By Global Financial Integrity, FACT Coalition, and the Anti-Corruption Data Collective

Today Global Financial Integrity, in conjunction with the FACT Coalition and the Anti-Corruption Data Collective, is releasing a report with identifies 25 cases in which illegal, allegedly illicit or suspicious funds were funneled into commercial property in the United States over approximately the last 20 years. With a total value of property exceeding $2.6 billion, California, Florida and New York are some of the most favored locations for these illegal investments, but criminals stashed money across some 20 different states. This money originated from around the globe and includes suspicious funds from 14 countries, including Iran, North Korea, Kazakhstan, Russia and Mexico. As varied as the sources of funds were, so too were the types of properties involved. Hotels, shopping malls, supermarkets, a music studio and an equestrian facility in addition to more pedestrian office high-rise

It should be noted that our research represents only known cases involving U.S. commercial real estate: the actual number is likely much higher. Our data definitively shows, however, that commercial property in the U.S. offers criminal syndicates, cartels, kleptocrats and fraudsters an easy path to hide and launder their ill-gotten gains. Russian oligarchs facing international sanctions have also invested in U.S. commercial real estate. Shockingly, eight of the 25 cases involve foreign government officials or their relatives, yet the links to these Politically Exposed Persons were only uncovered long after the purchases.In recent years it has become increasingly clear that the combination of complex financing schemes and a lack of transparency mean commercial real estate provides a unique opportunity for laundering huge amounts of cash with a relatively low risk of detection. Identifying who is behind the purchase of commercial property often presents a significant challenge given large financial flows from real estate investment trusts and private investment groups, in addition to funds from shell companies formed and operated by registered agents, proxies and/or attorneys. Key Findings – More than $2.6 billion in suspicious funds were invested in commercial real estate in 22 U.S. states over approximately the last 20 years. The actual figure is likely much higher.– Funds used to buy commercial real estate in the United States originated in 14 different countries including Russia (4 cases), Mexico (4 cases), China, Malaysia, Iran and Kazakhstan (see Map 2). – Of the 25 cases reviewed for this study, 14 involved either politically exposed persons or oligarchs who typically have especially close relationships with foreign government officials. – The types of properties appearing in cases fall into four broad categories: land/buildings, business facilities (e.g. music studios, health facilities), retail spaces (e.g. supermarkets, hotels) and industrial sites (e.g. steel plants). – Weak or non-existent reporting requirements by professions involved in the purchase of commercial real estate contributed to the ease with which illicit funds were laundered.Recommendations 1.FinCEN should adopt a reporting obligation for multiple real estate professionals in a cascading order to ensure the requirement falls on at least one U.S.-based entity involved in the transaction, from both the buyer and the seller. As attorneys are legally required to be part of the closing process in almost 20 states, attorneys should be included with specific reference to the function they perform in the transaction.The rule should cover transfers of ownership that do not constitute a sale. Current rules only refer to purchases of real property by a legal entity. However, numerous cases of real estate money laundering simply involve the transfer of ownership or creation of equitable interest in the property without an actual sale. FinCEN should expand the types of transactions covered to include direct/indirect transfers of ownership or creation of equitable interest in the property.The rule should cover transactions by trusts: An increasing proportion of housing is now owned by legal entities and arrangements, including trusts. In Los Angeles, for example, 23% of rental units are owned by trusts. Both foreign and some domestic trusts are excluded from the purview of the Corporate Transparency Act. We recommend that transactions by all different classes of legal entities and legal arrangements be included in any prospective rule.

Washington, DC: Global Financial Integrity, 2024. 21p.

By Ian Tennant and Prem Mahadevan

Summary This briefing note summarises the GI-TOC’s research and experiences in engaging with and supporting civil society responses to organised crime. This is provided in the context of the ongoing threats and shrinking space for civil society, and a need for policymakers and officials to understand civil society’s role, value and potential. It is hoped that this briefing note can provide researchers and officials with a background briefing that could enable improved policy responses aimed at supporting civil society as part of whole-of-society efforts to prevent and counter organised crime.

Briefing Note 27

The Hague: Serious Organised Crime & Anti-Corruption Evidence (SOC ACE) 2024. 10p.

