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Guns, Judges and Trump

Rebecca L. Brown, Lee Epstein, Mitu Gulati 

This Essay reports data on the impact of Bruen and its predecessor, Heller, on gun rights cases. Put mildly, the impact was substantial, not only in terms of the number of cases in the courts but also the partisanship displayed in the application of Bruen. And that partisanship increase was particularly large on the part of Trump-appointed judges. The Supreme Court has now decided Rahimi, its first opportunity to apply Bruen. While the Court's new decision blunted some of the sharpest concerns raised by Bruen, it did not eliminate the key concern, recommitting itself to a test that places considerable unguided discretion in judges, inviting partisan bias. The revolution that the Court wrought through Bruen and Heller may have only just begun.

Virginia Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper No. 2024-51

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Nuclear Terrorism: Assessment of U.S. Strategies to Prevent, Counter, and Respond to Weapons of Mass Destruction

By National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine


For nearly eight decades, the world has been navigating the dangers of the nuclear age. Despite Cold War tensions and the rise of global terrorism, nuclear weapons have not been used in conflict since Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. Efforts such as strategic deterrence, arms control and non-proliferation agreements, and the U.S.-led global counterterrorism have helped to keep nuclear incidents at bay. However, the nation's success to date in countering nuclear terrorism does not come with a guarantee, success often carries the risk that other challenges will siphon away attention and resources and can lead to the perception that the threat no longer exists.

This report found that U.S. efforts to counter nuclear or radiological terrorism are not keeping pace with the evolving threat landscape. The U.S. government should maintain a strategic focus and effort on combatting terrorism across the national security community in coordination with international partners, State, Local, Tribal and Territorial authorities, the National Laboratories, universities and colleges, and civil society. Developing and sustaining adequate nuclear incident response and recovery capabilities at the local and state levels will likely require significant new investments in resources and empowerment of local response from Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), working with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Environmental Protection Agency, Department of Energy, and National Institutes of Health.

Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. 2024. 158p.

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Firearm Storage Behaviors — Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System, Eight States, 2021–2022

By Norah W. Friar; Molly Merrill-Francis, Elizabeth M. Parker,  Carlos Siordia, Thomas R. Simon

Summary

What is already known about this topic?

Secure firearm storage is associated with lower risk for firearm injuries. Data on state and demographic variation in storage practices might help guide the development and implementation of prevention and evaluation efforts.

What is added by this report?

Among eight states with available data, 18.4%–50.6% of Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System respondents reported keeping a firearm in or around the home. Of respondents with a loaded firearm and a child or adolescent aged ≤17 years in the home, 25.2%–41.4% reported that a loaded firearm was kept unlocked.

What are the implications for public health practice?

State and demographic variation in storage practices highlights the importance of tailored prevention activities to reduce handling of guns by children and youths without adult supervision and other unauthorized persons.

Abstract

Secure firearm storage might help reduce access by children and other unauthorized users and the related risk for injury or death. Information about state-specific prevalence of firearm storage practices can be used to develop secure storage messages and programs; however, such information is often unavailable. Data from the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System, by respondent characteristics, were used to estimate prevalence of keeping firearms in or around the home and related storage practices for eight states that administered the firearm safety module in 2021 or 2022. Overall, 18.4% (California) to 50.6% (Alaska) of respondents reported that a firearm was kept in or around their home. Among those with a firearm in or around the home, 19.5% (Minnesota) to 43.8% (North Carolina) reported that a firearm was stored loaded. Across all eight states, approximately one half of those with a loaded firearm stored at least one loaded firearm unlocked. Among respondents with a child and a loaded firearm in the home, 25.2% (Ohio) to 41.4% (Alaska) reported that a loaded firearm was stored unlocked. Variability in firearm storage practices highlights the importance of local data and suggests opportunities to tailor prevention efforts to specific population groups to reduce risk for firearm handling by children without adult supervision, and other unauthorized persons.

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National Firearms Commerce and Trafficking Assessment (NFCTA): Firearms Trafficking Investigations - Volume Three

By The U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of 

The Justice Department today announced the publication of Firearm Trafficking Investigations, the third volume of the National Firearms Commerce and Trafficking Assessment (NFCTA), a four-part, comprehensive examination of commerce in firearms and the diversion of firearms to illegal markets. This Volume incorporates input from the most comprehensive national survey of the special agents who conduct Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) trafficking investigations to provide the first in-depth analysis of firearm trafficking investigations in more than two decades. This report examines 9,708 closed ATF firearm trafficking investigations initiated between CY 2017 and 2021. In April 2021, Attorney General Garland directed the ATF to undertake its first comprehensive study of criminal gun trafficking, the intentional movement of one or more firearms into the illegal market for a criminal purpose or possession.

