By Gianluca Boo and Gergely Hideg

Overview The year 2021 saw a concerning increase in global violent death rates after the relative calm of the Covid-19 pandemic era. While violent deaths in 2020 reached a historic low since 2004, 2021 marked a global increase of six per cent, halting the previous trend of improvement. Intentional homicides remained stable, comprising two-thirds of all violent deaths, while conflict-related deaths surged, especially in Afghanistan and Myanmar, due to political upheavals. Firearms played a significant role— accounting for about 45 percent of global violent deaths— albeit less than in previous years. Men disproportionately bore the brunt of violence, with death rates more than five times higher than those of women. Geographic patterns also revealed stark disparities. Asia and Africa exhibited the highest violent death rates, and regions such as Europe and Oceania experienced the lowest levels. Forecasts for the 2030 horizon suggest a need for concerted efforts to prevent violence, as the ‘business-as-usual’ analysis —assuming that current trends remain—projects a continued increase in deadly violence. Key findings The year 2021 saw a concerning six per cent rise in global deadly violence compared to 2020. Of the approximately 580,000 violent deaths, about 45 per cent were inflicted by firearms. Violence overwhelmingly and disproportionately affected men, with a rate of 12.27 victims per 100,000 population among men and boys versus 2.33 for women and girls. Compared to the 2015 benchmark of Agenda 2030, the number of intentional homicides has decreased by only 2.6 per cent. Just over a quarter of the world’s countries and territories are currently on track to meet SDG Target 16.1. Current trends suggest the world will miss this target by 2030. The year 2020 marked a high point in progress towards reducing violent deaths. From a rate of 7.0 violent deaths per 100,000 population that year, rates have since exhibited an upward trend, reaching 7.3 in 2021 and on track to reach 7.6 by 2030.

Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2024. 20p.

By MITCH MORRISSEY & ERIK GAMM

DNA evidence, where it’s available, is crucial to solving sexual assault cases—according to one study, it raises the likelihood of a guilty verdict from less than a third to nearly 75%. The trouble and expense of processing it, however, can create backlogs that put cases on hold for years. Dozens of state and local law-enforcement agencies have faced this problem over the decades since DNA technology emerged.

This year, due in part to years of alleged misconduct by one of its forensic scientists, the Colorado Bureau of Investigation (CBI) found itself with a queue of more than 1,400 untested sexual assault kits and without the means to process new ones promptly. The unsolved cases stuck in this backlog represent substantial further crime risks from repeat offenders, delayed justice for victims, and tangible costs to Colorado’s economy.

Key Findings

By processing all of the 1,369 DNA kits in the state’s backlog, Colorado could prosecute up to 200 rape cases.

This would also prevent up to 1,030 sexual assaults, 108 other violent crimes, 230 property offenses, and 113 drug/alcohol, public disorder, and other crimes.

At a testing cost of $2,000 per kit and adjudication, public-services, and work-loss costs totaling $82,000 per case, clearing the backlog and prosecuting cases associated with it will cost the state $21 million. In return, Colorado’s economy will eventually save $234.7 million due to prevention of future crimes.

The longer authorities take to clear the backlog, the larger the costs and smaller the savings will become.

CSI estimates that, by training 15 more DNA scientists over the next year, CBI will clear its DNA backlog of excess kits by July 2027. Delayed processing of kits currently in the backlog, which are expected to be tested by September 2026, will have allowed $51.8 million worth of additional criminal activity.

Even kits that don't lead to convictions are worth testing for the qualitative benefits they offer, like identifying deceased and incarcerated perpetrators, adding to the national DNA database, and providing closure to victims.

Common Sense Institute, 2025. 12p.

By the National Retail Federation, The Loss Prevention Research Council, Sensormatic Solutions

Retailers reported a 93% increase in the average number of shoplifting incidents per year in 2023 versus 2019 and a 90% increase in dollar loss due to shoplifting over the same time period. Conducted in partnership with the Loss Prevention Research Council and sponsored by Sensormatic Solutions, "The Impact of Retail Theft & Violence 2024" examines how theft and violence have evolved since before COVID and how retailers are combating today's retail crime landscape.

The survey was conducted online among senior loss prevention and security executives in the retail industry June 10 through July 12. The study contains results from mid-size to large retailers across 164 retail brands, which accounted for $1.52 trillion in annual sales in 2023 or 30% of total retail sales. The brands represent a variety of retail sectors including specialty and luxury retail, home improvement, mass merchandise, grocery and pharmacy.

Washington, DC: National Retail Federation, 2024. 26p.

By Cruz, J. M., Coombes, A., Mizrahi, Y., Vorobyeva, Y., Tanyu, M., Campie, P., Sánchez, J., & Hill, C

