By Peggy Nicholson

In many respects, the evolution of juvenile court reform and school discipline reform follow similar trajectories. This Article begins by tracking those respective evolutions. Part I outlines the evolution of the juvenile court system in the United States and focuses on the fledgling system’s distinction of children from adults and its “rehabilitative ideal” that children could outgrow challenging behavior if given the right treatment and services. After a long period of “adultification” of the juvenile court in response to rising crime rates, more recent reform efforts have focused on returning to the early court’s rehabilitative model, including policies that would keep young children out of juvenile court altogether. With the context of the juvenile court’s evolution in mind, Part II tracks the history of exclusionary school discipline, which is defined as any school disciplinary action, typically a suspension or expulsion, that removes a student from his or her typical education setting. Many of the same rationales for the “adultification” of the juvenile court, including the myth of the juvenile superpredator and the rise of a zero-tolerance approach to discipline, led to a sharp increase in the use of exclusionary discipline throughout the latter half of the twentieth century. However, with a growing body of research showing the harm and inefficacy of exclusionary discipline, advocates for discipline reform have pushed to decrease its use, which has included proposals to ban or limit exclusionary discipline for young students. The efforts to protect young children from both juvenile court intervention and exclusionary discipline are explored respectively in Parts III and IV. Part III describes the movement to “Raise the Minimum Age” of juvenile court jurisdiction as an avenue to bar court processing for young children. Notably, Part III outlines the variety of rationales that have been used to support raising the minimum age and charts the success of the movement in the last decade. Against this backdrop, Part IV turns to the movement to end exclusionary discipline for young children. Although important differences between the juvenile court and school discipline exist, many of the same rationales that support keeping young children out of juvenile court also apply to protecting young children from exclusionary discipline. Despite these similar rationales, which are explored in Part IV, the movement to end exclusionary discipline for young children has had less success, with fewer states adopting these measures. Further, most states that have passed laws limiting school exclusion for young students still allow exclusions to move forward in many circumstances. Part IV tracks existing statewide efforts to limit exclusionary discipline for young children and describes some of the challenges faced by these reform efforts. Despite the challenges, there are also opportunities. Part V highlights lessons learned from the “Raise the Minimum Age” movement to make recommendations for building momentum for states to end exclusionary discipline for young children. Given the willingness in many states to protect young children from juvenile court intervention, there is hope that similar arguments and advocacy strategies can be utilized to advance statewide policies that will protect those same young children from the harm of exclusionary discipline.

11 Belmont Law Review 334-383 (2024)

By  Brendan Lantz, and Kyle G. Knapp

The analysis, entitled, Trends in Juvenile Offending: What You Need to Know, focuses on trends in offending from 2016 through 2022 by examining changes in the frequency of juvenile offending by crime type, demographics, and several other characteristics. This study uses incident information from the National Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS) from 2016 to 2022. The study period begins in 2016 because of notable increases in agency participation in reporting crime statistics to NIBRS following 2015; it ends in 2022 because that was the most recent year of data available at the time the report was prepared. To produce these data, offense, victim, and offender segment-level information was aggregated to the incident level for each year. The year files were then appended into a master incident-level file, in which incidents were restricted to those (a) involving at least one juvenile offender; and (b) from agencies that reported to NIBRS each month during the study period. From this file, totals were created for each month in every year. Some totals represent the total number of offender participations, while other totals represent the total number of incidents with one or more characteristics of interest. The outline below walks through each segment of NIBRS, how information was aggregated, how cases were dropped, and how totals were generated. 

2024. 20p.

By Paul Pazen and Steven L. Byers

People in Colorado have not directly experienced crime. From property offenses to violent crimes, every crime leaves a traumatized victim. Whether the wounds are physical, psychological, or financial, it is important to acknowledge the profound effects that a crime can have on its victims. At Common Sense Institute, our goal is to address the economic impact of crime while remaining conscious of the suffering that it causes. This report analyzes the cost of juvenile crime in Colorado and its economic impact. This study encompasses the period of 2010 to 2023 and the data comes from Colorado Crime Statistics (2023). Colorado’s juvenile crime trends tell a mixed story. On the one hand, youth crime rates have fallen in the last 15 years as property crime rates fall, follow. On the other hand, violent youth crime has risen. Meanwhile, the number of juveniles arrested and detained has fallen from a combination of alternative sentencing, diversion programs, and increased parole. It is violent crime that costs more. Juvenile crime results in direct or tangible costs including unrecovered stolen property, damaged property, victims’ out-of-pocket medical expenses, the cost of police, courts and correctional institutions, and lost earnings by both victims and juvenile perpetrators who are arrested and convicted. Juvenile crime also inflicts indirect or intangible costs like the pain and suffering of victims, reduced quality of life for everyone, and lower levels of investment and lower property values.i Intangible costs are difficult to measure with precision but, among those who have estimated them, there is a consensus that the intangible cost of juvenile crime far exceeds the tangible cost. Reducing current rates of murder, rape, assault, theft, and robbery by juveniles would produce a wide range of savings and other benefits to families, individuals, property owners and taxpayers. All estimates of the cost of crime in this report are adjusted for inflation and are reported in 2020 dollars so that costs can be compared across years. In 2021, after an extraordinary rise in crime, CSI estimated a total cost of crime of $3.3 billion. 

