By Sunder Katwala, Steve Ballinger, Heather Rolfe and Jake Puddle

Conducted straight after the general election, this report examines shifting public attitudes to immigration and asylum, including the differences in attitudes between Labour, Conservative, Lib Dem and Reform voters and what that means for the politics of immigration in the new parliament.

The research also examines public attitudes on a series of key issues:

• The role of immigration in the 2024 general election.

• Public priorities for the new government.

• Public trust in the main political parties on immigration, and trust in leading politicians on the issue.

• Public perceptions of immigration: do people think net migration will fall or increase? Which flows do people think make up most immigration to the UK?

• Public satisfaction with the government’s handling of immigration.

• Do people want immigration numbers to reduce, increase or stay the same?

• Attitudes to migration to fill different roles: would people cut the numbers of doctors, care workers, lorry drivers or hospitality staff coming to the UK?

• Asylum, Channel crossings and legal routes

London: British Future, 2024. 74p.

By: Jennifer Vallentine, Roberto Forin, and Bram Frouws  

Migrant-receiving countries are increasingly focusing on return and reintegration as central elements of migration management. This briefing paper outlines key messages from research MMC has carried out on the experience of returning migrants in Asia, Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, and Europe, since 2017

Geneva: Mixed Migration Centre, 2024. 8p.

By The American Immigration Council

In recent months, leading politicians and policymakers have renewed calls for mass deportations of immigrants from the United States. While similar promises have been made in the past without coming to fruition—during the 2016 presidential campaign, for example, Donald Trump pledged to create a “deportation force” to round up undocumented immigrants —mass deportation now occupies a standing role in the rhetoric of leading immigration hawks. To cite just one example, former U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) director Tom Homan has promised “a historic deportation operation” should a hawkish administration return to power. While some plans have envisioned a one-time, massive operation designed to round up, detain, and deport the undocumented population en masse, others have envisioned starting from a baseline of one million deportations per year. Given that in the modern immigration enforcement era the United States has never deported more than half a million immigrants per year—and many of those have been migrants apprehended trying to enter the U.S., not just those already living here—any mass deportation proposal raises obvious questions: how, exactly, would the United States possibly carry out the largest law enforcement operation in world history? And at what cost? Using data from the American Community Survey (ACS) along with publicly available data about the current costs of immigration enforcement, this report aims to provide an estimation of what the fiscal and economic cost to the United States would be should the government deport a population of roughly 11 million people who as of 2022 lacked permanent legal status and faced the possibility of removal. We consider this both in terms of the direct budgetary costs—the expenses associated with arrest, detention, legal processing, and removal—that the federal government would have to pay, and in terms of the impact on the United States economy and tax base should these people be removed from the labor force and consumer market. In terms of fiscal costs, we also include an estimate of the impact of deporting an additional 2.3 million people who have crossed the U.S. southern border without legal immigration status and were released by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) from January 2023 through April 2024. We consider these fiscal costs separately because we don’t have more recent ACS data necessary to estimate the total net changes in the undocumented population past 2022, or the larger impact on the economy and tax base of removing those people, an impact that is therefore not reflected in this report. In total, we find that the cost of a one-time mass deportation operation aimed at both those populations—an estimated total of at least $315 billion. We wish to emphasize that this figure is a highly conservative estimate. It does not take into account the long-term costs of a sustained mass deportation operation or the incalculable additional costs necessary to acquire the institutional capacity to remove over 13 million people in a short period—incalculable because there is simply no reality in which such a singular operation is possible. For one thing, there would be no way to accomplish this mission without mass detention as an interim step. To put the scale of detaining over 13 million undocumented immigrants into context, the entire U.S. prison and jail population in 2022, comprising every person held in local, county, state, and federal prisons and jails, was 1.9 million people. To estimate the costs of a longer-term mass deportation operation, we calculated the cost of a program aiming to arrest, detain, process, and deport one million people per year—paralleling the more conservative proposals made by mass deportation proponents. Even assuming that 20 percent of the undocumented population would “self-deport” under a yearslong mass-deportation regime, we estimate the ultimate cost of such a longer operation would average out to $88 billion annually, for a total cost of $967.9 billion over more than a decade. This is a much higher sum than the one-time estimate, given the long-term costs of establishing and maintaining detention facilities and temporary camps to eventually be able to detain one million people at a time—costs that could not be modeled in a short-term analysis. This would require the United States to build and maintain 24 times more ICE detention capacity than currently exists. The government would also be required to establish and maintain over 1,000 new immigration courtrooms to process people at such a rate. Even this estimate is likely quite conservative, as we were unable to estimate the additional hiring costs for the tens of thousands of agents needed to carry out one million arrests per year, the additional capital investments necessary to increase the ICE Air Operations fleet of charter aircraft to carry out one million annual deportations, and a myriad of other ancillary costs necessary to ramp up federal immigration enforcement operations to the scale necessary.