Can a gang member in Honduras leave the gang, abandon criminal activities, and rehabilitate? What factors facilitate the process of disengagement from gangs in Honduras? To answer these questions, the American Institutes for Research (AIR), the Kimberly Green Latin American and Caribbean Center at Florida International University (LACC-FIU), and Democracy International (DI) conducted a study with Honduran gang members and former gang members across the country. The study is based on a survey with a sample of 1,021 respondents with a record of gang membership and 38 indepth interviews with former gang members and other community members. Active gang members do disengage from the gang and its activities, but this disengagement depends on a myriad of factors, including the types of social relationships which the individual establishes outside the gang, the type of gang organization, and the availability of faith-based programs willing to reach out to the individual. This study, funded through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) Latin America and Caribbean Youth Violence Prevention project, builds on previous academic scholarship on gangs in Honduras and Central America. We conducted the survey interviews in three adult penitentiaries, three juvenile detention centers, two juvenile parole programs, and several faith-based centers which work with former gang members in Tegucigalpa and San Pedro Sula. We complemented the information with semistructured interviews with 14 former gang members in the metropolitan areas of San Pedro and La Ceiba. We also interviewed 24 subject-matter experts and community members in Tegucigalpa, San Pedro Sula, and La Ceiba. We contracted a local firm, ANED, to conduct the survey interviews and trained a local team of interviewers, who collected the information under our direct supervision. For the in-depth interviews, we contracted and trained two local specialists. Data collection was conducted between October and December 2019. PRIMARY RESULTS The results indicate that gangs remain a predominantly male phenomenon, and the average age at which males join a gang is 15. Interviewed females joined the gang at an average age of 13.2. Nearly 46 percent of the subjects interviewed for this study are active members of a gang, while the rest are in different stages of gang membership. Approximately 54 percent of the subjects interviewed in the survey belong—or have belonged—to Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13), while 35 percent expressed their loyalty to the 18th Street Gang, also known as Pandilla 18 (or 18th Street Gang). The rest of the interviewees indicated membership in smaller gang groups: Los Chirizos, El Combo que no se deja, Los Olanchanos, Los Vatos Locos, etc. Education The average number of years that individuals with a record of gang membership spent in school was 9.6 years, and 90 percent of our respondents never finished high school. Half of the respondents have a household income of less than 250 USD, and 84 percent did not have a regular job, either in the formal or informal sector, even before going to prison. One in every four gang members lived with their parents or step-parents, while 31 percent lived with other relatives or alone. Furthermore, 56 percent of gang members had children of their own, and 45 percent were married or in a stable relationship. Gang Activities Violence and criminal activities are essential components of gang life. Extortion, murder, and drug trafficking are the most common crimes of which gang members are accused. Nearly 69 percent of the respondents were accused of committing these types of crimes in addition to assaults, robberies, and illicit association. In Honduras, both gangs control territories through the use of extortion, drug trafficking, and violence. Such activities, in combination with seniority as an active gang member, are critical components for ascending the gang structure ranks. Contrary to the common assumption that gang members had to complete a “mission” to join the gang, evidence collected by the study suggests that most of them did not have to go through rites of initiation or perform a mission. Rather, “missions” become an important mechanism by which to ascend the gang ranks once the individual has joined the gang. Gang Structure Over the past two decades, the structures of MS-13 and Barrio 18 seem to have evolved and “mutated.” Gangs appear to be more structured and mandated by a system of unwritten norms and rules common to each organization and shared by the diverse subgroups who share the same gang affiliation. Gangs preserve a regionally fragmented structure (sectors and cliques) which enables them to operate with certain autonomy while adhering to the rules established by membership. The structure of both MS-13 and Barrio 18 include different levels of management, which typically start with the clique as its lowest operational level (i.e., at the neighborhood level). Cliques are the basic gang unit and are composed of several members. On average, cliques are composed of 36 male members, but they vary by size. However, cliques from other gangs (Los Chirizos, El Combo que no se deja, etc.) tend to be larger on average, with 45.8 male members per clique. Cliques are clustered in regional groups called sectores (sectors). Both cliques and sectores are run by a senior member of the gang. Senior members of the MS-13 gang are known as Compas and Palabreros, and Barrio 18 leaders are known as Toros and Homies. Half of the survey respondents (49 percent) held what can be considered a soldier position within the structure of the gang, 17 percent held some position of leadership, and 25 percent were aspiring members of the gang who served as collaborators or informants. Gang leaders do not consider collaborators or informants to be official members of the gang, yet they participate in core activities and play a significant role in the dynamics of gang survival and operation. Joining the Gang From the standpoint of former and active gang members, most (63 percent) joined the gang because of the “pull forces” which peers in the gang exert over them in their teenage years. Gang involvement revolves around the opportunity of disenfranchised teens to join a group which provides them with affection and care, which many do not find at home. Thus, gang members value the “solidarity,” “social respect,” and resources the gang provides, which otherwise would be absent if they were not part of the organization. Evidence suggests that several gang members grew up in environments in which problematic families, lack of opportunities, and lack of respect and affection from their communities were common. Gang recruiters appeal to youth by promising to supply such needs to grow and exert stronger control inside their territories. Thus, findings suggest that most people end up joining gangs in Honduras for “innocent” reasons rather than because of criminal intent. Gang Disengagement The findings of this study suggest that many members do in fact disengage from gangs, but they go through a process in which the interaction of several conditions determines how soon or how complicated the separation could be. More than half of active gang members want to leave the gang. There are four significant predictors of active gang members’ intentions to leave a gang: the type of organization to which the person belongs, the number of years that the person has been active in the gang, the individual’s religious affiliation, and the person’s immediate social circle. Members of the two major gangs expressed less intention of leaving the gang compared to members of the smaller gangs. Active members of MS-13 demonstrated fewer intentions of leaving the gang compared to their rivals in Barrio 18. Additionally, there is a U-shaped curve relationship between the number of years in the gang and intentions to leave. During the first years of gang membership, intentions to leave are stronger; then they subside for a while and start growing again after six years of being in the gang. This pattern suggests that the early months and years of gang life are probably full of doubts about membership. These doubts are later quenched by gratifying experiences as a gang member and then re-emerge as the individual matures. This finding is significantly different from that in Cruz and colleagues’ 2018 study in El Salvador, in which researchers found that intentions to leave the gang are low during the first years of gang membership and then grow as time passes. Religion plays an important role in the process of leaving the gang, although comparatively, this role seems less prevalent than in El Salvador. Belonging to an evangelical church not only contributes to one’s intention to disengage from the gang but also is approved by leaders of the gang (more specifically, MS-13). Further, evangelical churches seem to be more successful than other denominations in connecting with the spiritual needs of the gang population. In the in-depth interviews, half of the respondents referred to a connection to God as the most powerful change mechanism which enabled gang members to disengage from the gang. Survey data also reveal that one of the most important factors in an individual’s intention to leave a gang is social interaction. Gang members who spent the most time with non-gang individuals (their family, non-gang friends, or even alone) before they were detained in prison were more prone to thoughts about leaving the gang. Thus, one’s social circle has a significant influence on the intent to disengage. Gang members who are exposed to social groups different from the gang appear to be more willing to abandon gang life. Reintegration The process of leaving a gang doesn’t end there. Rather, being a defector is the beginning of a series of challenges and obstacles which a former gang member has to face. The most common reintegration challenges by a former gang member include lack of opportunities, insecurity, police abuse, social discrimination, poverty, and lack of family support. Most study participants (69.2 percent) said that church or faith-based organizations are the appropriate institutions to lead rehabilitation and reintegration programs. Otherwise, 14.6 percent of respondents said that nongovernmental organizations should lead rehabilitation programs. Few people interviewed saw government agencies leading rehabilitation efforts, and experts interviewed thought there was little to no political will to approach the gang phenomenon from a rehabilitation standpoint. RECOMMENDATIONS Our research indicates that violence prevention efforts should target the root causes of joining a gang, which are mostly related to absence of positive youth development opportunities in their communities, including lack of employment, insufficient access to education, weak family structures, and negative peer influences. We recommend that programming focus on providing relational, educational, community, and economic supports to young people from an early age to both prevent youth from joining gangs, as well as to support those who have disengaged. Prevention strategies should include efforts to support disengagement from the gangs during the first years of gang membership, when many youth are considering disengagement. Finally, once gang members disengage from gangs, we recommend supporting rehabilitation and reintegration of former gang members to help them become productive members of society and prevent their reinsertion into gang activity.

