Edited by Franklin E. Zimring and David S. Tanenhaus 

This Is a hopeful but complicated era for those with ambitions to reform the juvenile courts and youth-serving public institutions in the United States. As advocates plea for major reforms, many fear the public backlash in making dramatic changes. Choosing the Future for American Juvenile Justice provides a look at the recent trends in juvenile justice as well as suggestions for reforms and policy changes in the future. Should youth be treated as adults when they break the law? How can youth be deterred from crime? What factors should be considered in how youth are punished?What role should the police have in schools?

New York; London: New York University Press, 2014. 257p.

By Ieke de Vriesl, Michael Baglivio, and Joan A. Reid

Despite extant literature on individual-level risk factors for sex trafficking among children and adolescents, little is known about the impact of social and ecological contexts on risk of human trafficking victimization. The purpose of this study was to examine the correlates signaling risk of human trafficking victimization at the individual, family, social, and community levels utilizing a sample of 40,531 justice-involved male and female youth, a small fraction of whom were suspected or verified victims of human trafficking between 2011 and 2015 (N = 801, including 699 female and 102 male youth). Using this sample, we examined differences across individual, family, social, and community characteristics of youth involved in the juvenile justice system who have a history of trafficking victimization and youth without such histories. Series of logistic regression analyses were conducted using varying control groups, created through exact matching and randomized matching groups to address sample imbalances. These analyses indicate that, at the individual level, youth who had experienced childhood adversities were more likely to report human trafficking victimization. Sex differences were found regarding risk factors pertaining to the family and broader socio-ecological contexts. Female youth who had witnessed family violence had an antisocial partner or antisocial friends, or resided in a community with a greater proportion of the population being foreign-born or speaking English less than very well were at heightened risk for human trafficking victimization. Little evidence was found for community-level risk factors of victimization in this specific sample of justice-involved youth. These findings encourage more research to unpack the multilevel correlates of victimizations at the individual, family, social, and community levels, recognizing potential differences between female and male youth regarding the factors that put them at heightened risk for juvenile sex trafficking victimizations. Practice and policy should direct awareness and prevention measures to social and ecological contexts.

By Michael John Cahill, Sarah Napier, Dana Thomsen, Micheala McCaig and Heather Wolbers 

This study analyses Australian Bureau of Statistics data to examine trends in the rate of juveniles being proceeded against by police for sexual offences in Australia, from 2008–09 to 2020–21. Over the 13-year period, the rate of recorded sexual offences committed by juveniles per 100,000 population was consistently higher than the rate for adults. While recorded assaultive sexual offences committed by juveniles decreased during this period, recorded non-assaultive sexual offences increased notably, and were still increasing at the end of the study period.

The study highlights the need for increased focus on early intervention (from the age of 13 onwards) and prevention efforts targeting non-assaultive sexual offending by both sexes and assaultive sexual offences by male juveniles in Australia.

Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology. 2024, 16pg

By Richard A. Mendel

   After decades of neglect, the youth justice field is awakening to the importance of diversion in lieu of arrest and formal court processing for many or most youth accused of delinquent behavior. Even amid rising concerns over youth crime nationwide, jurisdictions across the country are heeding the evidence by taking concerted action to address more cases of alleged lawbreaking behavior outside the formal justice system. This momentum to make diversion a centerpiece of juvenile justice reform is encouraging given powerful research showing that youth who are diverted from the justice system are far less likely to be arrested for subsequent offenses and far more likely to succeed in education and employment than comparable youth who are arrested and prosecuted in juvenile court. Greater use of diversion is also essential to reduce the persistent racial and ethnic disparities that pervade youth justice systems. This brief details significant diversion reform efforts of several types.   

Washington, DC: The Sentencing Project, 2024. 22p.

By Richard A. Mendel

This brief provides recommendations for advocates on how best to understand and address the messaging challenge in order to build support for further progress expanding the use of diversion in youth justice. The recent momentum to expand the use of diversion in youth justice is long overdue. However, to reach its potential, advocates must deliver clear, consistent messages to inform the public and persuade public officials. This will require advocates to: ● Develop a clear and simple definition of diversion that makes effective community-based alternatives to the formal justice system understandable and appealing to policymakers and the public. (See Text Box on p.2 for a definition and sample elevator pitch to promote diversion.) ● Craft messages to promote youth diversion that are grounded in evidence of diversion’s benefits and are compelling to persuadable voters as well as elected officials and other policymakers. ● Tailor messages to the political sensibilities and civic culture of the local community, and target messages to specific audiences. ● Develop effective strategies to combat sensationalized, alarmist, poorly contextualized news coverage and political rhetoric that stoke public fears of youth crime and subvert constructive reform efforts. ● Augment arguments and evidence with real-world stories illustrating the benefits of diversion and the harms of formal court processing. Involve youth, families, and community members with direct experience in the youth justice system to tell their stories and highlight the importance of diversion in human terms.

