By U.S. Department of Homeland Security,  he Office of Intelligence and Analysis

Executive Summary - The Homeland faces a complex set of threats to our public safety, border security, critical infrastructure, and economy from violent extremists, transnational criminal organizations (TCOs), adversarial nation-states, and malicious cyber actors. These threats, while varied in scope and intended purpose, at times compound one another in unexpected ways, harming our communities and generating costly disruptions to the US economy. Meanwhile, technological advances, climate change, and natural disasters have the potential to exacerbate many of the aforementioned threats. PUBLIC SAFETY AND SECURITY: Over the next year, the terrorism threat environment in the Homeland will remain high. We are particularly concerned about a confluence of factors this year, including violent extremist responses to domestic sociopolitical developments—especially the 2024 election cycle—and international events that domestic and foreign violent extremists likely will use to justify or encourage attacks in the Homeland. Lone offenders and small groups continue to pose the greatest threat of carrying out attacks with little to no warning. Meanwhile, foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs) and their supporters will maintain their enduring intent to conduct or inspire attacks in the Homeland. In addition, the production, trafficking, and sale of illegal drugs by transnational and domestic criminal actors will continue to pose the most lethal threat to communities in the United States. Fentanyl and other synthetic opioids remain the most lethal of drugs trafficked into the country, but small increases in overdoses linked to cocaine and methamphetamine highlight the danger from other drug types. 

We expect the Homeland also will face threats to public safety from state actors using subversive tactics in an effort to influence and divide the American public and undermine confidence in our institutions. Many of these actors—in particular, the People’s Republic of China (PRC)—also target ethnic and religious minorities, political dissidents, and journalists in the United States to silence and harass critical voices, violating our sovereignty and the rule of law. The 2024 election cycle will be an attractive target for many adversaries. Some domestic violent extremists (DVEs) likely view a wide range of targets indirectly and directly associated with elections as viable targets for violence with the intent of instilling fear among voters, candidates, and election workers, as well as disrupting election processes leading up to and after the November election. Nation-state-aligned foreign malign influence actors almost certainly will continue to target democratic processes with the aims of affecting US voter preferences, exacerbating social tensions, and undermining confidence in our democratic institutions and the integrity of the electoral process. BORDER AND IMMIGRATION SECURITY: Migrant encounters at our border have declined over the last year, but migrants are still arriving in high numbers, complicating border and immigration security. As overall encounters have declined, so too have encounters with individuals in the Terrorist Screening Data Set, also known as the “terrorism watchlist,” which includes individuals associated with information indicating they may be directly engaged in or supporting terrorist activities as well as known associates of watchlisted individuals, such as family members. For several years prior to this year's decline, terrorism watchlist encounters had increased, a trend consistent with the overall increase in migrant encounters at the southwest border. CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY: Domestic and foreign adversaries almost certainly will continue to threaten the integrity of our critical infrastructure with disruptive and destructive cyber and physical attacks, in part, because they perceive targeting these sectors will have cascading impacts on US industries and our standard of living. The PRC, Russia, and Iran will remain the most pressing foreign threats to our critical infrastructure. Most concerningly, we expect the PRC to continue its efforts to pre-position on US networks for potential cyber-attacks in the event of a conflict with the United States. Nation-states, criminal hacktivists, and financially motivated criminals will likely hone their techniques to disrupt US services or to conduct espionage focused on gaining access to US networks, including critical infrastructure entities. We assess that domestic and foreign violent extremists will continue to call for physical attacks on critical infrastructure in furtherance of their ideological goals and, at times, in response to international conflicts and crises. ECONOMIC SECURITY: Multifaceted and diverse economic threats—primarily from the PRC—will likely continue to harm US producers and consumers and degrade the competitiveness and future health of US companies and industries. The PRC likely will remain our greatest economic security threat because of its aggressive use of anticompetitive, coercive policies and theft of US intellectual property, technology, and trade secrets. Lastly, we expect our supply chains will remain vulnerable to foreign manipulation abroad, which could harm global productivity and consumer demand.    

Washington, DC: DHS, 2024. 46p.