Washington, DC: American Institutes for Research & Florida International University. 2020. 91p.

By De Souza Oliveira, Elenice De Souza; Natarajan, Mangai; and da Silva, Bráulio

Abstract This study examines the spatial patterns and other situational determinants leading to the high number of bus robberies in Belo Horizonte. Main research questions include patterns of robberies, spatial concentration, locations prone to robberies, and environmental characteristics therein. This study also provides a variety of safety measures based on the Situational Crime Prevention approach. The Rapid Assessment Methodology (RAM) was employed using both quantitative and qualitative data. It involves spatial analysis, direct observation of hot spots using a safety audit protocol, and focus group discussions with key participants. Bus robberies involve minimum risk and low detection and arrest. The “hottest products” to be stolen include electronic devices and cash. The robberies occur at specific times and locations depending on opportunity. As many crimes go unreported, police data have inaccuracies. Therefore, it is impossible to verify the exact location of the robberies. This study concludes that for safe travel preventive measure should focus on reducing crime opportunities. A collaborative effort is needed from agencies and individuals alike. Further research should focus on examining why the majority of bus robberies are concentrated in only two main bus routes. Are these hot spots just recent spikes or are they chronic?

Crime & Delinquency 1–25 © The Author(s) 2019, 26p.

By Beatriz Magaloni, Kerpel Sofía Marinkovic Dal Poggetto, Tommy E. Murphy, Florencia Pucci, Beatriz Serra Fernández

Cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT) has become a powerful and effective tool to deal with violence in many at-risk areas in the world. However, its use for gender-based violence (GBV) and dating violence, although promising, has been limited and used as a response service for survivors, rather than for prevention. To understand to what extent such interventions can help provide tools and skills to young people in their impressionable years to produce behavioral changes that prevent GBV, we carried out such an intervention among high school students in the municipality of Ecatepec in Mexico. We assessed the intervention with a randomized control trial. We introduce the novelty of collecting objective measures from automated neuropsychological tests to explore whether CBT might be functioning through the development of subjects' executive functions. Results from this intervention fail to show any clear change in self-reported violence. They do show, however, impacts on executive functions related to violence, such as emotional recognition and inhibitory control skills.

Washington, EC: Inter-American Development Bank Gender and Diversity Division May 2025 79p.

By Agustina Suaya, Karen Martínez, Monserrat Bustelo, Claudia Martínez

Violence against women (VAW) remains a pervasive and deeply entrenched issue, posing significant challenges to policymakers, researchers, and practitioners worldwide. This policy brief contributes to advancing the field by presenting new evidence on innovative approaches to VAW prevention and response. Despite increasing global attention, VAW prevention remains an evolving area of research, with critical gaps in understanding what interventions work, under what circumstances, and for whom (Araujo et al., 2024). The studies discussed in this document aim to address some of these gaps, focusing on key interventions in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC). In LAC, VAW persists at alarming levels. Twenty-five percent of women aged 15–49 have experienced physical or sexual violence by an intimate partner at some point in their lives, a figure that mirrors the global average of 27%. Furthermore, 11% of women in the region have faced sexual violence by non-partners, nearly double the global average of 6% (WHO, 2021). Psychological violence is even more widespread, with 64% of women in Colombia and 57% in Ecuador reporting such experiences (Araujo et al., 2024; Pispira et al., 2022). The region also faces the devastating toll of femicidal violence—the most extreme form of VAW. In 2022 alone, 4,050 women were victims of femicide across 26 LAC countries, with intimate partners or family members perpetrating a significant proportion of these crimes (ECLAC, 2023). Younger women are particularly vulnerable, with over 70% of femicide victims aged 15 to 44. These figures underline the critical need for comprehensive, evidence-based strategies to address the multifaceted nature of VAW.

