By Measures for Justice

MFJ collects data regarding adult criminal cases filed and resolved in state courts. Through these efforts,
we’ve identified gaps in the types of information received that limit our ability to generate a
comprehensive picture of how criminal cases are processed by trial courts across the United States. One
example of these gaps relates to cases involving American Indians and crimes committed on tribal lands. In an effort to paint a more comprehensive picture of how criminal cases unfold at the local level, MFJ
wanted to better understand jurisdictional authority over these cases.
Unfortunately, we quickly learned that disparate and convoluted laws governing criminal case processing
deeply complicate the question of jurisdictional authority and act as a significant barrier to understanding
the ways in which these cases are processed. A key contributor to this jurisdictional confusion is Public
Law 83-280 (PL-280), which reduces the ability of American Indian tribes to independently respond to
crimes occurring on Indian land, instead allocating authority to state governments to varying degrees across several states.   PL-280 plays a significant role in dictating which institutions respond to criminal offenses and, consequently, what justice looks like for different people across different communities in the United States. The sections that follow shed light on the complexity created by PL-280 and the challenges it poses for data collection and system transparency. Importantly, the intentions of this report are not to make comparisons or draw conclusions about the effectiveness of these differing approaches to justice, but rather to highlight the importance of data transparency and accessibility for the purposes of evaluating system performance and holding administrators accountable. We argue that this transparency is always key to ensure the fair and effective handling of cases, and this is of particular importance in places where the power to handle criminal matters has expanded beyond federal and tribal governments to the state by way of PL-280.

Rochester, NY: Measures for Justice, 2023. 16p.

By Measures for Justice

  After experiencing a series of hurdles obtaining and analyzing criminal justice data in New York State, Measures for Justice (MFJ) set out to better understand the state’s data infrastructure. Drawing on interviews with system stakeholders--including practitioners, policy advocates, and researchers--we explored the quality and availability of criminal justice data in the state of New York. With heated criminal justice reform debates underway, there is a clear need for data that can speak to system performance. And yet our investigation uncovered that, with few exceptions, the mechanisms for criminal justice data collection and release in New York State are broken. Efforts to put data to use across the state are frequently hampered by obscure systems, antiquated technologies, arduous request processes, and a degree of partiality that allows data access to some and not others. The present report explores each of these themes and ultimately suggests four pathways forward for New York agencies looking to pursue equitable and responsible data practices.

Rochester, NY: Measures for Justice, 2021. 23p.

By Measures for Justice

South Dakota is currently in a dispute about legalized marijuana use for recreational and medicinal purposes. In this context, it’s worth considering how the state handles criminal cases involving drug and DUI offenses. Measures for Justice (MFJ) recently published county-level criminal justice data for the state of South Dakota that span 2009–2017. A review of our findings suggests that relative to other offenses, South Dakota counties pursue harsher responses to court cases in which the most serious offense was related to drug possession/distribution or driving under the influence (DUI). The pattern can be seen at multiple points in case processing. This report explores these disparate findings using three Measures: dismissal rates, time to disposition, amount of fees and fines. Year by year, we have found that drug and DUI cases (1) are dismissed at a lower rate in most counties, (2) take longer, on average, to dispose of than other case types, and (3) face some of the highest financial obligations at conviction

Rochester, NY: Measures for Justice, 2021. 7p.

By Sema Taheri, Jennie Brooks, Mason DeLang, Shelby Davis, Hillary Livingston, Nathan LeMahieu, & Trevariana Mason

Despite accounting for a substantial portion of local, state, and federal budgets, our criminal justice institutions are among the least measured systems in our country. In an effort to bring transparency to this sector, MFJ has collected, standardized, and made public 20 states’ worth of criminal justice data.

The purpose of this report is to share what we have learned through this effort, including: (a) what we cannot see when data are missing, and (b) the value that data can provide when they are available and comparable. In particular, we identify patterns around the following:

There is a substantial lack of data around pretrial detention and release decision-making, as well as individual demographics (particularly indigence).

New data privacy laws are also making it needlessly difficult to obtain certain data. This poses challenges to understanding how individuals experience the system in cases that do not result in conviction.

There is great variation in how counties dispose of and sentence nonviolent cases; how financial obligations are imposed on individuals; and the collateral consequences that individuals face when convicted.

Across many of these findings, where demographics are available, we have an opportunity to identify and respond to significant disparities in group outcomes.

This report challenges stakeholders and policymakers to dig deeper into these patterns and missing data. It also implores policymakers and legislators to improve criminal justice data infrastructure to ensure a more transparent, fair, and equitable implementation of justice.

Rochester, NY: Measures for Justice, 2021. 17p.

By Kelsie Chesnut, Celia Strumph, Faiza Chappell, Ari Kotler, John Bae

A person’s conviction history should never be a barrier to housing. Housing provides a foundation to engage in opportunities such as education and employment, making it a critical piece of one’s life, especially after release from incarceration. Formerly incarcerated people point to housing as one of the most important factors in helping them stay out of prison after release. Despite research finding that a conviction history does not predict a person’s housing success, some landlords fear that people with conviction histories will pose a threat to safety and property. The barriers to housing that people with conviction histories face place emotional and financial strain on families and destabilize communities. Because people leaving incarceration are regularly denied access to safe and affordable housing due to their conviction histories, they often rely on their families as the primary source of stable housing after release. But they are four to seven times more likely to be unemployed compared to members of the general public, so they often can’t make enough money to contribute to the household. As a result, people leaving incarceration often face homelessness and housing instability. Approximately one-third of formerly incarcerated people lack stable housing after release. People who experience homelessness have frequent interactions with police, who arrest them for misdemeanors often associated with homelessness, such as sleeping in public spaces and trespassing, reinforcing a cycle of homelessness and incarceration. Moreover, housing restrictions based on landlords’ reluctance to accept tenants with conviction histories also force people who are otherwise qualified for housing to resort to more precarious housing settings such as shelters, placing undue stress on systems and agencies that are already overburdened and have limited resources. People will continue to face barriers absent protections that end housing discrimination for people with conviction histories. To ensure that people are able to access housing after criminal legal system involvement, the Vera Institute of Justice (Vera) is advancing policy changes in several states, building on emerging lessons from the field. This research brief sheds light on how the passage of fair chance housing laws has impacted communities in Cook County (Illinois), New Jersey, and Washington, DC. Vera interviewed policy advocates, housing providers, enforcement agencies, policymakers, and other stakeholders to determine if people’s ability to secure housing has changed, the impact on housing provider operations, and the factors required to ensure that policies work.

