations of its scale challenging. Despite their significant presence and contributions to the labour force and host societies, migrants in irregular situations face precarious conditions, including the constant threat of arrests, detention, and deportation due to their irregular status, as well as lack of access to education, healthcare, formal livelihoods, and sustainable housing. Additionally, those taking irregular pathways often encounter various protection risks along their journeys, including extortion, sexual and physical abuse, and trafficking in persons. Addressing the issue of irregular migration requires a multifaceted approach that recognises the diverse backgrounds and experiences of people on the move and addressing the motivations and drivers that compel individuals to undertake irregular journeys. A common narrative suggests that the lack of information about regular and safe migration pathways is a significant driver of irregular migration.12 This information gap, coupled with the lack of awareness of the risks associated with irregular journeys and limited accessible regular pathways, often compel many individuals to opt for irregular routes.13 In response, policy and programming initiatives have increasingly turned to information-dissemination and awareness-raising campaigns to mitigate irregular migration, as well as people smuggling and trafficking in persons. For example, between 2015 and 2019, European Union (EU) member states invested more than 23 million euros in 104 information and awarenessraising campaigns with the aim of reducing irregular migration towards Europe.14 In Bangladesh, the EU contributed 15.9 million euros to the five-year Prottasha project and a further 20 million euros in 2023 to Prottasha II15 which aims to promote sustainable reintegration and safe migration. The project includes awareness-raising about safe migration and the risks of migrating through irregular channels as a key component.16 In 2023, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the EU launched a series of audio-visual products as part of the ASEAN Safe and Fair Migration Campaign, aimed at better protection of migrant workers in Southeast Asia.17 In fact, the focus on information dissemination is not new; it was highlighted as one of the key strategies in a 2012 United Nations (UN) background paper on good practices in preventing people smuggling.18 However, despite the increase in policies and programming surrounding information dissemination on migration, there remains a challenge in assessing their effectiveness in preventing and reducing the risks associated with irregular migration. Under the mandate of the Bali Process on People Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons and Related Transnational Crime (Bali Process), the 2023 Adelaide Strategy for Cooperation (the Strategy) recognises ‘Irregular Migration’ and ‘Public Information Campaigns’ as two key cooperation areas across the Bali Process structure. The Strategy welcomes initiatives that build the preparedness of Bali Process Member States to respond to irregular migration and calls for support to ‘members to develop and implement effective public information campaigns, raise public awareness and promote digital literacy, including among youth, to reduce irregular migration and promote safe and legal migration’.19 As key origin, transit, and destination points across the Bali Process region, the four selected Bali Process Member States—Bangladesh, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand—provide valuable contextual insights for the purpose of this assessment. Against this background, this assessment aims to provide evidence-based insights and actionable policy recommendations on the information needs and perceptions surrounding irregular migration in key Bali Process Member States in South and Southeast Asia. It will identify the nuanced information needs of people on the move, assess their perceptions and motivations, and evaluate the role of information in migration decision-making, facilitating the design of information campaigns targeted at changing behaviours of persons at risk of irregular migration. Additionally, the assessment will examine interventions designed to bridge information gaps behind irregular migration.   

Bangkok:  Regional Support Office of the Bali Process ; Geneva: Mixed Migration Centre, 2025. 67p.

By Zechariah Chafee Jr.

Zechariah Chafee Jr.'s "The Inquiring Mind," published in 1928, stands as a seminal work in the discourse on civil liberties, particularly focusing on freedom of speech within the United States. He delves into the intricacies of freedom of speech providing a comprehensive exploration of the legal and philosophical foundations of free expression. The book emerged during a period marked by intense debates over civil liberties, especially in the aftermath of World War I and the accompanying "Red Scare." Chafee's work played a pivotal role in shaping modern First Amendment jurisprudence, influencing both legal scholars and judicial opinions. His defense of free speech contributed to a broader understanding of its essential role in a democratic society, challenging prevailing notions that favored repression over open discourse. The work is a cornerstone in the study of civil liberties, offering enduring insights into the complexities of freedom of speech. Its significance, rich content, and original perspectives continue to inform and challenge modern interpretations of free expression in democratic societies.

Main themes relevant to the modern era are::

• Social Media and Free Speech: The role of platforms like Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube in shaping discourse, including issues of content moderation, algorithmic bias, and "cancel culture."

• Misinformation and Fake News: The rise of deepfakes, conspiracy theories, and propaganda, and their impact on public perception and democracy.

