By The Mixed Migration Centre

Drawing on more than 1,000 surveys with refugees and migrants, this infographic examines their perceptions of dangerous locations, direct experiences of abuse and harsh conditions and their interactions with and perceptions of smugglers. Additionally, it explores the sources of information that refugees and migrants relied on before and during their journey, as well as their access to assistance.

London/Denmark: Mixed Migration Centre, 2024. 6p.

By Nick Drydakis

This study investigates the relationship between social vulnerability, illegal activities, and location-based business disruptions in Athens, the capital of Greece. The research utilizes repeated cross-sectional data from 2008, 2014, and 2023, gathered from areas with high levels of criminal activity, reflecting the experiences of business owners and managers in these locations. The findings reveal that heightened levels of social vulnerability—including the presence of illicit drug users and homeless individuals—alongside illegal activities such as gang-related protection rackets and black-market operations, are associated with increased location-based business disruptions. These disruptions manifest in assaults on employees and customers, business burglaries, reputational damage, supply chain problems, and decreased turnover. The study also examines the impact of economic conditions in 2014 and 2023, when Greece's Gross Domestic Product was lower than in 2008, indicating an economic recession. The findings suggest that the economic downturn during these years further exacerbated location-based business disruptions. Conversely, enhanced public safety measures, such as increased police presence, law enforcement, and improved public infrastructure, were associated with a reduction in these disruptions. Furthermore, an interesting insight was that businesses with longer operating histories tend to experience fewer location-based disruptions, indicating that operating history might be perceived as a resilience factor. The study suggests that policy actions should focus on increasing police visibility, providing financial support to high-risk businesses, funding urban regeneration projects, maintaining public infrastructure, and delivering social services aimed at helping marginalized communities escape vulnerability.

 Bonn:  IZA – Institute of Labor Economic, 2024. 46p.

By Gallup

 The world is contending with an unsettling reality: Violence continues to permeate our societies, threatening lives and undermining the foundations of safety and security that are crucial to sustainable development. Globally, 5% of people report being victims of violent crime in the past two years — a figure that, while seemingly small, represents millions of disrupted lives, shattered families, and communities gripped by fear. Exacerbating the global crisis of violence is the growing threat posed by state conflicts. According to the Global Peace Index, there are currently 56 active conflicts worldwide — the highest number since World War II. Even the leaders tasked with ensuring our safety are not immune; since 2022, attempts and successful assassinations of current and former heads of state have occurred in countries ranging from the U.S., Pakistan and Slovenia to Argentina and Japan. As the world grapples with these escalating threats, another peril looms: the rise of fear. Yet, measuring fear is complex. Traditional metrics, such as crime rates and conflict reports, provide essential data on physical security — but fail to capture how safe people feel, which profoundly impacts how they live. Our research consistently shows that when people feel safe, they are free to thrive — experiencing greater economic stability, contributing positively to their communities, and living longer, healthier lives. To build truly flourishing societies, we must address both physical safety and the critical need for people to feel safe. Recognizing the importance of this two-pronged approach, world leaders have integrated “subjective safety” into their development agendas. The United Nations Sustainable Development Goal 16 includes “feel[ing] safe walking alone at night” as an indicator (16.1.4). Gallup annually tracks this indicator worldwide, and we highlight its findings in our 2024 Global Safety Report. This year’s report offers encouraging insights: Global perceptions of safety and confidence in police have risen compared with a decade ago, largely due to increasing confidence in local law enforcement. Regardless of a country’s wealth, confidence in local police is one of the strongest predictors of people feeling safe. There are also remarkable examples of national progress. El Salvador, once notorious as the murder capital of the world, ranked second to last out of 134 countries for safety in 2016. Today, it has climbed to a tie for 8th out of 140 countries. Yet, challenges remain, particularly in addressing the safety perception gap between men and women, as men are over 20% more likely than women to say they feel safe in their communities. Ensuring everyone, regardless of where they live, can feel safe and secure in their daily lives is not just a moral imperative; it is the first step to sustainable growth and prosperous societies. The data in the following report show where the world stands on that vital first step — but it also reminds us that much work remains to be done  

Washington, DC: Gallup, 2024. 24p.