 American Immigration Council, 2024. 52p.

Edited by Krista Lynes, Tyler Morgenstern, and Ian Alan Paul

In recent years, spectacular images of ruined boats, makeshift border camps, and beaches littered with life vests have done much to consolidate the politics of movement in Europe. Indeed, the mediation of migration as a crisis has worked to shore up various forms of militarized surveillance, humanitarian response, legislative action, and affective investment. Bridging academic inquiry and artistic and activist practice, the essays, documents, and artworks gathered in Moving Images interrogate the mediation of migration and refugeeism in the contemporary European conjuncture, asking how images, discourses, and data are involved in shaping the visions and experience of migration in increasingly global contexts.

Bielefeld : Transcript, [2020]

By National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and MedicineNational Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine

Individuals from minoritized racial and ethnic groups continue to face systemic barriers that impede their ability to access, persist, and thrive in science, technology, engineering, mathematics, and medicine (STEMM) higher education and workforce. Without actively dismantling policies and practices that disadvantage people from minoritized groups, STEMM organizations stand to lose much needed talent and innovation as well as the ideas that come from having a diverse workforce. A new report from the Board on Behavioral, Cognitive, and Sensory Sciences examines the backdrop of systemic racism in the United States that has harmed and continues to harm people from minoritized groups, which is critical for understanding the unequal representation in STEMM. The report outlines actions that top leaders and gatekeepers in STEMM organizations, such as presidents and chief executive officers, can take to foster a culture and climate of antiracism, diversity, equity, and inclusion that is genuinely accessible and supportive to all.

Washington, DC: National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, 2023. 342p

By Heizler (Cohen), Odelia, Israeli, Osnat

Dramatic events can evoke feelings of compassion, fear, or threat, and can affect public opinion regarding controversial issues. Such an event was the drowning of 3-year-old Alan Kurdi, a Syrian boy whose body washed up on a Turkish shore, and was photographed, producing an iconic image that was seen worldwide. The image evoked empathy and compassion that neuroscience and psychological research associate with a motivation to help. This paper examines the impact of this event on four different aspects of attitudes toward immigration, some of which are more closely linked to pro-social behavior than others. The timing of the European Social Survey in Portugal allowed us to use this tragic event as a natural experiment. Our results show that Kurdi's drowning had a significant effect on emotion-related sentiments, but no such impact was detected on other attitudes. The results suggest that the event did not change the respondents' opinion regarding the possible negative consequences of immigration on the host country's economy, crime level, or culture, nor did it change their perception of the skills required by immigrants. On the other hand, the empathy induced by the tragic event increased their willingness to have a less restrictive immigration policy and their openness to having close social relationships with immigrants.

Bonn: Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), 2024. 34p.