By Sunder Katwala, Jill Rutter, and Steve Ballinger

The asylum system is failing. In 2022 a total of 45,756 people made the perilous journey across the Channel, up from 1,900 in 2019. At least 50 people have drowned or are missing, including 32 people who died when a boat capsized in November 2021. Criminal gangs are profiting from people’s desperation. Those who arrive in the UK face lengthy delays in processing their asylum applications. At the end of September 2022, just 7% of asylum applicants were processed within six months and 120,300 people were waiting for a decision on their initial application1. Unable to work while their decisions are processed, asylum seekers are left in unsuitable and expensive accommodation for months or sometimes years. This is unfair to asylum-seekers and costly to the taxpayer, with the bill for emergency hotel accommodation currently amounting to £5.6 million per day2. Moreover, the Home Office is failing to remove people whose asylum claims are refused, with just 816 voluntary and enforced removals in 2021, compared with 10,489 ten years previously3. Politicians must now prioritize reforms to build an asylum system that is controlled, well-managed and fair. The UK-Rwanda scheme is not the answer. It is wrong in principle, as it removes people without hearing their cases. It is also costly to the taxpayer and will not achieve its aims in practice. We believe, however, that there are constructive alternatives for asylum reform – measures that can secure broad consensus across parties, with civil society, and among most of the public. We propose an orderly, workable, and humane alternative reform agenda, comprised of the following elements: 1. Asylum policy should uphold Britain’s values, traditions, and international obligations to protect refugees. This means we reject proposals which violate the principles of a fair hearing for every case; or which break with the spirit and letter of our international commitments under the Refugee Convention. 2. Put in place a streamlined process to make fairer and faster asylum decisions. The Home Office should invest sufficient resources in a reformed asylum system, with a new strategy to triage initial applicants, simplify country guidance, and meet targets to make most decisions in six months. A fast-track process to refugee status for the strongest cases should also be introduced, together with a streamlined appeals procedure. 3. Hire a task force to tackle backlogs. With an individual target of processing four asylum cases each week or 100 asylum claims in six months, 1,000 temporary Home Office posts would be needed to eliminate the asylum backlog in six months, at an approximate cost of £60 million. With emergency hotel accommodation costing the Home Office £5.6 million each day in October 2022, this move would pay for itself within a fortnight, eliminating the need for hotels by freeing up dispersal accommodation. 4. Safer arrivals through a new humanitarian visa to come to the UK. This should be made available to people who have family or other close links to this country and issued in a select number of UK consulates in countries of transit. Parliament should set an annual quota for people admitted through this route, which would run alongside the UK Resettlement Scheme and community sponsorship, as well as refugee family reunion visas. 5. Adopt a policy of ‘comprehensive cooperation’ with our allies to tackle smuggling and irregular migration. The Government should seek enhanced cooperation with countries of transit and safe countries of origin. It should seek new and more comprehensive UK-France and UK-Belgium agreements, covering security, police cooperation, returns, and systems to share responsibility for people who do not qualify for asylum. The Foreign, Commonwealth, and Development Office should also support refugees in countries of transit such as Lebanon and Turkey, enabling them to support themselves there rather than travel across Europe. The UK Government should build on the agreement it signed with Albania in 2021 to allow the return of people who are not authorized to remain in the UK. It should also seek further return agreements with safe countries of return such as Bangladesh, Georgia, India, Nepal, and Nigeria. Safe countries of return should also be supported through the British overseas aid budget to enact programs to reduce irregular migration flows. 6. Ensure more and safer returns. The government should significantly increase the number of voluntary returns, reintroducing independent advice for those refused asylum, along with faster removals for irregular entrants whose asylum claims are refused. 7. Promote integration through ‘welcoming hubs’ that increase social contact between newcomers and receiving communities and help refugees to rebuild their lives and flourish. There is a public appetite to play a part in welcoming refugees. Faith and civil society organizations should harness this and set up local welcoming projects for asylum-seekers and refugees. More volunteers could be involved in activities such as English language conversation clubs and sports, offering advice and mentoring. Welcoming hubs should offer such community contact activities to asylum-seekers, refugees, and those on humanitarian visas, as part of a proactive approach to civic contact, integration, and citizenship. 8. Help more refugees to work. English language classes should be accessible in all parts of the UK so that refugees have the skills they need for work. Employment support should be better tailored to meet refugees’ needs and practical partnerships with employers should be strengthened. This will help more refugees to find work and enable them to make their contribution to our economy. 9. Sufficient and fairer funding to enable Home Office targets to be met rather than forgotten, through investment in an effective asylum system, reducing backlogs, and providing access to affordable English language classes in colleges. The dispersal of refugees across the UK should be based on a clear set of principles, with a fairer distribution of people and funding across regions and nations of the UK. Local authorities (and communities) should be consulted about new arrivals. 10. Stronger democratic accountability and public voice in asylum. An annual Immigration Review should be presented to Parliament, which should include a transparent review of asylum, refugee, and resettlement policy. The public should be involved in this review, through a well-organised engagement exercise that reaches people whose voices are not usually heard in consultations. Past experiences show that where communities are consulted about asylum dispersal accommodation and can ask questions, this process often unlocks public consent. The views of local communities should also contribute to this annual review and to plans to house asylum-seekers in their neighborhoods.   