By Holly E. Porter

This thesis explores responses to rape in the Acholi sub-region of northern Uganda, based on three years of participant observation plus in-depth interviews with a random sample of 187 women from two villages. The issues examined lie at the intersection of two ongoing discussions in scholarship and practice and contributes to each of them: wrongdoing and justice, and sexual violence and rape.

Northern Uganda is at the heart of international justice debates. Fierce controversy followed the 2005 announcement of the International Criminal Court’s intervention in ongoing conflict between the Lord’s Resistance Army and the Government of Uganda. Two opposing representations of Acholi society emerged: that Acholi were innately forgiving—able to deal with mass crime through traditional justice; or that they needed and often supported formal legal justice. But this missed crucial aspects of Acholi realities, which this study illustrates, most basically the profound value of social harmony, and a deep distrust of distanced authorities to dispense justice in their interest.

Many scholars and practitioners assume that in the aftermath of crime, justice must be done. Amongst Acholi, I have found, the primary moral imperative in the wake of wrongdoing is not punishment of the perpetrator or individual victim’s rights but the restoration of social harmony.

Experience of rape and harm it causes are predicated on understandings of wrongdoing related to challenges posed to social harmony. Similarly, an appropriate remedy depends not only on the act of forced sex itself, but also on the social role of the perpetrator and social context.

This thesis adds empirical, locally-grounded, and culturally-specific evidence in support of a more complicated and nuanced explanation of rape and its aftermath than is familiar in the analytical/normative frameworks familiar in post-atrocity justice debates or anti-rape feminist activist discourse. It suggests reimagining the meanings of these phenomena along lived continuums: before, during, and after war; and acknowledging the role of sex, power, and politics in all sexual experiences on a spectrum of coercion and enthusiastic consent.

London School of Economics and Political Science, April 2013

By: Steven Teutsch, Yasmin Hurd, and Elizabeth Boyle

The landscape of cannabis legalization in the United States has been changing dramatically. Cannabis is now available throughout the United States, with policies that vary significantly in terms of public health protection. In most states, legalization occurred through ballot initiatives and public ad campaigns often financed by wealthy donors. Voters acknowledged cannabis’s widespread use, its large illegal market, the criminalization of seemingly minor infractions, and discrimination in enforcement. Today, changes in the classification of cannabis under the federal Controlled Substances Act are pending, as is a possible change in the definition of “hemp.” These sweeping changes are occurring when many of the health consequences of cannabinoids remain quite uncertain. And those changes are coupled with a disturbing legacy of discrimination during the “war on drugs,” with associated devastating consequences for individuals and communities of color in particular. The legalization of an increasingly powerful intoxicating drug has necessitated a greater fusion of public health and drug policy in the states.

In the face of this complexity, how, then, is one to assess the consequences of the changes in cannabis policy for public health and social equity? This was the charge to the Committee on the Public Health Consequences of Changes in the Cannabis Landscape. The 2017 report of the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, The Health Effects of Cannabis and Cannabinoids: The Current State of Evidence and Recommendations for Research, focuses on the health effects and potential therapeutic benefits of cannabis, noting the paucity of high-quality studies on its health effects. Regrettably, little has changed in this regard since that report was published, and scant to no research exists on the explosion of new cannabis and cannabinoid products. The present report focuses on the public health consequences of cannabis policies that have not been examined by the National Academies.

States have received little federal guidance on how to proceed regarding the health impact of cannabis on the public and communities. Other than two memoranda deferring to states, the federal government has been noticeably missing from this dialogue. Yet cannabis can cause real harms, as multiple investigators, families, and various groups attested to our committee. The tools of public health—assessment, policy development, and assurance—can provide the critical health information decision-makers need to protect the public health and make amends for past cannabis-related inequities, but those tools are only slowly being applied.

With legalization by states now widespread, it is time to ask about its impact, especially given the large variation in state policies. These natural experiments provide a rich but very complex set of experiences for analysis, but these policies are all of relatively recent vintage. Consequently, available products, use patterns, and markets have not yet stabilized. Facing these challenges, the committee reviewed what is known about these policies, formulated recommendations where possible, and delineated a path forward. With a strong commitment to policy research and the application of traditional public health tools, we fully anticipate that better and more consistent policies will unfold.