• Censorship vs. Safety: The balance between preventing harmful speech (hate speech, extremist content) and protecting the right to express controversial opinions.

• Government and Corporate Influence: The role of states and tech companies in controlling or amplifying speech through regulations and policies.

• AI and the Future of Expression: How AI-generated content, chatbots, and automated censorship tools impact free inquiry.

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By The Mixed Migration Centre

  Drawing on more than 1,000 surveys with refugees and migrants, this infographic examines their perceptions of dangerous locations, direct experiences of abuse and harsh conditions and their interactions with and perceptions of smugglers. Additionally, it explores the sources of information that refugees and migrants relied on before and during their journey, as well as their access to assistance.  

London/Denmark: Mixed Migration Centre, 2024. 6p.

By The Mixed Migration Centre

Sudan serves as a key country of transit for movements along the Central Mediterranean Route, linking countries in East and the Horn of Africa to North Africa. Since the outbreak of conflict in April 2023, safe migration routes through the country have shifted away from Khartoum and migrants from conflict-affected regions are more reliant on smuggling networks to overcome limited mobility options and restrictive visa policies in neighbouring countries. This snapshot examines migrants' perceptions of their smugglers, the services they provide, and the abuses that migrants perceive smugglers to be perpetrating. It should be noted that while interviews with migrants were carried out in the second half of 2024, most respondents had been in Sudan since before the outbreak of war in April 2023 and are reflecting both on their interactions with smugglers along the journey to Sudan and once in the country. This is the first of two snapshots published on smuggling dynamics along routes to and within Sudan. The second snapshot on the role of smugglers is available here. Key findings • Over half of migrants felt that their smugglers helped them to reach their intended destination (59%) and did not feel intentionally misled by their smugglers (56%). • Perceptions varied by age, with youth (aged 18-24) expressing less confidence in their smugglers than older respondents (aged 25+). • The main services supplied by smugglers were providing accommodation (45%) and food/water (46%), facilitating border crossings (33%), and dealing with authorities (32%). Youth were more reliant on smugglers for crossing borders and dealing with authorities compared to older migrants (56% and 41% vs. 25% and 29%, respectively). • More than half of respondents (58%) described their smuggler as a "service provider or businessperson". Youth more often perceived their smugglers as criminals than older respondents (33% vs. 15-18%). • Few migrants (9%) perceived smugglers as perpetrators of abuse during their journey. For those who did (n=28), kidnapping (18 cases), detention (16 cases), physical violence (10 cases), and robbery (7 cases) were the top abuses.

London/Denmark: Mixed Migration Centre, 2025. 10p.

By Katerina Glyniadaki, Nora Ratzmann, Julia Stier

International organizations and foreign-funded NGOs run campaigns in Senegal to raise awareness of the perils of irregular migration. To increase their effectiveness, these organizations often enlist local migrant returnees to share their personal migration experiences and transmit an anti-irregular migration message to their compatriots. This article examines whether policymakers' assumptions regarding the representativeness of migrant returnees operating as (anti-)migration messengers in terms of shared identities corresponds to reality at the street level. It draws from theories of street-level bureaucracy and representative bureaucracy and is based on 31 qualitative interviews with migrant returnees and experts. The study shows that migrant returnees engaged in migration information campaigns are not as representative of the local population as envisaged by policymakers, potentially impacting policy outcomes. They stand out from their compatriots in terms of skillsets and social status – partly because of the selection mechanism employed by organizations and partly because of the training and capacity-building efforts directed at migrant returnees.

International Migration. 2025;63:e13382.