New York: Vera Institute of Justice, 2025. 17p.

By Kelsie Chesnut, Ruth Delaney, Eurielle Kiki, Niloufer Taber

On average, more than 1,000 people are released from state and federal prison every day, totaling 448,400 in 2022 alone.6 Each will need to secure housing, employment, and other essentials. Increasing access to good jobs among people who are formerly incarcerated will speed successful reintegration into society, reducing crime, bolstering local economies, and increasing tax revenues. Postsecondary education plays a crucial role in securing employment in today’s labor landscape. This trend has persisted for decades and shows no signs of changing soon, as underscored by projections from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. These show an annual average of 4.7 million job openings over the next decade, most of which will be concentrated in the health care and social assistance fields; professional, scientific, and technical services; and the transportation and warehousing sectors.7 Entry-level education requirements within these openings will range from some college to a bachelor’s degree.8 Most jobs now require some level of postsecondary education, and by 2031, 72 percent of all jobs in the United States will require education and training beyond high school.9 But just having the necessary level of education may not be enough. Approximately one-third of adults in the United States possess some form of a conviction history— including arrest records or charges without convictions—which often pose barriers to employment.10 Addressing this issue is essential for companies to remain competitive and for the overall health of the U.S. economy to thrive. Those with a history of incarceration see reduced wages and earnings. Studies reveal that past incarceration can lead to an 11 percent reduction in subsequent wages, a decrease of nine weeks in annual employment, and a staggering 40 percent decline in yearly earnings.11 This effect is disproportionately felt by formerly incarcerated Black and Latino men, who experience earnings losses of 44 percent and 41 percent, respectively, equating to an estimated earnings reduction of nearly $179,000 by age 48.12 Access to postsecondary education in prisons has the potential to substantially improve employment rates for people who are formerly incarcerated throughout the United States. On average, people returning home after completing a postsecondary education program while incarcerated can anticipate a nearly 10 percent increase in employment rates compared to those who do not complete a postsecondary education program.13 Low levels of educational attainment are common among incarcerated people, especially Black men.14 The statistics are stark: the incarceration rate for young Black men with low levels of education increased by 22 points in the two decades following 1980.15 By 2004, 34 percent of young Black male high school dropouts were incarcerated daily, a rate 40 times higher than the national average.16 Additionally, imprisonment has become prevalent for Black male dropouts born since the mid-1960s, with 60 to 70 percent experiencing incarceration.17 Despite this, the majority of people (58 percent) who are incarcerated do not complete an education program while in prison.18 Among those who do earn a new educational credential, the majority completed a high school or GED program.19 Only 9 percent of incarcerated people completed a postsecondary program while in prison in 2014.20 However, low enrollment does not reflect low interest: in 2014, 70 percent of people in prison expressed a desire to enroll in an academic program.21 The problem lies in access. Most existing programs are funded through the federal Second Chance Pell program, described in detail in this section, which most recently served a maximum of 20,299 incarcerated students over the 2022–2023 fiscal year.22 People who enroll in college in prison and who engage in careers after release have a lower likelihood of recidivating and a greater likelihood of earning living wages compared to their counterparts who did not.23 Entering a career, rather than transitional or shortterm employment, plays a role in this success. 24 However, finding stable employment post-release is one of the biggest challenges faced by people leaving prison.25 Enrolling in postsecondary programs could increase employment rates among formerly incarcerated people across the United States by nearly 10 percent, according to one estimate.26 An increase in employment rates translates into an increase in earnings for formerly incarcerated people and their families. One estimate placed the increase of the combined wages earned by all formerly incarcerated people at more than $45 million during the first year back in their communities.27 At the same time, the impact of lowered rates of rearrest and/or reconviction could decrease state reincarceration spending by as much as $365 million per year.28 One promising opportunity to reverse this trend took effect on July 1, 2023: the reinstatement of federal Pell Grant eligibility to incarcerated people after nearly 30 years of exclusion. Pell Grants are need-based federal financial aid that can be used to pay for eligible postsecondary education.29 Under the new law and regulations, postsecondary institutions must ensure the credentials they offer in prison are free of licensure barriers for people with convictions.30 These measures aim to prevent student enrollment in programs that would lead to jobs prohibited by state or federal law due to prior convictions.31 However, the restrictions in place are complex and vary widely from state to state. For example, estimates indicate that more than 1,100 occupations face state regulations through licensure, certification, and registration, yet fewer than 60 occupations are regulated by more than half the states, raising concerns about quality and consistency across jurisdictions.32 And although this offers a baseline of protection against inaccessible jobs and careers, a further step those planning Pell-eligible programs could take is to ensure the credential track leads to a “good job.” Study Overview The study was guided by three research questions: › Which occupations in each state are expected to grow in the future and pay a living wage upon entry? › Which of these jobs typically requires some form of postsecondary education? › Which of these good jobs are open to people with felony convictions? To answer the first two questions, Vera drew on available data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics to identify the occupations that could be classified as good jobs. Vera considered occupations to be good jobs if they were projected to grow in each state and the District of Columbia through 2030, paid a living wage at the 10th percentile of the occupation’s pay range as a proxy for entry-level wages, and required a postsecondary credential for entry or advancement.33 Vera made the decision to require that good jobs pay a living wage upon entry—rather than to consider the median income—to account for the position of workers who are formerly incarcerated, who have historically been paid reduced wages compared to their counterparts for a variety of reasons, such as being willing to work for less due to the pressures and challenges they face finding a job; having limited work histories prior to reentry; entering a new field opened to them by participation in education; or, once employed, being subject to stigma that hinders career advancement. However, this criterion resulted in the exclusion of many critical professions, such as educators and social workers, as these professions did not typically pay a living wage for one adult and no children upon entry. This is indicative of a broader labor issue outside of the scope of this study related to how the U.S. economy is structured and the prevalence of low wages overall. (See “Appendix A: Methodology” on page 21.) Vera’s living wage analysis originally included two household structures: one adult and no children; and one adult and two children. Upon analysis, virtually no occupations met the living wage for one adult and two children upon entry. This has a potentially disparate impact on women, who are more likely than men to be sole caregivers to children both generally and upon release from incarceration.34 Regarding the requirement for postsecondary education, Vera included occupations that required a postsecondary nondegree award, an associate’s degree, or a bachelor’s degree. Postsecondary nondegree awards are obtained through programs that lead to a certificate or other award, but not a degree. Some examples of a postsecondary nondegree award include nursing assistants, emergency medical technicians, paramedics, and hairstylists. From this pool of eligible occupations in each state, Vera then identified the top occupations legally accessible to people with felony conviction histories.36 Using data from the National Inventory of Collateral Consequences of Conviction, Vera cross-referenced those good jobs against any legal or regulatory barriers that limit or prevent entry to identify which are accessible to people with felony convictions.37 (See “Appendix A: Methodology” on page 21.) Although legal restrictions may vary based on the severity of conviction, Vera’s analysis is limited to any felony conviction. Findings are aggregated nationally and presented at the jurisdiction level in Appendix B on page 31. Applicable legal restrictions were applied at the time of analysis, but are subject to change.