POLICY BRIEF No IDB-PB-418

Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank Gender and Diversity Division , 2025. 18p.

By Ernesto Schargrodsky and Lucía Freira

The purpose of this paper is to study the relationship between inequality and crime, with a focus on the Latin America and Caribbean region. We find a significant, positive, and robust association between these variables.

The results persist if one instruments for inequality with historical variables in crime regressions, suggesting that a causal interpretation of the estimated effect is reasonable. Moreover, inequality is the only variable showing this robust regularity. Education levels, economic activity, income per capita, and poverty show weaker and unstable relationships with crime. The analysis of the distribution of crime victimization indicates that men and youth suffer more crime than women and the elderly. By socio-economic strata, high-income groups suffer more victimization relative to poorer groups in LAC countries, but the poor suffer more homicides.

UNDP LAC Working Paper 13.

Panama City, Panama: United Nations Development Programme, Latin America and the Caribbean , 2021. 48p.

By Lizabeth Remrey

In 2023, there were an estimated 19,800 homicide victimizations in the United States, a rate of 5.9 homicides per 100,000 persons (figure 1). This was lower than the estimated 22,240 victimizations (6.7 per 100,000) in 2022 but higher than the 16,670 victimizations (5.0 per 100,000) in 2019. (See appendix table 1 for state estimates.) Homicide refers to the offenses of murder and nonnegligent manslaughter and is defined as “the willful (nonnegligent) killing of one human being by another.”1 Findings in this report are based on the Bureau of Justice Statistics’ and FBI’s National IncidentBased Reporting System (NIBRS) Estimation Program and the FBI’s Supplementary Homicide Reports (SHR).

Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics , 2025. 23p.

By Lynn Langton, Christopher Krebs, Michael Planty, Marcus Berzofsky

This report describes efforts to compare estimates from the Bureau of Justice Statistics’ (BJS) National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) Supplemental Fraud Survey (SFS) to estimates and victimization patterns from other available sources of fraud data. There are numerous sources of data on the prevalence and nature of personal financial fraud. Each source uses different definitions of fraud, employs different methodologies, and suffers from a variety of limitations. BJS developed the SFS to address the major limitations and shortcomings of other existing fraud data collections. It was the first effort by BJS to estimate the prevalence and characteristics of fraud in the United States. The survey was administered to all NCVS respondents age 18 or older from October to December 2017. This paper examines initial SFS estimates of the prevalence and nature of personal financial fraud and explores the similarities and differences between the SFS and other sources of fraud data as one component of an effort to validate the SFS estimates.

Washington DC: U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2023. 95p.

Edited by Christelle Molima Bameka, Jastine C. Barrett, Mohamed Kamara, Karl Hanson, and Mark A. Drumbl

This multi- disciplinary volume provides an innovative approach to children and violence, looking beyond the existing literature that focuses on child soldiers in the ‘Global South.’ Harnessing expert contributions from over a dozen countries, the book examines the relationship between children and violence, with a focus on children ensnared in military conflict, embroiled in criminal gangs, and enmeshed in political activism. It analyses how children join fights, how they fight, and what happens to them after fighting officially ends. It addresses cutting- edge issues such as cyberwars, self-defence, intergenerational trauma, gender fluidity, racism and state surveillance. Throughout, the book underscores the need to respect the agency and dignity of children and youth, to build cultures of juvenile rights, and to think critically of the place of the child amid global power politics and decolonisation. Through accessible writing, and the provision of considerable new data, this book supports advocacy work and will enrich teaching and spark further academic research.

London; New York: Routledge, 2025. 271p,

By Lena Gunnarsson, Translated by B.J. Woodstein

How does sexual consent work? How do we know that another person really wants to have sex with us? Why do people sometimes give in to sex that they are not in the mood for? And how come it is sometimes difficult to draw a sharp line between sex and assault? Dynamics of Sexual Consent addresses these questions based on deeply personal interviews with 20 Swedish women and men of various ages and sexual orientations. In doing so, it contributes to understandings of sexual consent and sexual grey areas through its combination of conceptual rigour, analytical detail and empirical richness. While starting in the legal definition of consent as voluntary participation, the book broadens the discussion to a wider sociological and philosophical sphere where gendered power dynamics and relational dependencies challenge simplistic understandings of voluntariness. Contesting tendencies to see miscommunication as the key problem related to consent, it shows that emotional aspects are often the main factor standing in the way of genuinely consensual interactions. While the analysis is informed by a gender perspective emphasizing the gendered power asymmetries of heterosexuality, it also foregrounds men’s vulnerability and the power dynamics of samesex interactions. A key argument of the book is that, given the contextual and ambiguous nature of sexual interactions, it is impossible to delineate unequivocal and concretely applicable guidelines for what counts as consent. To compensate for the lack of universal, fail-safe rules, what is needed is an intensified collective reflection on consent and sexual grey areas, which can make individuals better equipped to identify and respect their own and others’ boundaries. An empirically rich and conceptually sophisticated contribution to understanding of sexual consent and sexual grey areas,

London; New York: Routledge, 2025. 284p.