This report would not have been possible without the deep expertise, wide range of perspectives, and strong commitment of all the committee members. Elizabeth Boyle, study director, and her National Academies colleagues, Khala Hurst-Beatty, Alexandra McKay, and Mia Saltrelli, labored long and hard to tie together all the disparate pieces of this report. We are deeply grateful to all of them. Lastly, we want to express our appreciation to our sponsors, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the National Institutes of Health, without whose vision this study would not have been possible.

The National Academies Press 2024

By Joseph Quesnel

Elected Representatives and the media are confused about what police independence means in Canada. Media accuse politicians who address policy issues with police of interfering in police operations. Ongoing pro-Palestinian protests in Canada have led to Canadians questioning police willingness to enforce the law in the face of troubled protest behaviour that has crossed into criminality. Canadians want police to enforce the law unbiasedly and believe police are accountable to the public. In examining the origins and evolution of Canada’s police independence doctrine, this study will show that Canadians have a point as our police are responsible to government ministers, meaning they are accountable to the Canadian public. However, Canadians know that the police must be insulated from political pressures. Canadian history contains examples of elected representatives inappropriately interfering in police operations. Perhaps the term ‘independence’ is inappropriate, given police are subject to laws, policies, and ministerial oversight. Police are autonomous, not independent. The study proposes a model of made-in-Canada democratic policing, allowing politicians to properly converse with police on policy directions while avoiding a form of “governmental policing” where elected representatives too easily influence police operations with partisan politics. Finally, the study’s policy recommendations set Canada toward “apolitical and autonomous” policing.

Winnipeg: Frontier Centre for Public Policy. 2024. 26p.

Edited by Pablo Policzer

Making Sense of Haiti's State Fragility and Violence : Combining Structure and Contingency? / Andreas E. Feldmann -- Operation Condor as an International System of State Violence and Terror : A Historical-Structural Analysis / J. Patrice McSherry -- Written in Black and Red : Murder as a Communicative Act in Mexico / Pablo Piccato -- Protest and Police "Excesses" in Chile : The Limits of Social Accountability / Michelle D. Bonner --Protest and Police "Excesses" in Chile : The Limits of Social Accountability / Michelle D. Bonner -- The Police Ombudsman in Brazil as a Potential Mechanism to Reduce Violence / Anthony W. Pereira -- Democracy, Threat, and Repression : Kidnapping and Repressive Dynamics during the Colombian Conflict / Francisco Gutiérrez Sanín -- To End the War in Colombia : Conversatorios among Security Forces, Ex-Guerrillas, and Political Elites, and Ceasefire Seminars-Workshops for the Technical Sub-Commission / Jennifer Schirmer.

Calgary, Alberta, Canada : University of Calgary Press, [2019]

By Russell G Smith and Amelia Hickman

This report estimates the cost of serious and organised crime in Australia in 2020–21 to be between $24.8b and $60.1b. This is the third in a series of reports undertaken for the Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission estimating the cost of serious and organised crime. It updates and improves on the methodology used in the previous report, which estimated the cost of organised crime in 2016–17. As with the previous research, this report considers the direct and consequential costs of serious and organised crime in Australia, as well as the costs to government entities, businesses and individuals associated with preventing and responding to serious and organised crime. While the current estimates were undertaken during the COVID-19 pandemic and may reflect changes in criminality resulting from the pandemic, the full economic impact of serious and organised criminal offending committed during the pandemic will not be known for some time. It is clear, however, that the impact of serious and organised crime on the Australian economy is substantial.  

Statistical Report No. 38 Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology 2022 73p.

By Matt Gibbs, Melissa Goldman, Machiko Hodge, Susan Newell, Susan Nicolson, Kerry O’Donohue, Ashlee Parcell, and Georgia van der Westhuizen