Brooklyn, NY: Vera Institute of Justice, 2025. 155p.

By Sarah Riley, Jacob Kang-Brown, Jessica Zhang, Jim Parsons, and Lauren Williams

It is widely recognized, if underappreciated, that incarceration physically separates people from their loved ones and communities. But there is far less attention paid to the intentional disappearance of incarcerated people from government statistics; this pernicious exclusion has profound ripple effects. Employment statistics are one key instance. Every month, the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) releases an official employment report. This report details changes in average hourly earnings, industry-specific employment trends, and fluctuations in unemployment rates across racial groups. Each of these statistics disregards everyone in jail or prison, a population disproportionately made up of Black people and low-wage workers.3 These metrics matter. They provide a key frame for understanding economic opportunity and racial equity in the United States.

Brooklyn, NY: Vera Institute of Justice, 2025. 13p.

By Ryan Shanahan, Selma Djokovic, Lidia Vasquez

The Vera Institute of Justice (Vera) conducted a rigorous evaluation of Restoring Promise, an initiative of Vera and the MILPA Collective (MILPA). Restoring Promise creates prison housing units grounded in human dignity for young adults (ages 18-25). The housing units operate with re-trained staff, trained mentors (older adults serving long or life sentences), and developmentally appropriate activities, workshops, and opportunities for young adults. Major goals and objectives The study has three main goals contributing to an overall evaluation of Restoring Promise. The first is to evaluate the impact Restoring Promise has on violence and misconduct among young adults in a large and challenging correctional system—the South Carolina Department of Corrections (SCDC). The second is to examine whether the impact of Restoring Promise can be generalized to all young adults in SCDC. The third is to understand how Restoring Promise is implemented and experienced across diverse correctional environments including rural and urban settings, jails and prisons, and facilities housing men and women. Research questions The study is organized around three research questions: 1) Does Restoring Promise reduce violence/misconduct and improve perceptions of safety for young adults exposed to the new approach, and by how much? 2) Do outcomes for young adults who volunteer to participate in Restoring Promise differ in important ways from those who do not elect to participate? 3) How is Restoring Promise implemented across diverse correctional environments (jails and prisons) and populations (rural and urban, men and women)?

Brooklyn, NY: Vera Institute of Justice, 2023. 67p.

By The: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

Illicit financial flows (IFFs)- financial flows that are illicit in origin, transfer, or use, that reflect an exchange of value and cross country borders – are major impediments to sustainable development. They divert important resources away from state revenue and public investments, foster impunity, and ultimately erode criminal justice systems as a whole. The harmful effects of illicit Financial flows and the need to reduce them are demonstrated by their inclusion in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development as Target 16.4. It stipulates the goal to “significantly reduce illicit financial flows and arms flows, strengthen the recovery and return of stolen assets and combat all forms of organized crime”. Progress towards this target is measured by SDG Indicator 16.4.1 (the “total value of inward and outward IFFs in current US dollars”), for which UNODC is the custodian together with UNCTAD.

Organized crimes vary in their characteristics, objectives, and the extent to which they cross national borders. Consequently, the amount and nature of the IFFs they generate also varies. Given the transnational nature of smuggling of migrants (SOM) and cross-border trafficking in persons (TIP), monitoring and combatting IFFs is crucially important for disrupting, prosecuting, and dismantling the organized criminal networks committing these dangerous crimes.

This Study focuses on the trends, nuances, and complexities surrounding IFFs associated with smuggling of migrants and trafficking in persons into the European Union (EU), with specific attention paid to those relating to GLO.ACT partner countries.1 It is based on an analysis of available data, field research findings, and review of secondary literature.

