By Vidhya Ramalingam

Far-right extremism remains a worrying problem across Europe. The most visible cases are those that hit the headlines, such as the discovery of the National Socialist Underground in Germany or Anders Behring Breivik’s attacks in Norway. In the past decade, both Hungary and Sweden were hit by a string of serial murders of Roma and ethnic minorities. Though attacks of this magnitude and scale remain rare, they are not unheard of. In some cases, those personally touched by these violent attacks are still fighting for justice. While high-profile and high-impact events hit the headlines, the bulk of the threat posed by the far right is felt through smaller-scale localised harassment, bullying and hate crime by extremists targeting minority communities. These kinds of incidences often go undetected, and indeed they are hard to quantify. They manifest in the sectioning off of some local areas as no-go zones for ethnic minorities, graffiti of far-right symbols on mosques and synagogues, or threats received by individual members of the community. Those carrying out these actions – far-right extremists – are a broad group, ranging from less ideological youth street gangs to neo-Nazi terrorist cells, anti-Islam activists and registered political parties. Though they differ in their aims and methods, there are some defining features: racism, xenophobia, ultra-nationalism and authoritarianism.

London: Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2014. 77p.

By F. Cilluffo, G.B. Saathoff, et. al

Savvy use of the Internet has empowered terror networks to expand their reach beyond national borders by enabling wide distribution of a compelling message and social connectivity with new audiences. Use of computer-mediated communication (CMC) has made a range of terrorist operational activities cheaper, faster, and more secure, including communications, fundraising, planning and coordination, training, information gathering and data mining, propaganda and misinformation dissemination, and radicalization and recruitment. The list is long, and not even complete. Before the Internet, terrorists seeking to communicate with one another through electronic means used telephones or radios, which could be tapped. Terrorists seeking to offer training meant congregating trainers and trainees in a fixed training location, exposing the group to capture or worse. Terrorists or their supporters engaged in fundraising or recruitment often pursued these aims in public settings. And terrorists researching a potential target often did so at public libraries and bookstores, subjecting them to surveillance in these public spaces. Now, with the Internet, all of these same activities can be conducted in relative anonymity from safe locations across the globe.

Washington, DC: Homeland Security Policy Institute, The George Washington University; Charlottesville, VA: The Critical Incident Analysis Group (CIAG) University of Virginia School of Medicine, 2007. 34p.

By Brian Michael Jenkins

The U.S. homeland faces a multilayered threat from terrorist organizations. Homegrown jihadists account for most of the terrorist activity in the United States since 9/11. Efforts by jihadist terrorist organizations to inspire terrorist attacks in the United States have thus far yielded meager results. No American jihadist group has emerged to sustain a terrorist campaign, and there is no evidence of an active jihadist underground to support a continuing terrorist holy war. The United States has invested significant resources in preventing terrorist attacks, and authorities have been able to uncover and thwart most of the terrorist plots. This Perspective identifies 86 plots to carry out terrorist attacks and 22 actual attacks since 9/11 involving 178 planners and perpetrators. Eighty-seven percent of those planners and perpetrators had long residencies in the United States. Only four of them had come to the United States illegally, all as minors. Nationality is a poor predictor of later terrorist activity, and vetting people coming to the United States, no matter how rigorous, cannot identify those who radicalize here. Determining whether a young teenager might, more than 12 years later, turn out to be a jihadist terrorist would require the bureaucratic equivalent of divine foresight.

Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2017. 98p.

By Lynn M. Wright

The domestic terrorist threat in the United States is active and complex, with ongoing threats from violent left- and right-wing extremist groups, and radicalization and recruitment efforts by international terrorist groups. In response, domestic intelligence agencies, at all levels of government, have instituted reforms and improvements since 9/11, but there are still gaps in information-sharing and community engagement. For example, a review of the Boston Marathon bombings uncovered that important risk-based information was not shared with local law enforcement. Concerning domestic terrorism, the United States may, once again, be failing to “connect the dots.” This thesis synthesizes existing studies, reports, and expert testimony concerning domestic terrorism and the roles of domestic intelligence agencies, law enforcement, and the public, and proposes the development and implementation of a formal, national counterterrorism (CT) doctrine. The CT doctrine, in conjunction with a counter radicalization strategy, should focus on bottom-up intelligence/information-sharing, training to strengthen and focus intelligence collection efforts, and culturally sensitive and engaging messaging on social media and the Internet to counter extremist propaganda.

Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School. 2014. 116p.