“This report makes clear that black-market guns sold by unlicensed dealers without a background check are increasingly being found at crime scenes,” said Attorney General Merrick B. Garland. “Under the Bipartisan Safer Communities Act, the Justice Department has proposed a new rule to clarify when gun dealers must get licenses and conduct background checks. The Department is also vigorously enforcing the new provisions Congress passed in the Act to prohibit illegal gun trafficking and straw purchasing. This report reminds us of the urgency of our work, and I am grateful to the extraordinary professionals of the ATF who put their lives on the line to help keep our communities safe, and whose tireless work is responsible for the most comprehensive look at America’s crime gun data in over two decades.”

“Thanks to the hard work of ATF, we now have fresh data and cutting-edge insights on the key drivers of illegal firearms trafficking,” said Deputy Attorney General Lisa Monaco. “Among other trends, the report shows the high frequency of traffickers selling firearms without a license to evade federal law, and the widespread impact of straw purchasers concealing the true recipients of illegally diverted firearms. This report will help agents and prosecutors target investigations, prosecute offenders, and reduce gun violence.”

“This is the most comprehensive survey ever of ATF’s thousands of expert gun trafficking agents to learn about the cases they do,” said ATF Director Steven Dettelbach. “Americans need this data to understand this threat and to better address it.  One striking finding from the data is that individuals illegally engaged in the business of unlicensed firearms dealing are contributing more and more to the flow of firearms into the black market, where we know that felons, gang members, and other violent offenders often get their guns. I want to be crystal clear – illegal firearms trafficking is not a victimless crime. You can’t illegally help to arm violent people and not be responsible for the violence that follows. We fight this public safety battle every day at ATF, as the thousands of ATF cases analyzed in this volume demonstrate. I commend the men and women of ATF and our truly wonderful partners for producing this important study, and also for risking everything to pursue these cases every single day.”

One of the key data-points identified in the analysis is the increased use of intelligence to initiate trafficking investigations. The use of Crime Gun Intelligence Center (CGIC) referrals increased nearly 20% from 2017 to 2021, while the use of Confidential Informants to initiative cases dropped nine percent during that time. This data underscores the value of CGICs, which are law enforcement hubs that focus exclusively on investigating and preventing gun violence in local communities. They bring together, under one roof, the expertise of state and federal investigators, firearms evidence examiners, and intelligence analysts to rapidly collect, analyze, and share information and leads about guns used in violent crimes and to take action to disrupt and dismantle firearm trafficking. ATF operates and supports more than 60 CGICs nationwide.

Another key data point demonstrates the shift in the types of supply lines, or trafficking channels, used to move firearms out of lawful commerce into the illegal market over the past two decades. Investigations involving corrupt federal firearms licensees (FFLs) decreased over the study period with the most frequent channels identified now being illegal, unlicensed firearm dealing by private persons and straw purchasing, which is when someone buys a gun for someone who is prohibited.

The report also identified source-to-market type trends. For instance, 56% of the cases examined involved intrastate trafficking, while 32% involved interstate trafficking. Intrastate trafficking was most prevalent in all regions except the northeast, where interstate trafficking was most prevalent. This reinforces the findings from Volume II, which confirmed that although most — 72% nationally — traced crime guns are recovered in the same state in which they were acquired from an FFL, certain states and cities are targets for firearm traffickers. The cross-jurisdictional nature of this issue — guns purchased in one state and trafficked to another where they’re used in crime — is what led the Attorney General to launch five firearms trafficking strike forces in July 2021.

Additional key findings from the study period include:

         The three most frequently identified violations of federal law in the investigations analyzed during this study included: (1) dealing in firearms without a license, (2) providing false information to an FFL, which is associated with straw purchasing, and (3) possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.

         Firearms trafficked through unlicensed dealers were used in shootings in 368 cases.

         Trafficked firearms were used in homicides in 265 cases, attempted homicide in 222 cases, and aggravated assaults in 446 cases.

         Over half of the firearms trafficked were handguns (nearly 56%), with rifles following in second (nearly 19%).