Vienna: UNODC, 2023. 86p.

By The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)

Key Takeaways Significant gross income from illicit drug trafficking Between 2019 and 2022, the Balkan route – a major corridor for trafficking opiates and, more recently, methamphetamine – generated an estimated total annual illicit gross income ranging from US$13.9 to US$21.4 billion. Opiates accounted for about 90 per cent of this total, with methamphetamine representing a smaller but growing share. The aggregated value of these trafficking flows surpasses the gross domestic product (GDP) of several countries along the route, highlighting the significant economic impact of these illegal activities. The data and analysis do not cover the period following the drug ban in Afghanistan that was imposed in 2022 by the Taliban and its impact on drug consumption and trafficking patterns. Geographic distribution of trafficking routes The Balkan route remains a critical pathway for drug trafficking, stretching from Afghanistan through Iran (Islamic Republic of) and Türkiye, and splitting into three main branches, all leading into Europe. Alongside the opiate flow, methamphetamine trafficking is expanding, with manufacturing hotspots identified in Afghanistan, Eastern Europe (Bulgaria, Czechia and Slovakia), Southern Europe (Greece) and Western Europe (Germany and the Kingdom of the Netherlands). Opiates and methamphetamine trafficking is concentrated in key hubs Given their location at the start of the Balkan route, Iran (Islamic Republic of) and Türkiye are the main hotspots for trafficking both drugs. Trafficking through Iran (Islamic Republic of) plays a pivotal role in the opiate trade, accounting for over one-third of total gross income along the Balkan route related to opiates. Other key trafficking hotspots can be found in Belgium and the Netherlands (Kingdom of the). These countries are not only key stops for traffickers but also act as hotspots for distributing opiates and methamphetamine in smaller quantities. Illicit actors in some countries like the Netherlands (Kingdom of the) also contribute to methamphetamine manufacture the impact of proximity and trafficker adaptability on interception rates Interception rates of illegally traded opiates and methamphetamine along the Balkan route are highest in the proximity of production sources. Iran (Islamic Republic of) and Türkiye intercept the highest percentage of all opiates that cross their territories at 28.2 and 29.3 percent respectively. Traffickers' adaptability − through tactics such as breaking shipments into smaller quantities, altering routes and employing advanced concealment methods − continue to pose significant challenges to law enforcement, particularly further along the supply chain. High profit margins in the drug trade Trafficking of opiates and methamphetamine can yield substantial profits, with an estimated combined annual illicit net income ranging from US$10.9 to US$16.9 billion. These profits represent more than 70 per cent of the total illicit gross income acquired through the trafficking of these two substances after deducting intermediate expenditures, production and purchasing costs.The largest shares of illicit net income are generated at the retail level, where price markups are highest. However, individuals higher up in the supply chain may earn more per person, as fewer people share the profits at the international and wholesale levels. Illicit financial flows (IFFs) related to the management of drug trafficking profits are in the order of billions. IFFs are cross border flows of financial or nonfinancial assets that are illicit in origin, transfer or use. These flows represent the hidden movement of wealth that undermines economic stability and evades lawful oversight. Looking at IFFs generated through the trafficking of opiates and methamphetamine, it is estimated that between a quarter and half of the US$13.7 billion in illicit net income generated from drug trafficking along the Balkan route is illegally moved across borders, generating potential IFFs related to the management of drug trafficking profits of US$3.4 billion to US$6.9 billion annually. Link between money laundering and IFFs There is some evidence that income from drug trafficking is laundered both domestically and abroad through investments in real estate, luxury vehicles and other assets. Shell companies and informal systems like Hawala are frequently used to transfer and launder money, complicating efforts to trace the illicit proceeds. Key trafficking transit points not only facilitate drug movement but also serve as hubs for laundering and redistributing illicit financial resources. Contrary to common assumptions, traditional tax havens may play a minimal role in laundering drug trafficking proceeds. Instead, the limited available data suggests that countries like Luxembourg, the Netherlands (Kingdom of the) and Spain are potential hubs for drug-related IFFs generated along the Balkan route, alongside the United Arab Emirates.

. Vienna / ©United Nations, 2025 59p.

By The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Research and Trend Analysis Branch\

Opium production in Afghanistan remains low for the second consecutive year, with production at 433 tons in 2024, confirmed new estimates from the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). Although this figure represents a 30 per cent increase from 2023, production still remains 93 per cent below 2022 levels, when the de facto authorities began enforcing a country-wide drug ban.

UNODC released opium cultivation figures on 6 November, confirming that cultivation in 2024 had increased by an estimated 19 per cent year-on-year to cover 12,800 hectares, remaining far below pre-ban levels.

The value of the 2024 opium harvest is roughly US$260 million, an increase of 130 per cent over the previous year but still 80 per cent lower than the pre-ban value in 2022.

“A second year of low opium cultivation and production presents opportunities and complex challenges,” said Ghada Waly, Executive Director of UNODC. “International efforts must be coordinated to ensure that this decline is not replaced with production of dangerous synthetic drugs such as methamphetamine within Afghanistan or the wider region. We also need to help poppy-dependent rural communities transition to licit, economically viable alternatives, by investing in infrastructure, agricultural resources, and sustainable livelihoods.”

In 2024, farmers cultivated more alternative crops like cereals and cotton on previously fallow land. However, opium provides up to 60 times more revenue in comparison to wheat. Without profitable, licit alternatives, economic hardships could encourage some farmers to return to poppy cultivation.

The majority of opium cultivation and production has shifted from the southwest provinces to the northeast, where two thirds of opium production was concentrated.

UNODC, in partnership with the UN Development Programme (UNDP), further released a report on capacities and resources for the treatment of substance use disorders in Afghanistan.

The survey findings show that treatment services are available in 32 out of 34 provinces, but significant disparities exist in service distribution, accessibility, and gender representation, particularly affecting female patients.