By Jerome P. Bjelopera

The emphasis of counterterrorism policy in the United States since Al Qaeda’s attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11) has been on jihadist terrorism. However, in the last decade, domestic terrorists—people who commit crimes within the homeland and draw inspiration from U.S.-based extremist ideologies and movements—have killed American citizens and damaged property across the country. Not all of these criminals have been prosecuted under federal terrorism statutes, which does not imply that domestic terrorists are taken any less seriously than other terrorists. The Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) do not officially designate domestic terrorist organizations, but they have openly delineated domestic terrorist “threats.” These include individuals who commit crimes in the name of ideologies supporting animal rights, environmental rights, anarchism, white supremacy, anti-government ideals, black separatism, and beliefs about abortion

Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2017. 62p.

By Kate Buchanan

This publication identifies a number of areas where additional steps are needed to tackle the availability and misuse of small arms. It points to promising policy initiatives, draws on lessons learned, and sets out recommendations for action. The main themes addressed are:- Preventing misuse- Controlling supply- Providing assistance to survivors of gun violence- Focusing on gender- Taking guns and ammunition out of circulation- Addressing the demand for small arms- Justice and security sector governance. This publication is designed specifically for government representatives, to provide a compelling people-centred agenda for the next phase of multilateral small arms activity, and will be widely distributed in the lead-up to the UN Review Conference on small arms.

Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 162p.

By Philip Alpers and Amélie Rossetti

Four consecutive formal reports have now found that no Australian State or Territory has at any stage fully complied with the 1996 or 2002 firearm resolutions which collectively formed the National Firearms Agreement. In important areas, State and Territory legislation has been blocked or revised to dilute the effect of the NFA. This report, commissioned and funded by Gun Control Australia, finds that on balance, both non-compliance from day one and two decades of political pressure have steadily reduced restrictions and undermined the NFA’s original intent.

Sydney: Gun Control Australia, 1997. 102p.

By Philp Alpers

In a typical year 99 New Zealanders are shot to death: one for every 88 hours.12 Of these, 75% are suicides, 12% homicides, and 11% accidents.13 In an average year, 13 children and youths aged 19 or younger die from gunshot wounds and another 89 people are admitted to hospital with nonfatal wounds. Our gun death toll is 15% higher than the toll from cervical cancer. For every ten New Zealanders who die from HIV/AIDS, sixteen die by gunshot. Gun death is three times more common than death by fire. Of all victims of gun homicide in this country during 1992-94, most (52.5%) were shot by a licensed gun owner. Almost all victims (95%) were killed by a familiar male. Half were shot by their partner, an estranged partner or a member of their own family. Previously law-abiding, licensed gun owners shoot between four and ten times as many victims as do people with a previous history of mental illness. Self defence is not an acceptable reason for gun ownership in New Zealand. The great majority of private firearms are held for pest control, agricultural and sporting purposes. While most gun owners are licensed every ten years, 97% of their firearms (shotguns and rifles) have not been registered to their owners since 1984. The remaining 3% – military-style semi-automatic rifles (MSSAs), handguns (pistols & revolvers), and restricted weapons (mainly fully automatic “machine guns”) – are individually registered to each owner and much more carefully controlled. As a result, crime with registered firearms is rare.

Wellington, ZN: New Zealand Police Association, 1997. 48p.

By Philp Alpers

In New Zealand, 250,000 licensed shooters own an estimated 1.1 million firearms, enough for one in each occupied dwelling and sufficient to outnumber the combined small-arms of the police and armed forces by a ratio of 30 to 1. We own 11 times as many guns per capita as the English and the Welsh, 60% more than the Australians but less than half as many as the residents of the United States. An additional 14,000 guns are imported to New Zealand in a typical year. Any New Zealander with a basic firearms licence may legally buy and keep any number of sporting rifles and shotguns in any home without any official records of the guns being kept anywhere. Police have no statutory authority to monitor the size and content of such a gun owner’s collection. Each day an average of seven firearm offences involving danger to life are reported to the police, while one in five homicides are committed with a firearm. In a typical year 91 New Zealanders are shot to death: one for every four days. Of these, 75% are suicides, 12% accidents, 11% homicides, while in 2% of cases the cause is undetermined. In an average year, 13 children aged 15 or younger die from gunshot wounds. Our gun death toll is 10% higher than the toll from cervical cancer. For every ten New Zealanders who die from HIV/AIDS, fifteen die by gunshot. Gun death is three times more common than death by fire. In addition to gun killings, non-fatal gun injuries result in one New Zealander being hospitalised on average every four days. Of all victims of gun homicide in this country during 1992-94, most (52.5%) were shot by a licensed gun owner. Almost all victims (95%) were killed by a familiar male. Half were shot by their partner, an estranged partner or a member of their own family. Of the perpetrators, 82% had no previous history of violent crime, while none had a history of mental illness.