Issue Brief #4

Washington, DC: The Sentencing Project, 2024. 7p.

By Richard A. Mendel

Robust data collection and analysis are essential tools in any effort to expand and improve the use of diversion. Without accurate and timely demographic data, advocates cannot highlight disparities in the use of diversion and push effectively for reforms. Without information on which youth are succeeding in diversion, system leaders cannot revise and improve practices to improve outcomes. Lasting progress in diversion from system involvement for youth requires state and local justice systems to set meaningful goals and carefully monitor results. If they are to understand and address disparities, states and localities must collect and analyze data, broken down by race and ethnicity, at every stage of the process. To hone their strategies and document diversion’s benefits as compared to formal justice system involvement, they also must track results – not merely recidivism, but also other outcomes related to youth well-being and success and victim satisfaction with the justice process. Ideally, justice systems should bring together stakeholder teams to review the available data, identify opportunities for expanded use of diversion, uncover decision points where disparities are occurring and their underlying causes, and then brainstorm and implement solutions to achieve equity

Washington, DC: The Sentencing Project, 2024. 7p.

Issue Brief #3  

By Richard A. Mendel

   Young people’s likelihood of avoiding future justice system contact and achieving success is affected not only by whether or not their cases are diverted from the justice system, but also by how their cases are handled once diverted. A growing consensus among youth justice experts supports several priorities regarding how best to organize and utilize youth diversion. Move responsibility for diverted youth out of the court system Too often, youth diverted from formal processing in court are overseen by prosecutors or probation officers in a process that can mirror traditional probation supervision. In 2020, the latest year for which data are available, more than 32,000 youth whose cases were not formally processed in court were nonetheless placed on probation caseloads. In practice, this type of informal probation often differs little from formal probation, with a long list of rules and requirements and the threat of returning to court for prosecution if youth don’t meet all expectations imposed on them. Adolescent development research and practical experience suggest strongly that this approach is misguided. Rather, the best practice is to divert youth away from the justice system and empower community partner organizations, as well as schools and families, to address young people’s misbehavior.

Issue Brief #2

Washington, DC: The Sentencing Project, 2024. 6p.

By  Sonja E. Siennick, William M. Casey, Brian J. Stults, Jhon A. Pupo, Dequan J. Cowell, Theodore R. Fronczak

This project was a three-year effort to (1) describe states’ current practices regarding the measurement of juvenile recidivism, (2) compare the rates and predictors of different measures of recidivism that varied in terms of marker events, follow-up lengths, and inclusion of adult system information, (3) compare the amount of program- and community-level variation in recidivism across different measures of recidivism, and (4) assist the state of Oregon in exploring potential changes to its current measure of juvenile recidivism. The study was a collaborative effort between Florida State University (FSU), the Florida Department of Juvenile Justice (FDJJ), and the Oregon Youth Authority (OYA). Archival data from FDJJ and OYA offered an opportunity to do what researchers had previously been unable to: analyze several different permutations of a reoffending measure based on the same sets of youth, and assess the robustness of findings across those permutations. The extent and prediction of juvenile reoffending are of considerable research and policy importance.

Tallahassee, FL:  Florida State University, 2023. 93p.

By Aaron H. L. Wong

In 2021, China amended its law on the minimum age of criminal responsibility (MACR), lowering the MACRof two specified offences to twelve years. As a result,China now has three different levels of MACR for dif-ferent offences. Based on the position in China, thisarticle argues that while lowering the MACR against the international trend can be justified as a necessary measure to tackle serious crimes committed by chil-dren, creating different levels of MACR based on the types of crime is wrong in principle. This article fur-ther considers the classic dilemma in setting an absoluteMACR, which results in either freeing the guilty or convicting the innocent. It is argued that setting a relatively low MACR accompanied by robust safeguards of doli incapax, child immaturity defence, diversion and wider sentencing options would allow a better assessment of children'sculpabilityandbetterservetheinterestsofjus-tice. It is also suggested that lowering the MACR will not unjustifiably undermine children’s rights if the juvenile justice system could ensure only those truly culpable could be convicted and that the option of prosecution is reserved as a last resort.