Although opiates remain the most frequently reported class of substance used by patients seeking treatment, demand for services addressing stimulant-related disorders is rising, as synthetic drugs such as methamphetamine have become increasingly available in Afghanistan.

Kabul/Vienna: UNODC: 2024. 36p.

By The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Research and Trend Analysis Branch

The Afghanistan Drug Insights are a series of reports that provide latest data and in-depth analysis on aspects of the evolving drug situation in Afghanistan. This second volume provides the latest figures on national and regional opium poppy production in 2024 and the challenges farmers are facing as they adapt to new economic conditions. The remaining reports in the series will cover a range of topics related to the drug situation in Afghanistan, including the socioeconomic situation of farmers after the drugs ban; drug trafficking and supply; and treatment availability and drug use. Given the unprecedented nature of the ongoing drugs ban in Afghanistan, having continued for a second year, UNODC has sought to examine different aspects of the drug situation in that country. Taken together, reports in the series paint a comprehensive picture of the enforcement of the ban on production, trafficking and consumption of all drugs, and delve deep into the impacts of the ban on the Afghan population, as well as on neighbouring countries and the wider region. The insights are aimed at informing efforts to address demand and supply of drugs within and outside Afghanistan in an objective and timely manner, using latest data at highest quality standards. The present insight has been produced under the project “Monitoring of Opium Production in Afghanistan” (AFG/F98). Information and data contained in this report, unless otherwise stated, are based on data collected by UNODC through remote sensing techniques, rural village surveys; as well as through global data collections on drugs (UNODC Annual Report Questionnaires and UNODC Drugs Monitoring Platform). Data on opium cultivation and production are based on the Afghanistan Opium Surveys 1994-2020 jointly published by UNODC and the Government of Afghanistan, as well as the Afghanistan Opium Surveys conducted by UNODC in 2021, 2022, and 2023.

Opium production in Afghanistan remains low for the second consecutive year, with production at 433 tons in 2024, confirmed new estimates from the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). Although this figure represents a 30 per cent increase from 2023, production still remains 93 per cent below 2022 levels, when the de facto authorities began enforcing a country-wide drug ban.

UNODC released opium cultivation figures on 6 November, confirming that cultivation in 2024 had increased by an estimated 19 per cent year-on-year to cover 12,800 hectares, remaining far below pre-ban levels.

The value of the 2024 opium harvest is roughly US$260 million, an increase of 130 per cent over the previous year but still 80 per cent lower than the pre-ban value in 2022.

“A second year of low opium cultivation and production presents opportunities and complex challenges,” said Ghada Waly, Executive Director of UNODC. “International efforts must be coordinated to ensure that this decline is not replaced with production of dangerous synthetic drugs such as methamphetamine within Afghanistan or the wider region. We also need to help poppy-dependent rural communities transition to licit, economically viable alternatives, by investing in infrastructure, agricultural resources, and sustainable livelihoods.”

In 2024, farmers cultivated more alternative crops like cereals and cotton on previously fallow land. However, opium provides up to 60 times more revenue in comparison to wheat. Without profitable, licit alternatives, economic hardships could encourage some farmers to return to poppy cultivation.

The majority of opium cultivation and production has shifted from the southwest provinces to the northeast, where two thirds of opium production was concentrated.

Kabul/Vienna: UNODC, 2024. 36p.

By The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Research and Trend Analysis Branch

The Afghanistan Drug Insights are a series of reports that provide the latest data and in-depth analysis on aspects of the evolving drug situation in Afghanistan. This fourth volume provides an assessment of drug seizure trends near Afghanistan and estimates potential opium stocks within the country by the end of 2022, just before the start of the ban. The remaining reports in the series will cover a range of topics related to the drug situation in Afghanistan, including the socioeconomic situation of farmers after the drugs ban, and drug use. Given the unprecedented nature of the ongoing drugs ban in Afghanistan, which has continued for a second year, UNODC sought to examine different aspects of the drug situation in that country. Taken together, the reports in the series paint a comprehensive picture of the effects of the enforcement of the ban on production, trafficking and consumption of all drugs and delve deep into the impacts of the ban on the Afghan economy, as well as on Afghanistan’s neighbors and the wider region. The insights are aimed at informing international engagement in Afghanistan in an objective and timely manner, using the latest data of the highest quality standards, presenting it in an evidence-based, coherent, coordinated, and structured manner as foreseen in Security Council resolution 2721 (2023). The present Insight has been produced under the project “Monitoring of Opium Production in Afghanistan” (AFG/F98). Information and data contained in this report, unless otherwise stated, are based on data collected by UNODC by remote sensing, through rural village surveys and other tools; as well as through global data collections on drugs (UNODC Annual Report Questionnaires and the UNODC Drugs Monitoring Platform). Data on opium cultivation and production are based on the Afghanistan Opium Surveys 1994-2020 jointly published by UNODC and the Government of Afghanistan, as well as the Afghanistan Opium Surveys conducted by UNODC in 2021, 2022, and 2023. Other data used in this report to model stock estimates come from UNODC’s Afghan Opiate Trade Project published in 2020.

Kabul/Vienna: UNODC, 2025. 52p.

