By the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights

Crime victimization has wide-reaching consequences for victims, their families and friends, their communities, and society in general. The rate of violent crime victimization has decreased dramatically since its peak in the early 1990s,1 providing the most relief to residents of disadvantaged neighborhoods who are most likely to experience violent crime.2 However, the nation recently experienced an increase in serious forms of violence. In 2020, homicide rates were 30 percent higher than the previous year.3 In the same period, aggravated assaults, including nonfatal shootings, also increased.4 While violent victimization rates started to decrease again after the first two years of the COVID-19 pandemic,5 violence remains a pressing concern for Americans.6 This trend merits closer investigation given that it follows decades of sustained progress and disproportionately affects underserved communities.7 To gain an understanding of federal efforts to evaluate racial disparities in crime victimization, the Commission voted on July 21, 2023, to examine the U.S. Department of Justice’s data collection on violent crime victimization and what that data show about disparate impacts of violent victimization on minority communities. This report uses social science methodologies to synthesize reliable research and present quantitative evidence from federal sources about racial and ethnic disparities in violent crime victimization from 2017-2021. Because crime concentrates in small geographic areas,8 the Commission also selected five jurisdictions to conduct a more in depth analysis of trends and racial disparities in violent crime victimization over the study period. In addition to relying on publicly available studies and data, the Commission held a public briefing on November 17, 2023, to receive written and oral testimony from academic and policy experts, former and current government officials, members of community advocacy groups, and violent  crime victims (see Appendix B). The Commission also sent formal requests for information to the U.S. Department of Justice. When considering all forms of violent crime, aggregated at the national level, there are no differences in the risk of victimization for White, Black, and Latino people.9 There are, however, enduring racial differences in homicide rates. Black Americans have long been the group most likely to be killed by homicide.10 Black Americans are 12 times as likely as White Americans to die by firearm homicide.11 The risk of homicide is highest for young, Black men. According to the Center for Disease Control and Prevention, homicide is the leading cause of death for Black males ages 1-44.12 Racial disparities in homicide are especially pronounced in large, metropolitan areas, where violent crime rates are the highest.13 The concentration of crime in large cities is a consistent pattern in crime trends over time.14 Within cities, violent crime concentrates in certain neighborhoods, street segments, or blocks.15 Ruth Abaya, Pediatric Emergency Medicine Physician and Senior Director for the Health Alliance for Violence Intervention, explains, “In many places throughout the country, community violence is concentrated, it’s cyclical, and it’s networked, creating cycles of harm and trauma that often impact multiple generations.”16 Hyperlocal crime concentration is not a new phenomenon. In their foundational study about the relationship between crime and place, influential U.S. criminologists Clifford R. Shaw and Henry D. McKay show that crime rates remain stable in neighborhoods over time even as the demographic composition of residents change.17 They argue that structural conditions, such as physical deterioration and high population turnover, create the conditions for crime.18 This finding is critical for framing racial disparities in crime victimization because it shows that the structure of high-crime neighborhoods, not factors related to the race of their residents, allows crime to flourish. Crime concentration in certain areas became associated with race because contemporary disadvantaged neighborhoods are predominately Black or Latino.19 Outdated government policies that created intentional residential racial segregation have had long-lasting consequences for where Americans still live.20 Ongoing racial segregation is associated with violent crime as the most segregated neighborhoods have elevated levels of violent crime.21 Data show that violence in these racially segregated and socioeconomically disadvantaged neighborhoods drives racial disparities in one serious type of violent crime: homicide.22 During the COVID-19 pandemic, as the overall crime rate fell,23 murder rates rose because of an increase in gun homicides in disadvantaged neighborhoods.24 A recent study demonstrates that the risk of firearm-related death or injury is more acute for young Black and Latino men who live in certain zip codes than for U.S. soldiers who were deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan.25 