By Sharon DeGraw

While the connections between science fiction and race have largely been neglected by scholars, racial identity is a key element of the subjectivity constructed in American SF. In his Mars series, Edgar Rice Burroughs primarily supported essentialist constructions of racial identity, but also included a few elements of racial egalitarianism. Writing in the 1930s, George S. Schuyler revised Burroughs' normative SF triangle of white author, white audience, and white protagonist and promoted an individualistic, highly variable concept of race instead. While both Burroughs and Schuyler wrote SF focusing on racial identity, the largely separate genres of science fiction and African American literature prevented the similarities between the two authors from being adequately acknowledged and explored. Beginning in the 1960s, Samuel R. Delany more fully joined SF and African American literature. Delany expands on Schuyler's racial constructionist approach to identity, including gender and sexuality in addition to race. Critically intertwining the genres of SF and African American literature allows a critique of the racism in the science fiction and a more accurate and positive portrayal of the scientific connections in the African American literature. Connecting the popular fiction of Burroughs, the controversial career of Schuyler, and the postmodern texts of Delany illuminates a gradual change from a stable, essentialist construction of racial identity at the turn of the century to the variable, social construction of poststructuralist subjectivity today.

London; New York: Routledge, 2007.

Edited by Silvio Cruschina & Chiara Gianollo

Language is a key element in constructing and reinforcing social identities. Through hate speech, language becomes an instrument of creating and spreading stereotypes, discrimination, and social injustices based on attributes such as race, ethnicity, religion, gender, nationality, political ideology, disability, or sexual orientation. The rise of digital communication, especially social media, has made hate speech a major topic of research in various fields. An Investigation of Hate Speech in Italian analyses hate speech from a linguistic perspective. The focus is not only on lexical means, but also on more subtle grammatical and pragmatic strategies related to implicit meanings or conversational dynamics. The volume identifies the common linguistic characteristics of hate speech in different domains of communication and explores criteria that can help distinguish between hate speech and freedom of expression. The studies in this volume focus on Italian, but the methods and findings can easily be extended to other languages for comparative and contrastive purposes. The chapters utilize extensive research data. Social media platforms have provided linguistic data that would otherwise be challenging to collect and analyse systematically. The chapters allow readers to link linguistic insights to different real-world contexts, helping them understand the impact language has on various aspects of life and society.

Helsinki: Helsinki University Press, 2024. 384p.

By Daniel Rueda

The Rise of Nationalist Populism explores the intersection between populism and nationalism, conducted through the discursive analysis of three Populist Radical Right parties that have gained prominence during the 2010s: Rassemblement National (France), Lega (Italy) and Vox (Spain). Due to its rise in Europe, the United States, and further afield, there is a growing interest in right-wing populism, an exclusionary and illiberal form of populism that has been able to attain success in several countries. This book contributes to the analysis of how populism, understood as a way of constructing the political, is shaped by the ideologies that permeate it. It examines how a certain form of nationalism is shaped by populist dynamics, that is by a certain form of identity-building. The book analyses the intersection between nationalism and populism in right-wing populist parties by using a discourse analysis methodology based on Ernesto Laclau’s works, thus conducting an examination similar to the ones presented by the Essex School of Discourse Analysis. The empirical analysis focuses on party literature and carefully selected candidate speeches at a national level for its three case studies, as well as providing an overarching comparison. The book shows how the economic crisis and the irruption of issues related to sovereignty and national identity arising in France, Italy and Spain paved the way for the emergence of their respective right-wing populist forces. The book will appeal to researchers and students of political science,

Oxford, UK: Routledge, 2025. 274p.

By Fernanda Otilla

This book investigates how digital technologies, such as social media and artificial intelligence, can contribute to combatting corruption in Brazil. Brazil, with its long history of scandals and abundant empirical data on digital media usage, serves as a perfect case study to trace the development of bottom-up and top-down digital anti-corruption technologies and their main features. This book highlights the connections between anti-corruption reforms and the rapid implementation of innovative solutions, primarily developed by tech-savvy public officials and citizens committed to anti-corruption efforts. The book draws on interviews with experts, activists and civil servants, as well as open-source materials and social media data to identify key actors, their practices, challenges and limitations of anti-corruption technologies. The result is a thorough analysis of the process of digitalisation of anti-corruption in Brazil, with a theoretical framework which can also be applied to other countries. The book introduces the concept of “integrity techies” to encompass social and political actors who develop and facilitate anti-corruption technologies, and discusses different outcomes and issues associated with digital innovation in anti-corruption. This book will be a key resource for students, researchers and practitioners interested in technologies and development in Brazil and Latin America, as well as corruption and anti-corruption studies more broadly.