Wellington, NZ: New Zealand Police Association, 1996. 38p.

By Philip Alpers

In New Zealand, 250,000 licensed shooters own an estimated 1.1 million firearms, enough for one in each occupied dwelling and sufficient to outnumber the combined small-arms of the police and armed forces by a ratio of 30 to 1. We own 16 times as many guns per capita as the English and the Welsh, 60% more than the Australians but less than half as many as the residents of the United States. An additional 14,000 guns are imported to New Zealand in a typical year. Each day an average of seven firearm offences involving danger to life are reported to the police, while one in five homicides are committed with a firearm. On average, one person dies by gunshot in New Zealand every four days. Despite a common certainty that firearms are increasingly misused, there has been little local research. Although critical data on the misuse of firearms are collected by police, these are not made available.

Wellington NZ: New Zealand Police Association, 1996. 33p.

Edited by Nils Duquet

This edited volume offers an in-depth and detailed insight into Project SAFTE’s research findings. In-depth country studies were conducted in eight EU member states by research teams from the Flemish Peace Institute, SIPRI, SSSA, Arquebus Solutions, Small Arms Survey and Bureau Bruinsma. The in-depth qualitative research methodology involved desk research and semi-structured interviews with key international actors and stakeholders such as Europol, EMPACT Firearms, Interpol, SEESAC and the Office of the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator. The volume sheds light on how illegal firearms markets are structured in the EU and shows how terrorists access these.

Brussels: Flemish Peace Institute, 2018. 484p.

By Columbine Review Commission

The Commission conducted 15 meetings open to members of the public. The Commission received statements from an extensive list of State and local officials and private persons who had experience with or information concerning the event; Commission staff reviewed thousands of pages of official and unofficial documents, reports, and studies. Two recommendations related to crisis response actions. First, law enforcement policy and training should emphasize that the highest priority of law enforcement officers, after arriving at the scene of a crisis, is to stop any ongoing assault. Second, there should be an increased emphasis on training appropriate personnel in preparation for and responding to large-scale emergencies. Two recommendations pertained to improved communications for critical emergencies. First, law enforcement agencies should plan their communications systems to facilitate crisis communication with other agencies with whom they might reasonably be expected to interface in emergencies. Second, Colorado should continue to develop a single statewide digital trunked communications system. Other categories of recommendations pertained to advance planning for critical emergencies; interaction with media representatives; tasks of school resource officers; detection by school administrators of potential perpetrators of school-based violence and administrative countermeasures; medical treatment for attack victims; reuniting attack victims and their families; identification of victims' bodies and family access to bodies; and suicide prevention in the aftermath of traumatic incidents.

Denver, Colo. : Columbine Review Commission, 2001. 174p.

By The Office of the Child Advocate

In January, 2013, the Office of the Child Advocate was directed by the Connecticut Child Fatality Review Panel to prepare a report that would focus on Adam Lanza (hereinafter referred to as AL), and include a review of the circumstances that pre-dated his commission of mass murder at Sandy Hook Elementary School. The charge was to develop any recommendations for public health system improvement that emanated from the review. Authors of this report focused on AL’s developmental, educational, and mental health profile over time, the services he received from various community providers, and ultimately his condition prior to his actions on December 14, 2012. Authors looked for any warning signs, red flags, or other lessons that could be learned from a review of AL’s life. It was not the primary purpose of this investigation to explicitly examine the role of guns in the Sandy Hook shootings. However, the conclusion cannot be avoided that access to guns is relevant to an examination of ways to improve the public health. Access to assault weapons with high capacity magazines did play a major role in this and other mass shootings in recent history. Our emphasis on AL’s developmental trajectory and issues of mental illness should not be understood to mean that these issues were considered more important than access to these weapons or that we do not consider such access to be a critical public health issue.

Hartford, CT : State of Connecticut, Office of the Child Advocate, 2014. 114p.