By Rebecca Rabinovitch,

In 2019, two appeal court decisions found that the administrative segregation regime used in Canada’s federal corrections system violated prisoners’ constitutional rights. While the two decisions differed in their analyses, some key points emerged: a constitutional system for segregating prisoners would need to ensure prisoners did not experience prolonged periods of severe isolation, and would need independent review of decisions to isolate prisoners. In response to these decisions, Bill C-83 was introduced. Among other changes, this bill aimed to abolish administrative segregation and replace it with a new system of structured intervention units (SIUs), intended to allow more humane separation of prisoners in line with the constitutional requirements identified by the appeal court decisions. However, this bill was criticized by many experts from the beginning of the legislative process as making insufficient change to truly vindicate the rights in question. Many worried that SIUs would be, in effect, administrative segregation under a new name. Now, as the five-year review of Bill C-83 approaches, there is an opportunity to assess whether SIUs have met the constitutional standards they were intended to realize. Through examination of the available data on SIUs – including documents from the Implementation Advisory Panel and Correctional Service Canada itself – this report examines the ongoing and serious violations of prisoners’ Charter rights under this system. The documented failures of the SIU regime in allowing these violations to continue highlights the urgency with which the review of Bill C-83 should be conducted. Under the SIU system, prisoners still experience a problematic degree of isolation. Many prisoners do not receive adequate time outside of their cells or engaged in meaningful human contact. Legislative standards for these activities are framed as obligations to provide opportunities rather than to ensure these standards are met, meaning that isolation can occur even when there is legislative compliance. However, prisoner refusals of offered opportunities cannot fully explain the degree of isolation present in SIUs, indicating that noncompliance with the legislation is a factor as well. These continuing conditions of severe isolation demonstrate that the holdings of the appeal court decisions relating to the duration of isolation and procedural fairness around isolation decisions cannot be dismissed as limited in relevance only to the former system of administrative segregation. Prisoners also continue to experience extended stays in SIUs. While the CCRA requires that prisoners be transferred out of the SIU as soon as possible, there is no cap on the duration of SIU stays to prevent prolonged isolation. A portion of the prisoners experiencing prolonged SIU stays also experience significant isolation caused by not receiving their entitlements to time outside of their cells and time in meaningful human contact. Under the Mandela Rules, the international standards for the treatment of prisoners accepted by Canada, this group of prisoners is experiencing torture. While Bill C-83 introduced a mechanism for review of SIU decisions by Independent External Decision Makers (IEDMs), this system contains serious flaws that impede its ability to provide  adequate procedural fairness. This problem is particularly urgent given the findings that prisoners continue to experience the very serious threats to life, liberty, and security of the person presented by the harmful degree of isolation faced in SIUs. In particular, IEDM review occurs after long periods of confinement in the SIU, and is reliant on information provided by Correctional Services Canada. This information has not been consistently complete or accurate, presenting a significant barrier to fair review. Even worse, many prisoners face delays in being referred to IEDM review at all, as well as delays in implementation of IEDM decisions. Finally, the SIU system has implications for the s. 15 Charter equality rights of particularly vulnerable groups of prisoners. Black and Indigenous prisoners are significantly overrepresented in the SIU population, meaning that these marginalized groups are placed at a heightened risk of experiencing the negative effects of SIU residence. Prisoners with mental health needs are also overrepresented in SIUs, despite their unique vulnerability to the psychological harms of isolation. The system of IEDM review has not succeeded in returning members of these groups to the general prison population, in part due to inconsistent provision of information about prisoners’ mental health status and social history factors to IEDMs. In combination, these problems indicate that serious violations of prisoners’ Charter rights remain prevalent in the SIU system. Bill C-83 cannot be said to have resolved the constitutional problems identified by the appeal courts of Ontario and British Columbia in their examination of the administrative segregation regime. As such, a thorough and expeditious five-year review of Bill C-83, involving civil society and aimed at reconsidering all aspects of SIUs, including compliance and enforcement, is imperative. In addition to the need to approach this review with urgency, this paper identifies further recommendations key to creating a system that can adequately respect prisoners’ Charter rights, including the following: • Amend the CCRA to define “solitary confinement” in line with the international standards set out in the Mandela Rules, • Prohibit prolonged solitary confinement (solitary confinement lasting over 15 days), • Prohibit solitary confinement for prisoners with serious mental health issues, and • Mandate improved data-sharing with the public and civil society   

The John Howard Society of Canada & David Asper Centre for Constitutional Rights, 2023. 43p

By Chris Horwood and Bram Frouws

Almost 10 months after damning human rights reports and global publicity exposed Saudi Arabian state-driven border killings of migrants – labelled by Human Rights Watch as possible crimes against humanity - the deaths and injuries continue. New evidence appears to indicate that the Saudi border authorities at their southern border with Yemen are continuing to use live weapons to fire indiscriminately at Ethiopians and Yemenis crossing the border irregularly. This update report argues that while the crimes being committed are murderous and grievous, the level of inaction and impunity in the face of global exposure and condemnation should also disturb us all.

London/Denmark: Mixed Migration Centre, 2024. 9p.