Oxford, UK: Routledge, 2025. 152p

Edited by Didier Bigo, Emma Mc Cluskey, and Félix Tréguer

This book adopts a critical lens to look at the workings of Western intelligence and intelligence oversight over time and space. Largely confined to the sub-field of intelligence studies, scholarly engagements with intelligence oversight have typically downplayed the violence carried out by secretive agencies. These studies have often served to justify weak oversight structures and promoted only marginal adaptations of policy frameworks in the wake of intelligence scandals. The essays gathered in this volume challenge the prevailing doxa in the academic field, adopting a critical lens to look at the workings of intelligence oversight in Europe and North America. Through chapters spanning across multiple disciplines – political sociology, history, and law – the book aims to recast intelligence oversight as acting in symbiosis with the legitimisation of the state’s secret violence and the enactment of impunity, showing how intelligence actors practically navigate the legal and political constraints created by oversight frameworks and practices, for instance by developing transnational networks of interdependence. The book also explores inventive legal steps and human rights mechanisms aimed at bridging some of the most serious gaps in existing frameworks, drawing inspiration from recent policy developments in the international struggle against torture. This book will be of much interest to students of intelligence studies, sociology, security studies, and international relations.

London; New York: Routledge, 2024. 311p.

By Justine Nolan and Samuel Pryde

Modern slavery in global supply chains is attracting increased attention from states, businesses and civil society including momentum to seek a "regulatory solution" to combatting it. In 2018, Australia introduced a Modern Slavery Act which was modelled on (in part) the UK Modern Slavery Act (2015). These laws emphasise corporate disclosure as the primary means of identifying and remedying modern slavery in supply chains. Whilst these disclosure-based laws harden the expectation that business will conduct itself responsibly, they are ultimately founded on a soft approach that assumes that the transparency gained from disclosure will incentivise corporate action to address human rights risks. Two independent reviews conducted in relation to the UK Act (in 2018) and the Australian law (in 2023) recommended significant changes to improve their regulatory effectiveness, including establishing a more ambitious enforcement model and a requirement to conduct human rights due diligence. This article considers the lessons learned since the establishment of the two modern slavery regimes, it explores the role of human rights due diligence in strengthening the current regulatory regimes and the efficacy of establishing a "failure to prevent" offence to enforce due diligence compliance. Finally, it discusses the utility of states adopting a forced labour import ban as a complementary regulatory strategy to contribute to a holistic regulatory framework to address modern slavery.

UNSW Law Research No. 24-37, 2024, 24p.

By Holly Nguyen, Kyle J. Thomas, Jennifer J. Tostlebe

Employment theoretically serves as a source of informal social control that can promote desistance from crime (Sampson & Laub, 1993). Findings from studies assessing the effects of employment, however, have been mixed. In a seminal study, Uggen (2000) reanalyzed data from the National Supported Work (NSW) Demonstration Project and found that employment significantly reduced the rate of recidivism among individuals aged 27 and older but had no impact on younger individuals. We reproduce and replicate Uggen's (2000) findings with data from four distinct employment programs: The National Supported Work Program (1975–1979), the Transitional Aid Research Project (1976–1977), the Employment Services for Ex-Offenders (1981–1984), and the Enhanced Services for the Hard-to-Employ Center for Employment Opportunities (2004–2008). We closely reproduced Uggen's original findings in the NSW but found evidence that the statistically significant interaction between age and employment in the NSW was only present at the year 3 follow-up and the observed effect is highly sensitive to minor threats to internal validity. Furthermore, a significant age–employment interaction was not observed in the three other data sources. These findings should encourage scholars to continue to investigate the age-graded nature of employment and crime, especially through a sociohistorical lens.

Criminology, Volume61, Issue3, August 2023, Pages 449-481

By Prithika Balakrishnan

Incarceration has become the norm for those who assert their innocence. A staggering number of defendants are incarcerated prior to the adjudication of their cases—a reality that has become a central paradox of an American criminal justice system which holds axiomatic the presumption of innocence. Recent attempts to address pretrial mass incarceration through bail reform and the COVID-19 pandemic compassionate release programs have embraced digital surveillance, resulting in unintended and little-understood consequences. This Article examines how the expanded use of pretrial GPS surveillance is radically changing the presumption of innocence by implicating punitive measures absent constitutional protections and amplifying the racial disparities in our criminal justice system. Largely viewed as a substitution for physical detention and therefore a less onerous intrusion on a defendant’s liberty, pretrial GPS surveillance erodes fundamental liberties under the guise of criminal justice regulation. These highly racialized but invisible repercussions include harms to physical and psychological health, freedom of movement, privacy, and future economic self-determination. I argue that, in light of these substantial harms, courts must examine how they evaluate technological surveillance, affording defendants substantive and procedural due process protections where there currently are none. Part I of this Article charts the ways in which bail reform and the COVID-19 pandemic-related compassionate release programs have resulted in the expansion of pretrial GPS monitoring far beyond the footprint of physical incarceration. Part II, examining an empirical case study as a basis, details the specific and racialized harms imposed by technologically-mediated restraint. Part III offers a substantive and procedural due process framework for how courts should weigh these harms. Finally, I argue for a re-assessment of United States v. Salerno to recognize future dangerousness as a fundamentally racialized concept that, guided by increasingly sophisticated means of constant surveillance, oversteps the boundary between regulatory and punitive purposes.

