By The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime

The influx of weapons to Ukraine after Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, added to an already large reservoir of weapons in the country (especially since the outbreak of the conflict in 2014), raised concern over the spread of these weapons in the hands of criminals further in Western Europe, and the possible effect on organized criminal activities.

Both Ukraine and Ukraine’s Western partners have been aware of the political and criminal risks of arms diversion, and have put in place strict oversight mechanisms to track the delivery of weapons. According to Vadym Dzyubynskyi, head of criminal investigation at the Ukrainian National Police:

• All lost and stolen weapons, which currently number 593 000, are all accounted for, numbered, and our European partners know about these weapons. If such a weapon emerges in any country in Europe or the world, we will immediately understand that it is a drop-in and a fake, that it is the work of Russian special services for disinformation and narratives about Ukraine.

Ukrainian soldiers interviewed in February 2024 all spoke of strict standards over weapons, both during and at the end of their service. But in this nervous climate, any official shortcomings have been heavily scrutinized. And although not directly connected to weapons diversion, corruption scandals over military procurement in Ukraine have fed into concerns over the accountability of materiel in the war. Parsing the true risk has become essential to deepen the discussion beyond the headlines.

In order to provide insight into this issue, in 2023 the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC) established an arms monitoring programme (‘the Monitor’) to track the flows of weapons out of Ukraine and into Europe.

At the heart of the project was the collection of black market prices for weapons both in Ukraine and in Europe, on the assumption that a comparison of prices in different countries, and an analysis of changes in those prices, would help shed light on the nature of supply and demand at the national and transnational level. This data has been sourced from underworld contacts and law enforcement in various countries. Qualitative interviews with underworld sources, law enforcement, journalists, activists and others have helped flesh out the data picture with regard to demand for weapons among criminals, appetite for risk and potential drivers and barriers. In addition, the Monitor collected information on seizures and official reports on firearms, and commissioned a survey of dark web marketplaces.

GI-TOC ARMS MONITORING PROJECT , 2024. 76p.

By Najla Nassif Palma

The idea that Rio de Janeiro has been plunged into an actual “war” against organized crime is widely discussed and is supported by an ever-increasing number of people in Brazil. Not surprisingly, such discourse has led to less protection for the civilian population, particularly in the so-called favelas, while allowing security forces to carry out operations with even greater relative impunity. This article argues that although urban violence in Rio de Janeiro is indeed a serious problem, it does not reach the threshold required to be considered a non-international armed conflict.

International Review of the Red Cross (2023), 105 (923), 795–827.

By Jennifer Cearns and Charles Beach

Contraband Cultures presents narratives, representations, practices and imaginaries of smuggling and extra-legal or informal circulation practices, across and between the Latin American region (including the Caribbean) and its diasporas. Countering a fetishizing and hegemonic imaginary (typically stemming from the Global North) of smuggling activity in Latin America as chaotic, lawless, violent and somehow ‘exotic’, this book reframes such activities through the lenses of kinship, political movements, economic exchange and resistance to capitalist state hegemony. The volume comprises a broad range of chapters from scholars across the social sciences and humanities, using various methodological techniques, theoretical traditions and analytic approaches to explore the efficacy and valence of ‘smuggling’ or ‘contraband’ as a lens onto modes of personhood, materiality, statehood and political (dis)connection across Latin America. This material is presented through a combination of historic documentation and contemporary ethnographic research across the region to highlight the genesis and development of these cultural practices whilst grounding them in the capitalist and colonial refashioning of the entire region from the sixteenth century to the present day.

London: UCL Press, 2024. 294p.

By Global Financial Integrity, Fedesarrollo, Transparency International Kenya and ACODE