By Paul Clewett, Julia Litzkow, Jennifer Vallentine

This paper examines smuggling dynamics and the related protection risks faced by refugees and migrants in the Western Balkans in 2024. It provides an overview of EU migration policy developments in the Western Balkans, focusing on the implementation of anti-smuggling measures. It examines shifts in smuggling routes and operations, and the experiences of people on the move under stricter migration management. The report also considers the potential impact which the implementation of the EU Pact on Migration and Asylum may have on smuggling dynamics and the protection risks facing refugees and migrants in the region.

The research is based on 17 interviews with refugees and migrants, 24 key informant interviews, and a review of secondary sources. It provides an overview of changes as of mid-2024, following the Mixed Migration Centre (MMC) June 2023 study Western Balkans: Mixed Migration Trends and Dynamics.

It aims to directly contribute to identifying solutions in the Western Balkans, in particular regarding the Danish Refugee Council’s (DRC) work in protecting refugees and migrants in Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

London/Denmark: Mixed Migration Centre, 2024. 23p.

By Bijal Shah

Just about all outcomes of the enforcement of law, whether beneficial or concerning, are to some extent the result of administrative discretion. In her insightful new article, Misdemeanor Declination: A Theory of Internal Separation of Powers, Professor Alexandra Natapoff expertly illustrates that this is as true in criminal administration as anywhere else. In particular, Natapoff identifies and evaluates an important moment of discretion in the administration of criminal law: a prosecutor’s decision whether to decline or file formal criminal charges after police have made an arrest. This invited response both appreciates Natapoff's enthusiasm for enhancing prosecutorial discretion in criminal administration and maintains a bit of skepticism regarding its efficacy. More specifically, it draws on the immigration context in order to explore the possibilities and hazards of internal administrative checks for constraining excessive policing in both the criminal and immigration environments. First, this response suggests that directives ensuring uniformity are important to ensuring high-quality prosecutorial discretion. Second, it argues that agency culture is an important player in the internal separation of powers that reduces prosecutors’ overarching potential to constrain law enforcement. Third, it observes that the declination decision can serve a gatekeeping function that limits desirable access to adjudication, particularly for communities with fewer resources and reduced participation in democratic process. Finally, this response notes the possibilities of institutional design and public oversight for improving law enforcement accountability.

Texas Law Review Online, Volume 103, 2024, Boston College Law School Legal Studies Research Paper No. 639, 15p.

By Stephen Webb

As immigration rises to the top of voters’ concerns, a major new Policy Exchange report examines why governments of both parties have found it so hard to get the numbers down, and what policies would be needed to achieve this. 

The report, written by Stephen Webb, a former Home Office director and with foreword by The Honourable Alexander Downer AC, former Foreign Minister of Australia, sets out the incentives in the system that have led to consistently high migration. These include the power of the pro-immigration lobby, mixed incentives within Government, and a human rights case law that has consistently moved in a more liberal direction over the past 30 years. It notes that the problems we are facing in the UK are increasingly shared by other European countries.   

The report exposes that at least £11m is being spent by NGOs with a focus on migration issues on research, analysis and lobbying – with a further £30m in taxpayer funded grants to universities, most of which have a clear tilt towards liberal immigration policies. 

The report argues that the policy response needs to change the incentives, whether they be on migrants themselves, employers and renters, other government departments and third countries who do not cooperate on returning their nationals. The report recommends: 

An auction system to allocate a limited number of work visas to ensure they go to the highest quality candidates, with the proceeds used to increase wages in the care sector,A system of ‘sureties’ which impose a penalty on visa holders if they do not leave on timeIllegal migrants to know they will not be allowed to settle in the UK, but will be transferred to safe accommodation on Ascension IslandTougher laws to block visas and overseas aid going to countries that do not cooperate in returns of their nationalsMuch tougher penalties for those employing and renting accommodation to people without the right to be in the UK.A cross European coalition to reform the ECHR, with a willingness to leave if this is not delivered 

In a foreword to the report, former Australian Foreign Minister, The Honourable Alexander Downer AC, said: 

“The issue of immigration has become one of the most contentious on the Western world…so far few countries have managed the issue well…but the British immigration system is a particular shambles… 

A British government will have sooner or later to get control of the immigration program.  If they fail to do so, we can be sure populists and extremists will get elected who promise to do it.”

London: Policy Exchange, 2025. 85p.