By Malore Dusenbery, Jeanette Hussemann, Teresa Crowe

More than 11 million people in the United States are Deaf, deaf, hard of hearing, late-deafened, or Deaf-Blind. Research indicates deaf people report experiencing victimization at higher rates, but a lack of accessible resources and trauma-informed services for American Sign Language (ASL) speakers makes it difficult for deaf people to report crimes and access support. In response to these issues, the Manhattan District Attorney’s Office in 2017 began funding Barrier Free Living (BFL), a provider of services for survivors of domestic violence and their families, to increase access to direct services for deaf survivors and increase local stakeholders’ awareness of deaf survivors’ needs through its Deaf Services (DS) program.

In 2019, Urban, in collaboration with Gallaudet University and NORC at the University of Chicago, began a multimethod process evaluation of BFL’s DS program to document its implementation and assess to what extent it achieved its intended goals. Drawing on information gathered from BFL staff, deaf consumers of BFL’s services, and community partners, we identified the following key findings:

The DS program provided a range of services to meet the diverse needs of deaf survivors, including counseling and support groups, legal services, case management, housing support, employment support, occupational therapy, and child care. Consumers reported overall positive experiences with the services they received and communication accessibility at BFL.

The DS program helped increase BFL’s ability to communicate with deaf survivors by increasing routine use of interpreters, training hearing staff in ASL, and improving communications technology.

The DS program led to increased awareness and collaboration around services provided to deaf clients, but communication and staffing challenges remain.

The DS program partners with a range of external agencies to support referrals or coordinate service provision, provide education and training, and conduct outreach and advocacy.

Funding and staffing are the primary factors that impede the provision of enhanced services for deaf survivors, but a community-wide lack of accessible and available services and housing also hinders providers from meeting their clients’ needs.

Based on these findings, we provide recommendations for

how BFL and similar direct service programs can improve and adapt staffing, services, and outreach to strengthen their response to deaf survivors;

how policymakers, funders, and system-level stakeholders can address societal and policy-level barriers to meeting the needs of deaf survivors; and

how researchers and funders of research can fill critical gaps in research on deaf survivors and deaf-focused services by increasing and improving the research done with the deaf community.

Washington, DC: The Urban Institute, 2022. 83p.

Edited by Thiago Pierobom de Ávila, Aline Yamamoto, Cristina Elsner de Faria, Jude McCulloch, Kerry Carrington

This collection of articles is the fruit of a joint project implemented between Brazilian and Australian researchers and professionals committed to the work of gender and family violence prevention and response. With the support of the Australian Embassy in Brazil and the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women Brazil Country Office, an innovative project was designed to support research exchange and strenghten academic collaboration, as well as foster a collaborative network of experts and professsionals, with the aim to enhance debate on gender and family violence prevention and extract lessons from both countries’ policy experiences. The Brazil-Australia Partnership on Preventing Domestic and Gender-based Violence project included several institutions. Amongst those institutions, it is important to highlight the role played by the Gender Equality Cabinet of the Public Prosecutor’s Office of the Federal District (MPDFT), along with the Monash Gender and Family Violence Prevention Centre and the School of Justice of Queensland University of Technology in Australia, in the organization of international conferences and the coordination of this collection. This initiative also had the active participation of the São Paulo Public Prosecutor’s Office (MPSP), the Pontifical Catholic University of São Paulo (PUC-SP), the Research Group on Criminal Policies of the Law Faculty at the University Center of Brasilia (UniCEUB), the Superior School of the Public Prosecutor of the Union (ESMPU), the Institute for Applied Economic Research (IPEA), the Center for Studies and Research on Women at the University of Brasilia (UnB) and the Gender Observatory of the Brazilian Senate. From the Australian side, the project was financially supported by the Council on Australia Latin America Relations (COALAR), and additionally to the institutions previously mentioned, it also had the participation of Australia’s National Research Organisation for Women’s Safety (ANROWS) and RMIT University. In June 2019, as part of the Project’s planning, a delegation of Australian professionals from governmental institutions, non-governmental organizations, academic and justice sectors came to Brazil (Brasilia and São Paulo) to explore the Brazilian policy framework and analyse program cases. Following it, in December 2019, a delegation of Brazilian experts went to Australia (Brisbane and Melbourne) to participate in expert workshops and conferences, as well as visit Australian successful programs for violence prevention. As a result, the project allowed an in-depth policy dialogue and advanced debates related to measuring the costs of domestic violence, as well as its impact on the economic growth. It also created opportunties to share good practices in gender equality policies, particularly primary prevention approaches, and to promote an integrated approach across the justice, public security and public health systems. The aim is to establish collaborative arrangements between both countries, contributing to policy development on gender and family violence prevention in Brazil and Australia.

Brasilia 2021 Ministério Público do Distrito Federal e Territórios, Brazil. 2021. 203p.