This policy memo is a joint publication by GFI, Fedesarrollo, Transparency International Kenya and ACODE, organizations that are based in the United States, Colombia, Kenya and Uganda, respectively. The memo draws on the technical and regional expertise of each of the organizations, seeking to analyze the complex challenges of Trade Based Money Laundering (TBML) from a truly global policy perspective. Broadly speaking, illicit financial flows (IFFs) are illegal movements of money or capital from one country to another. GFI classifies this movement as an illicit flow when funds are illegally earned, transferred, and/or utilized across an international border. The global scale of IFFs is considerable. According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Africa loses US$88.6 billion annually to IFFs. In the case of Latin America and the Caribbean, the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (UN ECLAC) estimates that from 2004- 2013, illicit financial outflows represented 1.8% of regional gross domestic product (GDP) and 3.1% of regional trade, with losses totalling US$765 billion for the 10-year period. Moreover, IFFs undermine institutions, contribute to insecurity, harm communities and the environment, and deprive countries of much-needed tax revenues. One of the most prevalent channels for IFFs is through the international trade system. As of 2021, GFI estimates that the annual value of trade-related IFFs in and out of developing countries amounted to, on average, about 20 percent of the value of their total trade with advanced economies. One area of particular concern is TBML, which the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) defines as the process of disguising the proceeds of crime and moving value through the use of trade transactions in an attempt to legitimize their illegal origin or finance illicit activities.5 As FATF notes, “the aim of TBML—unlike trade-related predicate offenses—is not the movement of goods, but rather the movement of money, which the trade transactions facilitate.”6; 7 TBML involves acts designed to conceal or disguise the true origin of criminally derived proceeds so that the unlawful proceeds appear to have been derived from legitimate origins or constitute legitimate assets. It is a highly effective way of integrating large volumes of criminal proceeds with legitimate income, and is attractive to organized crime groups because it is very hard to detect, track and investigate due to its transnational nature and the complexity of the international trade system. Recent cases have highlighted the sophisticated methods used to exploit the complex supply chains of international trade to launder criminal assets. When TBML goes unchecked, it has adverse effects on economies and societies as it perpetuates criminal activities such as illicit wildlife trade, bribery, corruption, and tax evasion. It subjects legitimate business to unfair competition in areas of goods and services due to unbalanced economies as a result of artificial manipulations. Additionally, TBML results in revenue losses, especially for developing countries struggling to meet their domestic resource mobilization targets

Global Financial Integrity, 2023. 23p.

By Marcena Hunter

While gold is often referred to as a blood mineral due to its role in conflict financing, the relationship between the gold sector, instability and violence is far more nuanced, with complex regional dynamics. In the gold production hub of West Africa, where artisanal and small-scale gold mining (ASGM) is pervasive, an increasing tide of insecurity and violence in recent years adds to the complexity of the sector. Woven into the region’s convoluted web of actors, activity and supply chains are criminal networks that link local mines to international trade hubs, exploiting the gold sector for financial gain and power. The analysis in this report demonstrates that the reality of the relationships between gold, conflict and criminality challenges the simplistic narrative of ‘blood minerals’ used to finance conflict, offering a far more nuanced understanding of the significance of the gold sector in West Africa. Rather, gold is closely intertwined with survival, money, power and criminality. Criminality, fragility and violence While literature on the relationship between gold and instability has often focused on conflict financing, the interplay between gold, governance and criminality can contribute to instability and violence before any form of conflict financing takes place. Criminal exploitation of the gold sector is fostered by persistent and widespread informality, due in part to the significant barriers to entry in the formal sector, and the lack of support for informal miners and gold traders. As a result, corrupt and criminal elites in the political and business spheres can capture illicit gold flows, further contributing to community frustrations that can give rise to conflict. Limiting access to the gold sector by restricting access to mine deposits or conducting crackdowns on unlicensed ASGM can also undermine the legitimacy of state actors. Thus, efforts to stabilize West Africa must account for complex criminal interests while also addressing the long-standing grievances and expectations of local communities.1 Such efforts are critical in both conflict-laden areas and stable areas to reduce the risk of conflict spreading. Where the gold sector contributes to conflict financing in West Africa, it can vary significantly in form and value. In locations where conflict and gold mining overlap, armed groups may target the gold sector by taxing mining and trade activities, demanding payment from miners for providing security, or establishing checkpoints along roads to mine sites and trade hubs for payment collection. Members of armed groups may also directly engage in gold mining, either for personal financial gain or to benefit the group. Yet in many regions, gold is not the primary source of revenue for armed groups; other industries like the livestock sector are also targets. Sitting in the space between increased fragility and conflict are local self-defence and identity militia groups, which can act in cooperation or in competition with the state.2 In West Africa, these groups fall on a spectrum ranging from hybrid security institutions to mafia-style protection rackets run by ‘violent entrepreneurs’. There is a heavy overlap between these groups and the gold sector, with many instances of groups providing security at gold mine sites and along transportation routes. Yet, the origins of the different groups, their roles in local communities and the gold sector, and their role in conflict dynamics vary greatly.

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime. 2022. 61p.

By The Transnational Alliance to Combat Illicit Trade (TRACIT)