71 UCLA L. Rev. 478 (2024), 61p.

By The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

  The Media Literacy Index, compiled in 2023 by the Open Society Institute, suggests that SouthEastern Europe (SEE) is among the most vulnerable regions in Europe to potential online harms. Violent extremist and terrorist groups exploit the internet to spread violent content, gain support, and recruit members. The COVID-19 pandemic saw a proliferation of hostile, sexist and xenophobic conspiracy theories, as highlighted by the UN Secretary-General in August 2022. Emerging studies find that media- and information literacy (MIL) can be useful for preventing the spread of mis- and disinformation and other harmful content online. OSCE Secretariat and field operations in the region have extensively worked on both preventing/ countering violent extremism and radicalization that lead to terrorism (P/CVERLT) and MIL. They have organized a number of activities, including workshops, training sessions, TV programmes and lectures for students – all designed in an effort to address the multi-faceted challenges posed by violent extremism and radicalization that lead to terrorism (VERLT) in the region, in line with OSCE’s comprehensive security approach, as well as to forge close collaborations with state authorities and civil society, in addition to partnering with the private sector in SEE. The first part of this report places the vulnerability to online harms in the context of broader MIL trends and challenges, with a particular focus on P/CVERLT. It highlights the multi-faceted challenges posed by disinformation – including polarization, radicalization to terrorist violence and threats to democracy – before outlining key technological and psychological challenges in addressing disinformation. The second part of the report analyses how these challenges are impacting SEE. Violent extremist groups remain resilient and adaptable, maintaining their audience, size despite repeated removals of their channels and accounts from the most popular online platforms in SEE. It also explores why SEE governments are struggling to respond to the current violent extremism environment,  highlighting media issues (including challenges around transparency, regulation and threats to journalists), the lack of effective and sustainable digital and media literacy education, failures of political leadership, and poor co-ordination among relevant stakeholders. The third part then examines the impact of existing media literacy campaigns, using the OSCE’s research and engagement with experts to identify what works and why. Different approaches – including inoculation theory, counter-narratives and technological approaches – are explored, while also explaining how they can be used to address issues such as confirmation bias and how they can be integrated into age-sensitive MIL approaches. The final part of the report provides substantive recommendations for all stakeholders on framing and communication. It also suggests content and format for a multi-stakeholder training curriculum, including methodology and design as well as strategies for avoiding backlash. The report concludes that, while there are numerous resources and initiatives on addressing the information disorder5 and aiming to foster medial literacy skills, there is a significant gap in connecting these efforts to projects focused on P/CVERLT. This report represents the beginning of an initiative that seeks to raise awareness of critical thinking and analysis, and meaningful engagement in the digital space, in order to build resilience to VERLT. Its follow-up project ‘INFORMED: Information and Media Literacy in Preventing Violent Extremism. Human rights and Gender-sensitive approaches to addressing the Digital Information Disorder’ seeks to support the OSCE participating States in identifying opportunities for collaboration with non-government stakeholders, including the private sector and civil society.    

Vienna:   Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 2024. 60p.

By NINA-SIMONE EDWARDS

What would the future look like if the privacy invasions that Black Americans are currently subjected to were not so normalized? This Note brings an Afrofuturistic perspective to the analysis of Terry stops, putting forward an alternative legal paradigm that uplifts Black Americans, their privacy, and their experiences, rather than police practices. Part I of this Note looks to the past, drawing on Afrofuturism’s tenant of reclamation, and assesses the development of vagrancy laws. Under these laws, vague legal standards allowed law enforcement to criminalize Black people after the end of slavery, punishing those who fell outside of the “white box,” or the social norms ascribed to whiteness. This threat of state violence swallowed any meaningful expectation of privacy, carrying forward the legacy of enslavement. Part II then discusses the similarities between the violations of privacy found in vagrancy laws and violations of privacy found in the use of Terry stops today. Terry stops, and the resulting threat of constant surveillance, have changed how Black Americans navigate public space. Like the vague standards in vagrancy laws, the requirement of “reasonable suspicion” to conduct a stop is weaponized by law enforcement to punish those outside of the “white box.” Further, this Note argues that the current Constitutional threshold for assessing whether state action violates the Fourth Amendment—whether someone has a reasonable expectation of privacy—is defcient. It too is a function of the “white box,” and fails to account for the Black American experience. Moreover, use of this standard maintains the status quo and fails to guarantee actual privacy. Part III then envisions what the law could look like under Afrofuturism; a future where we actually work to address the systemic harms imposed by Terry stops.

GEO. J. L. & MOD. CRIT. RACE PERSP. [Vol. 15:157, 2023., 29p.

By Paddy Kinyera

Uganda’s emerging oil industry could paradoxically undermine its socioeconomic development. This is because of opportunities for corruption, including in project expenditure, procurement, land acquisition, and revenue collection. The government has introduced several anti-corruption measures and other initiatives are attempting to maximise the industry’s benefits while limiting its socioeconomic costs. Further collective actions across government, civil society, and the international community are needed to limit corruption’s impacts.