Enduring racist narratives of crime26 dismiss this violence as “Black-on-Black” without acknowledging that most crimes occur within racial groups (intra-racial).27 Elliot Currie, professor of Criminology, Law and Society at the University of California Irvine, argues that America’s “peculiar indifference” to high rates of murder among young Black men “is not only socially destructive and economically wasteful but a profound moral default.”28 Homicides comprise a small share of all violent crimes; there are no racial disparities in the overall rate of violent crime victimization.29 There are, however, other social and demographic correlates of victimization. One strong predictor of being a victim of a violent crime is having previously been a victim of crime.30 Data suggest that victims of violent crime are four times as likely to experience repeat victimization.31 Additionally, both income and age predict victimization. People living in households that earn the lowest incomes (i.e., less than $25,000), are more likely to be victimized than their higher income counterparts.32 Adolescents and young adults are also disproportionately likely to be victims of violent crime, regardless of geography.33 The relationship between age and being involved in crime, as both an offender and a victim, is one of the most enduring patterns in crime.34 There are no overall gender disparities in violent victimization.35 There are, however, gender disparities in experiencing certain kinds of violence. Men are more likely than women to be homicide victims.36 When women are murdered, however, they are five times more likely than men to be killed by an intimate partner.37 Regardless of the severity of the crime, most victims of violent crime know the offender.38 Data show that an individual who commits a violent offense is statistically at a higher risk of becoming a victim of a later violent crime.39 Violent crime victims are also more likely than others to engage in violence.40 Too often, however, this victim-offender overlap is ignored41 because it complicates the false narrative of the “good victim/bad offender” dichotomy.42 This dichotomy is problematic because it risks disregarding past experiences of victimization and trauma for people who have engaged in violence.43 Studies also show that it is highly unlikely that these victims seek or receive any victim services.44 For instance, one study shows that only 16 percent of crime victims who had been involved in the justice system as offenders report accessing programs such as victim compensation, victim advocate services from the police or district attorney, or help with legal proceedings.45 The researchers argue that so few victims accessing services is a “potential harm to the short- and long-term health of offender-victims, and harm to the overall well-being of urban, minority communities.”46 The effects of violent crime extend beyond immediate physical pain and injury. There are long term physical health correlates of violent victimization, including conditions such as heart disease,47 cancer,48 high blood pressure,49 and premature mortality.50 Violent crimes also have emotional and psychological consequences for those who are injured, which can include suffering from post-traumatic stress and other manifestations of trauma that negatively impact the victim’s quality of life.51 The effects of violent crime can also extend beyond the victims to adversely affect  family members and entire communities.52 Access to justice and rehabilitative services offers a vital opportunity to break the cycle of violence in communities. A major impediment to exploring crime victimization rates is that many crimes, even violent crimes, are not known to law enforcement; therefore, official numbers collected by the FBI may underreport the prevalence of the issue.53 For instance, in 2020, less than half (40 percent) of violent victimizations were reported to police.54 Victims may choose not to report a crime to the police for a multitude of reasons, such as fear of reprisal or stigmatization, believing the police would not or could not do anything to help, or believing the crime was too personal to report.55 Not reporting a crime has serious implications beyond public safety; data show that victims are more likely to receive services and access resources if they report an incident to law enforcement.56 Compensation and assistance programs are available to crime victims, but long standing research shows that these programs are underutilized, mostly because victims are not aware of the programs and services available to them.57 For instance, 2016 data from the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) show that about 13 percent of violent crime survivors reported using victim services. For those who did not report the offense to police, only 5 percent reported utilizing services.58 More recent data show that the vast majority of violent crime victims continue not to receive assistance from victim service agencies; in 2021 just 9 percent of victims received services.59   (Continued) 

