By Laura Y. Calderón

Mexico had the most violent year in its history in 2019, reporting 29,406 intentional homicide cases, resulting in 34,588 individual victims.1 However, violence remains a highly focalized phenomenon in Mexico, with 23% of all intentional homicide cases concentrated in five municipalities and three major clusters of violence with homicide rates over 100 per 100,000 inhabitants. Following the national trend, the state of Guanajuato also had its most violent year in 2019, with one of its largest cities featured in the country’s top five most violent municipalities. This paper will analyze the surge in violence in Guanajuato in 2019, comparing the number of intentional homicide cases with the increasing problem of fuel theft in the state, and describing some of the state and federal government measures to address both issues.

San Diego: Justice in Mexico, University of San Diego, 2020. 28p.

By Jorge Cabat

Since the beginning of his administration, President Felipe Calderon launched a war against drug trafficking using the Army and the Federal Police. This strategy has had serious unintended consequences in terms of the level of violence. By August 2010, the government acknowledged that there were 28,000 drug-related deaths since December 2006. This violence has provoked hard criticisms of the Calderon Administration and some analysts have suggested that the decision to attack the drug cartels was motivated by political reasons in order to obtain legitimacy after a very close and polemic Presidential election in 2006. However, since the end of the Fox Administration there are parts of the Mexican territory controlled by drug traffickers, which no State can allow. The paper argues that even if the anti-drug strategy of Calderon has been very costly in terms of violence, there was no other alternative, as the other options were not viable at the beginning of the Calderon administration. From this point of view it is an inevitable war. The weak results achieved to date are due to the fact that the Mexican government does not possess the institutional and human resources to carry out this war. This explains the emphasis of the Mexican government on institutional building. However, this is a long-term solution. In the short term, everything suggests that the high levels of drug-related violence are going to continue.

México, D.F. : CIDE: 2010. 24p.

By Vanda Felbab-Brown

This paper explores policy options for responding to the supply of heroin and synthetic opioids from Mexico to the United States. Forced eradication of opium poppy has been the dominant response to illicit crop cultivation in Mexico for decades. Forced eradication appears to deliver fast results in suppressing poppy cultivation, but the suppression is not sustainable even in the short term. Farmers find a variety of ways to adapt and replant after eradication. Moreover, eradication undermines public safety and rule of law efforts in Mexico, both of high interest to the United States….Unless security and rule of law in Mexico significantly improve, the licensing of opium poppy in Mexico for medical purposes is unlikely to reduce the supply of heroin to the United States. Mexico faces multiple feasibility obstacles for getting international approval for licensing its poppy cultivation for medical purposes, including, currently, the inability to prevent opium diversion to illegal supply and lack of existing demand for its medical opioids. In seeking to establish such demand, Mexico should avoid setting off its own version of medical opioid addiction.

Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution,2020. 28p.

By International Crisis Group

What’s new? The theft and illicit sale of fuel, known in Mexico as huachicoleo, experienced an enormous spike after 2010. Rising fuel prices and other unintended effects of energy reforms and security policies have attracted organised crime into this domain, driving up murder rates.

Why does it matter? President Andrés Manuel López Obrador made fighting fuel theft a central item on his anti-crime agenda. But although he has had some success, enduring progress toward stopping huachicoleo could be elusive, largely due to pervasive official corruption and the failure to promote licit alternatives for earning a living.

What should be done? The government should tackle collusion between state officials and criminal outfits by introducing external oversight over state energy and security institutions. Conflict mitigation plans tailored to violent regions should offer legal alternatives to illicit livelihoods, protect civilians through focused police or military deployments, and support local security and justice institutions.

Mexico City; New York: Brussels: International Crisis Groupm, 2022. 22p.

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By George W. Grayson

La Familia Michoacana burst onto the national stage on September 6, 2006, when ruffians crashed into the seedy Sol y Sombra nightclub in Uruapan, Michoacán, and fired shots into the air. They screamed at the revelers to lie down, ripped open a plastic bag, and lobbed five human heads onto the beer-stained black and white dance floor. The day before these macabre pyrotechnics, the killers seized their prey from a mechanic’s shop and hacked off their heads with bowie knives while the men writhed in pain. “You don’t do something like that unless you want to send a big message,” said a U.S. law-enforcement official, speaking on condition of anonymity about an act of human depravity that would “cast a pall over the darkest nooks of hell.” The desperados left behind a note hailing their act as “divine justice,” adding that: "The Family doesn't kill for money; it doesn't kill women; it doesn't kill innocent people; only those who deserve to die, die. Everyone should know . . . this is divine justice.” While claiming to do the “Lord’s work,” the ruthless leaders of this syndicate have emerged as the dominant exporter of methamphetamines to the United States, even as they control scores of municipalities in Michoacán and neighboring states.

Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College Press, 2010. 128p.

By John P. Sullivan and Robert J. Bunker.

Contemporary Mexican cartel use of car bombs began in mid-July 2010 and has since escalated. Given the proximity to the United States, some literally within miles of the border, the car bombings, with about 20 incidents identified over the last 2 1/2 years, should be of interest to local, state, and federal U.S. law enforcement, the U.S. Army, and other governmental institutions which are providing increasing support to Mexican federal agencies. An historical overview and analysis of cartel car bomb use in Mexico provides context, insights, and lessons learned stemming from the Medellin and Cali cartel car bombing campaigns. In order to generate insights into future cartel car bombings in Mexico, the identification of such potentials offers a glimpse into cartel “enemy intent,” a possible form of actionable strategic intelligence. For Mexico, steady and both slowly and quickly increasing car bomb use trajectories may exist. The prognosis for decreasing car bomb deployment appears unlikely. If cartel car bombs were to be deployed on U.S. soil or against U.S. personnel and facilities in Mexico, such as our consulates, we could expect that a pattern of indications and warnings (I&W) would be evident prior to such an attack(s). In that case, I&W would be drawn from precursor events such as grenade and improvised explosive device (IED) attacks (or attempted attacks) on our personnel and facilities and on evolving cartel car bomb deployment patterns in Mexico. The authors conclude with initial recommendations for U.S. Army and defense community support to the military and the federal, state, and local police agencies of the Mexican state, and the various U.S. federal, state, and local police agencies operating near the U.S.-Mexican border. The extent of support in intelligence, organization, training, and equipment is highlighted, as well as the extent that these forms of support should be implemented to counter cartel vehicle-borne IEDs and overall cartel threats.

Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College Books, 2013. 72p.