By: Vladislav Chernavskikh

Recent advances in the capabilities of artificial intelligence (AI) have increased state interest in leveraging AI for military purposes. Military integration of advanced AI by nuclear-armed states has the potential to have an impact on elements of their nuclear deterrence architecture such as missile early-warning systems, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) and nuclear command, control and communications (NC3), as well as related conventional systems.

At the same time, a number of technological and logistical factors can potentially limit or slow the adoption of AI in the nuclear domain. Among these are unreliability of output, susceptibility to cyberattacks, lack of good-quality data, and inadequate hardware and an underdeveloped national industrial and technical base.

Given the current and relatively early stage of military adoption of advanced AI, the exploration of these factors lays the groundwork for further consideration of the likely realities of integration and of potential transparency measures and governance practices at the AI–nuclear nexus.

SIPRI Background Paper, September 2024

By: KELSEY DAVENPORT

From the document: "This report makes several assessments. [1] Structural factors in the existing array of organizations and treaty bodies focused on disarmament have prevented bold, creative action to advance the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. These factors include inadequate or overly broad membership, overreliance on consensus-based decision-making, and limited high-level political engagement. [...] [2] The NSS [nuclear security summit] process offers a model for creating a new series of disarmament summits designed to inject momentum into current efforts to reduce the risk posed by nuclear weapons and eliminate nuclear arsenals. Certain characteristics of the NSS process contributed to its success. [...] [3] A nuclear disarmament summit process modeled off the NSS process could provide a forum better suited to address new challenges that the existing forums have struggled to tackle in the current geopolitical environment. Like the NSS process, states would be encouraged to make national commitments ('house gifts') and work in partnership to make multinational commitments ('gift baskets') that exceed least-common denominator, consensus-based decision-making. Reporting within the summit process could drive accountability, and high-level political participation could create pressure for leaders to make ambitious but achievable commitments that advance disarmament. This report also argues how a high-level disarmament summit process would complement, not replace, existing initiatives and treaties that form the disarmament architecture."

Sep 2024 ARMS CONTROL ASSOCIATION (WASHINGTON, D.C.)

Nuclear Threat Initiative

From the document: "NTI [Nuclear Threat Initiative] convened a dialogue among nongovernmental U.S. and Russian cyber/information security and nuclear weapons policy experts. Following initial conversations in Moscow in 2019 about the findings from NTI's Cyber-Nuclear Weapons Study Group, the Track II dialogue was established and proceeded virtually in plenary and small-group sessions in 2020 and 2021. The participants are listed in Appendix 1. Expert participants built on a shared understanding that nuclear weapons systems must be protected from cyber threats, as well as other threats involving information and communications technologies (ICT), and that despite the current geopolitical environment, the unique U.S.-Russian nuclear relationship requires bilateral cooperation to maintain stability. They addressed topics including possible crisis scenarios and escalation pathways, opportunities for building confidence and predictability in the relationship, and bilateral cyber-nuclear norms that could mitigate the risks. The group generated ideas for joint and parallel actions to reduce cyber-nuclear weapons risks for both governments to consider and adopt. The following recommendations are designed to help avoid or mitigate the risks of a cyberattack prompting a nuclear crisis. The recommendations in this paper offer policymakers in Russia and the United States--and in other countries--options for reducing the risks of a cyber or information security attack that could lead to nuclear war." This record contains a Russian version following the English publication.

Nuclear Threat Initiative . 2023. 40p.