London: British Future, 2023. 48p.

By Keri Richardson, Rodney Monroe, Benjamin Carleton, and Tammy Felix 

A homicide is a traumatic event that leaves family members and close friends of the victim (also known as co-victims, homicide survivors, and secondary victims) in a state of shock and uncertainty over the violent and unexpected loss. Secondary victims may experience a range of short-term and long-term psychological effects in the aftermath of a homicide, including post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), depression, and anxiety. These effects are in addition to their grieving and other emotional states (e.g., rage, guilt, isolation), as well as the negative impacts a homicide can have on their productivity (e.g., academic, vocational, social). Despite the impact that a homicide has on secondary victims, the needs of this group are often neglected, as the focus of the police investigation is on apprehending the individual responsible for the crime. As the procedural requirements of the investigation take over, many secondary victims find themselves trying to cope with the loss of their loved one while navigating the unfamiliar processes of the criminal justice system. In the aftermath of a homicide, secondary victims want answers from police officials and help understanding the forthcoming legal process. However, this information can be hard for them to access, which only leads to increased frustration and trauma. Existing research has established that effective law enforcement requires engagement with and cooperation from the communities they serve. Voluntary support and cooperation from the community is essential for law enforcement agencies to maintain order and solve crimes. Studies on what affects community members’ willingness to come forward with information to support an investigation are less prevalent. Research is also limited on evaluating how community policing strategies increase community cooperation and the quality of investigations that may lead to an increase in cases cleared. Little is known about how support from homicide detectives can affect the level of cooperation received during an investigation. This work by CNA will serve as the first step by building the foundational knowledge for further evaluations of this topic. Given the profound impacts that a homicide has on secondary victims and their communities and the need to improve how these survivors are incorporated into the investigatory process, the Richmond (Virginia) Police Department implemented the first Homicide Support Group (HSG) in 2006. This is not to say that support for secondary victims did not exist before. Prior to the implementation of the HSG, secondary victims received support through U.S. Attorneys’ Offices, District/Commonwealth Attorneys’ Offices, victim advocates, courts, nonprofit organizations, and their own communities. However, law enforcement agencies lacked formalized internal policies, procedures, and services to specifically support secondary victims. Since the start of the Richmond HSG, a growing number of police departments (Fayetteville, North Carolina; Boston, Massachusetts; Charlotte- Mecklenburg, North Carolina; and Louisville, Kentucky) have adopted similar approaches to supporting secondary victims. 

Arlington VA: CNA, 2020. 30.

By Yasmine Wong
The UK Home Office recently announced that it is considering treating extreme misogyny (i.e., hatred of or prejudice against women) as a form of extremism following an ongoing review of the government’s counter-extremism strategy. The government believes that misogyny is an ideological trend that is gaining traction and fuelling extremism in the country.At the centre of this phenomenon is the “manosphere” – a networked group of online communities promoting “anti-feminism, misogyny, and hateful ideas” about women and sexual minorities. Groups like “Incels” (involuntary celibates) and “Men’s Rights Activists” famously make up the manosphere. They have a violent and extremist edge and portray men as victims in a world that they perceive to be benefitting women and other minorities.The manosphere has, unfortunately, crept into the mainstream through the popularisation and dissemination of misogynistic narratives by social media personalities like Andrew Tate. That misogyny appears to be driving extremism and has the potential to cause societal polarisation suggests that it is no longer an ideological problem but has become a national security one.