The treatment of children in the criminal justice system, some as young as 10 years old, is one of the most urgent human rights issues facing Australia today. Numerous inquiries and reviews, including Royal Commissions, as well as UN Committees, have highlighted serious breaches of rights and systemic problems with our child justice and related systems over many years. However, Australia continually fails to implement evidence-based reforms to our child justice systems which would reduce offending behaviour and make our communities safer. This report investigates opportunities for reform of child justice and related systems across Australia, based on evidence and the protection of human rights. It is the result of a project undertaken by the National Children’s Commissioner (NCC) in 2023–24. The project included a submissions process, consultations with children and young people, families, community members, and interviews and roundtables with government and non government stakeholders across Australia. Australia is not protecting the rights of children Children’s rights are set out in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), and other international instruments that Australia has ratified. Australia’s lawmakers and decision makers have obligations to take all possible measures to help all children in Australia realise their rights. However, reports and inquiries continue to highlight how our systems fail to protect their human rights. Many children at risk of or in contact with the criminal justice system are dealing with multiple and complex issues in their lives which often contribute significantly to their chances of offending and reoffending. Their lack of basic ‘Help way earlier!’ rights often manifest as the drivers of their contact with the justice system in the first place, including poverty, intergenerational trauma, violence and abuse, racism, homelessness, and inadequate healthcare. These social determinants of justice show that children’s rights to health, safety, culture, participation, non-discrimination, adequate standards of living, and education are not being realised. When children enter the justice system, they may face additional breaches of their rights. For example, despite what we know about the harmful effects of detention on children, children as young as 10 can be detained in most parts of Australia. The overwhelming majority of these children are unsentenced, on remand, with some detained because there is no safe place for them to live while on bail. When they enter detention, many have disabilities and mental health issues, and are harmed by the conditions in detention, including extended periods of time in isolation in their cells, as noted in numerous official reports. First Nations children and young people continue to be overrepresented in the criminal justice system, and particularly in detention. Children and young people told us what children need in order to stay out of trouble The voices of 150 children and young people are at the centre of this report. Children and young people said that children want to be safe and to have a place to live. They want to participate in positive activities, and they want friends and supportive family relationships. Children want to be heard and have their views taken seriously. They want to be able to go to school and one day get a job. Children want to get extra help for themselves and their family members when it's needed  Children and young people said these things would help children to stay out of trouble with the police and reduce their contact with the child justice system. A national, child rights-based approach to reform is required Recommendations from many inquiries, including Royal Commissions, have attempted to guide reform, in particular by focusing on prevention and early intervention in both child justice and child protection systems. However, responses have been piecemeal, uncoordinated and inadequate. Despite evidence of the social determinants that are the root causes of offending behaviour, policy responses to these children are often only tinkering with the symptoms, with tougher policing, stricter bail laws, and incarceration. This is done under the guise of keeping the community safe. However, human rights and community safety are not opposing goals. The solutions lie in transformational thinking and action to address systemic disadvantage. Many stakeholders, in submissions, interviews and roundtables, argued that the scale of the child rights crisis in Australia requires a nationally coordinated approach to reform. This type of reform should be driven by: Australian Governments establishing a National Taskforce for Reform of Child Justice Systems, that develops a 10-year cross-portfolio National Roadmap to reform the Australian Government appointing a Cabinet Minister for Children the Australian Government establishing a Ministerial Council for Child Wellbeing, chaired by the Minister for Children, and reporting to National Cabinet the Australian Government legislating a National Children’s Act as well as a Human Rights Act, incorporating the Convention on the Rights of the Child. Reform also requires positioning children at the centre of policy-making and service delivery; empowering First Nations children, families and communities; optimising community-based action; building a capable and child specialised workforce; basing systems on data and evidence; and embedding accountability for the rights of children. Multiple barriers have stood in the way of child rights and evidence-based reform Stakeholders, in interviews, roundtables and submissions to this project, identified barriers to achieving critical reform. They argued that unless these barriers are addressed, transforming the child justice and wellbeing landscape in Australia will not be possible. Barriers include systemic racism; the fragmented way our governments operate; limited workforce capacity; lack of political commitment to evidence-based reform; pervasive ‘tough on crime’ rhetoric; and our persistent failure to make child wellbeing a national priority. These barriers to reform will not be addressed by a ‘business as usual’ approach. Transformational reform requires political will at all levels, including states and territories, and strong leadership, collaboration and coordination at the national level. Australian governments should coordinate across the federation to protect the rights of children in their laws, policies and service systems, and in doing so create a safer community for all.  

Sydney: Australian Human Rights Commission, 2024. 195p.

By Anthony Morgan

This report examines the effect of money laundering on the harm associated with organised crime by linking data on organised crime groups known to law enforcement, and data on suspicious transactions reported to the Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC). This study is the first step in assessing the social and economic harms associated with money laundering and terrorism financing in Australia.