 By Daniel Di Martino  

This report estimates the lifetime fiscal impact of immigrants, of various ages and educational attainment, to the United States. It offers a methodological upgrade over similar analyses and estimates and evaluates the fiscal impact of various proposed immigration reforms. A clear picture of the fiscal cost of immigrants is particularly important, given the ongoing border crisis. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that the border surge will number 8.7 million unlawful immigrants between 2021 and 2026. The original analysis in this report finds that the border crisis will cost an estimated $1.15 trillion over the lifetime of the new unlawful immigrants—a cost larger than the entire U.S. defense budget and almost equal to the cost of Social Security in 2023. Looking at immigrants more broadly, this report shows that the average new immigrant (lawful or unlawful) has a positive fiscal impact and reduces the federal budget deficit by over $10,000 during his lifetime. For comparison, the average native-born citizen is expected to cost over $250,000 to the federal government. Despite the average immigrant reducing the budget deficit, immigrants without a college education and all those who immigrate to the U.S. after age 55 are universally a net fiscal burden by up to $400,000. The large positive fiscal impact of young and college-educated immigrants pulls up the overall average. Each immigrant under the age of 35 with a graduate degree.   Therefore, for policymakers considering the fiscal impact of immigrants to the U.S., the characteristics of people seeking entry into the country are crucial. Certain immigrants are fiscally beneficial; others are fiscally detrimental. This report quantifies the fiscal impact of common immigration reform proposals: • Mass deportations would significantly reduce the national debt over the long run, but a policy of selective legalization, coupled with mass deportations, would be even more fiscally beneficial, reducing the debt by about $1.9 trillion. • Given the education, age, and earnings of H-1B visa recipients, doubling the number of H-1B visas for just one year would reduce the budget deficit by $70 billion over the long run—and by another $70 billion each year thereafter. • The most beneficial immigration policy change would be to exempt STEM graduate degree holders from green-card caps, increasing immigration by some 15,000 people per year and reducing the visa backlog; this would reduce the deficit by $150 billion in the first year and $25 billion each year thereafter. • Eliminating refugee resettlement and permanent immigration by parents of U.S. citizens would reduce the debt by a combined $40 billion in net present value every year. • Congress could upskill the existing immigration flow by eliminating the diversity visa category and increasing the visas available to the top employment-based categories, and requiring immigrants to have earned a high school diploma to be eligible for a family visa, reducing the national debt by over $60 billion per year. By enacting a selectionist immigration policy—which requires securing the border from unlawful immigration, reducing low-skilled immigration, and expanding high-skilled immigration—the U.S. could reduce future federal debt by trillions of dollars over the long run. This report proposes a legislative package that provides over $2 trillion in net present value during the first year and over $200 billion each subsequent year, without accounting for the additional productivity growth resulting from high-skilled immigration. Furthermore, under these reforms, the annual number of immigrants who are new permanent residents decreases by about 15% after a temporary legalization program and a partial clearing of the employment-based visa backlog. Over the long term, annual legal immigration decreases under this plan from approximately 1 million in FY 2019 to approximately 860,000 

New York: The Manhattan Institute, 2024. 58p.

By Kayla R. Freemon, Melissa A. Gutierrez , Jessica Huff, Hyunjung Cheon, David Choate, Taylor Cox a, Charles M. Katz 

Limited research attention has focused on homicides involving foreign-born victims. Using data from the National Violent Death Reporting System, we examined 9428 homicides that occurred in 2017 in the United States across 32 states and D.C. Approximately 8% of homicide victims were foreign-born. Homicide victimization rates were substantially lower for foreign-born persons, compared to U.S.-born persons. However, foreign-born persons from Honduras, El Salvador, and Jamaica had a substantially higher risk of homicide victimization. Notably, few homicides involving foreign-born victims were gang- or drug-trade-related. With the growing number of immigrants in the United States, policy and prevention efforts should be guided by research.