By Ana Paula Oliveira

Summary As a global challenge, organised crime is increasingly threatening the safety and security of citizens. Despite the real-world impact, there is an apparent disconnection between international human rights laws and policies, and responses to transnational organized crime. Even though the regulatory frameworks may have different objectives and scopes, human rights and responses to organised crime are not concepts at odds. Without aiming to provide an exhaustive or comprehensive account of all human rights issues deriving from the workings of organised crime, this briefing note identifies four areas that justify greater attention to the fundamental rights of natural persons, and convergence in the human rights and crime agendas. It draws on a review of Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC)’s research and programming, and the author’s own experience as a lawyer working on organised crime issues for the past five years.

Briefing Note 29

The Hague: Serious Organised Crime & Anti-Corruption Evidence (SOC ACE) , 2024. 10[p.

By Reynell Badill and Víctor M. Mijares

Why do criminal groups decide to adopt political discourses? We argue that an armed group's discursive politicisation (the public declaration of political motivations) is more likely when the state declares the organisation to be an existential threat, militarises the fight against it (securitisation), and when the leaders of the armed group have had political training. This discourse aims to reduce the state's military actions against them and gain civilian support. This argument is demonstrated through a qualitative comparative analysis of six Latin American cases: Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia and Los Rastrojos (Colombia), Militarizado Partido Comunista del Perú (Peru), Primeiro Comando da Capital (Brazil), Tren de Aragua (Venezuela), and Cartel de Sinaloa (Mexico). Three of them adopted a political discourse, and the others did not. We provide an analytical framework for criminal actors who do not necessarily fit into insurgent, paramilitary or simple criminal group typology.

October 2021Global Crime 22(4):312-335

By The United Nations Office on Drug and Crime (UNODC)

Cocaine, cannabis resin and pharmaceutical opioids are the internationally trafficked drugs most seized in the Sahel. In terms of quantity, cannabis herb is actually the most commonly seized drug in the Sahel countries, but it seems to be produced locally and trafficked mostly for local consumption. Cannabis is also the principal substance for which people seek treatment in the region. The geographical location of West Africa renders it a natural stopover point for cocaine produced in South America en route to Europe, one of the largest consumer markets for cocaine after North America. In a context of increasing cocaine production in South America and increasing demand for the drug in Europe, flows of cocaine trafficked through West Africa have intensified. The re-emergence of large cocaine seizures since 2019 suggests a surge in large shipments of the drug to the coastal countries of West Africa, with 9.5 tons being seized in Cabo Verde. Although the majority of the cocaine reaching West Africa typically continues northwards towards North Africa and Europe via maritime routes along the African coast, an increasing number of significant cocaine seizures involving Sahel countries has provided evidence of large-scale cocaine trafficking through the region. From an average of 13 kg per year in the period 2015–2020, the quantity of cocaine seized in the Sahel countries increased to 41 kg in 2021 and 1,466 kg in 2022, with the bulk reported by Burkina Faso, Mali and the Niger. Annual estimates were not available for 2023, but at the time of writing over 2.3 tons of cocaine had already been seized in Mauritania in 2023.