         The average number of firearms trafficked per case was 16.

         In nearly 58% of the cases, five or fewer firearms were trafficked.

         The majority of traffickers who directly or indirectly facilitated the movement of firearms to illegal markets were white (53%), male (84%), and U.S. citizens (95%).

         The recipients or end users of the trafficked firearms tended to be previously convicted felons (60%) and young adults aged 25 to 34 (48%).

         The annual percentage of juvenile (17 and under) end-users increased almost 10% between 2017 and 2021.

In February 2023, the Department issued Volume II of the NFCTA, Crime Gun Intelligence and Analysis, which presents and analyzes data on crime guns (firearms used in crime) recovered between 2017 and 2021. The analysis reinforces the critical importance of ATF’s unique crime gun tracing authority and highlights the value of data from ATF’s National Integrated Ballistic Information Network (NIBIN) program.

In May 2022, the Department issued Volume I of the NFCTAFirearms in Commerce, which presents and analyzes data collected by ATF and other federal agencies related to the manufacture, exportation, and importation of firearms.

To produce the NFCTA, the ATF assembled a team of subject experts from ATF, as well as from academic and related fields. Although ATF issues a variety of public and law enforcement reports and bulletins regarding firearm commerce, trafficking, and related issues every year, it has not undertaken a joint academic study on the scale of the NFCTA in more than 20 years.

Washington, DC: 

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Narcotic Drugs: Estimated World Requirements for 2024

International Narcotics Control Board

Totals of estimates of annual medical and scientific requirements for narcotic drugs listed in Schedules I and II of the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, as amended by the 1972 Protocol Amending the Single Convention. These estimates have been confirmed by the International Narcotics Control Board and have henceforth legal value. The totals of the estimates enable parties to determine the maximum quantity of drugs that a State may acquire under the 1961 Convention through import and/or manufacture.

INCB, 2024. 500p.

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Community dialogue for safety and prosperity : An assessment

The communities of Hoekwil and Touwsranten on South Africa’s Garden Route have been engaged in an ongoing dialogue process to improve safety and increase the prosperity of all residents since August 2021. The dialogue brings residents together across class, race and nationality. This assessment reveals the achievements and challenges of the process.   

issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/uploads/pages/1715169127898-SAR-58.pdf

Institute for Security Studies, 2024.

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Systematic disparities in reporting on community firearm violence on local television news in Philadelphia, PA, USA

By Jessica H. Beard , Raha Raissian , Leah Roberts , Laura Partain , Jennifer Midberry , Tia Walker, et al.

Objective

To better understand how community firearm violence (CFV) is communicated to the public, we aimed to identify systematic differences between the characteristics of shooting victims and events covered on television news and all shootings in Philadelphia, PA, a city with escalating CFV incidence.

Methods

We compiled a stratified sample of local television news clips covering shootings that occurred in Philadelphia aired on two randomly selected days per month from January-June 2021 (n = 154 clips). We coded the clips to determine demographic and geographic information about the shooting victims and events and then matched coded shootings with corresponding shootings in the Philadelphia police database. We compared characteristics of shooting victims and shooting event locations depicted in television clips (n = 62) with overall characteristics of shootings in Philadelphia during the study period (n = 1082).

Results

Compared to all individuals shot, victims whose shootings were covered on local television news more likely to be children and more likely to be shot in a mass shooting. The average median household income of shooting locations featured on television was significantly higher than the median household income across all shooting locations ($60,302 for television shootings vs. $41,233 for all shootings; p = 0.002). Shootings featured on television occurred in areas with lower rates of income inequality and racialized economic segregation compared to all shooting locations.

Conclusions

Television news outlets in Philadelphia systematically over-reported shootings of children, mass shootings, and shootings that occurred in neighborhoods with higher median household income, less socioeconomic inequality, and lower rates of racialized economic segregation.