By Human Rights Watch

This has been a year of elections, resistance, and conflict, testing the integrity of democratic institutions and the principles of international human rights and humanitarian law. Whether in response to heightened repression in Russia, India, and Venezuela, or catastrophic armed conflicts in Gaza, Sudan, and Ukraine, governments around the world are being called upon to demonstrate their commitment to human rights, democracy, and humanitarian action. Many have failed the test. But even outspoken and action-oriented governments have invoked human rights standards weakly or inconsistently, feeding global perceptions that human rights lack legitimacy. That is an irresponsible and dangerous conclusion, and conveniently absolves governments of their legal obligations to uphold international human rights law both at home and in their actions abroad. Reflecting on the events of 2024, this is not a moment to retreat from the protections needed by everyone everywhere. Instead, governments should respect and defend universal human rights with more rigor and urgency than ever, and people and civil society need to remain steadfast in holding them accountable. The Power of Popular Resistance Elections need to abide by human rights standards, but elections are never an end in themselves. While rigged and otherwise unfair elections are a sign of more rights violations to come, even free and fair elections don’t necessarily mean a rights-respecting future. Although over 70 countries conducted national elections in 2024, their full impact on human rights will only be felt in what follows. Racism, hate, and discrimination drove many elections in the past year. In the United States, Donald Trump won the presidency for a second time, raising concerns that his new administration would repeat and even magnify the serious rights violations of his first term. Likewise, in the European Parliament elections of 2024, far-right parties made significant gains, exploiting anti-immigrant sentiment and nationalist rhetoric to advance policies that threaten minority communities and undermine democratic norms. Yet elsewhere, there was meaningful democratic resilience, as voters proved unwilling to accept populist agendas and held leaders and their parties accountable. In India, Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s hate speech on the campaign trail did not win him the electoral majority he craved, showing that even in the face of systemic challenges, democracy can still put a check on power. Authoritarian leaders tightened their grip on power in countries such as Russia, El Salvador and the Sahel nations of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, leveraging fear and misinformation to stifle dissent.

Our Annual Review Of Human Rights HumanRights Watch, 2025. 554p

By Stacey Cutbush, Leanne McCallum Desselle, Melissia Larson, Brianna D’Arcangelo

The past decade has seen a rapid increase in efforts to combat human trafficking. This rush has led to disparate approaches when developing programs and providing service, creating a fragmented landscape in which service providers have varying levels of preparedness and capacity. Subsequently, the services rendered to survivors of human trafficking are varied and uneven. To remedy this, there is a pressing need for a landscape analysis of existing standards in the field to inform the creation and adoption of unified standards of care (SOCs), ensuring a cohesive, consistent, and robust service response to survivors of human trafficking.

In recent years, there has been a growing demand from practitioners, evaluators, and researchers for unified SOCs in the anti-trafficking field. These stakeholders have expressed a need to establish principles, guidelines, or frameworks for service delivery to support their efforts. Establishing a cohesive, consistent, and robust framework that can be utilized across the field will benefit anti-trafficking efforts. Building on this momentum, the Office for Victims of Crime (OVC) and the Office of Trafficking in Persons (OTIP) have issued a call to action to develop unified SOCs for human trafficking service providers. As part of this multi-phase initiative, Freedom Network USA received a competitive award to the lead the development of SOCs and will convene an SOCs Technical Working Group (SOC TWG) to identify, adopt, adapt, and/or develop SOCs for human trafficking service providers.

RTI’s purpose in this project is to conduct a literature review by reviewing and synthesizing all existing literature related to human trafficking SOCs. This literature review will provide the SOC TWG with a foundational understanding of the current state of the field. Additionally, the insights derived from the literature review will guide the process and criteria for the TWG’S identification, adoption, adaptation, and/or development of SOCs in response to OVC-OTIP’s call to action. 

Research Triangle Park, NC: RTI, 2023. 20p. 