Cannabis resin is the second most seized drug in the Sahel countries after cannabis herb, with 24.8 tons seized in the period 2021–2022. Representing over 52.6 per cent of the total quantity of cannabis resin seized in West and Central Africa in the same period, this illustrates the importance of the Sahel route for cannabis resin trafficking. According to data from the Sahel countries, the cannabis resin trafficked in the region generally originates in Morocco, where an increase in cannabis resin production has been reported, reaching an estimated 901 tons in 2022. It is typically destined for countries in Western Europe and North Africa. Aside from the direct trafficking route between Spain and Morocco, cannabis resin is typically trafficked overland from Morocco to Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, the Niger and Chad, then onwards to Algeria, Libya and Egypt. Since 2020, the Sahel countries have reported that cannabis resin is being transported by sea via an alternative maritime route, mostly from Morocco down the coast of West Africa to ports on the Gulf of Guinea, in Benin and Togo in particular, before being transported north to the Niger and then on to North Africa. The reconfiguration of the cannabis resin trafficking routes in West Africa is likely to have an effect on the drug distribution networks operating between North Africa, the Gulf of Guinea and the Sahel. For example, Moroccan drug traffickers are likely to become less reliant on Malian organized crime groups, while traffickers in the Gulf of Guinea are likely to be increasingly exposed to cannabis resin, enabling them to diversify their trade and the markets to which they have access. Between 2011 and 2021, the annual prevalence of opioid use (including opiates) increased from 0.33 to 1.24 per cent in Africa. The non-medical use of pharmaceutical opioids appears to have grown considerably, from just two countries (the Niger and Togo) citing tramadol as the principal drug of concern by people entering drug treatment in 2017, to five countries (Burkina Faso, Liberia, Mali, the Niger and Sierra Leone) in 2019. Indeed, the non-medical use of tramadol remains a threat in North, West and Central Africa in particular. Tramadol is the most used opioid for non-medical purposes in Burkina Faso, Mauritania, the Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo. Moreover, in 2022, Tramadol was the second most common drug for which female patients sought treatment in Mali and Mauritania etc.

Vienna: UNODC, 2023. 40p.

The European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA)

A wastewater analysis has indicated that in Europe, cocaine from South America is now being consumed in smaller towns, as well as major urban areas.

The report, published on March 20 by the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA), is the institution’s latest annual overview of drug residues used to estimate cocaine consumption across participant cities in Europe. This year, the report analyzed results from approximately 90 cities and towns, though several major cities, including London, Madrid, and Berlin, did not participate.

It found that the Belgian city of Antwerp, a vital port for the arrival of drugs from Latin America to Europe, remains the continent’s cocaine consumption capital, while eastern European states — particularly the Czech Republic and Slovakia — continue to dominate in methamphetamine consumption, though that is changing slowly.

The report also looked beyond the European Union for the first time to compare residues at a global level, including cities in the United States and Brazil in its analysis.

Researchers tested the cities’ sewage systems for indications of how much cocaine the population is consuming, which they estimate in milligrams per 1,000 inhabitants per day (mg/1000p/day).

Wastewater studies measure only drugs that have been consumed, not those that were dumped, João Matias, a scientific analyst at the EMCDDA and one of the authors of the study, told InSight Crime.

“Once inside our bodies, the drug is metabolized. Once excreted to the sewage system, researchers can take samples before the water is treated. We look for the metabolites produced after the use of a specific substance,” said Matias.

Here, InSight Crime analyzes the report’s findings on the increasing prevalence of cocaine and methamphetamine outside of major cities in Europe, as well as new data from non-EU cities.

Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg 2024. 16p.

By Stacey Mckenna

Overdose deaths have skyrocketed across the United States in recent years, increasing by 622 percent between 2000 and 2020, with more than 112,000 lives lost in 2023. This crisis has been largely driven by the proliferation of potent synthetic opioids such as illicitly manufactured fentanyl, which is up to 50 times stronger than heroin.

The opioid antagonist, naloxone, is an especially important harm reduction tool in this landscape. Naloxone binds to opioid receptors in the brain, preventing other opioids, such as fentanyl or heroin, from binding to and activating them. The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) first approved the medication for the reversal of opioid overdoses in 1971. When administered in a timely manner, naloxone can restore breathing within minutes and successfully reverse 75 to 100 percent of overdoses.

Consequently, lawmakers and government agencies across the country have taken steps to improve access to naloxone. State legislatures have passed laws providing immunity to laypeople who administer the medication, authorized statewide standing orders to facilitate prescription-free pharmacy access, and purchased naloxone in bulk for direct distribution and to pass along to community-based organizations and first responders. Last year, the FDA approved intranasal naloxone products for over-the-counter sale for the first time.

However, with novel, increasingly potent synthetic opioids dominating the illicit supply, some medical experts worry that naloxone as we know it is simply not good enough anymore. In fact, in 2021, the FDA approved both higher-dose naloxone products and new, longer-lasting opioid antidotes, and some government agencies have begun purchasing these products for distribution in their communities.