By Huma Haider

Organised crime actors can be spoilers in peace processes or partners in peace. Policymakers and practitioners have in some cases engaged in a strategic trade-off – accepting organised crime as part of the political settlement to achieve short-term stability. However, the relationship between illicit markets and conflict can deepen over time, entrenching criminal structures in the post-conflict state. As Kemp and Shaw (2014, p. 16) argue, ‘failure to integrate issues of organised crime into mediation strategies and peace processes will leave the international community with a potentially dangerous blind spot.’ Negotiating with organised crime groups and addressing criminal agendas in peace processes has become a reality in practice. There is, however, limited research on negotiating with criminal actors in peace processes. In seeking to address this gap, this paper reviews scholarly and practitioner literature across a wide range of research disciplines. 1 Key findings from this evidence review include: • Confrontation approaches have failed to resolve the problem of serious organised crime (SOC) and, in some cases, have fuelled more violence and criminality. • Organised crime groups that have strong internal cohesion and hierarchical leadership are more likely to be considered potential partners in negotiation. • Negotiation can be a necessary approach when criminal groups have strong territorial control – serving as de facto authorities that fill governance gaps. • Socio-economic and financial opportunities, and legal leniency, can encourage criminal actors to come to the negotiating table and agree on a deal. • A criminal group’s demand for legal leniency tends to be higher when they are expected to make larger concessions, such as to disarm and demobilise. • It is challenging to determine an ‘end state’ to a criminal group and to achieve complete resolution of the criminal agenda. • Lack of political will, inadequate resources, and weak long-term planning constrain positive outcomes of negotiation processes and deal implementation. • Negotiators and mediators need to mitigate the risks of moral hazard and strengthening of criminal groups. • The lack of broad public support for negotiating with SOC actors can undermine and destroy such processes. • A balance is needed between satisfying the interests of victims and of perpetrators to avoid alienating victims and producing public backlash for negotiated deals. • Many negotiations tend to occur in secret, yet lack of transparency can undermine the legitimacy and sustainability of outcomes. This review demonstrates the importance of creating a framework for engaging with criminality and organised crime groups that extends beyond confrontation – allowing for accommodation and incorporating a wider societal change agenda through transformation. This requires an understanding of when to address SOC and engage criminal groups in peace processes; how to motivate actors to negotiate, conclude and implement deals; how to increase the likelihood of positive outcomes; and how to mitigate risks associated with negotiation. Drawing on a wide breadth of interdisciplinary literature, this paper aims to provide insights into these crucial questions. The case studies illustrate key themes and findings from this review (see Appendix 1). In El Salvador, ineffective confrontation, the internal cohesion of gangs, and an opportune moment contributed to the the successful conclusion of a gang truce. It ultimately failed, however, due in large part to public outrage that translated into political pullback. In Colombia, negotiations with the FARC2 produced an innovative transitional justice mechanism that, alongside security guarantees, served as an effective inducement for disarmament. In contrast, the absence of a requirement to disarm and demobilise was a key criticism of negotiations with gangs in Jamaica, where violence has continued. In Mali and in Kosovo, international actors were initially hesitant to address organised crime in peace processes, yet this was subsequently recognised as contributing to longer-term instability, resulting in new strategies to address SOC actors.

SOC ACE Evidence Review Paper No. 3.

Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham. 2023. 88p.

By Ben Mathews, Kelsey Hegarty, Harriet MacMillan, et al.

Objectives: To estimate the prevalence in Australia of intimate partner violence, each intimate partner violence type, and multitype intimate partner violence, overall and by gender, age group, and sexual orientation. Study design: National survey; Composite Abuse Scale (Revised)— Short Form administered in mobile telephone interviews, as a component of the Australian Child Maltreatment Study. Setting: Australia, 9 April – 11 October 2021. Participants: 8503 people aged 16 years or older: 3500 aged 16–24 years and about 1000 each aged 25–34, 35–44, 45–54, 55–64, or 65 years or older. Main outcome measures: Proportions of participants who had ever been in an intimate partner relationship since the age of 16 years (overall, and by gender, age group, and sexual orientation) who reported ever experiencing intimate partner physical, sexual, or psychological violence. Results: Survey data were available for 8503 eligible participants (14% of eligible persons contacted), of whom 7022 had been in intimate relationships. The prevalence of experiencing any intimate partner violence was 44.8% (95% confidence interval [CI], 43.3–46.2%); physical violence was reported by 29.1% (95% CI, 27.7–30.4%) of participants, sexual violence by 11.7% (95% CI, 10.8–12.7%), and psychological violence by 41.2% (95% CI, 39.8–42.6%). The prevalence of experiencing intimate partner violence was significantly higher among women (48.4%; 95% CI, 46.3–50.4%) than men (40.4%; 95% CI, 38.3–42.5%); the prevalence of physical, sexual, and psychological violence were also higher for women. The proportion of participants of diverse genders who reported experiencing intimate partner violence was high (62 of 88 participants; 69%; 95% CI, 55–83%). The proportion of nonheterosexual participants who reported experiencing intimate partner violence (70.2%; 95% CI, 65.7–74.7%) was larger than for those of heterosexual orientation (43.1%; 95% CI, 41.6–44.6%). More women (33.7%; 95% CI, 31.7–35.6%) than men (22.7%; 95% CI, 20.9–24.5%) reported multitype intimate partner violence. Larger proportions of participants aged 25–44 years (51.4%; 95% CI, 48.9–53.9%) or 16–24 years (48.4%, 95% CI, 46.1–50.6%) reported experiencing intimate partner violence than of participants aged 45 years or older (39.9%; 95% CI, 37.9–41.9%). Conclusions: Intimate partner violence is widespread in Australia. Women are significantly more likely than men to experience any intimate partner violence, each type of violence, and multitype intimate partner violence. A comprehensive national prevention policy is needed, and clinicians should be helped with recognising and responding to intimate partner violence.