By Vanda Felbab-Brown 

Over the past several decades, the U.S. opioid epidemic has spanned four phases:  Oversupply of prescription opioids in the 1990s.. A significant increase in heroin supply and use in the 2000s.  A supply-driven explosion of fentanyl use after 2012.  Most recently, polydrug use, with fentanyl mixed into/with all kinds of drugs. Since fentanyl entered the U.S. illegal drug market, more than a million people in the United States have died of opioid overdose. The costs of fentanyl use go beyond the tragic deaths and drug-use-related morbidity, however. In addition to having significant implications for public health and the economy, the fentanyl crisis intersects in many ways with U.S. foreign policy. U.S. overdose deaths began declining in 2023. But there is little certainty as to which domestic or foreign-policy interventions have been crucial drivers. The wider availability of overdose-reversal medication is fundamental, as is expanded access to evidence-based treatment. It is also possible that the Biden administration’s actions toward international supply from Mexico and China are contributing to this reduction in overdose deaths: since the start of 2024, China has become more active in suppressing the flow of precursor chemicals, and Mexican cartels, perhaps purposefully, are now trafficking a less lethal version of fentanyl. A wide array of policy measures as well as structural factors outside of policy control could be cumulatively and interactively reducing mortality. The fact that the declines in mortality are not uniform across U.S. ethnic, racial, and social groups or geographic areas suggests the importance of access to medication for overdose reversal and the treatment of opioid use disorder, as well as the influence of structural factors. There is strong bipartisan support for preserving access to medication-based treatments. But crucially, access depends on medical insurance coverage, such as that provided through Medicaid and the Affordable Care Act. There are strong ideological divides about the financing and structure of the U.S. insurance industry as well as other aspects of drug policy. On February 1, President Donald Trump imposed a 25% tariff on imports from Mexico and Canada and a 10% tariff on imports from China until each country stops the flow of fentanyl (as well as migrants, in the cases of Mexico and Canada).1 He gave all three countries a month-long reprieve before implementing the tariffs in March to see if they satisfied his counternarcotics demands. Canada adopted a robust package of anti-fentanyl measures. Mexico too tried to appease the United States through a set of law enforcement actions, though it held out on perhaps the most important form of cooperation—expanding the presence and mandates of U.S. law enforcement agents in Mexico to levels at least approaching those enjoyed during the Felipe Calderón administration. Unlike Mexico or Canada, China did not take any further counternarcotics actions and instead responded with counter-tariffs of its own, even as Trump threatened to add additional tariffs on imports from China of up to 60%.2 On March 4, 2025, Trump dismissed Canada’s and Mexico’s law enforcement actions as inadequate, implementing the 25% tariffs. He also added an additional 10% tariff on China, meaning the second Trump administration has now placed a 20% tariff on Chinese goods.3 Apart from increasing the cost of goods for U.S. customers and driving up inflation, these tariffs will have complex effects on anti-fentanyl cooperation. Any large U.S. tariffs on China will likely eviscerate Beijing’s cooperation with the United States, resetting the diplomatic clock  back to the bargaining of 2018 and noncooperation of 2021-2023. As crucial as it is to induce the government of Mexico to start robustly and systematically acting against Mexican criminal groups, whose power has grown enormously and threatens the Mexican state, Mexican society, and U.S. interests, Mexico has no capacity to halt the flow of fentanyl. Mixing the issues of migration and fentanyl risks Mexico appeasing the United States principally on migration while placating it with inadequate anti-fentanyl actions. Further, U.S. military action in Mexico, which has been threatened by Republican politicians close to Trump, would yield no sustained weakening of Mexican criminal groups or fentanyl flows. It would, however, poison the political atmosphere in Mexico and hinder its meaningful cooperation with the United States. Strong law enforcement cooperation with Canada is crucial. Canada has been facing law enforcement challenges, such as the expansion of Mexican and Asian organized crime groups and money laundering operations in Canada. But disregarding the domestic and collaborative law enforcement efforts Canada has put on the table is capricious. At home, Trump’s favored approach, which renews focus on imprisoning users and drug dealers, and dramatically toughening penalties for the latter, would be ineffective and counterproductive. And while providing treatment is very important, the dramatic effect of treatment modality on effectiveness cannot be overlooked. Approaches to treatment should be designed based on evidence, not ideology.

Washington, DC: Brookings Institute, 2025. 49p.

By Rima Ah Toong, Shelby Grauer, Katherine Tallan

  The Criminal Justice Commission (CJC) has administered the Illegal Marijuana Market Enforcement Grant since 2018 and is required to issue an annual report concerning the status and effectiveness of the program and to provide future funding recommendations to the Oregon Legislature (legislature). The Legislature funds this grant program with $6 million on a biennial basis. In response to a sharp increase in reports of unaddressed illegal grow sites and associated worker abuse in 2021 and 2022, the Legislature infused the grant program with an additional $26 million in emergency one-time funding, which the CJC awarded to grantees in 2022. In 2023, the legislature supplemented the $6 million in base funding with an additional $5 million, for a total of $11 million in biennial funds that will be awarded through a competitive grant solicitation process in 2024. This report examines the status of the grant program and grantee expenditures from 2021 to 2023. The CJC, with input from grantees, other agencies, and interested parties, also changed its program data reporting structure, in 2022, to better gauge the problems being addressed with these grant funds. Described in this report, among other things, are the following findings: • Since April 1, 2022, grant-funded law enforcement operations reported 424 illegal cannabis incidents, occurring in 96 unique zip codes. • Eleven zip codes saw 10 or more incidents involving grant-funded law enforcement activities during the reporting period. The zip codes experiencing the highest number of incidents were 97523 (the greater Cave Junction area, with 35 incidents) and 97526 (Grants Pass and areas north, with 17 incidents). • The number of incidents in which law enforcement observed or suspected labor trafficking and/or worker abuse decreased from 39 (20 percent) in 2022 to eight (3.5 percent) in 2023. However, the number of survivors of human trafficking served by grant funded community-based organizations (CBOs) increased from 100 to 344 during the same time period. • Survivors served by CBO grantees were primarily male (41.4 percent), Hispanic (48.9 percent), and ages 18-35 (28.8 percent). The majority received legal assistance (63.5 percent) and/or referrals to other needed crisis or long-term support services (56.8 percent). • Grantees reported that the 424 incidents resulted in 184 felony case filings in Oregon circuit courts. • Of the 424 reported incidents, 54.2 percent involved a land, natural resource, or civil code violation. • Law enforcement grantees seized approximately 1.8 million illegal cannabis plants and 351,781 pounds of illegal processed cannabis, as well as other illegal narcotics and substances, firearms, and equipment used to operate illegal grows off-grid. Based on the best available information, the projected cost for e  

Salem, OR: Oregon Criminal Justice Commission. 2024. 31p.