This policy study aims to inform legislators and public health decision-makers about how high-dose naloxone fits into federal, state, and local efforts to combat the opioid overdose crisis. We examine the research on naloxone efficacy—in laboratory and medical settings and in the real world—and assess potential drawbacks associated with alternatives to standard-dose naloxone.

R Street Shorts No. 135 Washington, DC: R Street, 2024. 10p.

By Janos Mark Szakolczai, Ryan Casey, Amy Cullen, Emily Qvist-Baudry and Alistair Fraser

1.1 Overview

In 2022, the Scottish Government commissioned a study of public space closed circuit television (CCTV) in Scotland, which aimed to update baseline evidence of the provision of public space CCTV in Scotland. The study was undertaken by a team of researchers from the University of Glasgow and the University of Edinburgh, with guidance from a Research Advisory Group consisting of key stakeholders in public space CCTV in Scotland.

The study sought to answer the following research questions:

1) What is the current provision of public space CCTV in Scotland and how, and for what purposes, do local authorities and Police Scotland use public space CCTV?

2) How do communities across Scotland perceive the use, effectiveness, and value of public space CCTV in their local communities?

3) What is the provision, delivery, operation, and maintenance of public space CCTV like in similar jurisdictions, and how does this compare with Scotland?

The project involved an in-depth, mixed methods approach to better understand the current provision and use of public space CCTV across Scotland, to assess the perceived use and value of public space CCTV in local communities, and to make international comparisons.

Glasgow: Scottish Government, 2023. 66p.

By Mathijs Kros, Tjeerd W. Piersma & Karin A. Beijersbergen

This paper investigates criminal career characteristics and trajectories of domestic burglars, residential and commercial robbers, and street robbers in the Netherlands. We used longitudinal data which includes the criminal cases from 1997 until 2020 for all people of 12 years or older. We studied all 89,062 offenders that had at least one criminal case in the period between 2002 and 2004. Semiparametric group trajectory models were used to cluster these offenders into groups with similar criminal careers. Our results suggest that in order to predict who will follow the career path of a life-course persistent offender, it is important to distinguish between specific groups of offenders. Life-course persistent offenders are found amongst domestic burglars, residential and commercial robbers, and street robbers, but not amongst offenders of other types of crime. Furthermore, the size of the group of life-course persistent offenders varies between the domestic burglars, residential and commercial robbers, and street robbers and is largest for domestic burglars. Other criminal career characteristics, such as age of onset, age of termination, duration, and specialisation, are also compared between offender groups.

J Dev Life Course Criminology 9, 379–403 (2023).

By Peng Chen and Justin Kurland

“Strike Hard” is an enhanced law-enforcement strategy in China that aims to suppress crime, but measurement of the crime-reducing effect and potential changes in the spatiotemporal concentration of crime associated with “Strike Hard” remains unknown. This paper seeks to examine the impact, if any, of “Strike Hard” on the spatiotemporal clustering of burglary incidents. Two and half years of residential burglary incidents from Chaoyang, Beijing is used to examine repeat and near-repeat burglary incidents before, during, and after the “Strike Hard” intervention and a new technique that enables the comparison of repeat and near repeat patterns across di erent temporal periods is introduced to achieve this. The results demonstrate the intervention disrupted the repeat pattern during the “Strike Hard” period reducing the observed ratio of single-day repeat burglaries by 155%; however, these same single-day repeat burglary events increased by 41% after the cessation of the intervention. Findings with respect to near repeats are less remarkable with nominal evidence to support that the intervention produced a significant decrease, but coupled with other results, suggest that spatiotemporal displacement may have been an undesired by-product of “Strike Hard”. This study from a non-Western setting provides further evidence of the generalizability of findings related to repeat and near-repeat patterns of burglary and further highlights the limited preventative effects that the “Strike Hard” enhanced law enforcement campaign had on burglary

ISPRS Int. J. Geo-Inf. 2020, 9, 150

By Nikita Lalwani

For much of the twentieth century, the United States did little to help repatriate looted antiquities, thanks to a powerful coalition of art collectors, museums, and numismatists who preferred an unregulated art market. Today, however, the country treats the protection of cultural property as an important national-security issue. What changed? This Essay tells the story of how a confluence of events—including the high-profile destruction and looting of cultural property in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as the revelation that looted antiquities were helping to bankroll terrorist organizations in the Middle East—convinced both Congress and the State Department to take the issue seriously. It then asks what this shift says about how the United States sets its policy agenda and reflects on how cultural property law should evolve from here.