Medical Journal of Australia (MJA), 2025, 9p.

By Ilias Chatzis, under the substantive guidance of Morgane Nicot, Martin Hemmi and Pascale Reinke-Schreiber

Migrant smuggling is a type of organized crime with links to other serious criminal offences, including illicit financial flows, corruption and trafficking in persons. Smuggling is an illegal service that is offered to countless people and requires a financial or material remuneration. Many migrants who do not have other viable options to move across borders, regularly depend on the services provided by smugglers to migrate. In principle, once the smuggling transaction is completed and the person arrives at the desired destination, the relationship between the smuggler and the migrant ceases without any harm being done. Too often, however, smuggled migrants and refugees suffer from various dangerous circumstances and abusive and violent treatment while under the control of smugglers. This Study considers the underlying risk factors that lead to abuse and violence during the smuggling operation and analyses whether gender influences the type of violence that is inflicted upon smuggled migrants. It also analyses the criminal justice responses to these abuses and the practical obstacles that may hamper the reporting, investigating or prosecuting of these “aggravations”. Finally, the Study provides recommendations for reducing the impunity of the people involved in such offences along the smuggling routes. UNODC, through the analysis of case law within its Knowledge Portal on Smuggling of Migrants, noted that there was little evidence of migrant smuggling being prosecuted in the countries where the smuggling venture occurred, let alone for cases where smuggling became abusive or exploitative. Yet, civil society, researchers and academia have increasingly raised their concerns over the extreme violence faced by people on the move along certain routes. To have a better understanding of the dynamics at play and the challenges to obtain justice in this context, this Study looks into two major transit regions, North Africa and Central America. It uses recently collected data from the UNODC Observatory on Migrant Smuggling that contains testimonies from frontline responders, smuggled migrants and migrant smugglers from West and North Africa. Aggravations occurring along the Central Mediterranean route also feature in the Study, as they are characteristic of the various types of abuse that migrants face before embarking on their dangerous sea crossings. It is often over those cases that courts in destination countries assess jurisdiction to prosecute smugglers and provide access to justice to the affected smuggled migrants. Practitioners were also interviewed for the Study to gain knowledge about smuggling characteristics in Central America. The present Study therefore focuses on these two regions, typically coined as transit regions for migrant smuggling operations.

Vienna: UNODC, 2021. 102p.

By Richard Matzopoulos, Sarah Truen, and Ian Neethling,

Violence as a health priority impacts low- to middle-income countries (LMICs) disproportionately, which experience mortality rates almost 2.5 times greater than in high-income countries.

South Africa is among the LMICs most affected by violence with homicide rates six times global averages and among the world’s highest rates of gender-based violence, including rape and intimate partner violence. Several historical drivers have contributed, including colonialism, apartheid race-based social control policies, civil unrest and armed struggle, and the violent oppression of social justice movements. Some social drivers have endured, and income inequality—which still largely follows the apartheid-era race profiles and geography—has continued to be entrenched within society.

Within this milieu, certain progressive policies such as the 1996 National Crime Prevention Strategy and the 2020 National Strategic Plan on Gender-Based Violence and Femicide have sought to holistically address South Africa’s problem. However, uptake has been sub-optimal and violence has become so normalized that the extent of its harm to society is no longer fully recognized.

The authors in this study present evidence for the prevention of violence including examples from South Africa, and document the enormous toll of violence in terms of both its health impact on mortality and morbidity and its economic cost. In doing so, the study illustrates the costs of prevention are not prohibitive and emphasizes the urgent need to implement effective policies and interventions.

Recommendations in this study include highlighting the urgent need to provide financial and technical support for intersectoral collaboration, multilateral research cooperation, and research capacity to address violence, which in South Africa imposes a significant threat to development. Key aspects to support this agenda include: an integrated violence prevention approach to prevent violence at a societal level; and research to improve the evidence base for violence prevention and the quality of future costing studies.

New York: Center on International Cooperation, New York University, 2023. 54p.

By Li Li, Anke Hoeffler, and Teresa Artho

Background: Switzerland is a high-income country with low rates of fatal and nonfatal violence. Possibly due to these low prevalence rates, the costs of violence to Swiss society have received relatively little attention. Objective: This report aims to establish the prevalence rates of homicide and assaults (both physical and sexual) in Switzerland and assess their related tangible and intangible costs. Furthermore, it aims to estimate the economic cost of violence in Switzerland while specifically delving into the economic impact of domestic violence and intimate partner violence (IPV). Methods: We employ a comprehensive approach to categorize violence-related costs into three categories: (1) tangible direct costs; (2) tangible indirect costs; and (3) intangible costs. Within each category, we further classify costs based on the outcome of injuries, distinguishing between fatal and nonfatal violence. To estimate these costs, we use official crime data from the Federal Statistical Office for homicide and assaults. Recognizing the issue of underreporting in physical and sexual assault offenses, victimization surveys are employed to estimate the number of unreported cases. In the absence of Swiss data on the cost of injuries, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) provides estimates on medical costs, work loss costs, and the value of a statistical life (VSL)/quality of life loss costs. To ensure comparability, violence types are mapped, and costs are adjusted for purchasing power parity between the US and Switzerland. We also make adjustments to reflect the relative size of medical spending between the two countries. For comparison, we use prevalence rates of physical assault from Gallup. Using the same methodology, we also estimate the costs of domestic violence and IPV. Results: Our estimates suggest that the economic cost of violence in Switzerland is about USD 66.3 billion, equivalent to 8.3 percent of the country’s GDP, according to Swiss data. However, the costs could be as high as USD 73.4 billion, representing 9.2 percent of GDP, based on the Gallup World Poll data. Further, domestic violence alone accounts for at least 4.4 percent of Swiss GDP, while IPV accounts for at least 3.2 percent. Conclusions: Despite low Swiss prevalence rates of violence, the estimated costs of said violence are high. However, there is considerable uncertainty regarding our estimates due to missing Swiss data on medical and criminal justice costs, as well as the severity of injuries due to assault.