By Marcin Rojszczak

This book discusses contemporary standards of legal safeguards in the area of bulk electronic surveillance from the perspective of the European legal model. Bulk, or untargeted, surveillance, although traditionally associated with the interception of electronic communications, is increasingly used as a convenient tool for collecting information on large groups of society. The collection of redundant information, which is intrinsic to bulk surveillance, is no longer a side effect but an important objective of the use of bulk powers. As a result, untargeted surveillance is everywhere increasingly being implemented, and without any clear link to state security or crime-fighting objectives. This work examines the origins of untargeted measures, explores their mechanics and key concepts, and defines what distinguishes them from other forms of surveillance. The various elements of the legal safeguards in place, which are fundamental to protecting individuals from the risks of abuse of power, are analysed in detail. The book discusses not only the different standards of legal safeguards, but also gives examples of their implementation in individual European countries. It also examines the relationship between the development of the global data market and untargeted surveillance powers, in particular in the context of the risks associated with algorithmic surveillance, client-side scanning, the privatisation of surveillance – or surveillance as a service – and the increasingly widespread use of preventive content filtering mechanisms. The book will be a valuable resource for academics and researchers working in the areas of law, international relations, public policy, engineering and sociology. It will also appeal to professionals dealing with various aspects of the use of surveillance measures, such as experts, members of the legislature and law enforcement agencies.

London; New York: Routledge, 2025. 290p.

By Hilary Francis

In recent years, child migrants from Honduras, Guatemala and El Salvador have made the perilous journey to the United States in unprecedented numbers, but their peers in Nicaragua have remained at home. Nicaragua also enjoys lower murder rates and far fewer gang problems when compared with her neighbours. Why is Nicaragua so different? The present government has promulgated a discourse of Nicaraguan exceptionalism, arguing that Nicaragua is unique thanks to the heritage of the 1979 Sandinista revolution. This volume critically interrogates that claim, asking whether the legacy of the revolution is truly exceptional. An interdisciplinary work, the book brings together historians, anthropologists and sociologists to explore the multifarious ways in which the revolutionary past continues to shape public policy – and daily life – in Nicaragua’s tumultuous present.

London: University of London Press, 2020. 198p.

By Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International

Amnesty International Kenya and Human Rights Watch document the abuses committed by police and other state agents during the 2023 nationwide protests. The opposition, Azimio La Umoja One Kenya Coalition, organized the protests over alleged fraud and malpractices during the 2022 elections, and against the high cost of living and tax hikes proposed by the new administration of President William Ruto. “Unchecked Injustice” is based on 224 interviews with survivors and witnesses to abuses in Nairobi, Kisumu, Machakos, Migori, Nakuru, Kisii, Nyamira, Homa Bay, Siaya, and Makueni counties. The report documents how police used arbitrary and excessive force against protesters between March-July 2023. They shot directly into crowds with lethal weapons and lesslethal “rubber bullets,” fired tear gas into residential areas and schools, and carried out violent and abusive house-to-house operations, beating and shooting residents, killing at least 31 people. The Independent Policing Oversight Authority, which provides civilian oversight of the work of the police in Kenya, recorded that at least 67 were killed during this period. The report also documents arbitrary arrests, detention, torture and other ill-treatment of people including children under 18, and the long-term health and socio-economic impact of abuses. Amnesty International Kenya and Human Rights Watch call on the Kenyan government to acknowledge, condemn and investigate the killings and use of excessive force by police, and hold to account those credibly implicated in abuses. The government should also introduce credible police reforms.

New York: Human Rights Watch, 2024. 96p.

By Human Rights Watch

The 175-page report, “‘I Learned How to Say No’: Labor Abuses & Sexual Exploitation in Colombian Webcam Studios,” exposes working conditions in webcam studios in Bogotá, Cali, Medellín, and Palmira, where models record content that is broadcasted by adult platforms and streamed around the world. Webcamming is a global industry in which studies estimate that platforms keep between 50 and 65 percent of what viewers pay. People interviewed said that studios retain as much as 70 percent of what is paid out by the platform, reducing the pay of workers. Adult webcam platforms based in the United States and Europe should immediately address labor abuses and sexual exploitation in Colombian webcam studios.

New York: Human Rights Watch, 2024. 285p.