Yale Law Journal, VOLUME 130, 2020-2021

By Christine Acosta Weirich

In the aftermath of the Arab Spring in 2011, many nations in the Cradle of Civilization faced civil unrest, much of which continues today in the form of the ongoing Syrian Civil War, the conflict in Yemen, and instability in nations such as Iraq and Turkey. As a consequence, antiquities and cultural heritage in the region are currently facing a notoriously exacerbated level of risk. Despite the looting and destruction of cultural objects and monuments presenting a longstanding global and historical trend, the field of antiquities trafficking research lacks a unique and effective perspective within its current body of work and research. Likewise, criminology as a scientific field of study has largely overlooked the complex issue of looting and trafficking of cultural objects. This thesis focuses on the issue of Antiquities Trafficking Networks from a crime prevention perspective and attempts to demonstrate the effectiveness and apt nature of Crime Script Analysis and Situational Crime Prevention. This is accomplished first with a study and analysis of the wider phenomenon of Antiquities Trafficking Networks (from looting to market), followed by a specific case study of antiquities trafficked from within Syria since the beginning of the Civil War. Following these analyses, thirteen prominent Situational Crime Prevention strategies for Antiquities Trafficking Networks, and ten strategies for future conflict zones are generated by this research project. Through these strategies, Crime Script Analysis – in conjunction with Situational Crime Prevention – has proven to be a highly effective and efficient method and framework for studying this particularly difficult field. Ultimately, this thesis proposes a new crime prevention-focused methodology, to help tackle the issue of antiquities trafficking, as well as presenting one of the first prevention-specific analyses in this area. In doing so, it offers a basic model that maps the structure and necessary elements for antiquities trafficking to occur and allows for future research projects to adapt or customize this script model to situation-specific cases of antiquities looting, transit, and marketing.

Ph.D. Thesis. Glasgow: University of Glasgow, 2018. 312p.

By Michaela Millinder

KEY FINDINGS

• Illicit actors, including terrorists, target cultural heritage and soft targets for a myriad of motivations: for financial gain and to diversify revenue streams, to validate their narratives or propaganda, and to systematically erase communities’ collective identities, both to subjugate these societies and re-write and control their histories. These seemingly divergent motivations are not exclusive, and the same illicit actor can destroy cultural heritage for propaganda and profit from its sale.

• The intentional destruction of cultural heritage, which is a war crime, often occurs concurrently with other human rights abuses and is a condition that can be conducive to genocide. It can furthermore hinder post-conflict recovery and peacebuilding efforts.

• Due to the inherent aspects of cultural heritage and soft targets, protection challenges include: tensions in balancing security and civilian access to sites or public spaces, lack of awareness and education on the risks to cultural heritage, the multiplicity of actors involved in cultural heritage management and, at times, the difficulty in securing their engagement, siloed responses, limited resources, and state involvement in the targeting and destruction of cultural heritage.

• Risk assessments, information sharing, cross-sectoral and agency partnerships, educational and awareness raising efforts, including on the threats facing cultural heritage, and prosecutions and international accountability mechanisms have all been utilized as good protection practices and responses.

• Recommendations: Share risk assessments locally, regionally, and globally across relevant sectors and agencies with adequate international assistance; align soft target and critical infrastructure protection efforts; prioritize targeted education and public awareness on the importance of protecting cultural heritage and threats facing it; build capacity of stakeholders involved in protection efforts; and pursue accountability for cultural heritage destruction, including antiquities trafficking, and enforce penalties for violations.

New York: Soufan Center, 2024 26p.