Key Findings

• Suspicious matter reports captured a high proportion of individuals and groups known by law enforcement to be involved in organised crime.

• Known organised crime groups accounted for a very small proportion of suspicious matter reports.

• The amount of money laundered by groups varied according to where they laundered their funds and whether they had professional facilitators.

• The presence and amount of money laundering was consistently associated with an increase in recorded crime-related harm and the probability of organised crime.

• Evidence indicates that the laundering of illicit funds preceded increases in crime-related harm.

Consultancy Report Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 2024. 73p.

By Jason Beaman

This final research report describes a project that used various data sources to analyze the relationship between methamphetamine usage metrics, such as overdose deaths and related crimes, and violent crime such as rape and robbery, in order to inform law enforcement and other stakeholders of upstream prevention for crimes related to methamphetamine use. The project’s key objectives included developing a dashboard, analyzing methamphetamine-crime intersections, and assessing the influence of social determinants of health (SDOH) of methamphetamine use. Results demonstrated significant correlations between methamphetamine overdoses and violent crimes, especially economic-compulsive crimes. The report highlights distinct patterns and geographic variations among rural and American Indian communities. The report notes that results emphasize the complex interplay between methamphetamine use, violent crime, and socio-economic factors, and it advocates for targeted prevention strategies. It also offers the Oklahoma Methamphetamine Data Initiative (OKMDI) framework for addressing substance use and violence as a tool for policymakers and law enforcement.

Stillwater, OK: Oklahoma State University, 2024. 39p.

By Ben Mostyn

This article presents archival data produced by Australian diplomats in the 1980s that report on the ‘drug problem’ in various host countries. The reports reveal growing concern in many countries at a rapid increase in drug use. The second half of the article focusses on diplomatic reports from the United Nations where discussions were beginning about creating a third convention against drug trafficking. These early drafts of the convention labelled drug trafficking a ‘crime against humanity’—a criminal charge that had not been prosecuted since the Nuremburg trials. The article applies elements of moral panic theory, neorealism, and the sociology of punishment. Combining these theories suggests that condemning drug traffickers in the 1980s allowed diplomats to create a global social solidarity that may have helped end the Cold War.

Critical Criminology, August 2024. Crit Crim (2024).

By Irene María Álvarez-Rodríguez Translated by Victoria Furio

The consolidation of armed civilian collectives in the Mexican state of Michoacán arose in a setting in which the illegal regional economy no longer focused on drug smuggling but had turned to a variety of criminal activities and in which the perspective of a moral economy had been restored. This restructuring of the criminal economy was a strong factor in the emergence of the armed collectives.

LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES, Issue 236, Vol. 48 No. 1, January 2021, 231–244