With inflation at its highest levels since 2008, the international economy finds itself amid a cost of-living crisis. In many countries, inflation has reached multi-decade highs, with both headline and core inflation continuing to rise and broaden beyond food and energy prices. Inflation has also been intensified by post-COVID economics and the Russian invasion of Ukraine – both of which have driven global commodity prices higher. Among the cascading effects of inflation on the global economy is the negative impact it has on the market dynamics that drive illicit trade. Specifically, high levels of inflation can have a disastrous impact on consumer purchasing power. In turn, reduced purchasing power coupled with increased poverty reduces consumer “product affordability,” which is widely regarded as the primary driver for illicit trade. When prices rise faster than incomes, people can afford to buy fewer goods and services and cheaper goods including illicit and black-market products become more tempting. Given these dynamics, where inflation incentivizes consumers to choose cheaper, illicit alternatives, governments will necessarily need to be more vigilant in their efforts to defend their economies from illicit trade. In this light, Turkiye presents a valuable opportunity to raise awareness on the relationship between inflation and growth in illicit trade. proTurkiye is experiencing high inflation rates. In October 2022, inflation climbed to a 25-year high of 85.5 %. Consequently, the impacts of soaring inflation leading to price increases have created a notable erosion of consumer purchasing power in Turkiye. Turkiye already faces challenges from illicit trade on multiple fronts. For example, it is an important source country for illicit plant protection products, counterfeit goods are widespread, and the country grapples with the harmful effects of illicit tobacco, alcohol and petroleum products. Moreover, the government’s goal of making Turkiye a top pharma hub by 2023 is threatened by a lucrative market for illegal pharmaceuticals. This situation is exacerbated by Turkiye’s location in the region, which makes it a key transit hub for both complete counterfeit products and counterfeit components. In principle and practice, the challenge of product “affordability” is a long-standing driver for illicit trade. Keeping that in mind, inflation amplifies a problem that usually already exists. In Turkiye’s case, inflation can be expected to intensify the problem and, consequently, requires its government to likewise intensify efforts to mitigate illicit trade. This report explores the situation of illicit trade in Turkiye, addresses its susceptibility to inflation, outlines the issues that must be addressed, and presents a set of policy recommendations that could help the government and other stakeholders fortify their efforts to control illicit trade.

The Transnational Alliance to Combat Illicit Trade (TRACIT) , 2022. 24p.

By The International Crisis Group

Myanmar’s Shan State and Laos’s Bokeo province, which straddle the Mekong River, have emerged as a contiguous zone of vibrant criminality, much of which is beyond the reach of national authorities. Unregulated casinos, money laundering, drug production and trafficking, online scamming operations, and illegal wildlife trade all thrive, entrenching corruption, weakening governance and damaging the bonds that create community. The criminal networks involved have regional – in some cases, global – reach and can rapidly shift from one jurisdiction to another to minimise risks to their operations. A coordinated regional approach is thus vital for tackling them. But geopolitical competition between China and the U.S. complicates coordination. Regional states continue to rely heavily on unilateral criminal justice responses, but collaborative law enforcement is needed, as are multi-state efforts to ameliorate the governance and socio-economic problems that allow these criminal syndicates to prosper. Ideally, these efforts would involve agencies with migration, development and other relevant expertise. Parts of the Mekong, particularly the 100km section that forms the Myanmar-Lao border, have long been a frontier of unregulated and illicit trade, far from centres of power and commerce. Given its importance as a conduit between China and South East Asia, in recent decades governments have aspired for the Mekong to become a major transport route. But along with physical obstacles – sandbanks, shoals and rapids – insecurity has impeded riverborne trade, most commonly in the form of piracy and extortion of boats plying the route. The situation came to a head in October 2011, when thirteen Chinese merchant mariners were murdered – the deadliest attack on Chinese nationals abroad since World War II. China pinned the blame on Myanmar pirates, whose leader it captured in Laos and executed following a complex extra-territorial police operation. (It later emerged that others may have been primarily responsible.) Beijing then initiated joint gunboat patrols with neighbouring countries, allowing it to project force down the Mekong. While these actions put an end to piracy on this key stretch of river, they did not deter other forms of crime. Since 2o11, the territories on the Myanmar and Lao sides of the Mekong have emerged as hotbeds of illegal activity, from drug production and trafficking to online gambling, money laundering and cyber-scam operations that often use captive workers from around the world. Not only do transnational criminal organisations operating in this zone benefit from lax or non-existent regulations, but they also take advantage of its multi-jurisdictional character, quickly shifting operations from one place to another to evade crackdowns. Coordinated law enforcement across the region is crucial if governments want any chance of tackling these expanding criminal activities, but other capabilities must also be brought to bear. Authorities in the region need to acknowledge that any solution to this transnational problem will involve government agencies from several jurisdictions – as opposed to the typical security or police approach that treats immediate symptoms, but not the fundamental causes of the problem, including weak governance and rampant corruption, not to mention a willingness or desire of some jurisdictions to court illicit investments.

Bangkok/Brussels, International Crisis Group, 2023. 40p. Asia Report N°332 | 18 August 2023

By Stephen Merchant, Greg Wilson

In 2023 the Government commissioned a ‘first principles’ independent review of the Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission (ACIC) and associated Commonwealth law enforcement arrangements.

The review assessed the effectiveness of the ACIC’s legislative framework and found that comprehensive reform was needed to ensure ACIC could operate effectively as Australia’s national criminal intelligence agency. The review recommended ACIC shift away from its existing law enforcement and investigative functions towards providing unique intelligence on serious and organised crime to Commonwealth, state and territory law enforcement agencies.