Washington, DC: USSC, 2024. 

By Storm Ervin, Erica Henderson

The Urban Institute received funding from the George Kaiser Family Foundation to conduct an 11-month mixed-methods assessment of adult domestic violence (DV) in Tulsa, Oklahoma. * The purpose of Urban’s study was to understand major programs, policies, services, and funding sources geared toward preventing and responding to adult DV survivors and recommend ways Tulsa could improve its response to domestic violence. The first part of the mixed-method assessment focused primarily on the largest service provider in Tulsa, Domestic Violence Intervention Services, Inc. (DVIS). The second part of the assessment focused on qualitative data collection with criminal legal and human services agencies and stakeholders to provide insight into the larger domestic violence landscape in Tulsa. Based on the assessment findings, we identified seven overarching recommendations for how Tulsa could improve its response to domestic violence. Overarching Findings Tulsa’s largest DV service provider, DVIS, and Tulsa’s family justice center, the Family Safety Center (FSC), offer a multitude of evidence-based practices for adult and child survivors. In addition, DVIS is successful in reaching and serving people with low educational attainment and unemployment, which are major risk factors for experiencing DV. Law enforcement has implemented evidenced-based screening tools—such as the Lethality Assessment Program and the Danger Assessment for Law Enforcement—to screen for lethality and strangulation among victims at the scene of DV incidents. Further, organizations engage in several interagency efforts to respond to DV through Tulsa’s Rapid Intervention Team, the FSC, Tulsa’s response to strangulation, and the Integrated DV Court. Finally, not without some challenges, federal and philanthropic funding sources have demonstrated commitment to supporting Tulsa’s response to DV. Our assessment also yielded notable areas for improvement. For example, Black and Indigenous survivors are vastly underserved by DVIS, though they are most likely to experience intimate partner homicide (Oklahoma Domestic Violence Fatality Review Board 2021). In addition, Tulsa has few programs aimed at intervening on behalf of children who experience or are at risk of DV. For both adults and children, stakeholders reported few programs for preventing DV. Moreover, stakeholders reported policy and practice constraints as negatively impacting survivors and intervention in DV. For example, failure-to-protect legislation was described as a method for criminalizing survivors. Stakeholders also reported that Battering Intervention Programs (BIPs) involve burdensome amounts of money and time for those who are mandated to participate. Moreover, policy constraints limit stakeholders’ ability to provide wraparound services to people who cause harm. Another notable challenge is the McGirt Decision, which established that state courts no longer have the authority to prosecute crimes committed by or against Oklahomans who are also tribal members, and in turn, complicated Tulsa’s ability to respond to people who cause harm and also belong to Indigenous communities. Other challenges include those related to specific agencies, such as law enforcement’s faithful administration of the Lethality Assessment Program (LAP) screens, the role that the Oklahoma Department of Human Services plays in separating children listed in protective orders, and service providers’ limited ability to provide more evidence-based services. Other notable challenges are agencies’ limited capacity and staff and a lack of sustainable funding sources.    

Washington, DC: The Urban Institute, 2023. 110p.

By Nicole Renehan and David Gadd 

As the Probation Service moves towards a ‘new generation’ of programmes for domestic abuse perpetrators, it is important not to forget the lessons of the past. It is more than two decades since the inception of the Duluth Domestic Violence Pathfinder, the first probation-led programme for domestic abuse perpetrators in England and Wales. Despite the lack of an outcome evaluation, and a report critical about the early stages of its implementation (Bilby and Hatcher, 2004), the Integrated Domestic Abuse Programme, and an alternative Community Domestic Violence Programme, were rolled across all probation areas by 2005. The evidence in terms of what worked for domestic abuse offenders remained elusive nonetheless, with only one post-hoc evaluation more than ten years later suggesting marginally better outcomes for abusive men who at least start a programme (Bloomfield and Dixon, 2015). Both programmes were disbanded in favour of Building Better Relationships (BBR), currently the only accredited programme in probation for domestic abuse perpetrators, now about to be retired with a very limited evidence base against which to judge its effectiveness. As BBR is replaced with Building Choices, we must learn whatever lessons we can about how to intervene safely and effectively with perpetrators of domestic abuse. We do, however, know that the BBR era will not leave the intervention landscape unblemished. Two ethnographic studies, two inspections, and an evaluation feasibility study all raised substantive concerns regarding the quality of its implementation, unsustainable waiting lists, a less-than-impressed probation client group about the service received, and a stressed and overstretched workforce (Renehan and Gadd, 2024; Hughes, 2024; Teasdale et al., 2023; HM Inspectorate of Probation, 2023; 2018). The most critical lesson of Duluth – that effective work with men who abuse cannot be secured without adequately supporting their partners – has not always been heeded. It will need to be if Building Choices, a more generalised strengths-based programme, is to enhance the safety of adult survivors and their children at risk of repeat victimisation and to protect any new partners that men – who have been domestically abusive – form relationships with. Both the Home Office and the VCSE sector have agreed clear standards in terms of working with domestic abuse perpetrators (Home Office, 2023; Respect 2022). These include centralising victim safety; multi-agency working; timely, accessible and gender-informed interventions; and suitably skilled and supported intervention practitioners who can foster motivation for change. Fostering motivation, of course, relies upon the quality of the relationship between practitioner and client, something that can be hard to achieve for practitioners with high caseloads. The working alliance, therefore, should not be subordinated in any intervention, generalised or otherwise. There is scope for this within the Building Choices model, though it still requires considerable elaboration. Three elements provide the scaffolding of a preliminary, optional module ‘for those that need it’: • establishing a sense of safety • building working relationships • stimulating curiosity in change In this Academic Insights paper, we argue that these three elements should form the bedrock of – and be embedded throughout – any safe and effective intervention.  We explain some of the challenges that must be surmounted if the Probation Service is to achieve this.    