Greenwood Village, CO: Common Sense Institute, 2024. 30p.

By Western Australia Corruption and Crime Commission

In the early hours of 12 October 2023, a 16-year-old First Nation's boy, Cleveland Keith Dodd - died in custody. He was found hanging from a damaged vent in the ceiling of his cell at Unit 18 in Casuarina Prison. Cleveland's death comes some 32 years after the conclusion of the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody. The painful truth is that he is by no means the first Indigenous Australian to have died in custody in Western Australia since that time. The profound tragedy is that he is the first child. While the cause and manner of Cleveland's death have not yet been determined by the Coroner, the Commission is satisfied within its jurisdiction that Cleveland fixed a torn piece of t-shirt material to a damaged ceiling vent, the ligature point from which he was later found hanging. At 01:35 on 12 October 2023, Cleveland used his cell call to contact a Youth Custodial Officer to tell him of his intention to hang himself -shortly before doing so. Cleveland's final threat of self-harm was one of at least 17 threats of self-harm or self-harm attempts made by the young people detainees at Unit 18 in the 24 hours leading up to it. Why Cleveland was driven to self-harm is not an inquiry within the jurisdiction of the Commission. The question of how he was able to attempt to take his own life in a tightly controlled space - is. There are several bodies vested with statutory power to investigate the circumstances surrounding the death of a child in custody. That is for good reason. The death of a child in such circumstances deeply affects not only their family but the Western Australian community as a whole. Broader systemic and cultural issues within the Department of Justice (DOJ) may have contributed to this outcome. In his May 2023 Inspection of Banksia Hill Detention Centre and Unit 18, the Inspector of Custodial Services Mr Eamon Ryan found young people, staff, and a physical environment in acute crisis. In the almost 18 months leading up to his inspection, the rates of self-harm and attempted suicide among young people in custody were unprecedently high. Staffing was in terminal decline. These wider considerations may form part of the Coronial inquest into Cleveland's death or the inquiries of the other authorities. The Commission has a narrow but important jurisdiction. Until 2014 the Commission also had jurisdiction in respect of public officers who engage in conduct that constitutes or involves a breach of the trust placed in the public officer by reason of his or her office of employment as a public officer and could constitute a disciplinary offence providing reasonable grounds for termination of employment. In 2014 Parliament removed that jurisdiction from the Commission and vested it in the Public Sector Commission. Therefore, acts of neglect or misfeasance which do not disclose a possible offence of 2 or more years' imprisonment are outside the Commission's jurisdiction. The Commission is empowered to investigate serious misconduct. Serious misconduct is defined in the Corruption, Crime and Misconduct Act 2003 (CCM Act) s 4. To constitute serious misconduct under s 4(a) or (b), a public officer must have acted or failed to act corruptly. Corruption has been held to include conduct that involves moral impropriety in public administration, or some perversion of the proper performance of the duties of office.1 There was no evidence giving rise to a reasonable suspicion that any public officer had engaged in conduct of that kind. As a result, the Commission concentrated on investigating whether any public officer may have engaged in serious misconduct under s 4(c), by committing an offence punishable by 2 or more years' imprisonment while acting or purporting to act in his or her official capacity. The scope of the Commission's investigation was limited to forming opinions asto whether any public officer committed an offence punishable by 2 or more years' imprisonment. The purpose of the investigation was to determine whether any public officers engaged in conduct of that kind in the execution of their duties at Unit 18 at Casuarina Prison from 10 to 12 October 2023. On 12 October 2023, the DOJ notified the Commission of Cleveland's critical incident.2 After assessing the matter, on 20 October 2023 the Commission formed Operation Lowestoft to investigate. The same day, the Commission took the unusual step of making a public announcement in relation to the investigation, given the extensive reporting, public interest and the seriousness of the incident. On 2 November 2023, a member of Cleveland's family made a report directly to the Commission.3 The Commission's inquiry focused on the actions of the five DOJ Youth Custodial Officers (YCOs) and one nurse contracted to the DOJ who worked the night shift during which Cleveland self-harmed. A significant amount of CCTV footage and a large volume of records were obtained. Interviews with witnesses were conducted. The DOJ fully cooperated with the Commission's investigation. All five YCOs and the Nurse were examined under oath or affirmation between 29 January and 2 February 2023. Between 5 and 8 February 2023, the Unit Manager of the day shift at Unit 18 on 11 October 2023, the Superintendent of Unit 18, Mr Douglas Coyne, and the Deputy Commissioner for Women, Ms Christine Ginbey, who was at the time the Deputy Commissioner for Women and Young People, were examined under oath or affirmation. Having carefully weighed the benefits of public exposure and public awareness against the potential for prejudice or privacy infringements, the Commissioner did not determine that it was in the public interest to open those examinations to the public. Nonetheless, the Commission considered that there was a strong public interest in the Commission investigating the persons present at Unit 18 on 11 and 12 October 2023, and those who supervised them. Under their watch - a boy died. The Commission's mandate was to investigate and expose any possible serious misconduct by those who may have played a part in it. The criminal offences that the Commission's investigation centred around were those of the falsification of a record by a public officer contrary to the Criminal Code s 85, an act or omission causing bodily harm or danger under the Criminal Code s 304 (arising by way of a breach of the duty to provide the necessaries of life under the Criminal Code s 262) and failing to protect a child from harm pursuant to the Children and Community Services Act 2004 (CCS Act) s 101. The Commission analysed the information gathered by the investigation. The Commission assessed the evidence of all the witnesses who gave evidence. In the Commission's opinion each of the witnesses was genuinely affected by Cleveland's death. There were undoubtedly breaches of DOJ procedures and policies that occurred on the night of Cleveland's self-harm. There may have been conduct engaged in that constitutes misfeasance or misconduct of another kind described in the CCM Act s 4(d). That is a matter about which the Commission has no jurisdiction to form an opinion. While Cleveland's death is plainly a devastating outcome of the events that occurred between 10 and 12 October 2023, in the Commission's assessment, there is no evidence to suggest that the public officers involved committed an offence punishable by 2 or more years' imprisonment in the execution of their duties at Unit 18 during that time. Consequently, the Commission has formed no opinions of serious misconduct.   