New York: NYU Center on International Cooperation, 2023. 36p

By Perez-Vincent, Santiago M.; Puebla, David; Alvarado, Nathalie; Mejía, Luis Fernando; Cadena, Ximena; Higuera, Sebastián; Niño, José David

Crime and violence have plagued Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) for decades. For the region’s inhabitants, living amid violence disrupts everyday life, while also complicating the operations of the State and private companies, and reducing societal well-being in multiple ways. The fear and experience of being a victim of crime can affect people’s physical and mental health, lower productivity, and shape fundamental decisions, such as where to live and how to pursue academic and professional development. For the Inter- American Development Bank (IDB) Group, the leading development institution in LAC, the high levels of crime and violence in the region pose a serious obstacle to achieving its strategic objectives of strengthening sustainable economic growth, reducing poverty and inequality, and addressing climate change. Quantifying the cost of crime is fundamental to understanding the gravity of the situation and aligning the dialogue to find concrete actions to remedy it. However, doing so is not a simple task. Measuring the cost of crime requires estimating what the lives of LAC citizens would be like if they were not exposed to crime and violence, and comparing this alternative scenario with the current situation. The complexity of the phenomenon of crime and violence—which affects and is affected by multiple individual and social factors—makes such a comparison difficult. The lack of accurate, up-to-date, and comparable data on crime and victimization in most countries in the region further complicates the task. Moreover, crime generates costs not only from the occurrence of criminal acts but also from the anticipation and fear of them, underscoring the importance of incorporating perceptions of insecurity in analyses of its costs and in shaping public policies. The response to crime also implies a reorientation of resources. Thus, these analyses should also include a review of the allocation and efficiency of public spending on security. Despite these difficulties, but mindful of them, the IDB has promoted a series of publications to aid in quantifying the cost of crime and violence in LAC. The most recent of these publications (Jaitman et al. , 2017) estimated that the direct costs of crime (in terms of (i) human capital lost due to homicides, reported non-lethal crimes, and deprivation of liberty; (ii) expenditures by private firms to prevent crime; and (iii) public spending to respond to and prevent crime) averaged between 3 and 3.5 percent of GDP in 17 countries in the region in 2014. This publication continues that line of research. Prepared in partnership with Fedesarrollo, the document expands, updates, and refines the estimates of these three direct costs of crime and violence. The updated results—covering 22 countries in the region—show that the costs of crime remain high, at around 3.4 percent of GDP in 2022. This is roughly equivalent to 78 percent of the public budget for education, twice the public budget for social assistance, and 12 times the budget for research and development in these countries. The new estimates also show the evolution of these costs over time. In addition to updating the estimates for these three direct costs, this new publication explores the indirect costs of crime and violence (i.e., dimensions affected by fear or by the experience of being a victim of crime or violence). It summarizes recent advances in the academic literature focused on quantifying the impact of crime and violence on various dimensions of development. The evidence, much of it from our region, reveals that crime and violence directly affect the objectives of the IDB Group’s new Institutional Strategy. They impact business and investment, reducing economic growth. They affect human capital accumulation and the health at birth of the most vulnerable populations, deepening poverty and inequality. And they are linked to the unrestricted exploitation of natural resources and ecosystem degradation, thus contributing to climate change. The study concludes with the analysis of three complementary studies, carried out within the framework of this publication, that seek to show how crime imposes costs on our region, affecting tourism activity, migration, and business productivity. Together, the analyses presented in both parts of the paper complement each other to provide a comprehensive look at the costs that crime and violence impose on LAC societies. However, much remains to be learned. Emerging dynamics, such as cybercrime, and complex ones, such as organized crime, pose challenges with likely profound impacts for the LAC region. These issues are evolving in a worrisome way. Organized criminal groups, which account for 50 percent of homicides in the Americas (UNODC, 2023), are increasing their presence and influence, raising concerns about rising violence across the region. In LAC, 54 percent of households report the presence of local criminal groups (Uribe et al. , 2022), and between 20 and 50 percent consider organized crime to be the greatest threat to their security (LAPOP, 2012, 2014, 2019). Improving the measurement of these phenomena and the quantification of their impacts should be an essential part of efforts to achieve an effective public policy approach. The IDB seeks to promote sound public sector institutions and policies that translate into more effective, efficient, and transparent governments that serve the needs of the people and foster sustainable and inclusive growth. The main objective of this publication is to provide information to support these objectives by raising awareness of the magnitude and variety of the impacts of crime and violence in our region. We also hope that it will promote debate and the development of new studies to deepen this complex but urgent research agenda.

Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank (“IDB”) 2024. 170p.