Preventive Medicine Reports Volume 26, April 2022, 101714

By Alex Nowrasteh, Sarah Eckhardt, and Michael Howard

The National Research Council and the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) published ground breaking investigations into the economics of immigration in 1997 and 2017. Both publications contained thorough literature surveys compiled by experts, academics, and think tank scholars on how immigration affects many aspects of the U.S. economy. The 2017 NAS report included an original fiscal impact model as a unique contribution to immigration scholarship. Its findings have been used by policymakers, economists, journalists, and others to debate immigration reform. Here, we acquired the exact methods used by the NAS from its authors to replicate, update, and expand upon the 2017 fiscal impact model published in the NAS’s The Economic and Fiscal Consequences of Immigration. This paper presents two analyses: a measure of the historical fiscal impacts of immigrants from 1994 to 2018 and the projected long-term fiscal impact of an additional immigrant and that immigrant’s descendants. An individual's fiscal impact refers to the difference between the taxes that person paid and the benefits that person received over a given period. We use and compare two models for these analyses: the first follows the NAS’s methodology as closely as possible and updates the data for more recent years (hereafter referred to as the Updated Model), and the second makes several methodological changes that we believe improve the accuracy of the final results (hereafter referred to as the Cato Model). The most substantial changes made in the Cato Model include correcting for a downward bias in the estimation of immigrants’ future fiscal contributions identified by Michael Clemens in 2021, allocating the fiscal impact of U.S.-born dependents of immigrants to the second generation group, and using a predictive regression to assign future education levels to individuals who are too young to have completed their education. Other minor changes are discussed in later sections. Immigrants have a more positive net fiscal impact than that of native-born Americans in most scenarios in the Updated Model and in every scenario in the Cato Model, depending on how the costs of public goods are allocated. The Cato Model finds that immigrant individuals who arrive at age 25 and who are high school dropouts have a net fiscal impact of +$216,000 in net present value terms, which does not include their descendants. Including the fiscal impact of those immigrants’ descendants reduces those immigrants’ net fiscal impact to +$57,000. By comparison, native-born American high school dropouts of the same age have a net fiscal impact of −$32,000 that drops to −$177,000 when their descendants are included (see Table 31). Results also differ by level of government. State and local governments often incur a less positive or even negative net fiscal impact from immigration, whereas the federal government almost always sees revenues rise above expenditures in response to immigration. With some variation and exceptions, the net fiscal impact of immigrants is more positive than it is for native-born Americans and positive overall for the federal and state/local governments

Washington, DC: The Cato Institute, 2023. 246p.  

By Miguel Pinedo, and Carmen R. Valdez

We examined the differential impact of having a family member, friend, or co-worker/community member detained or deported on the mental health of US citizens. In 2019, a sample of 3446 adult participants of White, Black, and Latinx racial/ethnic descent were recruited to complete an online questionnaire. Participants completed the Patient Health Questionnaire-4 to screen for anxiety, depression, and psychological distress. Analyses were restricted to US citizens (n = 3282). Multivariable logistic and linear regressions were conducted to examine the mental health of US citizens who reported personally knowing a migrant who has been detained or deported and by their relationship to the migrant, overall and among Latinxs only. Among US citizens, 32% reported personally knowing someone who has been detained or deported. In multivariable analyses, US citizens who personally knew a detained or deported migrant were more likely to report anxiety, depression, and greater psychological distress. Associations were more pronounced among those who reported having a family member detained or deported. US-citizen Latinxs with social ties to migrants who have been detained or deported were especially more likely to report poor mental health than White and Latinx participants who did not personally know a migrant who has been detained or deported. It is critical that policy makers consider the potential mental health harms on migrants and its own citizens when designing policies targeting migrant communities. 

Am J Community Psychol (2020) 66:119–129 

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By Joanne Passaro

Gender and Homelessness: The book explores how gender differences contribute to the persistence of homelessness, with a focus black men in New York City.

Cultural and Moral Location: Homelessness is not just an economic issue but also a cultural and moral one, where homeless men are seen as both hypermasculinized and emasculated.

Survival Strategies: Homeless women often strategize to appear"worthy" to move through the system, while homeless men lack similar strategies and face greater stigmatization.

Impact of Family Structures: The book argues that nuclear family ideologies play a significant role in who remains homeless versus who becomes houseless.

Psychology Press, 1996, 128 pages

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Edited by Marcela Raffaelli & Reed W. Larson

Focus on Street Youth: The document explores the developmental issues faced by homeless and working street youth around the world,highlighting their unique challenges and resilience.

Geographical Approach: It presents studies from different regions,including India, Brazil, Kenya, and the United States, to show the diverse experiences and factors affecting street youth.

Research and Methodology: The document discusses the methodological and ethical issues in researching street youth,emphasizing the importance of understanding their context and using appropriate research methods.