Misogyny as a “Gateway Drug” to Violent Extremism

Far-right extremist attacks motivated by misogyny have surfaced in the last five years. In 2023, the perpetrator of the mall shooting in Allen, Texas, where eight people were killed, was found to have misogynistic, white supremacist and racist tendencies. In 2021, the gunman who killed eight people (of which six were Asian women) in Atlanta was believed to have been motivated by misogynistic and racist inclinations. In 2020, a man in Hanau, Germany, went on a shooting rampage, killing nine people. He was thought to have also been motivated by similar tendencies.Researchers hypothesise that misogyny has become a “gateway drug” to far-right violent extremism. This happens when the ideological frame that blames women for individual and societal ills is expanded to include ethnic or religious “others”, opening the cognitive door to wider forms of hate-based and exclusionary extremism against different identity groups.For instance, the perceived existential threat posed by feminism and gender equality on men has been likened to the perceived existential threat that migrants pose to the white male identity as initially outlined in “great replacement” or “white genocide” conspiracies. In other words, far-right actors employ misogyny in intersection with racism and xenophobia, blaming women, migrants, and other minorities for the decline of traditional notions of nationhood, family, and masculinity.

Misogyny Has Crept Into the Mainstream

Misogyny is no longer confined to the fringes of subcultures and communities; it has crept into the mainstream. The rise of online personalities like Andrew Tate, Jordan Peterson, Myron Gaines, and Walter Weekes, who peddle toxic masculinity, and misogynistic views, is a worrying trend. Tate, for example, exploits male fears about their economic futures and the threat to hegemonic masculinity. His social media content, often seen as “humorous” and “authentic”, serve as social currency among young men and boys.Social media algorithms are also complicit in the amplification of misogynistic content, pushing “toxic, hateful or misogynistic material” to young people (particularly boys suffering from anxiety and poor mental health) under the guise of entertainment. Researchers found a four-fold increase in misogynistic content recommended by TikTok’s algorithm over a five-day period of study, amping up to more extreme videos which focus on “anger and blame directed at women”.The results from a separate Australian study conducted in 2022 corroborate this, finding that algorithms used in YouTube and YouTube Shorts contributed to the promotion of “misogynistic, anti-feminist and other extremist content” to Australian boys and young men. A 2024 Irish study produced similar results – TikTok and YouTube recommended misogynist content to boys and young men regardless of whether they actively searched for it, with the intensity increasing according to the level of engagement.

Misogyny In Asia

In Asia, “male anger” allows misogynistic narratives and the broader extremist ideologies that they harbour to take root among a susceptible audience. In South Korea and Japan, there is an observed increase in misogynistic attacks inspired by elements of Incel ideology.In China, misogynistic terms and narratives similar to those used in Incel communities of the West are to be found in most social media platforms, with high-profile anti-feminist influencers like Zhu Zhou encouraging attacks against women who do not fulfil “reproductive duties”.In India, the flourishing Indian Incel community feeds off and exacerbates the misogyny already prevalent in Indian society, with violence meted out to women by men “who feel slighted or rejected by them”. Known as Currycels, Indian Incels believe that they are disadvantaged because of their race (as Indian women are thought to prefer White men) and that they are the victims of feminism.These examples appear to underscore the view that feminist progress and greater gender equality begets misogynistic backlash. It also raises the question of whether such misogyny will give rise to far-right extremism and violence in the future.

Implications for Singapore

While the popularity of manosphere content has not been ascertained in Singapore, local online spaces, particularly local Reddit communities and forums like HardwareZone and Sammyboy, do play host to misogynistic narratives. The narratives, particularly those that feature the privileges of women at the expense of men, have been observed to mirror narratives found in the manosphere.In r/Singapore (a community where Reddit users discuss topics relating to Singapore), users lament about institutions such as the Singapore legal system and national service favouring women and disadvantaging men. They argue that Singaporean women are not oppressed, which justifies ire against feminism and gender equality.A study conducted by the Association of Women for Action and Research (AWARE) found a host of misogyny in Singapore’s social media space, with content ranging from outright expressions of violence against women to narratives that reinforce gender stereotypes, with the most common being comments that belittled and objectified women. Misogynistic content was also found to have higher levels of engagement.The 2024 Ipsos survey found that almost half of Singaporeans think efforts toward women’s equality have gone so far that they now occur at the expense of men. Notably, men echo these statements at a far higher rate than women. Similarly, the results of a 2022 Ipsos survey conducted in Singapore mirror those of the 2024 study, where one in three Singaporean men believed that feminism does more harm than good, and that “traditional masculinity is under threat”, with a quarter denying the existence of gender inequality.While there may not be reported cases of misogyny directly leading to instances of far-right extremism in Singapore, this idea of “traditional masculinity being under threat” evokes concerning parallels with misogynistic narratives that serve as rallying calls in far-right spaces.Furthermore, Singapore remains highly connected to the Internet, and a survey revealed that online misogyny is commonplace. It also reported that six in ten young people spoke of being exposed to sensitive content (including gender-based hate) without searching for it. The proliferation of misogynistic (and incel-adjacent) narratives online may be an indication that conditions exist that are conducive for such extremist ideologies to take root here.