By William S. Pollack, William.; Modzeleski, and Rooney, Georgeann

In the wake of several high-profile shootings at schools in the United States, most notably the shootings that occurred at Columbine High School on April 20, 1999, the United States Secret Service (Secret Service) and the United States Department of Education (ED) embarked on a collaborative endeavor to study incidents of planned (or "targeted") violence in the nation's schools. Initiated in 1999, the study, termed the Safe School Initiative (SSI), examined several issues, most notably whether past school-based attacks were planned, and what could be done to prevent future attacks. The SSI findings highlight that in most targeted school-based attacks, individuals, referred to as "bystanders" in this report, had some type of advanced knowledge about planned school violence. Despite this advanced knowledge, the attacks still occurred. This study aimed to further the prevention of targeted school-based attacks by exploring how students with prior knowledge of attacks made decisions regarding what steps, if any, to take after learning the information. The study sought to identify what might be done to encourage more students to share information they learn about potential targeted school-based violence with one or more adults. Six key findings were identified. Given the small sample size and the exploratory nature of the study, generalization from these findings may be limited. The findings are: (1) The relationships between the bystanders and the attackers, as well as when and how the bystanders came upon information about the planned attacks, varied; (2) Bystanders shared information related to a threat along a continuum that ranged from bystanders who took no action to those who actively conveyed the information; (3) School climate affected whether bystanders came forward with information related to the threats; (4) Some bystanders disbelieved that the attacks would occur and thus did not report them; (5) Bystanders often misjudged the likelihood and immediacy of the planned attack; and (6) In some situations, parents and parental figures influenced whether the bystander reported the information related to the potential attack to school staff or other adults in positions of authority,

Washington, DC: United States Secret Service and United States Department of Education, 2008. 15p.

By Alex P. Schmid

Based on an in-depth literature review, Research Fellow Dr. Alex P. Schmid explores the terms “radicalisation”, “de-radicalisation” and “counter-radicalisation” and the discourses surrounding them. Much of the literature on radicalisation focuses on Islamist extremism and jihadist terrorism. This is also reflected in this Research Paper which explores the relationship between radicalisation, extremism and terrorism. Historically, “radicalism” – contrary to “extremism” – does not necessarily have negative connotations, nor is it a synonym for terrorism. Schmid argues that both extremism and radicalism can only be properly assessed in relation to what is mainstream political thought in a given period. The paper further explores what we know well and what we know less well about radicalisation. It proposes to explore radicalisation not only on the micro-level of “vulnerable individuals” but also on the meso-level of the “radical milieu” and the macro-level of “radicalising public opinion and political parties”. The author reconceptualises radicalisation as a process that can occur on both sides of conflict dyads and challenges several widespread assumptions. The final section examines various counter-radicalisation and deradicalisation programmes. It concludes with a series of policy recommendations.

The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2013. 105p.

Edited by Jan Willem Duyvendak and James M. Jasper.

In this important book, Jan Willem Duyvendak and James M. Jasper bring together an internationally acclaimed group of contributors to demonstrate the complexities of the social and political spheres in various areas of public policy. By breaking down the state into the players who really make decisions and pursue coherent strategies, these essays provide new perspectives on the interactions between political protestors and the many parts of the state—from courts, political parties, and legislators to police, armies, and intelligence services. By analyzing politics as the interplay of various players within structured arenas, <i>Breaking Down the State</i> provides an innovative look at law and order versus opposition movements in countries across the globe.

Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2015. 246p.

By The Federal Commission on School Safety

Communities across the country are responding to school violence with a number of measures, including assigned school resource officers (SRO). School administrations, law enforcement agencies, families, and community stakeholders are diligently working to protect children and education personnel from school attacks. The National Police Foundation (NPF), in collaboration with the COPS Office, created the Averted School Violence (ASV) database in 2015 as a platform for law enforcement, school staff, and mental health professionals to share information about ASV incidents and lessons learned with the goal of mitigating and ultimately preventing future injuries and fatalities in educational institutions. The database includes school incidents beginning with the Columbine High School attack (1999) and continuing to the present day. The NPF has partnered with stakeholder groups National Association of School Resource Officers (NASRO) and the International Association of Campus Law Enforcement Administrators (IACLEA) to conduct research and analysis on improving school safety. This report examines a dozen case studies of targeted violence incidents thwarted by the positive and often heroic actions of classmates, school administrators, SROs, and law enforcement agencies. It also includes recommendations and lessons learned from all cases in the ASV database. In addition, a companion publication entitled Targeted Violence Averted: College and University Case Studies presents information on post-secondary averted violence incidents and lessons learned to support student safety.

Washington, DC: Department of Education, Department of Health and Human Services, Department of Homeland Security and Department of Justice, 2018. 180p.