  Main points ▪ Corruption remains a real threat to the oil industry as it is deeply entrenched in the country’s political economy, affecting every sector. ▪ Generally, corruption has become a lucrative venture in Uganda, operated by ‘gainful concealment’. ▪ The oil industry offers rich ground for corruption, as evidenced to date by cases arising from project implementation by private firms. ▪ As part of institutional measures to guard the oil industry against corruption, the government created the Petroleum Fund within the Public Finance Management Act (2015) to prevent mismanagement of oil revenues. ▪ Existing institutions and structures are mainly constrained by bureaucracy, unresponsiveness, disjointed operations, and limits to legal mandates.   

U4 ISSUE 2024:7   

Bergen: U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre , Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI), 2024. 28p.

By Sara Rahman

AIM To evaluate the impact of the first phase of the Mandatory Alcohol Interlock Program (MAIP), introduced in NSW in February 2015, on repeat drink-driving, driving while disqualified, traffic infringements, and crash outcomes. METHOD We use a dataset of 98,501 observations involving offenders with a proven ‘exceed the prescribed concentration of alcohol’ (PCA) offence or a ‘refuse to provide a breath sample’ offence finalised in a NSW court between 1 June 2012 and 30 April 2018. We identify the impact of taking up an alcohol interlock on reoffending and road crashes using a regression discontinuity design. This analysis compares outcomes for first-time PCA offenders in a small bandwidth on either side of the high range blood alcohol concentration (BAC) threshold of .15. We also estimate the overall impact of the introduction of MAIP on drink driving and road crashes using a difference-in-differences approach. This compares outcomes for eligible and ineligible offenders before and after the introduction of the program. We implement a range of robustness checks and analyse outcomes for various groups of offenders, including those receiving different interlock periods, and those with different demographic characteristics and criminal histories. RESULTS MAIP reduced the likelihood of drink driving during the interlock period for first-time high range PCA offenders who start the program by 11 percentage points (p.p.; a reduction of 86%) compared to mid range offenders just below the high range PCA threshold. We also observe reductions in PCA offending within 36 months of finalisation (of 3.4 p.p.; 43%) and within 60 months of finalisation (of 6.0 p.p.; 43%) among all eligible offenders compared to offenders committing eligible offences before the program’s introduction. The program reduces traffic infringements committed after court finalisation, but these effects are concentrated among repeat low range PCA drink drivers. We do not find significant effects of the program on reducing the likelihood of involvement in an alcohol-related crash nor on crashes resulting in injuries and fatalities. The reductions in PCA offending are particularly large for offenders convicted of the most severe offences (i.e., repeat high range drink driving and repeat refuse to provide a breath sample offenders), those residing in disadvantaged areas, and to a lesser extent, those residing outside major cities. CONCLUSION Alcohol interlocks significantly reduce drink driving while interlocks are active and (to a modest extent) following their removal.

(Crime and Justice Bulletin No. 251), Sydney: NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research. 2022. 35p.

By Thomas: Abt., Mills, M., Magori, G.    

Cognitive behavioral interventions (CBIs) have emerged as a key evidence-informed strategy for saving lives and stopping violence. Despite a strong scientific track record, the capacity to scale these strategies remains limited. During Fall 2024, the Center for the Study and Practice of Violence Reduction brought together leading academics, on-the-ground practitioners, key government officials, and interested funders to discuss why. To implement CBI strategies effectively, six practices were identified as essential. First, successful CBIs employ practical tools and strategies that are proven to work. Second, they utilize street outreach workers with a high degree of cultural responsivity. Third, these organizations employ “relentless engagement” to connect high risk individuals to treatment and services. Fourth, they offer extensive training to their employees, both so they may utilize CBI tools and teach them to others. Fifth, they are flexible, adapting models to real world conditions. Sixth and finally, successful CBIs support and invest in their workers - their most valuable asset. Implementation best practices like these can be challenging for a number of reasons. First, those who are most in need are often the most resistant to these services, making it imperative that outreach workers leverage their credibility to find creative ways to connect with prospective participants. Second, negative peer influences can hinder participants from drawing on CBI tools in critical situations. Third, substance use and mental health issues pose significant challenges to program participants. Fourth, all elements of proper implementation are not yet fully understood. While a solid base of evidence supports CBI strategies, they still require further development and study. Trauma, if left unaddressed, can also impede the effective implementation of CBIs. Trauma Informed care can provide a basic framework for support while healing-centered engagement can further promote healing, a sense of belonging and self-determination, and empowerment to achieve post-traumatic growth. CBIs should focus not only on treating the trauma of program participants, but also that of program staff. To successfully scale CBIs, a number of strategies were recommended. CBIs must be cost effective, although even the most expensive approaches more than justify themselves in terms of social return on investment. CBIs must also secure consistent funding, increasing their capacity to access governmental and nongovernmental resources. Increased professionalization is necessary for sustainable and scalable CBI interventions. Finally, while a strong base of evidence supports CBI strategies, further research and study is necessary, especially with regard to implementation. In conclusion, CBIs continue to demonstrate effectiveness in reducing community violence, particularly when attention is paid to best practices. Continued investment is necessary to advance the field while growing it at the same time.   