The independent review’s recommendations set out a blueprint to transform the ACIC in response to the significant and ongoing threat of serious and organised crime. The Government has agreed or agreed in-principle with 27 of the 29 recommendations - as set out in the government response.

Key recommendations

• Undertake robust legislative reforms to address significant deficiencies in the existing legislative frameworks and ensure the ACIC has appropriate powers for the collection of intelligence.

• Incorporate appropriate oversight and safeguards for the ACIC, including in relation to its use of coercive powers.

• Reinvigorate national governance and coordination arrangements for responding to serious and organised crime.

• Reinforce the independence of the Australian Institute of Criminology.

BARTON, ACT : Attorney-General's Department (Australia), 2024. 68p.

By Tse Yang Lim, Huiru Dong, Erin Stringfellow, Zeynep Hasgul, Ju Park, Lukas Glos, Reza Kazemi, and Mohammad S Jalali

Fentanyl and its analogs contribute substantially to drug overdose deaths in the United States. There is concern that people using drugs are being unknowingly exposed to fentanyl, increasing their risk of overdose death. This study examines temporal trends and spatial variations in the co-occurrence of fentanyl with other seized drugs.

Methods

We identified fentanyl co-occurrence (the proportion of samples of non-fentanyl substances that also contain fentanyl) among 9 substances or substance classes of interest: methamphetamine, cannabis, cocaine, heroin, club drugs, hallucinogens, and prescription opioids, stimulants, and benzodiazepines. We used serial cross-sectional data on drug reports across 50 states and the District of Columbia from the National Forensic Laboratory Information System, the largest available database on the U.S. illicit drug supply, from January 2013 to December 2023.

Findings

We analyzed data from 11,940,207 samples. Fentanyl co-occurrence with all examined substances increased monotonically over time (Mann-Kendall p < 0.0001). Nationally, fentanyl co-occurrence was highest among heroin samples (approx. 50%), but relatively low among methamphetamine (≤1%), cocaine (≤4%), and other drug samples. However, co-occurrence rates have grown to over 10% for cocaine and methamphetamine in several Northeast states in 2017–2023.

Interpretation:

Fentanyl co-occurs most commonly with heroin, but its presence in stimulant supplies is increasing in some areas, where it may pose a disproportionately high risk of overdose.

Lancet Reg Health Amicas, . 2024 Sep 27;39:100898. doi: 10.1016/j.lana.2024.100898

By Nicolás Zevallos Trigoso, Jaris Mujica, and Christian Campos Vásquez

Coca legalization in Peru could reshape the economy, drug control policies, and even the influence of organized crime, but the implications are complex. This report explores how moving from prohibition to a regulated market affects not only the legal framework but also the ground reality for coca growers, consumers, and law enforcement. Legalization doesn’t just mean lifting restrictions; it involves constructing a regulatory structure that acknowledges coca as both a cultural staple and a consumer good.

The study reveals that while legalization could reduce the criminalization of coca production, it also creates new challenges. Ensuring a legal supply chain for coca derivatives, from cultivation to sale, demands extensive state oversight—a task complicated by limited resources and a history of challenges with other legal commodities like timber and gold. Moreover, organized crime could exploit the gaps in regulation, adapting to the legal framework while maintaining parallel illegal operations.

The analysis dives into four major areas of impact: changes in drug policy, shifts in organized crime dynamics, effects on the local economy of coca growers, and potential shifts in consumer patterns. The findings suggest that legalization could reduce repressive policing but require intensified regulatory control, putting immense pressure on Peru’s state capacity. Organized crime may also adapt to the new structures, blending illegal activities with legal coca businesses.

This study also highlights lessons from other industries that have moved from illicit to regulated markets, providing a balanced view of possible outcomes. While coca legalization could offer a path away from prohibition’s punitive approach, the transition to a regulated market could mean ongoing challenges.

Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2024 24p.

By Max Daly ̵ Patrick Shortis

There has been a groundbreaking shift in the global drug trade, pioneered in Russia and now spreading globally. Unlike traditional drug trafficking models, this system leverages darknet markets and cryptocurrency for anonymous transactions, allowing buyers to retrieve drugs from hidden physical locations, or “dead drops,” rather than direct exchanges. Driven by large platforms such as Kraken, Mega, and Blacksprut, Russian darknet markets control 93% of the global share, generating approximately $1.5 billion in revenue in 2023 alone. This dominance marks a new era for organized crime, with Russia’s digital drug economy vastly surpassing traditional Western darknet markets in scope and influence.