By The International Crisis Group

Launched soon after they retook power in 2021, the Taliban’s campaign against narcotics has drastically reduced opium poppy cultivation and upended Afghanistan’s drug economy. Driven by ideology, the Taliban’s anti-drug efforts include rounding up drug users, eradicating crops, and shuttering drug bazaars. The Taliban’s enforcement impacts the livelihoods of millions of people, particularly poor labourers and rural women. Wealthy traders, meanwhile, are profiting from high prices by selling existing stocks. Many farmers have switched to crops such as wheat, but struggle with the reduced income. The ban’s future is uncertain; although the Taliban are adamant about implementing it, it could collapse under the weight of economic hardship. Foreign donors, who have much to gain from reduced drug production in Afghanistan, should harness the Taliban’s zeal for counter-narcotics and encourage licit economic growth. In the meantime, the Taliban should consider the welfare of the poorest farmers and implement a phased approach to the ban. Implemented with growing seriousness, the Taliban’s anti-narcotics campaign has profoundly affected a country that ranks among the world’s largest suppliers of illegal drugs. The main focus has been opium, a central part of Afghanistan’s agricultural sector. Enforcement began slowly, but has grown stricter. Taliban forces started with easy targets, herding drug users into jails and rehabilitation centres. They then warned farmers not to cultivate the opium poppies whose resin they have harvested for centuries. When that failed, the Taliban deployed fighters to face down villagers and destroy their crops. As a result, the UN estimates, cultivation declined by 95 per cent – more than any other counter-narcotics campaign in recent history. The Taliban also started to apply pressure on traffickers, despite the fact that some of them backed their movement for decades. More recently the de facto authorities shut down drug bazaars and arrested hundreds of dealers. While underworld kingpins and big landowners have thrived under the ban, reaping the benefits of skyrocketing prices by selling stockpiles, many farmers have suffered. By UN estimates, the halt to opium farming has affected the livelihoods of almost seven million people. These individuals are unlikely to find other work in a stagnant economy burdened with sanctions. Farmers have lost an estimated $1.3 billion annually, or 8 percent of GDP in 2023. Farm work remains the biggest source of employment for Afghan women. The ban has hit them especially hard, given their lack of opportunities under a Taliban regime that severely limits their ability to work. The economic shock has been compounded by the Taliban’s limited capacity to offer farmers and rural workers alternatives. Many switched to cultivating wheat or cotton, but struggle to make ends meet. Development of licit agriculture would require more irrigation, cold storage facilities and better roads. The Taliban does not have the budget to develop such infrastructure. Meanwhile, the opium price has soared, tempting farmers to flout the ban. So far, few dare to defy the Taliban. Farmers respect the ban most faithfully in the south, where the Taliban have many supporters, and where bigger farms produced stocks of opium that could be sold after the ban. Still, pockets of disobedience remain, even in the Taliban’s home province of Kandahar. In the smaller fields of the mountainous north and east, resistance is more widespread. While the Taliban’s measures have shaken the drug sector to its very foundations, the future of the ban remains in doubt. Some experts predict that its economic impact will force the Taliban to back track on a signature policy. Of course, it is also possible that the Taliban leadership will remain stubborn and steadfast. Foreign governments have a lot to gain from Afghanistan no longer flooding global markets with drugs. After the Taliban’s severe restrictions on women’s rights made the regime odious to much of the outside world, the narcotics ban offers a rare opportunity to work with the new authorities on a pressing issue to the benefit of all sides. The Taliban’s strategy of banning drugs without providing alternative jobs risks large-scale displacement of rural Afghans and rising emigration, along with growing desperation among the poor. Donors should support a transition toward licit and equitable growth in the economy, easing the acute poverty crisis the country currently faces. Some already give aid for food security and rehabilitation of drug users, but the assistance falls far short. Effective support at a national scale would require working with the Taliban regime, which is politically difficult and, for many Western policymakers, unpalatable. It would, however, aid Afghan civilians, especially rural women. In the first instance, support could focus on rural development, agricultural support, water conservation and investments in agro-processing. But the reality is that a drug-free agricultural sector will not provide enough jobs, so the country needs a development plan focusing more broadly on non-farm employment, including for women. Regional countries should support Afghanistan’s integration into transport networks and trade arrangements, for their own interests and to stabilise their neighbourhood. All of this will require time. Until the country makes the painful transition away from dependence on narcotics as a cash crop, the Taliban should show a bit of leni ency. Although it is unlikely it will backtrack on the ban, at a minimum the regime should halt more intrusive eradication practices such as house-to-house searches. Adopting more lenient practices such as turning a blind eye to small garden plots of poppy and cannabis would give the poorest farmers a better chance of survival in the coming years. Farmers selling tiny amounts of opium for prices hundreds of times higher than what is paid for other crops would give them a lifeline without jeopardising the ban’s overall objectives. 

Report No. 340 Kabul/Brussels,  International Crisis Group, 2024. 35p.

By Sintiki Tarfa Ugbe, et al.

This policy brief by the West African Epidemiology Network on Drug Use (WENDU) details regional drug use trends for 2023. Based on data from 11 countries, the brief reviews supply, consumption, treatment opportunities and counter-narcotics efforts. In a continuing trend, cannabis dominates the regional substance use data matrix, followed by medical opioids. However, alcohol use disorders are growing across multiple countries and, worryingly, more minors are getting caught in the toxic web of drug use. Recommendations • The increasing involvement of minors in drug use demands the urgent introduction of comprehensive substance abuse prevention programmes across all educational levels. • Given the rising prevalence of substance abuse among women and their limited access to treatment opportunities, women-focused rehabilitation centres are urgently needed. • There is a need for regionwide adoption of the Alternative to Incarceration programme introduced by ECOWAS. • ECOWAS and political leaders across West Africa need an evidence-based and context-appropriate stance on the region’s cannabis problem.  