College Park, MD:  Center for the Study and Practice of Violence Reduction University of Maryland,  2025.  25p.

By Mark B. Johnson, Adam Gilberston, Scott McKnight

With the recent liberalization of cannabis control laws, increasingly larger numbers of drivers are testing positive for cannabis. Research suggests many cannabis users believe driving under the influence of the drug is relatively safe. The purpose of this multiphase project was to understand cannabis users’ thoughts, perceptions, and reasons for driving under the influence of cannabis and develop public health messages that might deter users from impaired driving in the future. The project had three main phases: message development, message ranking, and message validation. In the message development phase, the research team conducted 11 focus groups with subgroups of 88 cannabis users with a history of drugged driving. Subgroups included older adults, middle-aged adults, younger adults, medical cannabis users, recreational cannabis users, habitual users, occasional users, those in recreational-legal states, those in recreational-illegal states, and those who regularly use alcohol and cannabis together. Drawing on focus group discussions, the research team developed messages designed to persuade cannabis users not to drive under the influence. These were supplemented with messages edited from a ChatGPT query “What are some messages to convince people not to drive under the influence of cannabis?” In the message ranking phase, two samples of cannabis users were recruited to help identify message effectiveness. Using an online survey platform, the first sample of cannabis users (n=63) was asked to rank the messages within randomized blocks in terms of their perceived effectiveness. Results identified the top ranked individual messages. Next, a second sample of cannabis users (n=50) were asked to rank the most promising messages head-to-head. Once the messages were ranked, the research team selected three messages to evaluate in the message validation phase. To validate the messages, participants were presented with a hypothetical scenario where a person consumed cannabis to the point of feeling high, but suddenly realized that they needed to go somewhere and it was important to leave almost immediately. One of the risk messages was then integrated into the scenario. After reading it, participants were asked to imagine themselves in that situation and indicate how likely it would be (percent) that they would drive in that situation (as opposed to taking an Uber or following some other path). Participants also answered questions about demographics, cannabis use, and personality characteristics. Finally, the most promising message from this stage was compared with a poorer scoring message to validate the viability of the message. Analysis of the focus groups discussions identified six broad themes that may be useful in developing messages to deter cannabis-impaired driving:    • Legal and financial consequences • Safety concerns • Statistics and science • Narrative or testimonial • Personal responsibility • Separating cannabis use from driving. The analysis showed little evidence that different cohorts of users identified more strongly with specific themes or message types. In general, however, focus group discussants suggested the most effective messages would be those that (a) were positive, (b) were realistic, (c) avoided stereotypes, and (d) reflected diversity. The ranking exercise indicated that messages that highlighted personal responsibility and safety concerns performed better than messages based on legal risks and separating cannabis use from driving. The top-rated messages from the ranking study were the following: • Driving high isn't just reckless; it's selfish. Think twice before getting behind the wheel after using marijuana. • You wouldn't drink and drive, so why drive high? Don’t drive under the influence of marijuana. • Marijuana impairs your judgement, slows your reactions, and increases your risk of crashing. Don’t drive high. In the validation study, exposing participants to the top-rated “Driving high isn’t just reckless; it’s selfish…” message resulted in significantly lower willingness to drive scores (19.9%) than a poorer scoring message from the ranking study (34.2%). The relatively large effect of the “Driving high isn’t just reckless; it’s selfish…” message on willingness to drive persisted for high-risk users including habitual users, those who frequently drove under the influence, recreational users, and those who lived in recreational-legal states. While this study produced a list of messages to deter driving after cannabis use, the message that “Driving high isn’t just reckless; it’s selfish…” seemed more effective than other messages in terms of lowering participants’ willingness to drive under the influence in a hypothetical scenario. Notably, this message was developed by ChatGPT, rather than the focus group process, a finding that warrants further exploration. Participants’ ranking of messages appeared relatively consistent with findings on message effectiveness (as measured by participant reports of willingness to engage in the behavior). Strategically, to increase efficiency, future message development approaches could consider quickly constructing many messages (with less concern for quality), followed by an inexpensive ranking process to narrow down the most effective messages. However, even the best messages will only affect a portion of the people exposed to them. Multimethod, multifaceted approaches are needed to achieve sizeable population reductions in impaired driving.

Washington DC: AAA Foundation for Traffic Safety; 2025l 53p.

By Pablo Madriaza, Ghayda Hassan, Sébastien Brouillette-Alarie, Aoudou Njingouo Mounchingam, Loïc Durocher-Corfa, Eugene Borokhovski, David Pickup, Sabrina Paillé

The problem: People use social media platforms to chat, search, and share information, express their opinions, and connect with others. But these platforms also facilitate the posting of divisive, harmful, and hateful messages, targeting groups and individuals, based on their race, religion, gender, sexual orientation, or political views. Hate content is not only a problem on the Internet, but also on traditional media, especially in places where the Internet is not widely available or in rural areas. Despite growing awareness of the harms that exposure to hate can cause, especially to victims, there is no clear consensus in the literature on what specific impacts this exposure, as bystanders, produces on individuals, groups, and the population at large. Most of the existing research has focused on analyzing the content and the extent of the problem. More research in this area is needed to develop better intervention programs that are adapted to the current reality of hate.