Conclusion

Regardless of how misogyny and the gender divide present themselves, the resultant impact is the same – the exacerbation of polarisation along intersecting identity lines and the rise of extremism. Rather than normalising the gender divide and misogynistic attitudes, it is imperative to understand the risks associated with the global growth of misogyny, not just in its insidious role in violent extremism, but also its potential to damage the social fabric.

Singapore,  S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS),   2024. 4p.

By Megan K. McBride, Zack Gold, Pamela G. Faber, and Kaia Haney With contributions by William Rosenau and Alexander Powell

Concern about extremism in the military did not begin with the January 6 insurrection on the US Capitol, but media reporting on the issue increased in the wake of the attack, which ensured the kind of sustained attention that is often necessary to compel action. On February 5, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin directed a force-wide stand-down to address the problem. He also asked the Countering Extremism Working Group to update the Department of Defense (DOD) definition of extremist activities, update training modules so that transitioning servicemembers are aware that they might be targeted for recruitment by extremist organizations, and review the screening questions for new recruits in order to solicit information about extremist behavior. As part of a CNA-initiated project to examine past efforts to address extremism in the US military, we identified a number of interesting parallels between this issue and the problem of sexual harassment and sexual assault. The purpose of this paper is to describe and explain these parallels, and to identify lessons that DOD should learn from its past experiences trying to address sexual harassment and assault in the context of its current challenge with racial extremism. Critically, we are not arguing that DOD’s approach to sexual harassment and sexual assault has been successful. Nor are we arguing that sexual harassment, sexual assault, and racial extremism are equivalent or comparable violations. Our argument is more modest: DOD’s approach to sexual harassment and sexual assault contains elements that are relevant to the problem of racial extremism and could provide a foundation on which to identify both helpful and unhelpful ways of approaching this issue.

Arlington, VA: CNA, 2021. 72p.

By Pamela G. Faber, Megan K. McBride, Julia McQuaid, Emily Mushen, Alexander Powell, William G. Rosenau and Elizabeth Yang With contributions by Megan Katt and Annaleah Westerhaug

The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict – Stability and Humanitarian Affairs (OASD (SO/LIC-SHA)) asked  CNA to study the role of women and gender in both violent extremist organizations (VEOs) and US counterterrorism (CT) and counter violent extremism (CVE)  operations (hereafter CT/CVE). This request emerged from the recognition that greater understanding of the role of gender and women in CT/CVE operations is necessary as mandated in section 1047 of the 2020 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) and in accordance with the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) Act of 2017. This study addresses the following research questions: 

• What roles do women play in VEOs organizationally and operationally? 

• How have these roles shifted over time, and how might they evolve in the short and long terms?

• What are the existing Department of Defense (DOD) and Special Operations Forces (SOF) approaches and policies regarding gender and CT/CVE? 

• What opportunities are presented to DOD, and SOF in particular, through increased consideration of gender in CT/CVE? What are the risks of failing to do so? 

• How should the US factor the role of gender into future CT/CVE operations, training, and education?

To carry this out, we developed a three-part approach: 

• Identified the roles of women and gender in VEOs through nine case studies: Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia–People’s Army, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, Kurdistan Workers’ Party, Al-Shabaab, National Socialist Underground and National Action (two white supremacist groups in Europe), Boko Haram, Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, Lord’s Resistance Army, and Abu Sayyaf Group.

• Assessed whether current US DOD CT/CVE strategy, policy, and activities incorporate gender considerations.

• Identified gaps, risks, and opportunities according to four thematic categories: strategy, policy and doctrine, internal activities,1 external activities, and conceptual understanding.

Our findings demonstrate that women play supporting, enabling, and operational roles in VEOs, and that there is no deliberate or coordinated effort to integrate these roles into CT/CVE strategy, policy, or activities.