Issue 32, WENDU policy brief 2 | September 2024 24p.

By Michael J. Zoorob,; Ju Nyeong Park,; Alex H. Kral,; et al

Importance: With the implementation of Measure 110 (M110) in 2021, Oregon became the first US state to decriminalize small amounts of any drug for personal use. To date, no analysis of the association of this law with overdose mortality has fully accounted for the introduction of fentanyl-a substance that is known to drive fatal overdose-to Oregon's unregulated drug market.

Objective: To evaluate whether the decriminalization of drug possession in Oregon was associated with changes in fatal drug overdose rates after accounting for the rapid spread of fentanyl in Oregon's unregulated drug market.

Design, setting, and participants: In this cohort study, the association between fatal overdose and enactment of M110 was analyzed using a matrix completion synthetic control method. The control group consisted of the 48 US states and Washington, DC, all of which did not decriminalize drugs. The rapid spread of fentanyl in unregulated drug markets was determined using the state-level percentage of all samples reported to the National Forensic Laboratory Information System that were identified as fentanyl or its analogues. Mortality data were obtained from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention for January 1, 2008, to December 31, 2022. Data analysis was performed from fall 2023 through spring 2024.

Exposures: Measure 110 took effect in Oregon on February 1, 2021.

Main outcomes and measures: The primary outcome assessed was fatal drug overdose rates per half-year. A changepoint analysis also determined when each state experienced a rapid escalation of fentanyl in its unregulated drug market.

Results: In this analysis, rapid spread of fentanyl in Oregon's unregulated drug supply occurred in the first half of 2021, contemporaneous with enactment of M110. A positive crude association was found between drug decriminalization and fatal overdose rate per 100 000 per half year (estimate [SE], 1.83 [0.47]; P < .001). After adjusting for the spread of fentanyl as a confounder, the effect size changed signs (estimate [SE], -0.51 [0.61]; P = .41) and there was no longer an association between decriminalization and overdose mortality in Oregon. Sensitivity analyses were consistent with this result.

Conclusions and relevance: In this cohort study of fatal drug overdose and the spread of fentanyl through Oregon's unregulated drug market, no association between M110 and fatal overdose rates was observed. Future evaluations of the health effects of drug policies should account for changes in the composition of unregulated drug markets.  

JAMA Netw Open. 2024;7(9):e2431612. doi:10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2024.31612

By Drug Policy Alliance

In 2020, Oregon voters overwhelmingly approved Ballot Measure 110. This made Oregon the first state in the U.S. to decriminalize possession of small amounts of all drugs, while greatly expanding addiction services and social supports. But in 2024, state leaders recriminalized drug possession after a disinformation campaign led by drug war defenders and backed by corporate interests. Statewide criminal penalties for drug possession returned on September 1, 2024. Promised deflection programs were not ready, meaning people will be arrested and prosecuted because of their addictions. As before, drug use will be used as an excuse to arrest Black and Brown Oregonians at higher rates (they are statistically more likely to face incarceration and harsher sentencing due to targeted policing and enforcement). Oregon’s public defender shortage continues. People who are arrested will likely have their cases dismissed for lack of counsel. In a return to the failed war on drugs, people will cycle through the criminal legal system without connection to services. The successes of Measure 110 should neither be downplayed nor contributed to H.B. 4002. Measure 110 provided over $300 million for addiction services, including a program where police connect people to care without arrest. Policymakers must focus on implementing a thorough public health approach to drugs and real solutions to other pressing issues, not on the false promises of criminalizing drug possession.

New York: Drug Policy Alliance, 2024. 5p.

By Russ Scott

Australia has one of the highest rates in the world of the use of the crystalline form of methamphetamine, a highly addictive stimulant that is often associated with a chronic, relapsing dependency. Methamphetamine use is associated with both acquisitive and violent offending, which cause substantial personal and societal costs. Whilst the short-term euphoria and stimulation provide a positive reinforcement to methamphetamine use, the aversive states of withdrawing from methamphetamine and the associated craving, which may last up to five weeks into abstinence, underlie the negative reinforcement to continued methamphetamine use. Although many methamphetamine-dependent users experience high levels of psychological distress, it is likely that less than half engage with treatment or support services, and current intervention and treatment programmes have high discontinuation rates. Stigma and discrimination, even from paramedics and health clinicians, are prominent barriers to methamphetamine-dependent users accessing treatment in Australia