Objective: The objective of this review is to synthesize the empirical evidence on how media exposure to hate affects or is associated with various outcomes for individuals and groups.

Search methods: Searches covered the period up to December 2021 to assess the impact of exposure to hate. The searches were performed using search terms across 20 databases, 51 related websites, the Google search engine, as well as other systematic reviews and related papers.

Selection criteria: This review included any correlational, experimental, and quasi-experimental study that establishes an impact relationship and/or association between exposure to hate in online and traditional media and the resulting consequences on individuals or groups.

Data collection and analysis: Fifty-five studies analyzing 101 effect sizes, classified into 43 different outcomes, were identified after the screening process. Initially, effect sizes were calculated based on the type of design and the statistics used in the studies, and then transformed into standardized mean differences. Each outcome was classified following an exhaustive review of the operational constructs present in the studies. These outcomes were grouped into five major dimensions: attitudinal changes, intergroup dynamics, interpersonal behaviors, political beliefs, and psychological effects. When two or more outcomes from the studies addressed the same construct, they were synthesized together. A separate meta-analysis was conducted for each identified outcome from different samples. Additionally, experimental and quasi-experimental studies were synthesized separately from correlational studies. Twenty-four meta-analyses were performed using a random effects model, and meta-regressions and moderator analyses were conducted to explore factors influencing effect size estimates.

Results: The 55 studies included in this systematic review were published between 1996 and 2021, with most of them published since 2015. They include 25 correlational studies, and 22 randomized and 8 non-randomized experimental studies. Most of these studies provide data extracted from individuals (e.g., self-report); however, this review includes 6 studies that are based on quantitative analysis of comments or posts, or their relationship to specific geographic areas. Correlational studies encompass sample sizes ranging from 101 to 6829 participants, while experimental and quasi-experimental studies involve participant numbers between 69 and 1112. In most cases, the exposure to hate content occurred online or within social media contexts (37 studies), while only 8 studies reported such exposure in traditional media platforms. In the remaining studies, the exposure to hate content was delivered through political propaganda, primarily associated with extreme right-wing groups. No studies were removed from the systematic review due to quality assessment. In the experimental studies, participants demonstrated high adherence to the experimental conditions and thus contributed significantly to most of the results. The correlational and quasi-experimental studies used consistent, valid, and reliable instruments to measure exposure and outcomes derived from well-defined variables. As with the experimental studies, the results from the correlation and quasi-experimental studies were complete. Meta-analyses related to four dimensions were performed: Attitudinal changes, Intergroup dynamics, Interpersonal behaviors, and Psychological effects. We were unable to conduct a meta-analysis for the "Political Beliefs" dimension due to an insufficient number of studies. In terms of attitude changes, exposure to hate leads to negative attitudes (d Ex = 0.414; 95% confidence interval [CI] = 0.005, 0.824; p < 0.05; n = 8 and d corr = 0.322; 95% CI = 0.14, 0.504; p < 0.01; n = 2) and negative stereotypes (d Ex = 0.28; 95% CI = -0.018, 0.586; p < 0.10; n = 9) about individuals or groups with protected characteristics, while also hindering the promotion of positive attitudes toward them (d exp = -0.227; 95% CI = -0.466, 0.011; p < 0.10; n = 3). However, it does not increase support for hate content or political violence. Concerning intergroup dynamics, exposure to hate reduces intergroup trust (d exp = -0.308; 95% CI = -0.559, -0.058; p < 0.05; n = 2), especially between targeted groups and the general population, but has no significant impact on the perception of discrimination among minorities. In the context of Interpersonal behaviors, the meta-analyses confirm a strong association between exposure to hate and victimization (d corr = 0.721; 95% CI = 0.472, 0.97; p < 0.01; n = 3) and moderate effects on online hate speech perpetration (d corr = 0.36; 95% CI = -0.028, 0.754; p < 0.10; n = 2) and offline violent behavior (d corr = 0.47; 95%CI = 0.328, 0.612; p < 0.01; n = 2). Exposure to online hate also fuels more hate in online comments (d = 0.51; 95% CI = 0.034-0.984; p < 0.05; n = 2) but does not seem to affect hate crimes directly. However, there is no evidence that exposure to hate fosters resistance behaviors among individuals who are frequently subjected to it (e.g. the intention to counter-argue factually). In terms of psychological consequences, this review demonstrates that exposure to hate content negatively affects individuals' psychological well-being. Experimental studies indicate a large and significant effect size concerning the development of depressive symptoms due to exposure (d exp = 1.105; 95% CI = 0.797, 1.423; p < 0.01; n = 2). Additionally, a small effect size is observed concerning the link between exposure and reduced life satisfaction(d corr = -0.186; 95% CI = -0.279, -0.093; p < 0.01; n = 3), as well as increased social fear regarding the likelihood of a terrorist attack (d corr = -0.206; 95% CI = 0.147, 0.264; p < 0.01 n = 5). Conversely, exposure to hate speech does not seem to generate or be linked to the development of negative emotions related to its content.