The rise of Russia’s dead drop drug trade stems from several unique national factors: restrictive anti-drug policies, strained Western trade relations, and a strong technological foundation. Enabled by these conditions, the dead drop model has reshaped how drugs are distributed in Russia. Drug transactions now involve no face-to-face interactions; instead, orders are placed online, paid for with cryptocurrency, and retrieved from secret locations across cities within hours. This system, offering convenience and anonymity, has seen synthetic drugs—especially synthetic cathinones like mephedrone—overtake traditional imported substances like cocaine and heroin in Russia. As the report highlights, these potent synthetic drugs are cheap, easy to manufacture, and readily distributed through Russia’s vast delivery networks.

The report further underscores the severe social impacts of this model on Russian society, particularly among young people. Youth are drawn into this high-tech drug economy, often working as couriers or “kladmen” for online shops—a job that comes with high risks, including violence, criminal charges, and addiction. Violence has become endemic in the system, with enforcers, known as “sportsmen,” meting out harsh punishments for couriers suspected of theft or negligence. This pervasive violence, combined with the easy availability of highly addictive synthetic drugs, is fueling a public health crisis and contributing to rising incarceration rates among young Russians.

Beyond Russia, the report warns that this drug trade model is now expanding across borders, posing public health and security risks. It’s affecting Russian youth heavily, leading to violence, criminalization, and increased synthetic drug dependence. Understanding Russia’s darknet markets offers insight into the future of drug trafficking worldwide. Authorities and international bodies must adapt to address the growing influence of this high-tech, anonymous, and highly organized trade system.

Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2024. 53p.

By Phil Williams

By 2040, organized crime may thrive like never before, exploiting climate crises, geopolitical conflicts, and technological advancements. Our latest report reveals a chilling forecast where criminal networks operate as shadow governments, shielded by authoritarian regimes and empowered by rapid technological evolution.

This “fifth wave” of organized crime, as coined by author Phil Williams, will capitalize on scarcity markets, leveraging disruptions in essential resources like water, minerals, and energy caused by climate change. Criminal networks are expected to infiltrate legitimate markets, blurring lines between lawful and illicit activities and using scarcity as a driving force for growth.

The report suggests that by leveraging emerging tools such as artificial intelligence, autonomous vehicles, and 5G technology, criminal organizations will achieve new levels of sophistication, making it difficult for law enforcement to counter their reach and resilience. Meanwhile, geopolitical tensions are likely to exacerbate the situation, as some authoritarian regimes utilize criminal networks as extensions of state power, offering them safe havens and strategic support in exchange for destabilizing activities abroad.

The findings raise urgent questions about global readiness to combat organized crime’s possible evolution. “The Fifth Wave” challenges policymakers, law enforcement agencies, and international organizations to rethink their approach to organized crime in a rapidly shifting world. It underscores the importance of proactive strategies that go beyond traditional crime-fighting tactics, advocating for comprehensive international collaboration, adaptive policy-making, and innovative technology to address this deeply entrenched threat.

As crime increasingly infiltrates legal economies, emerging as a powerful economic and social force, international collaboration and innovative strategies will be vital to mitigate this emerging threat. This threat requires an unprecedented global response.

Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2024. 30p.

By Dardan Kocani

Despite efforts to prevent illicit finance – such as the adoption of international frameworks, Financial Action Task Force (FATF) standards and the EU’s anti-money laundering (AML) directives – financial institutions in the Western Balkans remain highly vulnerable to sophisticated criminals and the inherent risks in the formal financial system. Financial institutions such as banks, microfinance institutions, cryptocurrency services and money transfer services are frequently exploited by criminals to move illicit money across borders.

This report delves into the structural weaknesses and vulnerabilities that facilitate money laundering in the Western Balkans. One major insight is the impact of cryptocurrency, where regulatory shortcomings enable anonymous, cross-border transactions that are hard to trace. Financial technology, while promising innovation, also introduces fresh risks, especially where compliance and monitoring frameworks have yet to catch up. With no centralized registry for politically exposed persons (PEPs) or beneficial owners, financial institutions often lack critical information, inadvertently providing cover for criminal actors.

The study identifies specific methods used to launder money, such as smurfing through bank accounts, taking out suspicious bank loans, engaging in real estate purchases, and employing frontmen. Notable cases in the region expose systemic vulnerabilities in banks, where criminal actors leverage insider support or regulatory gaps to move substantial amounts undetected. Furthermore, public-private partnerships in AML enforcement remain insufficient, creating weak links that are frequently exploited.

This report provides strategic recommendations for governments, financial institutions and non-state actors in the region to address these gaps, emphasizing the need for robust inter-agency collaboration, stronger regulatory frameworks, and consistent training for AML officers. The region needs a heightened, collaborative effort to prevent local financial institutions from becoming conduits for transnational organized crime and dirty money laundering.

Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC)’s Observatory of Illicit Economies in South Eastern Europe. 2024. 40p.