Psychiatry, Psychology and Law; Vol. 31, No. 4, 671–704,, 2024

By Delvon T. Mattingly  , Maggie K. Richardson ,  Joy L. Hart

Introduction: Cannabis use is increasing due to several factors including the adoption of laws legalizing its use across the United States (US). We examined changes in current cannabis use among US youth and adults and by key socio-demographic groups. Methods: Using data from the 2013–2022 National Survey on Drug Use and Health (n=543,195), we estimated the prevalence of (2013–2019, 2020, 2021–2022) and trends in (2013–2019, 2021–2022) current (i.e., past 30- day) cannabis use among US youth (aged 12–17) and adults (aged 18+) overall and by age, gender, race and ethnicity, educational attainment, and total annual family income. We also examined sociodemographic factors associated with use from 2013 to 2019, in 2020, and from 2021 to 2022. Results: Cannabis use increased from 7.59 % to 11.48 % in 2013–2019, was 11.54 % in 2020, and increased again from 13.13 % to 15.11 % in 2021–2022. Among youth, cannabis use remained constant from 2013 to 2019 and 2021–2022. In 2022, use was highest among aged 18–34, male, non-Hispanic multiracial, and generally lower SES adults. From 2021–2022, cannabis use increased among several groups such as adults who were aged 35–49 (14.25–17.23 %), female (11.21–13.00 %), and Hispanic (10.42–13.50 %). Adults who were aged 18–25, male, non-Hispanic multiracial, some college educated, and of lower annual family income had consistently higher odds of current cannabis use from 2013 to 2019, in 2020, and from 2021 to 2022. Conclusions: Cannabis use is increasing overall and among certain sociodemographic groups. Our findings inform prevention and harm reduction efforts aimed at mitigating the prevalence of cannabis use in the US. 

Drug and Alcohol Dependence Reports 12 (2024) 10025 

By Michelle Minton and Geoffrey Lawrence

Hawaii may be poised to become the 25th state to legalize the recreational use of cannabis for adults aged 21 and over. Nearly 90 percent of Hawaii residents supported full legalization of cannabis for adult use in a January 2023 poll conducted by the Hawaii Cannabis Industry Association. Gov. Josh Green has said he would sign a legalization bill if one is delivered to his desk—marking a significant departure from former Gov. Dave Ige, who left office in 2023. During the 2023 legislative session, lawmakers considered proposals to legalize adult-use cannabis. One of these bills was passed by the state Senate but was not heard in the state House of Representatives. Between the conclusion of the 2023 legislative session and the convening of the 2024 session, Attorney General Anne Lopez met with key lawmakers to develop proposed language for a legalization bill that could gain the support of the administration and the legislature. This working group produced a 315-page draft bill, introduced in each chamber of the legislature as House Bill 2600 and Senate Bill 3335, respectively. Despite having played a key role in drafting the legislation, however, the attorney general’s office testified in early hearings that it “does not support the legalization of adult-use cannabis,” although the current legislation is a “good faith effort toward protecting the public welfare and is an improvement on previous bills that have been heard by the legislature.” Reason Foundation has offered recommendations for improvement to successive cannabis legalization proposals in Hawaii. Several of these recommendations were adopted by Senate committees during the 2023 legislative session. Reason Foundation has also reviewed the provisions of Senate Bill 3335, as amended, and submitted recommendations for improvement. This brief goes beyond those recommendations and provides key background on the Hawaiian marijuana market and considerations for market structure and tax policy. Cannabis consumers are price-sensitive and have many options for purchasing cannabis. Prices and availability within the licensed cannabis industry can strongly influence the decisions of both producers and consumers to either participate in this industry or engage in illicit cannabis activity. In California, high taxes and a lack of legal sellers resulted in roughly two-thirds of cannabis demand being satisfied by the illicit market six years after legalization. The prevalence of illicit sales also negatively affects state tax collections, as only a minority of cannabis transactions are legal and subject to taxation. California has recently begun to take corrective action to lower the tax-induced price disparity between licensed and illicit goods, but Hawaiian lawmakers can circumvent the rise of large illicit markets with an appropriate market design. 

Los Angeles: The Reason Foundation, 2024. 18p.