By The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) . Southeast Asia and the Pacific

  The transnational organized crime threat landscape in Southeast Asia is evolving faster than in any previous point in history. This change has been marked by growth in the production and trafficking of synthetic drugs and cyber-enabled fraud, driven by highly sophisticated syndicates and complex networks of money launderers, human traffickers, and a growing number of other service providers and facilitators. Despite mounting enforcement efforts, cyber enabled fraud has continued to intensify, resulting in estimated financial losses between US $18 billion and $37 billion from scams targeting victims in East and Southeast Asia in 2023. A predominant proportion of these losses were attributed to scams committed by organized crime groups in Southeast Asia. Fundamentally, the sheer scale of proceeds being generated within the region’s booming illicit economy has required the professionalization and innovation of money laundering activities, and transnational criminal groups in Southeast Asia have emerged as global market leaders. Building on existing underground banking infrastructure including underregulated casinos, junkets, and illegal online gambling platforms that have adopted cryptocurrency, the proliferation of high-risk virtual asset service providers (VASPs) across Southeast Asia have now emerged as a new vehicle through which this has taken place, servicing criminal industries without accountability. Against this backdrop, it has become clear that several countries in Southeast Asia, and particularly those in the Mekong, have been targeted as a key testing ground for transnational criminal networks looking to expand their influence and diversify into new business lines. Asian crime syndicates have rapidly integrated new service-based business models and technologies including malware, generative AI, and deepfakes into their operations while opening up new underground markets and cryptocurrency solutions for their money laundering needs. As law enforcement and regulators stepped up their efforts against casinos, illegal online gambling, and cyber-enabled fraud in Southeast Asia, organized crime have hedged and consolidated by expanding operations across inaccessible and autonomous non-state armed group territories and other criminal enclaves in and around the Golden Triangle and elsewhere in the region and beyond. It is now increasingly clear that a potentially irreversible displacement and spillover has taken place in which organized crime are able to pick, choose, and move value and jurisdictions as needed, with the resulting situation rapidly outpacing the capacity of governments to contain it. Expanding on UNODC’s past analyses of casinos, money laundering, underground banking and transnational organized crime in Southeast Asia, the development of this report has required analysis of law enforcement investigations and prosecutions which have provided insights into the region’s shifting threat landscape. More specifically, it has been developed through extensive examination of criminal indictments and case records, intelligence analysis, court documents, and corporate records, as well as consultation with both international and regional law enforcement and criminal intelligence partners. UNODC has also conducted an extensive mapping and analysis of data obtained from thousands of Telegram underground marketplaces, groups, and channels attributed to Asian organized crime networks and affiliated service providers. The report consists of three comprehensive chapters, offering insights into the latest regional developments and trends, underground banking and money laundering, and technological innovation fueling the ongoing situation. It presents information and data points that have not previously been pieced together, representing a unique attempt to further improve understanding of the region’s evolving criminal ecosystem and the convergence of cyber-enabled fraud, underground banking, and technological innovation 

Vienna: UNODC, 2024. 142p.

By The United Nations, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 

This briefing paper sets out human rights concerns arising since early 2021 from online scam operations including their link to human trafficking in Southeast Asia as well as recommendations drawn from international human rights standards. These concerns occur in the context of wide-ranging digital criminal activity such as romance-investment scams, crypto fraud, money laundering and illegal gambling. At the time of writing this paper, the situation remains fluid: hundreds of thousands of people from across the region and beyond have been forcibly engaged in online criminality, States within the region are trying to identify actions and policies to address this phenomenon, while criminal actors are reacting by finding ways to change and relocate their operations, building new centres across the region and upgrading existing compounds. At the outset it is important to acknowledge that there are two sets of victims in this complex phenomenon. People who have been defrauded through online criminality are victims of the financial and other crimes committed by these scam operations. Many have lost their life savings, taken on debt and suffered shame and stigma for having been scammed. On the other side, individuals who are coerced into working in these scam operations and endure inhumane treatment are victims of serious human rights violations and it is their situation that is the focus of this briefing paper. People who are forced to take part in online scams are most often trafficked persons and migrants in vulnerable situations who face a range of human rights risks, violations and abuses. A human rights-based approach to this complex situation means not merely addressing organised crime or enforcing border controls, but seeks to place the victims at the centre of the response, by addressing structural factors, tackling impunity and providing protection and justice for victims of trafficking and migrants in situations of vulnerability. Human trafficking is a recognised criminal offence under international law and many of the practices associated with trafficking constitute violations under international human rights law. Violations of human rights are both a root cause of trafficking and can occur throughout the trafficking cycle. The majority of people trafficked into online scam operations are men, although women and children are also among the victims. Most are not citizens of the countries in which the trafficking occurs, however reports have indicated that at least in some countries nationals are also being targeted. People who have been trafficked into online forced criminality face threats to their right to life, liberty and security of the person. They are subject to torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment, arbitrary detention, sexual violence, forced labour and other forms of labour exploitation as well as a range of other human rights violations and abuses.  This briefing paper is primarily focused on migrants who have endured trafficking and other human rights violations in the context of the scam operations, while acknowledging that the concerns and guidance contained here apply equally in most cases to citizens in this situation. The information in this briefing paper draws on primary and secondary research by the UN Human Rights Office, including victim testimony, as well as the work of the UN human rights mechanisms and information from other UN entities, supplemented by open-source information. While not exhaustive, Section A seeks to draw attention to the many serious human rights issues that result from this emerging phenomenon. Section B offers guidance to States and other stakeholders drawing from human rights standards and offers targeted recommendations aimed at ensuring responses are human rights-based. The briefing paper was transmitted to the relevant States for factual comments prior to publication

Bangkok: OHCHR, 2023. 38p.  