By Jo‑Anne Kramer, Arjan A. J. Blokland·, Edward R. Kleemans, Melvin R. J. Soudijn

In order to launder large amounts of money, (drug) criminals can seek help from financial facilitators. According to the FATF, these facilitators are operating increasingly business-like and even participate in professional money laundering networks. This study examines the extent to which financial facilitators in the Netherlands exhibit business-like characteristics and the extent to which they organize themselves in money laundering networks. We further examine the relationship between business-like behavior and individual money launderers’ position in the social network. Using police intelligence data, we were able to analyze the contacts of 198 financial facilitators who were active in the Netherlands in the period 2016–2020, all having worked for drug criminals. Based on social network analysis, this research shows that financial facilitators in the Netherlands can be linked in extensive money laundering networks. Based on the facilitators’ area of expertise, roughly two main types of professional money laundering networks can be discerned. Some subnetworks operate in the real estate sector, while others primarily engage in underground banking. Furthermore, the application of regression models to predict business-like behavior using individual network measures shows that facilitators with more central positions in the net work and those who collaborate with financial facilitators from varying expertise groups tend to behave more business-like than other financial facilitators.

Trends in Organized Crime (2024) 27:314–341

By Paolo Campana, Cecilia Meneghini

This paper explores the structure of organised crime movement across local communities and the drivers underpinning such movement. Firstly, it builds on network analysis to offer a novel methodological approach to empirically and quantitatively study the movement of organised crime offenders across geographical areas. The paper then applies this approach to evidence from Cambridgeshire in the United Kingdom. It reconstructs the movement of organised crime members across local areas based on a large-scale police dataset that includes 41 months of recorded crime events. It identifies organised crime “turf” and “target” areas and then explores the drivers of movement from the former to the latter using Exponential Random Graph Models. Findings confirm that geographical distance matters; however, socio-demographic, urban, economic and crime-related characteristics of communities play a key role. Organised crime group members target urban communities with higher than average illegal market opportunities (proxied by drug-related activity). The work also finds the effect of socio-demographic homophily between turf and target communities, suggesting that organised crime group members might target territories that are similar to their own. While a high level of deprivation makes a community more likely to send organised crime members, its impact on a community’s probability of being a receiver is less clear. Finally, the paper offers a way to identify communities (local areas) at risk of being targeted by criminal organisations, thus providing practitioners with a tool for early interventions

Trends in Organized Crime (2024) 27:286–313

By David Bright, Giovanni Sadewo, Timothy I. C. Cubitt, Christopher Dowling, Anthony Morgan

Outlaw motorcycle gangs (OMCGs) have become synonymous with organised crime through engagement in criminal activities including illicit drug production and distribution, firearms trafficking, and serious violent crime. These crimes contribute significant social and economic harms in countries that feature a presence from these groups. The current paper uses network analytics to analyse the extent of co-offending within and across established clubs in Australia, including the relative involvement of senior, or office-bearing, members. The majority of affiliates in this sample co-offended with another OMCG affiliate within the sample period, with office bearers, members, nominees and associates represented proportionally among co-offending networks to in the sample at large. However, within these clubs, criminal activities were conducted in small cliques or components of affiliates. This research supports the role of OMCGs as important facilitators of crime, and the role of co-offending in the criminal offending of affiliates. The findings hold important implications for understanding how offending is organised among OMCGs, differences between groups, differing levels of engagement from the club hierarchy

Trends in Organized Crime (2024) 27:263–285

By United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime - UNODC

Fraud has evolved significantly over the years, adapting to technological advancements and changes in society. It has become increasingly sophisticated, often using psychological manipulation, enabled by information and communications technologies (ICTs). The high volume and severity of fraud pose a significant risk to people, economies and prosperity worldwide, and have a negative impact on the public’s confidence in the rule of law. However, developing an accurate understanding of fraud presents several challenges. Victims often underreport fraud due to feelings of shame, self blame or embarrassment, as well as a lack of recognition that a crime has occurred. Moreover, a significant portion of fraud targets businesses, many of which choose not to report these crimes to avoid damaging their reputation. The anonymity and remoteness often associated with fraud perpetration conceal the identities of offenders from both victims and authorities, hindering efforts to assess underlying patterns, factors of vulnerability and associated risks. Furthermore, the dynamic nature of fraud — which is constantly being adapted to changes in legal, social, commercial and technological systems — means that new and innovative methods of the offence may go unnoticed within static official data. In many cases, domestic law enforcement entities do not have the capacity to investigate and uncover the offenders and the organized criminal groups behind the crime: international cooperation is required, suggesting the need to give greater prominence to fraud in the policy framework and legislation against organized crime.