Developmental Impact: It examines how street life affects the development of street youth, including their cognitive skills, identity formation, and psychological adjustment.

Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1999, 90 pages

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By Lucy Bonnerjea & Jean Lawton

Study Focus: The report examines homelessness in Brent within the context of race and housing, specifically looking at disadvantages faced by black people.

Historical Context: It provides a historical overview of homelessness legislation, highlighting the 1977 Housing Act And its impact on local authorities' responsibilities.

Current Issues: The document discusses current challenges in managing homelessness, including inadequate housing policies, discrimination, and the impact on families.

Recommendations: It offers policy recommendations to improve housing access, quality, and support for homeless families, emphasizing the need for equal opportunities and better planning.

Policy Studies Institute, 1987, 88 pages

By U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement

The U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Annual Report provides an overview of the agency’s key programs, enforcement metrics, and accomplishments. It represents the agency’s commitment to transparency and accountability, and meets and exceeds the requirements in the Joint Explanatory Statement accompanying the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Appropriations Act, 2023, which states: ICE is directed to continue issuing annual Fiscal Year ERO and HSI reports by not later than 90 days after [the] end of each fiscal year. The reports should compare data for the reporting fiscal year to the prior five fiscal years in a sortable, downloadable, and printable format, with a description of any significant deviations in data representation when compared to prior years. ICE was created in 2003 through the merger of the investigative and interior enforcement elements of the former U.S. Customs Service and the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Today, it is a premier federal law enforcement agency with over 20,000 law enforcement and support personnel in more than 400 offices across the United States and around the world. Its mission is to promote homeland security and public safety through the criminal and civil enforcement of federal laws governing border control, customs, trade, and immigration. In support of this mission, ICE works to uphold hundreds of federal statutes, administer U.S. immigration laws, oversee the cases of more than 6.2 million noncitizens on the agency’s national docket, combat fentanyl and other illegal narcotics, prevent terrorism, and combat the illegal movement of people and goods across the U.S. border. The agency is one of the three principal operational components charged with the immigration and customs authorities Congress placed in DHS under the Homeland Security Act of 2002 and is a member of the federal law enforcement community. ICE’s unique combination of legal authorities and intelligence-driven law enforcement capabilities position the agency to respond to a range of increasingly complex cross-border and domestic threats. The agency has an annual budget of approximately $8 billion, primarily devoted to three operational directorates: Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO), Homeland Security Investigations (HSI), and the Office of the Principal Legal Advisor (OPLA). A fourth directorate — Management & Administration (M&A) — supports the three operational branches to advance ICE’s mission, while the Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) promotes integrity and accountability by conducting independent reviews of ICE programs and operations. Additionally, several support programs within the ICE Office of the Director (OD) are devoted to improving the agency’s operational and policymaking capabilities, enhancing stakeholder relationships, cultivating a professionally trained and diverse workforce, and ensuring safe and humane conditions for those in ICE custody.    

Washington, DC: U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 2023. 99p.

Edited by Ivan Ureta

Sensitive issues like migration and human mobility provoke paradigms and prejudices in public opinion. Media, Migration and Public Opinion is a collective effort of academic criticism to overcome these myths. The main motive of this book is linked to the fact that migration, media and public opinion related issues focusing on North Africa have not been addressed properly by available literature. Against this background, the objective of Media, Migration and Public Opinion pursues three aims: Firstly, it fills a gap in the scholarly literature regarding media, political communication and migration by shifting the focus to the North African countries Morocco, Algeria and Libya. Secondly, it assesses to what extent the paradigms of the «other» and its characterization as a source of problems established in receiving countries are also present in sending and transit countries. Thirdly, the book puts North African issues in relation to European countries by presenting case-studies focused on Spain, Malta and Switzerland in order to raise commonalities and differences.

Bern, SWIT: Peter Lang, 2011. 292p.