Academic Insights 2024/05 Manchester, UK:  HM Inspectorate of Probation, 2024. 14p.

By Jessica Reichert,  Sharyn Adams, H. Douglas Otto,  Julia Sanchez 

 East St. Louis, Illinois has experienced high rates of violent crime including homicide. In 2019, the city’s homicide rate was 137 per 100,000 residents, which was considerably higher than the state rate and the Chicago rate (Federal Bureau of Investigation [FBI], 2019). Victims of violent crime may have many service needs, such as behavioral health counseling, medical care, legal services, housing, and financial assistance (Aeffect, Inc., 2017). Many crime victims come to the attention of police, so a program was developed in East St. Louis to refer victims to services they need. The East St. Louis Community Engagement Response Team (ESL-CERT) was created to refer victims of crime to necessary services using a law enforcement task force (composed of dedicated Illinois State Police officers) working on violent crime cases in East St. Louis. The program is considered a “deflection” program in which law enforcement and other first responders (or co-responders) connect individuals to treatment and/or other social services thereby deflecting them from emergency services, crisis interventions, and justice involvement (Firesheets et al., 2022; Kelly et al., 2022; Lindquist-Grantz et al., 2021). The program assists crime victims, so there is no threat of potential arrest charges. This evaluation examined the ESL-CERT’s action planning process. Local stakeholders met virtually for 21 hours over seven days to develop the program’s Solution Action Plan (SAP). Action planning is a way to increase community engagement, develop clear and concise program goals, and create strategies to effectively achieve those goals (Creatly, 2021). The action planning work culminated in an action plan with objectives, strategies, and steps needed to aid in program implementation. Methodology To avoid the risk of spreading COVID-19 in 2021, the action planning process was held virtually via Zoom for three-hours per day for seven days. Representatives of several local community agencies and groups participated; 30 participated in at least one session from 23 organizations and 14 organization types. There were 30 community representatives, with attendance ranging from 12 to 19 participants per session. In addition to local participants, 26 representatives from outside of the community [Illinois Department of Human Services (IDHS), Treatment Alternatives for Safe Communities (TASC), Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority (ICJIA), and Police, Treatment, and Community Collaborative (PTACC) and subject matter experts] attended at least one session each. ICJIA researchers also provided a local crime victim data presentation on day 6. To evaluate the action planning procedure, the ICJIA research team examined a variety of data sources, including field observations, supporting documents, and participant surveys. The secretary of the ICJIA Institutional Review Board approved the proposed research as a program evaluation. Three researchers completed 21 hours of field observations of the action planning process from June 30, 2021, to August 8, 2021. All action planning sessions were conducted and recorded virtually through Zoom Video Conferencing. A total of 30 community members participated in at least one of the seven sessions. After each session, we administered a survey to action planning participants using the Zoom poll feature. The survey included questions about the action planning process, collaboration with other participants, and their intentions of post-action planning with responses on a 4-point Likert scale. Respondents totaled between seven and 20 respondents per day. Finally, we administered a second online survey using Qualtrics software. The survey included questions about participants (e.g., demographics information) and one open-ended question requesting their thoughts on the action planning process. A total of 13 participants responded. Data Analysis We analyzed field notes and supportive documents. We summarized what transpired sequentially for each of the seven days of action planning as the group built on the previous day’s work in each session. The Zoom platform poll data was exported in Excel for data analysis and the online survey was exported from Qualtrics to Excel for data analysis. We analyzed the poll and online survey data to generate descriptive statistics. Study Limitations We encountered some limitations while conducting this evaluation. First, we could only draw from what was said during the sessions. Participants’ internal thoughts and feelings could only be collected through brief, close-ended poll questions. Second, the participants changed each day because many could not attend all seven sessions leading to varying levels of participation in the action planning and polls. Third, while a number of reminders were sent to the group, only 13 participants responded to the online survey to gather participant demographics. Fourth, COVID 19 precipitated the need for virtual action planning, which had its challenges. For example, because of the large number of participants on the virtual platform, it was difficult to discern who was speaking. Finally, as Chicago-based researchers, we were relative outsiders. Without living or working in their community, it was difficult for us to ascertain group dynamics or potential interpersonal issues and understand historical and community context. Key Findings We noted a number of key findings on action planning participants, engagement, and discussions, as well as participant feedback on the action planning process. The survey, taken by 13 action planning participants, revealed most were female, White, non-Latinx, earned master’s degrees and incomes over $90,000, had over 20 years of experience in various fields such as social services and criminal justice, and were an average age of 52. A poll taken by seven participants on the last day showed five worked in East St. Louis and lived in a city outside of East St. Louis. The group members engaged in discussions to develop the violent crime victim program. Action planning discussions covered many areas, including: • Program purpose, capacity, eligibility, and name. • Community issues, partners, and awareness. • Outcome measures and strategies. • Training needs and topics. • Service provision. • Data and evaluation. During our observations of action planning, we noted that at times, likely exacerbated by the virtual format, it was a challenge to engage some action planning group members. In addition, some participants were initially confused about the action planning process and the program model. Finally, some participants had difficulty formulating measurable objectives. Overall, based on our surveys, participants were pleased with, and supportive, of the action planning process and the program. All participants reported the planned program would help victims of crime somewhat to a great extent. Also all indicated they would be likely or very likely to take an active role in implementation and that the program would be somewhat to very sustainable. However, three of seven participants noted the program had weak community engagement during the action planning process. Ultimately, the discussions culminated in an action plan document—the Solutions Action Plan— with objectives and action steps for the next phase of the program: implementation. The action plan contained four outcomes, 11 strategies, and 21 action steps. Recommendations Based on the evaluation findings, we offered recommendations for action planning. Suggestions to enhance participant understanding and encourage individual engagement on a virtual platform included providing data and background information, personalized invitations, regular introductions, a designated feedback loop, and the use of poll questions to aid in discussion. Another recommendation is to engage a more diverse pool of participants (e.g., East St. Louis residents and younger participants) and limit the number of outsiders participating in action planning. Finally, we recommend setting program goals and using a logic model to ensure all objectives are measurable. Conclusion - Overall, the action planning process resulted in a plan to implement a new deflection program to assist victims of violent crime in East St. Louis. The action plan document contained four objectives, 11 strategies, and 21 action steps. The next steps for the program after action planning, was implementation of the program in which the group would work on completing their action steps. Ultimately, this program supports goals of the Illinois Statewide Violence Prevention Plan including collaborations, pro-social programming, and comprehensive case management and clinical support for victims (Garthe et al., 2021).   