By Radha Barooah and Ana Paula Oliveira Siria Gastélum Félix

This brief aims to bring specific local perspectives to the broader global policymaking agenda, and is intended to inform government officials and policymakers, as well as civil society groups working in this field.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY People from all walks of life have disappeared during Mexico’s so-called ‘war on drugs’; many others become victims of the growing global human trafficking industry; migrants go missing as they travel to seek a better life elsewhere, often displaced by criminal groups. Vulnerable youth, particularly young boys, are co-opted by criminal interests and then ‘disappeared’ to forcibly join gangs, often groomed to provide gang ‘muscle’ or traffic drugs.1 Women and children are often trafficked for sexual exploitation and forced labour.2 Many activists, journalists, politicians and whistle-blowers who campaign against organized crime or corruption have disappeared. Disappearances – as we define the phenomenon in this paper – are deployed for various reasons: to silence the voices of social and political leaders, activists and journalists; to assert violent control over criminal territories and illicit markets; or to monetize vulnerable people as a tradeable commodity. In all these cases, criminal groups have a hand, and although organized crime-related disappearances vary in motive and scope, they disproportionately affect the most marginalized communities. Criminal groups therefore instrumentalize disappearances for different objectives. But a fundamental challenge of dealing with this widespread problem is that cases are rarely differentiated and often assumed by law enforcement authorities to be one-off isolated incidents. However, when examining this issue closely, there is a more menacing pattern behind them, namely that they are often perpetrated by organized criminal groups operating in a particular community or controlling a market territory. By not discerning this broader picture of underlying criminal intent, by focusing on the what and ignoring the why, the phenomenon tends to receive limited attention in public policy agendas. There is also inadequate institutional support and investigative work, which has the effect of impeding victims’ access to justice. The international framework designed to address enforced disappearances – the International Convention for Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances (ICPPED)3 – requires that state involvement in the act (in the form of collusion, authorization or acquiescence) is proven in order to trigger its obligations. Compounding this, the conditions of state involvement and the role of organized crime actors are not clearly set out in the wording of the convention, so cases of disappearances linked to illicit economies tend to be confined to the margins of national and international agendas. Meanwhile, the international human rights discourse on disappearances perpetrated by non-state actors (e.g. criminal groups or networks) has progressed to a certain degree, but it, too, remains ill-equipped to determine the conditions and factors of collusion between organized crime and state actors that would amount to authorization, acquiescence or omission. These imprecisions and gaps in the legal framework result in a general lack of institutional support for victims and their families. Despite this, individuals and communities affected by this crime have developed mechanisms to respond. Since 2019, the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC), through its Resilience Fund, has supported over 50 community-based initiatives and activists searching for people who have disappeared, including relatives seeking justice and journalists investigating disappearances related to organized crime around the world.4 The Resilience Fund has documented first-hand experiences through interviews and dialogues and provided financial and capacity-building support.5 This brief draws from the work and perspectives of such civil society and community members who live in environments that are exposed to disappearances. It assesses this form of organized crime as a serious human rights violation. While informed by the global dynamics of this criminal market, it focuses on contexts in which disappearances occur in Latin America, analyzing in particular the cases of Mexico and Venezuela. The first setting examines how criminal groups strategically deploy disappearances to fulfill various objectives; the other considers how disappearances occur in the mining sector, which experiences a high prevalence of criminality. This policy brief therefore aims to bring these specific local perspectives to the broader global policymaking agenda, and is intended to inform government officials and policymakers, as well as civil society groups working in this field. While some of the evidence in the brief is anecdotal, the authors have corroborated it with open-source data and a literature review. The analysis is exploratory and is designed to add to a small yet growing body of literature on disappearances among vulnerable communities exposed to organized crime and amplify understanding of the pressing nature of the problem in policy circles.

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime. 2024. 28p.

By J.R. Mailey

Sudan’s current conflict, which erupted in April 2023, is the latest chapter in a story of rival predatory networks competing for control over formal and illicit economies, the information environment and the use of organized violence.

As the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and Rapid Support Forces (RSF) spread death and destruction across the country, fuelling a humanitarian crisis, their battle is driven by the desire to preserve their vast economic empires and the systems that support them.

This report explores the intricate web of illicit networks, armed conflicts, and the devastating impact on Sudan’s socio-political landscape. It explores how predatory networks commoditize violence, exploit strategic industries, and manipulate state institutions for their gain. From the militarization of the economy to the instrumentalization of criminal markets, this investigation sheds light on the arc of state collapse and the urgent need for comprehensive peacebuilding strategies.