By Peter Langman, Anthony Petrosino, and Hannah Sutherland

School shootings are the subject of debate in the media and in communities across the United States, and there is much discussion about prevention and the root causes of such attacks. But what does research say about these tragic events and their perpetrators? Do all shooters fit a specific profile? And what meaningful steps can schools and communities take to reduce the likelihood of these events? In concise, clear language, this research brief, produced by the WestEd Justice & Prevention Research Center, describes and refutes five common misconceptions about school shootings and suggests an evidence-based strategy to reduce the probability of attacks. The authors conclude that schools and communities are better served when presented with a balanced perspective informed by the wealth of available research about perpetrators, their varying motivations, and pre-attack behaviors.

San Francisco, CA: WestEd Justice and Prevention Research Center, 2018. 5p.

By Jaclyn Schildkraut

The first five months of 2021 saw high-profile public mass shootings in cities across the United States of America, like Atlanta, Georgia (March 16, 8 dead), Boulder, Colorado (March 22, 10 dead), Indianapolis, Indiana (April 15, 8 dead), and San Jose, California (May 26, 9 dead). Following a year where such events rarely made headlines as the nation found itself in the throes of the coronavirus pandemic, these incidents revived the public discourse about mass shootings in America, as well as how to prevent and respond to such tragedies. This dialogue raised an important question: As society returns to normal after the COVID-19 pandemic, what does the future of mass shootings look like? To answer this, it is important to understand the trends associated with the phenomenon of mass shootings. The first issuance of this policy brief in 2018 examined 51 years (1966-2016) of mass shootings data based on a comprehensive database from researchers Jaclyn Schildkraut and H. Jaymi Elsass.3 As described below, the researchers developed their own definition that became the foundation of this analysis given deficiencies with existing classifications and data sources. This updated brief provides analyses including an additional four new years of data since the original 2018 policy brief to identify changes in trends and broader considerations for policymakers, particularly given the COVID-19 pandemic’s impact and lessons learned from specific shootings within this period. Specifically, this brief presents and analyzes a total of 55 years of mass shooting data from 1966 to 2020, including frequency, injury and fatality, location type, weapon usage, and perpetrator demographics. The appendix contains information on only the most recent four years of data from 2017 to 2020.

Albany, NY: Rockefeller Institute of Government, 2021. 25p.

By International Crisis Group

Once regarded as a minor hub in Mexico’s criminal economy, Veracruz is now confronting the harrowing truths from over a decade of violence and grand corruption. At least 2,750 people are believed to have disappeared in a state whose former governor is wanted for embezzlement on numerous counts. The murders of seventeen journalists from 2010 onwards are the most notorious examples of a whirlwind of killings that targeted, among others, legal professionals, police officers, potential witnesses to crimes and any civilians who dared check the ambitions of a multitude of criminal organisations and their political accomplices. A new governor from the opposition National Action Party (PAN) has promised to clean out the state and prosecute wrongdoers, fostering hopes that peace can be restored. But as economic turbulence threatens the country, and bankruptcy looms over Veracruz, strong international support will be crucial to bolster initiatives aimed at finding the bodies of the disappeared, investigating past crimes, and transforming the state’s police force and prosecution service. Veracruz is emblematic of the challenges facing the country as a whole. Threats by the new U.S. administration to curb Mexican imports and fortify the border to keep out undocumented immigrants imperils its southern neighbour’s economic prospects. Similarly, President Trump’s predilection for armed force to combat cartels ignores the harm produced by the militarisation of public security as well as its proven ineffectiveness. But Mexican voices demanding a stronger national response are hamstrung by the extreme unpopularity of political leaders and public estrangement from government. Corruption and perceived criminal complicity have undermined the legitimacy of the Mexican government at all levels, especially at the tier of the country’s 31 regional states. Baptised “viceroys” as a result of the extraordinary powers granted them during Mexico’s transition from one-party regime to multiparty democracy, state governors have also become some of the country’s most disreputable public authorities. Since 2010, eleven state governors have come under investigation for corruption. In Veracruz, an alliance between criminal groups and the highest levels of local political power paved the way to an unbridled campaign of violence through the capture of local judicial and security institutions, guaranteeing impunity for both sides. Strengthening institutional probity and capacity in Veracruz, as in the rest of Mexico, will require federal and state levels to deliver on vows to work in partnership to staunch corruption, and on their willingness to abjure short-term political and electoral advantage. With the election of the new governor, Miguel Ángel Yunes Linares, the once hegemonic Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) lost power in the state for the first time in over 80 years. But the PRI remains in control at the federal level and has shown wavering commitment to Yunes’ reformist plans, not least because of the importance of securing votes from the region, the country’s third most populous, in the 2018 presidential election. The state’s budgetary crisis and the new governor’s two-year mandate make it highly unlikely that the state government could accomplish sweeping reform to Veracruz’s institutions without sustained federal backing.

Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2017. 41p.