By Hai Thanh Luong

The Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS), including five Southeast Asian countries and China, has experienced a significant increase in the cultivation of opium, trafficking of heroin and methamphetamine, and consumption of these illicit drugs. In recent years, the GMS has been expanded considerably as supply, destination, and transit route for illegal drug trade’s networks to and through, particularly when China officially applied ‘Belt and Road’ strategy. This paper reviews historical aspects and current trends in drug production and trafficking in the GMS, with special emphasis on Mekong River areas where China is ‘located’ as the heart of the transition. Some evidence consistent with the ‘supply, destination, and transit route’ arguments is found through locating and mapping drug trafficking networks to connect with China. Finally, this paper calls for some initial recommendations to improve the process of bilateral and multilateral cooperation in the GMS within the scope of Belt and Road Initiative. 

The Chinese Journal of Global Governance 6 (2020) 20–35 

By Joseph E. Schumacher, Abdullah Ahsan, Amber H. Simpler, Adam P. Natoli & Bradley J. Cain

Conducting research within a carceral health care context offers a unique view into the nature of drug use among arrestees with potential to identify and prevent drug use consequences. The purpose of this study was to characterize the nature and extent of drug use among first-time jail arrestees to inform detection and treatment.

Methods

This study utilized a naturalistic research design to collect de-identified urine drug screens (UDS), jail characteristics, and arrestee demographic variables among arrestees indicating drug use from 25 jails across the United States in 2023 through a confidential data sharing agreement with NaphCare, Inc. using its proprietary electronic health record operating system. Descriptive statistics were used to detail the features of the dataset, Pearson’s chi-square tests of independence were performed to statistically analyze associations between UDS results and jail characteristics and arrestee demographics, and significant chi-square test results were further investigated by examining standardized residuals to clarify the nature and significance of within-group differences in proportions.

Results

Of the 43,553 UDS cases comprising the final sample (28.8% of total arrestees), 74.8% (32,561) were positive for one or more drugs, and 25.2% of UDS cases were negative for all drugs. Among those who tested positive, 69.0% were positive for cannabis, 54.8% for stimulants, 29.6% for opioids, and 12.4% for sedatives. Arrestees were positive for multiple drugs half the time, with combinations of cannabis, stimulants, and opioids most common. Significant associations between drug use and both jail characteristics and arrestee demographics were found.

Conclusions

Though drug use is not a recent phenomenon, the lethality potential of the drugs being used today is relatively new. Arrestees with positive urine drug screens are at heightened risk of adverse outcome due to sudden cessation of substance use. Findings highlight the need for objective clinical data to guide acute treatment of individuals at risk of withdrawing while detained. A

ddiction Science & Clinical Practice (2025), 15p.

By Lucia Bird Ruiz Benitez de Lugo and Kars de Bruijne

Since 2022, a synthetic drug known as ‘kush’, has killed likely thousands of people in West Africa. Kush emerged in Sierra Leone, but quickly spread across countries in the subregion, including Liberia, Guinea, the Gambia, Guinea-Bissau and Senegal, with devastating effects. By April 2024, the health impacts of kush, a synthetic drug containing nitazenes, opioids as – or more – powerful than fentanyl, as well as synthetic cannabinoids, were so acute that the presidents of Sierra Leone and Liberia had declared national emergencies over drug use – an unprecedented step.

This drug represents a turning point in West Africa’s drug landscape. The scale of its market expansion and its lethal public health effects are unparalleled. Yet, amidst widespread speculation about kush, a number of critical questions remained unanswered about the drug. What is kush? Where does it come from? Who is producing and trafficking it? And what can be done to reduce the harm posed by this drug?

This research confirms that kush is composed of potent synthetic opioids called nitazenes, some of which are 25 times stronger than fentanyl, and synthetic cannabinoids commonly found in European drug markets. The consequences have been dire, with mass fatalities overwhelming mortuary systems, forcing emergency group cremations, and leading to bodies being abandoned in the streets.

The research identifies China, the Netherlands, and most likely the UK as key sources of kush and it’s active ingredients, which are trafficked via maritime routes and postal courier services. It is unclear if the kush ingredients exported from European countries include nitazenes, or only synthetic cannabinoids. Initially controlled by a few organized criminal groups, the kush market has since fragmented, making it even more difficult to counteract. Local synthesis of the drug has increased, escalating health risks, and Sierra Leone’s street gangs for a key part of the drug’s distribution network.

Some key points highlighted in the report are:

Kush is a drug that has killed likely thousands of people in West Africa, with Sierra Leone as its epicentre;

Chemical testing finds that nearly 50% of samples contain nitazenes, a very addictive and deadly synthetic opioid comparable to fentanyl (the other half contains synthetic cannabinoids)

Some of these substances are imported from China, the Netherlands and most likely the United Kingdom through maritime routes, the air and postal courier services (It is unclear if the kush ingredients exported from European countries include nitazenes, or only synthetic cannabinoids);

The market for kush used to be more strongly controlled by large groups but increasingly fragmented, with smaller actors setting up own operations

Urgent coordinated action is needed on three fronts; a) better monitoring, early warning, testing, and information-sharing in West Africa; b) disrupting supply chains by China, the Netherlands and the UK and at Sierra Leonean points of entry; c) a strong push on mitigating the harms of kush consumption

Clingendael: 2025. 60p