By Lucas Bartolomé -Chairperson, Mihnea Dorneanu -Chairperson

At the present time, the demand for drugs is growing as strong as ever, and to meet this demand, criminal organizations set up drug production operations, particularly in politically unstable regions, often with the collaboration of local militias. These operations help fund the violence and many other criminal activities committed by these organizations, including money laundering, wildlife trading, smuggling, prostitution, human trafficking, and modern-day slavery. Furthermore, the kind of drugs grown are harmful both to the growers of the raw material in the origin country, as they are often trapped in cycles of poverty which inhibit economic development, as well as to the users, due to the societal harm addiction causes upon the population. Therefore, it is essential to fight against the drug trade and find ways to mitigate its effect; however, this is notoriously difficult. Typically, the mechanism for these kinds of operations is the following: farmers in politically unstable regions are forced to grow the plants from which drugs are extracted as they are the only ones from which they are able to make a living; they do this under the protection of local warlords or militias, to whom they often have to pay tax to. Raw opium is delivered, generally through local middlemen, to the criminal organizations that handle the refining and distribution to the rest of the world. This is usually done with either the tacit acceptance of the government, which might consider the militias as strategically useful, or by bribing corrupt government officials who will turn a blind eye. Nowadays in Asia, there exist two main areas where drug production is rampant. These are the socalled "Golden Crescent" and "Golden Triangle". The Golden Crescent covers parts of Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran, though production is nowadays mostly concentrated in Afghanistan. The area has had a long history of cultivating poppies in order to extract opium at a small scale; nonetheless, with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, many mujahideen guerrillas turned to poppy farming and opium refining as a source of income, and this continued and increased throughout the end of the Soviet occupation, and the beginning of Taliban rule, as Afghanistan became the world's major source of opioids and replaced Iran and Pakistan's dominance in the region. This lasted right up until the Taliban introduced a ban on poppy farming in 2001, which was brutally enforced and caused a sharp drop in poppy farming with an accompanying skyrocketing of the price. This was short-lived as the September 11th attacks soon occurred and the ensuing invasion of the country by the United States yet again plunged the area into conflict and poppy production once more became the only source of income for many farmers. Despite many attempts by the democratic Afghan government, to this day Afghanistan continues to be the world's largest producer of opioids, which mostly get trafficked to Europe and North America, and the end of the Afghan War and resumption of Taliban rule don't seem to have put a stop to it. Despite nominally being against the drug trade, the Taliban has been accused of using poppy farming to secure its own funding and of intentionally causing the spike in price in 2001 to sell its own reserves at a higher price. The democratic government seemed more inclined to genuinely try to solve the problem; however, local corrupt officials severely undermined its efforts. Though the Golden Crescent's main export is opium, recent forays into the production of synthetic drugs such as methamphetamines have been reported, and the region is also the top exporter of cannabis.

Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Model United Nations of Bucharest, 2023. 30p.

By Izedomi Ayeni

Purpose: The purpose of this phenomenological qualitative study was to discover the attitudes and perceptions of police officers on the legalization of recreational cannabis and crime.

Methodology: This qualitative, phenomenological methodology employed the use of semi-structured interview questions consisting of open-ended questions to understand the lived experiences of Colorado Police and Sheriff Officers and their perspectives on the experiences with the legalization of cannabis and crime. The sample size of 16 officers was selected from the sampling frame, which included Denver Police officers and Larimer County Sheriff officers.

Findings: Analysis of the data from interviews resulted in the identification of 14 major findings; 1) Officers oppose legalization; 2) Officers have an unfavorable opinion regarding legalization because they feel it can lead to increased access/use of illicit drugs; 3) Officers feel that the only reason the state legalized cannabis is for the tax revenue it generates for the state; 4) Officers’ viewpoint is that legalization has led to more violent crimes; 5) Officers perceive that Amendment 64 was designed to change perceptions about legal recreational marijuana; 6) Officers feel that legalization has led to an increase in burglary; 7) Officers are cognizant of the possibility of an increase in organized crime activities; 8) Officers expressed displeasure with the decriminalization of non-medical use, possession, and purchase of narcotics; 9) Officers express how an increase in crime has negatively impacted policing efforts; 10) Officers attribute an increase in homelessness and transient population as a symptom of the legalization of recreational cannabis; 11) Officers express frustration with lack of effective regulation; 12) Officers expressed that legalization has had no effect on timely responses to crime; 13) Officers expressed that the biggest challenge faced is maneuvering the demands of state versus federal law; 14) Officers express frustration in navigating the legal requirements relating to legal search and seizure.

Conclusions: As more states are considering legalizing cannabis for recreational use, these findings present significant suggestions for the state legislature and the members of the law enforcement community in those states.

Recommendations: Additional research should be conducted in other states to expand on the perceptions of the law enforcement community pre-and post-legalization of recreational cannabis and the impact it has on crime.

Irvine, CA: Brandman University, 2020. 217p.