Author's conclusions: This systematic review confirms that exposure to hate in online and in traditional media has a significant negative impact on individuals and groups. It emphasizes the importance of taking these findings into account for policymaking, prevention, and intervention strategies. Hate speech spreads through biased commentary and perceptions, normalizing prejudice and causing harm. This not only leads to violence, victimization, and perpetration of hate speech but also contributes to a broader climate of hostility. Conversely, this research suggests that people exposed to this type of content do not show increased shock or revulsion toward it. This may explain why it is easily disseminated and often perceived as harmless, leading some to oppose its regulation. Focusing efforts solely on content control may then have a limited impact in driving substantial change. More research is needed to explore these variables, as well as the relationship between hate speech and political beliefs and the connection to violent extremism. Indeed, we know very little about how exposure to hate influences political and extremist views.

Campbell Syst Rev . 2025 Jan 16;21(1):e70018.

By Frøja Storm-Mathisen

This article introduces the concept ‘narrative normalization of violence’ as a theoretical framework for exploring the interplay between crime and marginality in street culture. Drawing from 4 months of ethnographic observations and 24 qualitative interviews with young men involved in a violent street culture in Oslo, Norway, the study identifies three prevalent narratives. The first, ‘Part of the game’, minimizes the danger of violence; the second, ‘It’s all about respect’, internalizes violence as part of a desired subcultural identity; and the third, ‘We come from concrete’, emphasizes the importance of belonging. In distinctive and important ways these narratives shape collective energies that influence beliefs, attitudes and aspirations, which work to narratively render the exceptional nature of violence manageable and mundane.

The British Journal of Criminology, Volume 65, Issue 1, January 2025, Pages 37–53,

 By Jonathan Moreno-Medina r Aurelie Ouss r Patrick Bayer r Bocar A. Ba 

This paper examines language patterns in US television news coverage of police killings. We first document that the media use semantic structures—such as passive voice, nominalizations, and intransitive verbs—that obscure responsibility more often in cases of police killings than in cases of civilian killings. Through an online experiment, we demonstrate the significance of these semantic differences, revealing that participants are less likely to hold police officers morally responsible and demand penalties when exposed to obfuscatory language, particularly in cases involving unarmed victims. Further analysis of news data shows greater use of obfuscatory language when the victims are unarmed or video footage is available—situations where obfuscation may have the greatest impact. Exploring the causes of this differential obfuscation, we do not find evidence that it is driven by either demand-side factors or supply-side factors associated with TV station ownership and political leaning. Instead, our results suggest that narratives crafted by police departments are a more likely driver of media obfuscation. Our study underscores the importance of semantic structures in how media shape perceptions, extending beyond considerations of coverage volume and bias.

Cambridge, MA:   NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, 2022.   66p.

By Lina Jakob and Caroline Anderson

This Evidence Brief provides a snapshot of recent research findings on child maltreatment and its impacts on individuals, families and the community. It brings together some of the latest research findings in one place. While the brief is not a comprehensive summary of all relevant evidence, it aims to deliver clear and accessible insights for those involved in developing policies, programs and strategies within the child and family sector. The Evidence Brief also contains a number of infographics that staff working in the sector may find useful to include in presentations and other communication materials.1

Family and Communities Services Insights, Analysis and Research (FACSIAR)

Parramatta NSW : Department of Communities and Justice (NSW), 2024. 14p.