Chicago:  Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority, 2023. 75p.  

By Goodman-Williams, Rachael; Volz, Jessica; Smith, Samantha

Introduction: Forensic nurses routinely provide services to sexual assault victims who are uncertain about reporting their assault to police. The purpose of this study was to determine whether assault characteristics are related to the concerns about police reporting expressed by sexual assault victims who have forensic evidence collected but do not report their assault to police at that time. Methods:We Analyzed Medical records of patients who received services at a hospital-based forensic nursing program between 2010 and 2021. Records were included if a sexual assault evidence kit was collected, the patient declined to report the assault to police, and the patient completed a nonreport sexual assault evidence kit supple ment form that included a question asking why they chose not to report the assault (N = 296). We qualitatively analyzed patients' reasons for not reporting the assault and then used two-variable case-ordered matrices and chi-square analyses to explore relationships between reasons for not reporting and assault characteristics. Results: Identified reasons for not reporting included lacking information about the assault, fear of harm/retaliation, andself-blame/minimization. Physicalforce,drug/alcohol consumption,andvictim–offender relationships were related to patients referencing lacking information and fearing harm/retaliation as reasons for not reporting, but not related to the frequency of patients referencing self-blame/minimization. Implications: Results indicate that assault characteristics are related to reasons for not reporting at the time of the medical forensic examination. Being aware of these

  Journal of Forensic Nursing 20(3):p 151-159, 7/9 2024. 