The international community has recognized the worrying scale of fraud and the need for joint efforts in preventing and combating it. The General Assembly, in its resolution 78/229, reaffirmed the importance of the work of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in the fulfilment of its mandate in crime prevention and criminal justice, including providing to Member States, upon request and as a matter of high priority, technical cooperation, advisory services and other forms of assistance, and coordinating with and complementing the work of all relevant and competent United Nations bodies and offices in respect to all forms of organized crime, including fraud. Nevertheless, the intersection between fraud and organized crime is not well understood and is further complicated by overlaps with other key areas, including cybercrime, white-collar crime, money-laundering and corruption. An understanding of organized fraud is necessary to inform the decisions of policymakers and other stakeholders and drive effective responses. The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, the main global legally binding instrument to prevent and fight all forms and manifestations of transnational organized crime and protect the victims thereof, provides a framework to understand the nature of organized fraud and how the response to it can be integrated into the response to the different threats presented by transnational organized crime.

Scope of the issue paper

Fraud is an expansive category of crime. One of the greatest challenges to understanding it is its scope. It encompasses a range of criminal behaviours that are bound together by the common principle of dishonesty. The opportunities to employ dishonesty for the purposes of fraud span the full range of social, commercial, financial and technological settings, which can vary in different regions of the world. These opportunities are exploited by criminals from highly diverse backgrounds, ranging from professionals exploiting a legitimate corporate position to cybercriminals from within deprived communities. In this way, fraud is distinct from many other criminal categories that cover more discrete criminal behaviours occurring in specific settings (e.g. burglary). This diversity creates challenges in terms of developing a single, cohesive and comprehensive picture of fraud. The present issue paper covers fraud perpetrated by organized criminal groups (i.e. organized fraud). The role of organized crime can vary depending on the type of fraud, although, to a greater or lesser extent, it has a footprint in nearly all types of fraud. For the purposes of containing the scope of the issue paper, the following elements are not included:

• Other crimes in which fraud plays an enabling role, including the fraudulent use of identity to prevent a perpetrator from being traced, such as opening financial accounts to launder the proceeds of crime; fraudulent communications to enter into a relationship with a victim for the purpose of blackmailing or extorting money from them;1 and fraudulent job advertisements for recruiting and trafficking victims into forced labour and servitude.

• Fraud targeting the financial interests of the State (e.g. tax regimes), such as missing trader intra-community fraud (otherwise known as MTIC or VAT fraud); excise fraud, in which duties on imported products are not paid (e.g. fuel); public procurement fraud; and fraudulent applications for government grants and subsidies. The policy and response landscape for addressing these types of fraud can be distinct, being made up of various agencies and regulatory powers beyond law enforcement (e.g. the tax authority). The links between these types of fraud and organized crime are more well established in the literature.

The focus of the issue paper is organized fraud that targets individual members of the public or private institutions for the purposes of obtaining a financial or other material benefit.

Vienna: UNODC< 2024. 82p.

By Christopher Blattman, Benjamin Lessing, and Santiago Tobón

Organised crime poses one of the greatest threats to national security and development in the 21st century. Despite this, most policy, data collection, and scholarly research focuses on individuals and disorganised violence. Our work addresses several critical gaps in knowledge:

• What are the incentives for gangs to engage in violence and socially costly behaviour?

• Which are the trade-offs that practitioners face when deciding how to engage with organised violence?

• What type of information do relevant decision-makers need to inform their policies?

• Which are the most relevant tools for tracking down gang behaviour and use of violence?

We address these questions in the context of Medellín, Colombia’s second largest and most important city. Over the past six years, our work has covered a broad methodological spectrum, including:

• qualitative data collection through interviews with dozens of criminals and criminal justice experts;

• quantitative data collection from thousands of citizens in surveys representative at highly localised levels;

• active collaboration with local relevant stakeholders such as the city administration and the local police department;

• quasi-experimental evaluations of long-running policies dating back to the 1980s; and

• experimental evaluations of marginal improvements in state presence in violent and gang controlled areas.

Our preliminary findings point to terrible trade-offs, where authorities face plausibly impossible questions when balancing short-term gains in violence reduction and sacrifices in state legitimacy, with long-term uncertainty concerning both violence and state legitimacy. We highlight preliminary recommendations for guiding policy decisions.

Birmingham, UK: The Serious Organised Crime & Anti-Corruption Evidence (SOC ACE) 2022. 9p.

By Tena Prelec

The research paper that this briefing note summarises introduces a new framework for assessing the relationship between information manipulation and organised crime. Through applied real-world case studies from Russia, Ukraine, Moldova (Transnistria), and Albania, the framework reveals diverse patterns in these relationships, and the varying intensity of the information manipulation employed at a granular level. An emerging hypothesis emerging from the research suggests that authoritarian states may wield greater freedom in misusing information when they have intermediate – rather than high – levels of integration with the organised crime groups (OCG’s) executing disinformation campaigns on their behalf. The paper also identifies several areas for further research, including public receptivity to information manipulation, the mercurial nature of ties between elite actors and the use of information manipulation by elites, to create confusion amongst the public rather than to change their minds.