Northbridge, WA: The Commission, 2024. 70p.

By Colleen Sbeglia, Cortney Simmons, Grace Icenogle, Marsha Levick, Monica Peniche, Jordan Beardslee, Elizabeth Cauffman

In Miller v. Alabama (2012), the Supreme Court abolished mandatory juvenile life without parole (JLWOP) sentences and subsequently decided that the ruling applied retroactively (Montgomery v. Louisiana, 2016), effectively rendering thousands of inmates eligible for resentencing and potential release from prison. In its decisions, the Court cited developmental science, noting that youth, by virtue of their transient immaturity, are less culpable and more amenable to rehabilitation relative to their adult counterparts. Specifically, the Court notes adolescents' propensity for impulsive action, sensitivity to social influence, and difficulty understanding long-term consequences. Even so, these rulings raised concerns regarding the consequences of releasing prisoners who had committed heinous crimes as juveniles. Several years after the Court's decision, preliminary data are now available to shed light on rates of recidivism among those released. The current paper comprises three goals. First, we discuss the science of adolescent development and how it intersects with legal practice, contextualizing the Court's decision. Second, we present recidivism data from a sample of individuals formerly sentenced to JLWOP in Pennsylvania who were resentenced and released under Miller and Montgomery (N = 287). Results indicate that 15 individuals received new criminal charges up to 7 years postrelease (5.2%), the majority of which were nonviolent offenses. This low rate of recidivism is consistent with the developmental science documenting compromised decision-making during the adolescent years, followed by desistance from criminal behavior in adulthood. Lastly, we discuss the importance of interdisciplinary collaborations between researchers and legal practitioners, as well as critical future avenues of research in this area.

Journal of Research on Adolescence, 00, 1–11. 2024.  

By Ashley Nellis and Devyn Brown

A wave of reforms since 2010 has changed the trajectory of punishment for young people by substantially limiting the use of juvenile life without parole (JLWOP) sentences. At the sentence’s height of prominence in 2012, more than 2,900 people were serving JLWOP, which provided no avenue for review or release. Since reforms began, most sentence recipients have at least been afforded meaningful opportunity for a parole or sentence review. More than 1,000 have come home. This progress is remarkable, yet thousands more who have been sentenced to similarly extreme punishments as youth have not been awarded the same opportunity. Our analysis shows that in 2020, prisons held over 8,600 people sentenced for crimes committed when they were under 18 who were serving either life with the possibility of parole (LWP) or “virtual” life sentences of 50 years or longer. This brief argues for extending the sentencing relief available in JLWOP cases to those serving other forms of life imprisonment for crimes committed in their youth. In addition, The Sentencing Project has estimated that nearly two in five people sentenced to life without parole (LWOP) were 25 or younger at the time of their crime. These emerging adults, too, deserve a meaningful opportunity for a second look because their developmental similarities with younger people reduce their culpability in criminal conduct. The evidence provided in this brief supports bold reforms for youth and emerging adults sentenced to extreme punishments.

Washington, DC: The Sentencing Project, 2024. 10p.