The paper is the first in a series focusing on Sudan, aiming to present an overview about the competition for control of Sudan’s security services, civilian bureaucracy and strategic industries. The following reports will explore the people, institutions, networks and transactions that have underpinned the enduring ecosystem of crime and corruption in Sudan that ultimately gave way to the current civil war.

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2024. 28p.

By The International Crisis Group Latin America and Caribbean

What’s new? The assassination in July of Haitian President Jovenel Moïse, perpetrated with no apparent resistance from his elite security detail, and a bout of natural disasters weeks later have further destabilised an already fragile Haiti and intensified its humanitarian crisis at a time of extreme insecurity. Why does it matter? Coming amid intersecting political, human rights, economic and humanitarian crises, Moïse’s killing and other recent events have exposed the chronic failings of state authorities and difficulties in ensuring that foreign support is deployed effectively. Growing insecurity is also driving instability and increased migrant flows within and outside the country. What should be done? Funnelling aid to vulnerable people hit by recent natural disasters, preferably through local civil society, is the imperative. International back ing for prosecuting high-level crimes, police reform and support for a broad-based representative and inclusive interim government stand a better chance than a rush to elections of helping restore stability.

Bogotá/New York/Brussels, The International Crisis Group, 30 September 2021 24p.

By United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC); Robert Muggah, et al.

KEY FINDINGS

• Increasingly sophisticated and high-calibre firearms and ammunition are being trafficked into Haiti amid an unprecedented and rapidly deteriorating security situation.

• Haiti remains a trans-shipment country for drugs, primarily cocaine and cannabis, which mostly enter the country via boat or plane, arriving through public, private and informal ports as well as clandestine runways.

• Haiti’s borders are essentially porous, and the challenges of patrolling 1,771 kilometres of coastline and a 392-kilometre land border with the Dominican Republic are overwhelming the capacities of Haiti’s national police, customs, border patrols and coast guard, who are severely under-staffed and under-resourced, a variety of sources with their attendant limitations, including unverified media reports, to take account of recent developments. It opens with a cursory overview of the criminal context in which firearms and drug trafficking are occurring. The second section considers the basic infrastructure that facilitates trafficking, especially seaports, roads and airstrips. Sections three and four examine patterns of trafficking of both firearms and drugs into and out of Haiti. The final section summarizes global, regional and national measures to address related challenges, alongside knowledge gaps warranting deeper investigation. Given the evolving circumstances, any attempt to document firearms and drug trafficking trends in Haiti will be fragmented and partial. Even so, certain tendencies and patterns can be discerned. Very generally, firearms and ammunition typically enter Haiti via land and sea, and drugs usually transit Haiti from seaports, airports and across poorly monitored border points. Most weapons are sourced in the US and make their way to gang members and private residents through intermediaries, often through public and private ports and porous checkpoints. Whether they are interdicted or not, most drugs passing through Haiti are produced in Colombia (cocaine) or Jamaica (cannabis) and shipped directly from source, or pass via Bahamas, Turks and Caicos, and Venezuela. From Haiti they are shipped onward to the Dominican Republic, Western Europe and, primarily, the US. and increasingly targeted by gangs.

• Heavily armed criminal gangs are targeting ports, highways, critical infrastructure, customs offices, police stations, court houses, prisons, businesses and neighbourhoods.

• Virtually every metric of insecurity, from homicide, sexual violence and kidnapping to the killing of police and migration out of the country – is trending upward.

• International, regional and national responses have underscored the importance of increasing support to law enforcement and border management. Comprehensive approaches encompassing investments in community policing, criminal justice reform and anti-corruption measures are crucial to delivering sustainable peace and stability in Haiti.