By Michael Garcia Bochenek

In the last few months of 2017, public defenders working in United States communities along the US-Mexico border began noticing a pattern. Over several months, they had seen an increasing number of people facing criminal charges for irregularly crossing the border arriving in court with a new concern: When these people had a chance to speak in court, their primary worry was not that they were facing prosecution; instead, they were asking the judges where their children were. These public defenders were seeing the early days of the forcible family separation policy put in place by the administration of US President Donald J. Trump and developed in a larger context of overheated, dehumanizing, and at times racist official rhetoric toward migrants. The policy began in March 2017 as a pilot program in and around El Paso, Texas, and was then rolled out along the entire US-Mexico border in early 2018. The policy deployed a minor federal criminal charge—“improper entry”—to force children and parents apart. Its official name, “Zero Tolerance,” referred to Attorney General Jeff Sessions’ directive that every adult who entered the United States irregularly would face prosecution. Criminal charges for improper entry have long been misused as a means of immigration enforcement, raising serious human rights concerns. More than five years before Sessions’ “zero tolerance” directive, improper entry and improper reentry were the most prosecuted federal crimes in the United States. As misguided and abusive as this earlier use of such charges was, it had not deliberately targeted children and their parents. In fact, before mid-2017, the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) generally did not request prosecution of parents arriving with their children and federal prosecutors had usually declined to pursue improper entry charges against parents traveling with their children precisely to avoid separating arriving families. The policy developed at Sessions’ directive did not appear primarily aimed at securing convictions. Although a criminal conviction would mean more serious consequences on a subsequent irregular entry, the offense is, as a federal magistrate judge observed, “quite literally one of the least serious federal offenses.”1 The real payoff, as far as the architects of the policy were concerned, was that a criminal charge could be used as a reason to transfer the immediate responsibility for protective care of the child. Parents who faced charges were in the custody of the US Marshals Service. Their children remained in US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) detention. The parents were rapidly convicted—some spent less than a minute in front of the judge once their case was called, and most received sentences of time already served in government custody, so they were back in CBP holding cells in short order. In the meantime, however, DHS, the federal government department that includes CBP, had deemed their children to be unaccompanied. DHS agents not only knew exactly where the parents were but also knew that the parents would quickly return to CBP detention. Even so, the department treated the brief change in custody as meaning that parents were not “available” to provide care. Unaccompanied migrant children are entitled to specific protections. In response to a court case settled in 1997, Flores v. Reno, care of unaccompanied children is the responsibility of the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR), an agency of the US Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). A 2008 anti-trafficking law requires DHS to transfer unaccompanied children to ORR expeditiously, usually within 72 hours. The forcible family separation policy weaponized these requirements. Keeping families together is, in the vast majority of these types of cases, in children's best interests. But instead of making every effort to keep families together, DHS transferred the children it had separated to ORR, without planning for or putting measures in place that would enable authorities to reunite them with their parents. Discussions about separating children from their parents at the border began less than a month after President Trump took office. One federal prosecutor commented in early 2017, “History would not judge that kindly.” 2 In March 2017, after Reuters broke the story that family separation was under consideration, a DHS staffer emailed Allen Blume, the department’s budget director, to say, “I would be truly grateful if you could tell me this isn’t being seriously considered.” 3 This report is based on a review of public and internal government documents, legal proceedings, and the findings of DHS, DOJ, and HHS internal investigations, drawing on Human Rights Watch’s extensive interviews with forcibly separated children and parents in 2018 and 2019. It finds that the forcible separation of children from their parents was a deliberate, targeted policy choice taken even though the architects of the policy knew or should have known that it would inflict anguish and suffering on families. Forcible separation of children from their families inflicted harms that were severe and foreseeable. Once parents realized they would not be immediately reunited with their children, they were distraught. Some children sobbed uncontrollably. Many felt abandoned. Nearly all were bewildered, not least because immigration officials would not tell them where their parents were or gave responses that proved to be lies. Children forcibly separated from their parents experienced anxiety, had nightmares, regressed to earlier developmental stages, or found it difficult to trust others and form attachments. Some lashed out. Others stopped speaking.

New York: Human Rights Watch, 2024, 145p.

By Abby Córdova, Jonathan Hiskey, Mary Malone, and Diana Orcés

U.S. efforts to control unauthorized crossings of its southwest border have long rested on the idea of deterrence — if migrants know that a border is dangerous to cross and the likelihood of deportation is high, they will be dissuaded from trying in the first place. Despite the seemingly intuitive logic of this strategy, and the billions of dollars invested in it, deterrence efforts largely have failed, with the number of border crossings in recent years exceeding those of 30 years ago.

To understand why this decades-old, bipartisan deterrence strategy has proven ineffective, the authors focus on individuals from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras who have previous migration experience, with a vast majority of them seeking entry into the U.S. These individuals have direct knowledge of the difficulties and dangers a border crossing poses, yet many report plans to try to cross the border again. To understand why they persist, the authors rely on survey data specifically collected to better understand the root causes of international migration.

Journal on Migration and Human SecurityVolume 12, Issue 3, September 2024, Pages 160-181