Preventive Medicine Reports

Volume 42, June 2024, 102739

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An inspection of Probation Service - Kent, Surrey and Sussex region

By HM Inspectorate of Probation

  This was the first regional inspection of probation services in Kent, Surrey and Sussex (KSS) since the commencement of the Inspectorate’s new probation inspection programme in October 2023. There were clear strengths in the region’s overall strategic arrangements, but the quality of work delivered to manage people on probation was insufficient in five out of six of our standards of casework, with particularly poor and concerning results in the quality of court reports and public protection. Statutory victim work was, by contrast, delivered to a high standard and the results were impressive. Overall, we have rated this region as ‘Requires improvement’. Staffing in the region was in a fragile position. Despite improvements made to staffing numbers as a result of proactive recruitment, significant gaps were still present with a 30 per cent vacancy rate for Probation Officers (POs). The national recruitment model has consistently failed to provide the region with its required number of allocated learners. National recruitment limitations and insufficient salaries to cope with the cost of living in the region were hampering the region’s ability to resource the service appropriately. Levels of experience in the region were limited, with 22 per cent of staff having joined the service within the past 12 months. Deficits were found with Professional Qualification in Probation (PQiP) training, and with the region not preparing learners adequately for their role post qualification. Like other areas of the region, court had resourcing issues, with a third of the target staffing not in place, and with a number of staff working remotely. Significant improvements in the quality of court work were required, with only 14 per cent of cases inspected being judged to be of sufficient standard, which has the potential to impact on the confidence of sentencers. Improvements were needed in the quality of work to assess and manage the risks that people on probation pose to the community. This was particularly poor in implementation and delivery, where only 22 per cent of cases we inspected were judged sufficient to effectively support the safety of other people. On the contrary, statutory victim work was very strong, rated ‘Outstanding’. It was particularly impressive that 100 per cent of victims whose cases were inspected were able to make relevant contributions prior to the release of perpetrators. Whilst the results on the ground were disappointing, we found that the leadership team were resilient, innovative and responsive to the challenges the region faced. This included implementation of additional roles to improve quality, and the targeted approach by unpaid work leaders to address enforcement issues. A consistent message around improving culture had been delivered well. Leaders had been persistent in addressing unacceptable behaviour appropriately and decisively. This challenging piece of work should be marked as a positive achievement for the region. KSS will be disappointed with the overall findings of this inspection, given the strengths in leadership and strong delivery in victim work. The current recruitment model is unlikely to address the issues it faces regarding resourcing, and a more localised and incentive-based approach is required. A number of achievements have been made by the region, but it does continue to face challenges going forward. If the staffing difficulties can be addressed and there is a focus on the quality of casework and embedding learning, the region can progress on a continued positive trajectory.  

  Manchester, UK: HM Inspectorate of Probation, May 2024. 31p.

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ShotSpotter™ in Durham, NC: A Community Sentiment Evaluation

By Pilar Kelly,  Angie Weis Gammell, Lindsay Bass-Patel

  In July 2023, the Wilson Center conducted nine focus groups and two individual interviews, with a total of 30 participants who live in the ShotSpotter pilot area in Durham, North Carolina. Participants were asked to discuss their perceptions of safety, gun violence, policing in their neighborhoods, ShotSpotter technology, and changes in policing or violence since the ShotSpotter pilot began. Participants had not observed any impact on gun crime since ShotSpotter was implemented, nor did they believe ShotSpotter could help to reduce gun crime. No resident identified any negative change in police activity or tactics since ShotSpotter was implemented. The participants who reported seeing changes in policing since ShotSpotter described those changes in a positive light. For participants who expressed opposition to having ShotSpotter in their neighborhoods, their opposition was rooted primarily in a lack of trust rather than direct experiences. This mistrust was directed toward City Council, ShotSpotter as a corporation, policing as an institution, and concerns about technology storing sensitive data. The majority of participants who spoke about the cost of ShotSpotter expressed negative views and suggested that the money would be better spent on other initiatives. Additionally, some residents felt unheard in the decision-making process to pilot ShotSpotter, which contributed to negative feelings about both the technology and City Council. Still, participants expressed hopes that ShotSpotter may lead to faster response times and more direct communication between residents and police, both of which they believe may work to enhance community members trust in police officers. Regarding whether ShotSpotter should continue in their community, two participants expressed strong support for continuing the ShotSpotter program, eight participants expressed strong opposition, and ten participants expressed conditional responses or uncertainty. For example, some participants would support the program if there were data that demonstrated ShotSpotter was impactful and effective.   

Durham, NC: Wilson Center for Science and Justice, at Duke Law School, 2024. 32p.