Haiti is in the grip of multiple, interlocking, and cascading crises. If unattended, there are serious risks of further destabilization from a myriad of increasingly powerful criminal armed groups. The risks of regional spill-over and contagion are widely acknowledged: The United Nations Security Council has repeatedly raised concerns about the country’s “protracted and deteriorating political, economic, security, human rights, humanitarian and food security crises” and “extremely high levels of gang violence and other criminal activities”. 1 A particular preoccupation relates to the contribution of illegal firearms and drug trafficking in fuelling Haiti’s deepening security dilemmas. This assessment provides an overview of the scope, scale and dynamics of firearms and drug trafficking in Haiti, including sources, routes, vectors and destinations. It is based on published and unpublished information and 45 interviews conducted by UNODC with representatives of the Haitian government, bilateral and multilateral agencies, subject matter experts, and Haitian civil society.2 The situation in the country is deteriorating rapidly, and this assessment has drawn upon

Vienna: UNODC, 2023. 47p.

By Insa Koch, Patrick Williams, and Lauren Wroe

Government policies relating to dealers in ‘county lines’ drugs trafficking cases have been welcomed as a departure from punitive approaches to drugs and ‘gang’ policing, in that those on the bottom rung of the drugs economy of heroin and crack cocaine are no longer treated as criminals but as potential victims and ‘modern slaves’ in need of protection. However, our research suggests not so much a radical break with previous modes of policing as that the term ‘county lines’ emerged as a logical extension of the government’s racist and classist language surrounding ‘gangs’, knife crime and youth violence. Policies implemented in the name of safeguarding the vulnerable also act as a gateway for criminalisation not just under drugs laws but also modern slavery legislation. The government’s discovery of, and responses to, ‘county lines’ hinge on a moral crisis in the making, which ultimately deepens the state’s pre-emptive and violent criminalisation of the ‘Black criminal other’ at a time of deep political crisis.

First published online November 15, 2023., Race & Class, 0(0). https://doi.org/10.1177/03063968231201325

By The U.K. Home Office

Purpose - This note provides country of origin information (COI) and analysis of COI for use by Home Office decision makers handling particular types of protection and human rights claims (as set out in the Introduction section). It is not intended to be an exhaustive survey of a particular subject or theme. It is split into 2 parts: (1) an assessment of COI and other evidence; and (2) COI. These are explained in more detail below. Assessment This section analyses the evidence relevant to this note - that is information in the COI section; refugee/human rights laws and policies; and applicable caselaw - by describing this and its inter-relationships, and provides an assessment of, in general, whether one or more of the following applies:

• A person is reasonably likely to face a real risk of persecution or serious harm

• That the general humanitarian situation is so severe that there are substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk of serious harm because conditions amount to inhuman or degrading treatment as within paragraphs 339C and 339CA(iii) of the Immigration Rules/Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)

• That the security situation is such that there are substantial grounds for believing there is a real risk of serious harm because there exists a serious and individual threat to a civilian’s life or person by reason of indiscriminate violence in a situation of international or internal armed conflict as within paragraphs 339C and 339CA(iv) of the Immigration Rules

• A person is able to obtain protection from the state (or quasi state bodies)

• A person is reasonably able to relocate within a country or territory

• A claim is likely to justify granting asylum, humanitarian protection or other form of leave, and

• If a claim is refused, it is likely or unlikely to be certifiable as ‘clearly unfounded’ under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. Decision makers must, however, still consider all claims on an individual basis, taking into account each case’s specific facts.

London: Assets Publishing Service, 2022. 84p.

By John Sunday Ojo, Samuel Oyewole & Folahanmi Aina

Nigeria has confronted several security conundrums in recent years, including armed banditry, which poses a severe threat to the north-west and the entire nation. North-west Nigeria has been hit by an unprecedented wave of kidnappings, maiming, killings, population displacements, cattle rustling, and disruption of socio-economic activities due to the rise of armed bandits in the region. These events have created a climate of uncertainty that has become a cause for concern for the government and the citizenry. Relying on secondary sources of data, this article examines the causes, manifestations, and dimensions of armed banditry in north-west Nigeria, and its security implications. It provides a survey of both the visible and less-visible actors in the conflict. The article argues that armed banditry in the north-west and other parts of Nigeria transcends pastoralist insurgency, as evident in the dominant narratives, considering the multiplicity of complexly connected causal factors, actors, manifestations, and dimensions that are present in the threats posed by this development. The article also shows the negative impacts of armed banditry on human and national security in the region.

Democracy and Security, Volume 19, 2023 - Issue 4