By The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime

  Russia’s engagement in Africa has evolved in the aftermath of Yevgeny Prigozhin’s aborted march on Moscow in June 2023 and his death in an aeroplane crash two months later. His private military company (PMC), the Wagner Group, had built up operations in several African countries over the preceding decade by providing mercenary troops, conducting political influence campaigns and by establishing a network of companies in the extractives sector. Would these arrangements survive the death of Wagner’s influential leader? If so, what shape would they take? Moscow acted quickly after Prigozhin’s death by sending high-level officials to several countries to reassure Wagner’s former clients that support would continue uninterrupted. But it was clear that Russia also had larger plans, and was seeking to expand its presence in new arenas. A clear picture is now emerging as to how Russia’s strategy in Africa is developing. It consists of four thematic (and at times overlapping) strands, namely rebranding, maintenance, expansion and diversification. Rebranding Wagner was a priority for the Russian state, as part of its efforts to assert control over an entity that had embarked on a march against the seat of power. Various pathways were created to assimilate Wagner personnel, but the establishment of the Africa Corps, under the direct supervision of Russia’s military intelligence service (GRU), was the most pertinent to Wagner’s Africa operations. Other aspects of Wagner’s operations have also continued under new titles. For example, the African Initiative in Burkina Faso, which disseminates pro-Russian messaging in the region, is in many ways another iteration of Wagner’s media and political influence work, and includes several former Wagner or Wagner-linked staff. The Africa Corps has benefited from direct state assistance – ships delivering tonnes of material for this outfit have been recorded arriving in Libya, for example. However, it has not been an entirely painless transition. The Africa Corps has struggled to generate momentum, with recruitment targets being revised downwards and personnel transferred to Russia. This difficulty may in part explain the somewhat contradictory second theme: that of maintaining the Wagner brand. Maintenance of Wagner as an entity – at least in name – has been a key consideration in Mali and the Central African Republic (CAR), where the brand is strong due to entrenched involvement in economic activities and security services, as well as Wagner’s high public profile. This reflects Moscow’s pragmatism regarding the requirements of local contexts, plus recognition that Wagner’s original interventions were coherent with Russian state interests, and thus did not need to be radically overhauled. ‘Wagner’ Telegram channels also continue to post recruitment advertisements for personnel to work in Africa, highlighting the ongoing power of the brand. However, this continuity may also mask how much has changed behind the scenes: while Wagner ‘lives’ in the CAR and Mali, it is now much more tightly under Moscow’s control. At the same time, the policy space has not been static, and new opportunities for intervention emerged for Russia in 2023–2024. This has led to expansion into several countries in West Africa – Burkina Faso, Chad and Niger – where governments have sought to explore economic and security alternatives to their long-standing Western partners, particularly France. Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC) research has also highlighted the Republic of Congo, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Senegal as potential future areas of Africa Corps intervention. In part, this more expansionist approach speaks to the step change in the visibility of Russian policy from the early Wagner days, when deniability was a key consideration. (Before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Wagner’s existence was always denied, both by Moscow and Prigozhin.) Russia has long explored state level partnerships with African countries, but now there is greater confidence in and visibility of Russian intentions on the continent, even if the partners on the ground have not changed dramatically from Prigozhin’s stewardship. As a result, what was, under Wagner, a patchwork of local engagements is being knitted together in an overt and more coherent geopolitical vision. Coming out of the shadows allows Russia to cast itself as a backer of African attempts to escape Western neo-colonialism. This is achieved in part by highlighting the West’s failed attempts to tackle Islamist extremism in Africa (and its attempts to super-impose Western values that are sometimes at odds with local culture). Only in Sudan has there been something of a recalibration from Prigozhin’s approach. Prigozhin had partnered closely with the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), while the Russian government maintained ties with the government and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), driven by a long-term goal of acquiring a naval base on the Red Sea. This contradiction became sharper when war broke out between Sudan’s military and the RSF in April 2023. Sudan’s emergence as a proxy battleground in the Russia-Ukraine conflict may also have shifted Moscow’s thinking and explain the pivot away from the RSF to more closely align with the SAF, which has sought Russian materiel to fight its paramilitary enemy   

Geneva, SWIT: The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime  , 2025. 50p

By Daryl J Higgins , Ben Mathews , Rosana Pacella , James G Scott , David Finkelhor , Franziska Meinck , Holly E Erskine , Hannah J Thomas , David M Lawrence , Divna M Haslam , Eva Malacova , Michael P Dunne 

Objectives: To determine the prevalence in Australia of multi-type child maltreatment, defined as two or more maltreatment types (physical abuse, sexual abuse, emotional abuse, neglect, or exposure to domestic violence) and to examine its nature, family risk factors, and gender and age cohort differences.

Design: Retrospective cross-sectional survey using a validated questionnaire.

Setting and participants: Mobile phone random digit-dial sample of the Australian population aged 16 years and older.

Main outcome measures: National estimates of multi-type child maltreatment up to age 18 years using the Juvenile Victimisation Questionnaire-R2: Adapted Version (Australian Child Maltreatment Study).

Results: Of 8503 participants, 62.2% (95% CI, 60.9-63.6%) experienced one or more types of child maltreatment. Prevalence of single-type maltreatment was 22.8% (95% CI, 21.7-24.0%), whereas 39.4% (95% CI, 38.1-40.7%) of participants reported multi-type maltreatment and 3.5% (95% CI, 3.0-4.0%) reported all five types. Multi-type maltreatment was more common for gender diverse participants (66.1% [95% CI, 53.7-78.7%]) and women (43.2% [95% CI, 41.3-45.1%]) than for men (34.9% [95% CI, 33.0-36.7%]). Multi-type maltreatment prevalence was highest for those aged 25-44 years. Family-related adverse childhood experiences - especially mental illness and alcohol or substance misuse - increased risk. Exposure to domestic violence was the maltreatment type most often present in multi-type maltreatment patterns.

Conclusions: Multi-type child maltreatment is prevalent in Australia and more common in women and gender diverse individuals. Child protection services, health practitioners, and prevention and intervention services must assess and manage multi-type maltreatment in children and address its health consequences across the lifespan. Public health policy should consider prevention services or strategies that target multi-type child maltreatment.

Australia. Med J Aust. 2023 Apr 3;218 Suppl 6(Suppl 6):S19-