By Ty Miller

In December of 2012, Washington and Colorado implemented the legalization of possession and use of marijuana for recreational purposes. Following this, January of 2014, Colorado opened the first recreational marijuana dispensaries in the United States. Although the debate about recreational marijuana has been fought in the public and academic spheres, we have limited empirical data as to the effect of these policies. With this, arguments in regard to whether marijuana should be legalized in the United States have far outpaced reliable scientific research. As more states, and potentially the federal government, begin to vote on whether to legalize, reliable research will be necessary. Sociology provides possible theoretical justifications for both sides of the recreational marijuana debate. However, there is still relatively little research on the effects of legalization in the United States. The current project analyzes changes in measures of excessive drinking, crime, DUI-related fatalities, and DUI arrests in Washington and Colorado following legalization of recreational marijuana. Each set of analyses are carried out in two parts. First, I examine the effects of legalizing possession and use in 2013. Second, I examine the effects of opening recreational dispensaries in Colorado in 2014. These separate analyses are utilized to uncover any shock-effects that might be inherently tied to legalization of possession and use or the opening of recreational dispensaries. Results indicate that, in most of the analyses, there are no significant effects of either part of legalization on the outcome variables of interest. The lone significant effect is that policing of DUI appears to increase following the legalization of possession and use in Washington and Colorado in 2013. The implications of these findings for both sociological theory and policy-making are discussed in the concluding chapter

West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University, 2018. 282p.

By Marie Gottschalk

A closer examination of media coverage, the response of law enforcement and policy makers, the legislative record, and the availability of proven, highquality treatments for substance abuse casts doubt on claims that the country pivoted toward public health and harm-reduction strategies to address the opioid crisis because its victims were disproportionately white people. Law enforcement solutions directed at people who use and sell street drugs continue to far outpace public health and harm-reduction strategies. Government support for expanding access to proven treatments for opioid use disorder that save and rebuild lives remains paltry given the scale of this public health catastrophe. And although the rhetoric has been somewhat more sympathetic, at times it rivals the excesses of the crack era. The article examines the various phases of the opioid crisis as they have unfolded over the past 25 years; related geographic and racial shifts in overdose fatalities with each new phase; media coverage of the crisis; the federal government’s response, including by the US Congress and presidents from George H.W. Bush to Joe Biden; punitive developments at the state and local levels; and the country’s poor record on prevention and making effective treatment widely available for people with substance use disorder.

Annual Review of Criminology, 2023. 6:363–98 . 39p.

By Jeffrey A. Singer and Trevor Burrus

Fifty‐one years after President Richard M. Nixon declared a “war on drugs,” overdose deaths from illicit drug use have climbed to record levels. Last November, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention reported 100,000 overdose deaths for the 12‐month period ending in April 2021, a 28.5 percent increase over the year before. Nearly 76,000 of those deaths were opioid related, and 83 percent of opioid‐related deaths involved illicit fentanyl.

Fentanyl is a highly potent opioid—about 50 times stronger than heroin—that can easily cause overdoses, particularly if users don’t know if it is in their drug supply or how much. Over the past decade, drug traffickers have increasingly preferred fentanyl because of its compact size. The smuggler’s preference for higher potency drugs is a manifestation of the “iron law of prohibition,” and it is almost the entire reason fentanyl has poisoned the American drug supply. The iron law of prohibition states that, all things being equal, as enforcement ramps up, smugglers prefer higher potency forms of a drug for the same reason those who sneak alcohol into a football game prefer hard alcohol in flasks to 12‐packs of beer. The lethal logic of the iron law of prohibition means that we cannot enforce our way out of the opioid crisis. And if fentanyl smugglers bexcome somehow easy to catch, there’s always carfentanil, which is about 100 times more potent than fentanyl and has already been showing up in America’s drug supply.

Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 2022. 10p.

By Jeffrey A. Singer and Sophia Heimow 

  Every state except Alaska has laws that criminalize the possession and/or sale of paraphernalia for the consumption of illicit drugs. State-level drug paraphernalia laws prevent people who use those drugs from accessing the means to reduce the risk of infection or overdose. This makes nonmedical drug use even more dangerous because the laws often prevent access to clean needles and syringes along with products to test drugs for deadly contaminants. These laws are meant to discourage illicit drug use. Instead, they produce avoidable disease and death. Drug prohibition puts peaceful, voluntary drug users at risk of losing their liberty and often their lives. Paraphernalia laws similarly increase the risk that users will lose their lives. Some states have amended their laws to permit harmreduction programs and tools. For example, many states allow syringe services programs (also called SSPs or “needle exchange programs”) to operate within narrowly defined parameters. The goal of drug paraphernalia policy should be to save lives by reducing the risks of overdose and disease. This means removing government barriers to obtaining and distributing clean syringes and drug testing equipment. Because Alaska leaves residents free to purchase syringes and other paraphernalia in any quantity, anyone can operate an SSP and implement other harm-reduction measures. States should follow Alaska’s lead by repealing their drug paraphernalia laws so that programs aimed at reducing overdoses and disease can proliferate and succeed.

Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 2022. 24p.

By Trevor Burrus and Jeffrey A. Singer.

People have used opium and its derivatives both medically and recreationally since antiquity. However, since the early 20th century, law and society have viewed people who use opioids, cocaine, and certain other psychoactive substances as immoral and even criminal. For more than 100 years, this viewpoint has destructively intruded on the patient‐doctor relationship. Government and law enforcement increasingly surveil and influence the way doctors treat pain, psychoactive substance use, and substance use disorder. This change has happened in two discernible waves, which we call Drug War I and Drug War II.

Drug War I occurred after Congress enacted the Harrison Narcotics Act in 1914, which permitted doctors to prescribe opioids to treat their patients. A wave of arrests and prosecutions of thousands of doctors ensued as agents of the U.S. Treasury Department, empowered to enforce the act, took it upon themselves to define legitimate medical practice.

Drug War II began in the 1970s, with government‐funded education/indoctrination campaigns that caused both doctors and patients to fear opioids for their addictive and overdose potential. Later, as the scientific literature led medical specialty organizations and government health officials to overcome this apprehension and take the treatment of pain more seriously, opioid prescribing increased considerably.

By 2006, federal regulatory agencies perceived what they called an “opioid crisis” and mistakenly attributed it to doctors “overprescribing” opioids and generating a growing population of opioid addicts. This formed the basis for an even more massive intrusion of federal and state power into the privacy of medical records, patient‐doctor confidentiality, and the very way in which doctors are allowed to use scientific and professional knowledge to practice medicine. Medical decisionmaking came increasingly under the purview of law enforcement, sparking a new wave of arrests and prosecutions.

Patients who had their pain controlled with long‐term opioid treatment are being denied treatment or involuntarily tapered off their pain control, as doctors fear arrest and an end to their medical careers. A growing population of “pain refugees” has emerged, with some patients turning in desperation to the black market for opioids and some even turning to suicide. As prescribing rates continue to plunge, overdoses from the nonmedical use of opioids are skyrocketing, now largely caused by illicit fentanyl.

The medical mismanagement of pain, which causes harm to patients, is best addressed through the civil tort system. Additionally, states establish professional licensing boards specifically to enforce the “standard of care” rendered by the professionals they oversee. Law enforcement has no medical expertise and should have no say in classifying narcotics and psychoactive substances. Lawmakers should avoid passing or repeal any laws that cast in stone prescribing guidelines released by any state or federal public health agencies. Federal and state law enforcement should be required to get a warrant before perusing state prescription drug monitoring program databases. Law enforcement should be required to report any suspected standard‐of‐care deviations to state professional licensing boards for review and adjudication. Neither the practice of medicine nor the act of self‐medication belongs in the realm of the criminal legal system.

Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 2022. 37p.

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)

This report examines the emergence of new hubs for cocaine trafficking, noting that countries in Southeastern Europe and Africa – particularly those in West and Central Africa – are increasingly being used as key transit zones for the drug. Ports on the North Sea like Antwerp, Rotterdam, and Hamburg, meanwhile, have eclipsed traditional entry points in Spain and Portugal for cocaine arriving in Western Europe. Traffickers are also diversifying their routes in Central America by sending more and more cocaine to Europe, in addition to North America.

The modalities of cocaine traffickers are also examined in this report, with findings showing that the criminal landscape is fragmenting into a myriad of trafficking networks. The demobilization of fighters from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) - who had previously controlled many of Colombia’s coca-growing regions – created an opening for others to step in, such as new, local actors; ex-FARC guerillas; or even foreign groups from Mexico and Europe. Additionally, the report reveals that so-called “service providers”, i.e., specialized groups that lend their services at all stages of the supply chain for a fee, have proliferated.

Vienna: UNODC, 2023. 184p.

By Jeffrey A. Singer

Dr. Rahul Gupta, the White House director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy, stated the Biden administration would be “prioritizing harm-reduction practices because these are proven, cost-effective and evidence-based methods that work to save lives.”1 Overdose prevention centers (OPCs) are a successful harm-reduction strategy that has been saving lives in 16 developed countries—including the United States, where such facilities operate in defiance of the law. OPCs, also known as safe consumption sites or drug consumption rooms, began in Europe in the mid-1980s.2 Governments and harm-reduction organizations now operate OPCs in much of Europe, Canada, Mexico, and Australia. Unfortunately, a federal law that prosecutors and harm reduction opponents call the “crack house” statute (21 U.S.C. Section 856) makes them illegal in the United States.3 Some OPCs in the United States operate in the shadows. Underground OPCs have been providing services since at least 2014. More recently, state and local officials have been approving OPCs in defiance of federal law. This policy brief reviews how OPCs are an effective, mainstream harm-reduction strategy. Congress should stop standing in the way of local harm-reduction organizations that seek to reduce overdose deaths by establishing OPCs.

Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 2023. 12p.