By Pia Hüsch, Gareth Mott and Jamie MacColl, with Jason R C Nurse, James Sullivan, Sarah Turner and Nandita Pattnaik

More individuals and organisations in the UK and globally are becoming victims of ransomware. However, little is known about their experiences. This paper sheds light on the victim experience and identifies several key factors that typically shape such experiences. These factors are context-specific and can either improve or worsen the victim experience. They include the following: • Timing of an incident, which may happen after a victim has increased their cyber security measures or at an already stressful time for an organisation, such as the beginning of a school year. • Level of preparation in the form of strong cyber security measures and contingency plans explicitly tailored to respond to a cyber incident. • Human factors, such as the workplace environment and pre-existing dynamics which are often reinforced during an incident. Good levels of unity can bring staff together during a moment of crisis, but a lack of leadership or a blame culture are likely to aggravate the harm experienced during the incident. • Engagement with third-party service providers, such as those providing technical incident response or legal services, can alleviate the negative aspects of the victim experience by providing critical legal, technical or other help. However, they may aggravate the harm by providing poor services or losing valuable time in responding to the incident. • A successful communications campaign is highly context and victim specific. It must include external and internal communications with staff members not part of the immediate response to ensure a good workplace culture. For support, many victims turn to public sector institutions such as law enforcement. Expectations for technical support and expertise from law enforcement are generally low, but victims feel especially unsupported where phone calls are not returned and there is no engagement or feedback loop. The National Cyber Security Centre enjoys a better reputation. However, there is widespread uncertainty about its role and the thresholds that must be met for it to provide support. This poses a reputational risk. Understanding how ransomware attacks are personally felt by victims and what factors aggravate or alleviaBy te the harm they experience is key for policyma  

London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies RUSI, 2024. 70p. 

By Freya Rock

A Victim Personal Statement (VPS) is submitted by the victim of a crime to the sentencing court to document the physical, emotional, financial, or other impact of the crime. Victim impact statements have become a key element of the sentencing process, although concerns remain about a number of implementation challenges. • The VPS scheme was introduced in England and Wales in 2001 following a commitment in the Victims’ Charter of 1996. The right to submit a VPS is contained in the Victims’ Code. In contrast to other jurisdictions, the right is not currently based in statute. This is set to change with the coming into force of the Victims and Prisoners Bill that is currently passing through Parliament. • Research, including the Victims’ Commissioner’s (2015) study of the VPS scheme in England and Wales, suggests that victim impact statements may improve the proportionality of sentencing outcomes because judges find them helpful in determining the nature and extent of the harm caused. A more accurate calibration of the seriousness of the crime should lead to a more proportionate sentence. • Recent empirical data on the use of VPS are very limited. This restricts the conclusions which may reasonably be drawn about the benefits and burdens/disadvantages of victim impact statements. No data on the volume of victim statements are currently collected by either the Government or the Ministry of Justice, and questions about the VPS have not featured consistently on the Office for National Statistics’ National Crime Survey. • Roberts and Pina-Sanchez’s analyses of Crime Survey for England and Wales (CSEW) data found that across the most recent administrations of the CSEW only 13% recalled receiving an offer. Of the victims who recalled being offered the opportunity to submit a statement, about half (53%) stated they had submitted one. Those who reported having submitted a VPS were asked whether in their opinion the VPS ‘was taken into account by the CJS’. Approximately one-third responded ‘yes, completely’, 30% chose ‘yes, to some extent’ and 34% responded ‘no’. • VPS research should document the reasons behind the low notification and uptake rates. Police officers’ understanding of, and attitudes towards, the VPS should be explored further to ascertain what needs to be done to ensure that the opportunity to submit a VPS is offered to all victims. • Research should explore how Victim Personal Statements are used by sentencers in England and Wales, particularly magistrates. Little is currently known beyond the Victims’ Commissioner’s (2015) finding that sentencers in England and Wales find the statements useful because they help to determine the nature and extent of the harm. • Another priority for future VPS research should be to undertake in-depth qualitative exploration of the reasons why victims in England and Wales choose to submit a VPS and their experiences of doing so. This would involve interviews with victims who have submitted a VPS, ideally before and after the sentencing hearing, to understand their hopes and expectations. • Researchers should also explore the impact the VPS has on the offender. Research has suggested that offenders may appreciate the full consequences of their criminal acts when the victim describes the impact of the crime. Hearing from the person most directly affected may be more meaningful than listening to a prosecutor’s description of the crime.

The Sentencing Academy. 2024, 18pg