Arlington, VA: CNA, 2021. 232p.

By William Rosenau, Megan McBride

The alleged participation of off-duty law enforcement personnel in the January 6, 2021, assault on the US Capitol has generated fresh interest in the broader issue of police participation in right-wing extremist groups and activities. Such extremism poses obvious but significant challenges for police agencies and their  communities. It can undermine the rule of law, damage police morale, compromise investigations, hinder successful prosecutions, and disrupt relationships between the police and the communities they serve (particularly communities of color). In the words of one police captain, “whenever the police department shirks its unbiased responsibility. . .the community then is in for real trouble.” Although we know that there are right-wing extremists among the nation’s 800,000 law enforcement officers, we do not know the extent of that presence or the most common ideologies. We also lack a detailed understanding of the strategies and tactics right-wing extremists use to infiltrate and recruit within police ranks and the extent to which the extremist presence may imperil investigations, including those concerning criminal extremist activities. In addition, while much has been made of the threat posed by intentional infiltrations, a potentially greater concern is the organic and gradual radicalization of those already on the force. This paper provides an overview of the current state of knowledge about police officer engagement in rightwing extremism, including the sustained use of racist, misogynistic, and homophobic language and stereotyping, both online and offline. After surveying the contemporary right-wing extremist landscape, this paper uses publicly available sources to explore in a preliminary way aspects of extremist penetration and recruitment, pre-employment screening challenges, police participation in extremist activity, and the role of social media platforms and the internet in enabling extremism. The paper concludes with a set of analytical questions that practitioners and policy-makers must answer if they hope to mitigate the rightwing extremist threat. 

Arlington, VA: CNA, 2021. 9p

By Lu Dong, Jennifer Bouey, Grace Tang, Stacey Yi, Douglas Yeung, Rafiq Dossani, June Lim, Yannan Li, Steven Zhang

Since the onset of the coronavirus pandemic, Asian American communities have faced a new wave of anti-Asian hate throughout the United States. Given diverse communication channels that are clustered by ethnicity, language preferences, and immigration generations within Asian American populations, there is a pressing need for culturally and linguistically appropriate strategies to raise awareness of available services to address anti-Asian hate. Community-based organizations (CBOs) play a crucial role in this regard, but they require tailored strategies to effectively reach and support Asian American communities. The authors conducted a community survey in Los Angeles (LA) and New York City (NYC) to provide CBOs that serve Asian and Asian American communities with important insights to enhance outreach and support strategies, ensuring that these strategies are accessible and effectively meeting the needs of community members who are affected by anti-Asian discrimination and violence.

Key Findings

• Among survey respondents, who were mostly from Chinese, Korean, and Thai ethnic groups, 37 percent of participants reported experiencing an anti-Asian hate incident; rates were similar in LA and NYC.

• English-speaking respondents, younger (18–24 years old) respondents, and respondents from higher income brackets were more likely to report experiencing an anti-Asian hate incident.

• About 61 percent of respondents indicated that they would report a hate incident to the police, and 61 percent would also seek help from CBOs that provide support services to hate-crime victims. Only 37 percent of respondents would use local community service numbers (211 or 311), and 13 percent indicated that they would not take any action. First-generation immigrants were more likely to take actions than were later generations.

• Major barriers to reporting incidents include language issues, lack of time, and lack of awareness of available resources. Approximately 45 percent of participants were unaware of community-based resources available to address anti-Asian hate; there were more-significant knowledge gaps in LA than in NYC.

• Despite most Asian Americans appreciating community-based counter-hate-incident services — such as medical support and counseling — actual use rates were low.

• Respondents from later immigrant generations (1.5, second, and third or later generations) reported more barriers and expressed more concerns about seeking support from CBOs after experiencing anti-Asian hate incidents.

Recommendations

• Strengthen services to meet the needs of members of two Asian American subgroups who might need more-tailored outreach and support: English-speaking later generations of Asian Americans who have more exposure to discrimination and older adults who might have difficulty recognizing and expressing their experiences of racism.

• Leverage close family ties and use diverse linguistic and cultural social media platforms to enhance outreach and information dissemination about anti-hate resources at CBOs.

• Empower first-generation community influencers to enhance outreach.

• Enhance CBOs' policy advocacy through strengthened data collection.

Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2024,