Evaluation of Durham’s ShotSpotter Installation: Results of a 12-Month Pilot Project

By Philip J. Cook and Adam Soliman

The City of Durham contracted with SoundThinking for a 12-month pilot program with ShotSpotter, a gunfire detection system. The system was installed in a three square-mile area of Durham that was selected based on having a relatively high rate of gun violence. The pilot operated from December 15, 2022 through December 14, 2023. This evaluation offers information on both the costs and the relevant impacts of the ShotSpotter pilot installation, but it does not offer a suggestion on whether the City should use ShotSpotter in the future. It is intended to inform the decision-makers, but not to advise them. Notifications and Deployments The ShotSpotter (SS) installation operated as a supplement to the 911 system, whereby residents are encouraged to contact the Durham Police Department (DPD) if they hear or witness a shooting. During the pilot period, DPD received 1,447 notifications of gunfire in the target area in which ShotSpotter was installed: 57% of these were SS alerts with no 911 call, 28% were 911 calls with no SS alert, and 15% had both 911 and SS notifications. Thus SS more than doubled the number of gunshot notifications compared with what DPD would have received (from 911) in its absence. DPD implemented a response protocol for the entire city on December 15, 2022 that any gunshot notification would be treated as a Priority 2 incident, requiring the immediate deployment of two patrol cars to the scene without sirens and flashers. In the target area, the effect of the “extra” SS alerts was to add an average of 2.3 Priority 2 deployments daily to the target area, approximately a 2% increase citywide. The SS installation was designed to detect gunfire that occurred outdoors, with a few exceptions (such as if the firearm was equipped with a silencer). For the 52 known gunshot incidents during the pilot period in which victims were wounded or killed, SS alerts were published for 26 and 911 calls received for 50 of these 52. Eight of the incidents (accounting for 14 gunshot victims) that were missed by SS were due to system failure or human error. In addition to these false negatives, there were likely some false positives, but we have no way to estimate how frequent. SS alerts include information on the time and precise location of the incident, and the number of shots fired. They were transmitted directly to DPD’s CAD system in each patrol car, almost always within 60 seconds. For incidents in which there is both a SS alert and a 911 call, the SS alert typically was first, and often provided a more precise location. Our analysis finds that in 2023, the median response time (from alert to arrival at the scene) was 5.5 minutes, which reflected a decline by 1.2 minutes in the target area compared with the rest of the city. There was a still greater improvement in the 90th percentile of response times, which declined by 3.6 minutes. In sum, SS had the effect of more than doubling the number of gunshot notifications received by DPD for the target area, and notably improving response times by patrol officers. 

Durham, NC: Wilson Center for Science and Justice, at Duke Law School, 2024. 39p.   

Purchaser, firearm, and retailer characteristics associated with crime gun recovery: a longitudinal analysis of firearms sold in California from 1996 to 2021

By Sonia L. RobinsonChristopher D. McCortColette SmirniotisGaren J. Wintemute & Hannah S. Laqueur 

Background

Firearm violence is a major cause of death and injury in the United States. Tracking the movement of firearms from legal purchase to use in crimes can help inform prevention of firearm injuries and deaths. The last state-wide studies analyzing crime gun recoveries used data from over 20 years ago; thus, an update is needed.

Methods

We used data for 5,247,348 handgun and 2,868,713 long gun transactions and law enforcement recoveries from California crime gun recovery (2010–2021) and California’s Dealer Records of Sales records. Covariates included characteristics of dealership sales, firearms and their transactions, and purchaser’s demographic characteristics, purchasing history, criminal history (from firearm purchaser criminal history records), and neighborhood socioeconomic status. Analyses for handguns and long guns was conducted separately. In multivariable analysis, we included correlates into a Cox proportional hazard model accounting for left truncation and clustering between the same firearm, purchaser, dealerships, and geographic location. Covariates that remained significant (P < 0.05) were retained. For handguns, we evaluated associations of violent and weapons crimes separately. In supplementary analyses, we examined interactions by purchasers’ race and ethnicity.

Results

In total, 38,441 handguns (0.80%) and 6,806 long guns (0.24%) were recovered in crimes. A firearm dealer’s sales volume, percent of transactions that were denials, pawns, pawn redemptions, and firearms that became crime guns were each positively associated with firearm recovery in crime. Handguns that were inexpensive, larger caliber, and that had been reported lost or stolen were positively associated with recovery in crimes. Purchaser characteristics associated with crime gun recovery included: being younger, female, Black, Hispanic, Native American or Pacific Islander, or other race/ethnicity (vs white), having previous arrests, living in close proximity to the firearm dealership, and living in a more socially vulnerable census tract. Associations with race and ethnicity were modified by previous infraction-only arrests.