By International Organization for Migration Regional Office for Central America, North America and the Caribbean San Jose, Costa Rica

The increase in irregular migration in the Central American and Mexican routes has generated an increase in the flow of migrants through dangerous zones, exposing migrants to various risks, from the use of dangerous means of transportation to situations of exploitation, violence and disappearances. In recent years, hundreds of migrants have been reported missing or dead in these zones. Protection services face challenges and limitations in providing comprehensive care to the large number of migrants passing through the region. These risks are increased for vulnerable populations such as unaccompanied minors, women and LGBTIQA+ persons. In response, governments recognize the need to ensure the physical, legal and emotional safety of migrants in transit through the region. This study, developed by the IOM Regional Program on Migration with the support of the Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration of the United States Department of State, provides crucial information and lines of action to protect migrants in transit, contributing to the fulfillment of international commitments and the strengthening of coordination among member countries for the assistance and protection of migrants.

International Organization for Migration Regional Office for Central America, North America and the Caribbean San Jose, Costa Rica, 2024. 50p.   

By Daniel Drewski and Jürgen Gerhards

Across the world, the number of people forcibly displaced from their homes has more than doubled during the last decade. Although international law does not allow states to turn back refugees, some countries close their borders to refugees, some open their borders and grant extensive protection, while others admit some groups of refugees while excluding others. How can we make sense of these different responses to admitting refugees? In this book, Daniel Drewski and Jürgen Gerhards show that governments' refugee policy, as well as the stance adopted by opposition parties on the issue, is heavily dependent on how they frame their country's collective identity on the one hand and the identity and characteristics of the refugees on the other. By defining the "we" and the "others", politicians draw on collectively shared cultural repertoires, which vary by country and by political constituency within a country. The book is based on a discourse analysis of parliamentary debates. It explores the specific framing of nations' identities and the corresponding perceptions of otherness by focusing on six countries that have been confronted with large numbers of refugees: Germany, Poland, and Turkey, all responding to the exodus of Syrian and Middle Eastern refugees; Chile's reaction to the Venezuelan displacement; Singapore and its stance towards Rohingya refugees; and Uganda's response to the displacement from South Sudan. The study explores not only differences between governments of different countries but also the conflicting views of different political parties within the same country.

Oxford, UK; New York: Oxford University Press,  2024.  321p.

Edited by Angela Di Stasi, Ida Caracciolo, Giovanni Cellamare, Pietro Gargiulo

This book discusses existing and future trends concerning the development of migratory policies between local and global levels, to understand the challenges and gaps in the protection of migrants. The collection explores international migration and its impact on sovereignty, international cooperation, security, and human rights. In particular, it takes into account the composite framework of international and national rules, and the role of judicial and monitoring bodies in protecting the rights of migrants, with the aim of assessing the state of the art, identifying the gaps, and formulating possible remedies. The work of some international organizations such as the UN and its specialized agencies and the European Union is investigated, together with a set of regional practices such as those of Latin America and South-East Asia, and countries, such as Mexico, Georgia, Tunisia, Italy, and the United States. The issues of the fundamental rights of migrants in the European legal order are also addressed, including the emerging scenarios related to recent crises like the one generated by the war in Ukraine. This timely collection will be essential reading for academics, researchers, and policy-makers working in the areas of Migration Law, Asylum and Refugee Law, International Law, International Organizations, EU Law, International Human Rights Law, International Humanitarian Law, Comparative Law and Socio-Legal Studies.

London; New York: Routledge, 2025. 705p.

Crisis Group Latin America Briefing N°51  

What’s new? Across the region where Brazil, Colombia, and Peru meet deep in the Amazon, an assortment of criminal organizations are exploiting the feeble reach of states, abundance of natural resources, and poverty of local communities to grow, diversify, and hatch new cross-border ventures. Why does it matter? Surging cocaine production in Peru and the spread of other rackets like gold dredging and illicit logging threaten Indigenous ways of life, spur deadly violence, and harm the environment. Should these criminal ventures go unchecked, they could undermine the already tenuous state control of the world’s largest rainforest. What should be done? Following up on promises made in 2023, the three countries should bolster security cooperation and harness foreign assistance with a view to prosecuting and sanctioning those responsible for environmental crimes. Support for law-abiding livelihoods and stronger collaboration with Indigenous communities at the front lines of criminal expansion are vital.

  Bogota/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2024.    28p.