SOC ACE Research Paper. Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham. 2024. 7p.

By Huma Haider

Organised criminal actors can extend their influence over security sector officials through corruption, paying them to selectively enforce the law. In some cases, the rise of organised crime (OC) has eroded the state’s capacity to deliver security and justice. In other contexts, criminality is associated with a strong state that can protect corrupt officials and criminal actors. Strengthening the capabilities of corrupt security institutions can, in turn, be counterproductive in the fight against OC. The linkages between corruption, OC, the functioning of security and justice institutions, and their reform processes, call for integrated analysis, planning and implementation of initiatives to achieve security sector reform and governance (SSR/G) and to counter OC. There is, however, a gap in scholarship analysing connections between SSR/G and OC. In seeking to address this gap, this paper adopts an inter-disciplinary approach, reviewing scholarly and practitioner literature across a wide range of research disciplines. Key findings from the evidence review include:

• Delayed or weak implementation of security sector reform (SSR) in transitional contexts can result in the entrenchment of corruption in security sectors, alongside new forms of corruption (for example, from privatisation processes), which in turn risks the rise of illicit activities.

• OC can thrive where state institutions are absent or weak and where they are present or strong. A binary focus on strong versus weak states, with inadequate attention to context, has led at times to counterproductive interventions aimed at strengthening state institutions and the capabilities of security forces.

• The political context in which SSR and initiatives to counter OC take place can have a significant influence on outcomes. Such reforms and initiatives require political will and support. Elites in authoritarian contexts may block reforms that could hold them accountable and undermine their ability to profit from OC.

• Many SSR studies indicate that programming often prioritises less politically sensitive capacity building interventions. Yet, reforms that increase deterrent capacity can reinforce militarisation and increase violent crime by OC actors.

• Higher levels of popular trust in the military have often been accompanied by greater state reliance on the military to perform civilian law enforcement and/or militarisation of the police to address OC and restore public order.

• The militarisation of law enforcement has typically failed to counter OC, producing greater violence and criminality in many fragile and violent contexts.

• Relying on armed forces to counter OC has often reduced incentives and resources for strengthening police institutions

• Community-oriented policing is often employed to improve public trust in the police, yet there is limited systematic or comparative evidence that this is achieved.

• Mass incarceration, from law and order approaches, has frequently strengthened the cohesion of organised crime groups (OCG), giving them a territorial base for power projection.

• Overcrowded prison facilities and insufficient state staffing levels have often resulted in the rise of criminal governance and prisoner syndicates as parallel powers.

• Inadequate reintegration of ex-combatants, or gang members in situations of urban violence, can encourage their involvement in criminal activities.

• Conventional approaches to investigating and prosecuting criminal activity can be ineffective against complex OC networks. A proactive approach is required that seeks to disrupt and dismantle such networks, beyond arresting individual criminals.

• Criminal justice actors need to recognise that women can be both victims and perpetrators in the context of OC, possibly allowing for legal leniency.

• Judicial reforms tend to be more effective when they produce institutional change and empower new personnel to push through reforms.

• Special courts, established to tackle OC and corruption, may divert resources from elsewhere in the judicial sector. It can also be challenging to reconcile accountability for past gross human rights violations and the need to counter contemporary OC.

• Transitional trials, selective prosecutions and vetting, which remove officials guilty of corruption, OC and/or human rights violations from security and justice institutions, can help to reform abusive institutions and build trust.

• There is evidence that failure to properly vet military officials and ex-combatants prior to their entry into a civilian police force has resulted in corrupt police forces with links to criminality.

• There is debate as to whether transitional justice activities enable institutional reform and rule of law programming that can help to counter OC, or whether they are isolated from domestic capacity building.

• Developing accountability and oversight of security sector institutions (for example, anti-corruption mechanisms and civilian oversight) can help to reduce OC infiltration.

• Citizen security, a concept that extends to non-security sectors (for example, education, infrastructure and livelihoods), can be a helpful lens in designing more comprehensive interventions required to counter OC.

• Where gender-responsive SSR is advocated, it is often reduced to adding women to programming and institutions, without addressing the structural, institutional and cultural barriers to meaningful engagement.

• An effective system for combatting transnational OC requires the development of entities and mechanisms aimed at building operational cooperation and coordination among the security agencies of different states.

This Evidence Review Paper demonstrates the importance of adopting an OC-informed perspective in SSR/G and a SSR/G-informed perspective in addressing OC. By exploring the interlinkages, complementarities and trade-offs between security and justice sectors and their reforms, on the one hand, and countering OC, on the other, this paper seeks to provide insights into these perspectives.

SOC ACE Evidence Review Paper No. 05. Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham 2024. 97p.