Conclusions

This study confirms that many previously studied correlates of firearm recovery are still relevant today. We were able to expand on previous research by examining novel associations including purchasers’ criminal history and previous firearm transaction history. These results provide evidence that can be used to disrupt firearm use in crimes.

 Inj. Epidemiol. 11, 8 (2024). https://doi.org/10.1186/s40621-024-00491-8

Gun Victimization in the Line of Duty: Fatal and Non-Fatal Firearm Assaults on Police Officers in the United States, 2014-2019

By Michael Sierra-Arévaloa and Justin Nix 

After more than 50 years of social science research on policing in the United States, the danger of police work remains a salient feature of police officers’ occupational environment (Loftus, 2010; Marenin, 2016; Sierra-Arévalo, 2019). Scholarly attention to the danger of policing has been renewed by recent discussion of a “war on cops” that began after the 2014 police killing of Michael Brown in Ferguson, MO. Proponents of this hypothesized war posit that the contemporary political climate has resulted in widespread distrust and even disdain of police on the part of public officials, academics, and the news media; in turn, the public has become increasingly “anti-police” and emboldened to question, resist, and violently attack police officers on U.S. streets (Mac Donald, 2016). However, despite widespread concern among police administrators (Nix et al., 2018), empirical research on the most dire implication of a war on cops—violence against police—finds no significant increases in fatal or non-fatal violence against police in recent years (Maguire et al., 2017; Shjarback & Maguire, 2019). Nonetheless, the issue of violence against police remains highly salient to U.S. politics and policy, including the rise of the Blue Lives Matter movement and the growth in laws seeking enhanced penalties for killing police officers (Craven, 2017).  Despite the rich history of research on danger in police work, however, there are several long-standing limitations to this body of scholarship. First, researchers’ operationalization of “danger” tends toward the rarest, most extreme measure of danger in police work: felonious line of-duty deaths that are driven by firearm assaults (see White et al., 2019, p. 14). This focus on felonious deaths underestimates the total scope of the danger police confront by ignoring nonfatal violence against officers (c.f. Bierie, 2017; Bierie et al., 2016), including non-fatal firearm assaults that, even though they do not result in a line-of-duty death, represent cases of deadly force directed at police. Second, analyses that attend to all assaults on police officers better capture less-than-lethal violence (e.g. punches, kicks) but do not differentiate such cases from especially lethal threats like firearm assaults (Shjarback & Maguire, 2019; Tiesman et al., 2018; c.f. Bierie et al., 2016). Third, data sources that rely on voluntary reporting by police (e.g. LEOKA, NIBRS) are limited by a lack of consistent reporting by law enforcement agencies and marked lag times in the release of said data, frustrating timely, confident estimates of a pressing public safety and policy issue (Kuhns et al., 2016, p. 6; Nix et al., 2019, p. 6; Shjarback & Maguire, 2019). Because of its inattention to cases in which officers are shot but not killed, existing research tends to provide either an underestimate of gun violence directed at officers or eschew specificity in favor of an estimate of assault broadly defined. This, in combination with the data quality and timeliness issues that affect datasets commonly used to examine violence against police, prevents accurate estimates of total firearm assaults on officers that are of longstanding salience to the issue of officer safety in the United States (Cell, 2019; The President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, 1967, p. 239).  Given the decided gravity of the problem at hand, there is a clear and urgent need for researchers to bring new, more timely data to bear. This article addresses these issues with open-source data provided by the Gun Violence Archive (GVA), a non-profit organization that collects and constantly updates data on firearm assaults of police officers across the United States. Because GVA records both fatal and non-fatal firearm assaults on police, we are able to provide an estimate of firearm assaults on police officers that includes (and differentiates) fatal and non-fatal shootings.3 We use these data to provide national- and state-level estimates of fatal and non-fatal firearm assaults against police officers in the United States from 2014 to 2019. We conclude with consideration of future directions for this research as well as the promises and limitations of data like those collected by GVA in research on violence against and by police. We also provide concrete policy recommendations for improving the quality and timeliness of data on violence against police to better support police agencies, researchers, and policy makers.    

Criminology & Public Policy, Volume19, Issue3 Special Issue:CUTTING‐EDGE RESEARCH IN POLICE POLICY AND PRACTICE August 2020 Pages 1041-1066

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