By Dorothy Kronick 

Some theories predict that profits facilitate peace in illegal markets, while others predict that profits fuel violence. I provide empirical evidence from drug trafficking in Venezuela. Using original data, I compare lethal violence trends in municipalities near a major trafficking route to trends elsewhere, both before and after the counternarcotics policy in neighboring Colombia increased the use of Venezuelan transport routes. For thirty years before this policy change, lethal violence trends were similar; afterward, outcomes diverged: violence increased more along the trafficking route than elsewhere. Together with qualitative accounts, these findings illuminate the conditions under which profits fuel violence in illegal markets. 

Journal of Conflict Resolution 2020, Vol. 64(7-8) 1499-1523 ª The Author(s) 2020 

By Juan Camilo Castillo and Dorothy Kronick

Drug traffickers sometimes share profits peacefully. Other times they fight. We propose a model to investigate this variation, focusing on the role of the state. Seizing illegal goods can paradoxically increase traffickers’ profits and higher profits fuel violence. Killing kingpins makes crime bosses short-sighted, also fueling conflict. Only by targeting the most violent traffickers can the state reduce violence without increasing supply. These results help explain empirical patterns of violence in the drug war, which is less studied than interstate or civil war but often as deadly 

American Political Science Review (2020) 114, 3, 874–887