Howard Journal of Crime & Justice, Pages: 3-21 | First Published: 2024

By Chris Trotter

Poor family environment, including child abuse and neglect, family criminality, family disruption, and severe family conflict are background factors for many children (and adults) involved in the justice system as evidenced in a large number of research studies (e.g. Katsiyannis et al., 2018). Family issues are also the concern of both adult probation and youth justice practitioners and others who provide community supervision. Two studies of community supervision, for example, found that family issues were the most, or at least one of the most, commonly discussed issues in interviews with both children and adults (Bonta et al., 2008; Trotter and Evans, 2012). There is also considerable support for the effectiveness of family interventions for children in the criminal justice system. Petrosino and colleagues (2009), in a review of the available research, found that family-based interventions have considerable impact on reoffending. They suggest that, on average, children involved in family-based interventions have recidivism rates 16% to 28% lower than comparable control groups. This is consistent with a detailed review by Lipsey and Cullen (2007) who considered four different meta-analyses on the effectiveness of family interventions for children, and found an average reduction in recidivism compared to untreated control groups of between 20% and 52%. Hartnett et al. (2016) and Petrosino et al. (2009) argue, based on their reviews, that family interventions may be more effective than other interventions for children facing family issues. Hartnett et al. (2016), for example, argue that family work is more effective than cognitive behavioural and group therapy interventions. Support for family interventions is also provided in earlier reviews by Latimer (2001) and Dowden and Andrews (2003), although both reviews suggest that the effectiveness of family interventions is dependent on the nature of the intervention which is offered; the interventions need to be consistent with evidence-based practice principles. Despite the research support for family interventions, they seem to be relatively rare in criminal justice settings. Specific interventions focused on issues such as drug treatment, anger management or employment are more common. Where family interventions are offered in youth justice, they tend to be delivered by licenced therapists trained in specific models such as multi-systemic family therapy or functional family therapy (Hartnett et al., 2017; Markham, 2018). In this paper, I focus upon an example of a project that uses youth justice workers to deliver a family intervention – Collaborative Family Work. This work is designed to be delivered as part of the routine offerings of a youth justice service.

Manchester UK: HM Inspectorate of Probation. HM Inspectorate of Probation Academic Insights 2021/02

By Suzanne Mooney, Stephen Coulter, Lisa Bunting and DLorna Montgomery

This paper is drawn from an original report (Mooney et al., 2019) commissioned by the Safeguarding Board Northern Ireland as part of a cross-departmental initiative to support the development of trauma-informed practice in Northern Ireland. The original report used the ‘Sequential Intercept Model’ or SIM as a framework to undertake a selective review of practice innovations at different stages of the justice process as a means to consider how to divert young people and adults with complex needs from the criminal justice system (CJS) . Awareness of the SIM had emerged from a rapid evidence review which had summarised the evidence relating to the implementation of trauma-informed practice across multiple systems and settings (child welfare, health, education), including justice (see Bunting et al., 2018a-e; Bunting et al., 2019). International recognition of the strong connections between a trauma history and involvement with the justice system (Bellis et al., 2015), continued traumatic experiences within the justice system (Kubiak et al., 2017), and the relationship between harsh punishments and continued offending (Ko et al., 2008) has led to the adoption of trauma-informed approaches in secure settings both internationally and in the UK (e.g. D’Souza et al., 2021). Although not specifically named by its developers as a trauma-informed approach, the SIM was identified as a promising framework promoted by the US federal government Substance Abuse and Mental Health Administration Agency (SAMHSA), highlighting opportunities to implement community-based intervention for justice-involved individuals suffering mental ill health and/or substance use as a means of minimising CJS involvement (Munetz and Griffin, 2006, p.320). It is argued that such diversion has the potential to reduce costs to society and deliver appropriate services without increasing the risk to public safety (Heilbrun et al., 2015). Justice-involved persons with complex needs It is well established in international literature that young people and adults involved with the justice system are disproportionately affected by adversity and trauma (Miller et al., 2011), with exposure to childhood adversity identified as a key risk factor for subsequent justice involvement (Kerig and Becker, 2010; Bellis et al., 2015). UK research indicates the scale of the increased risk with population-based adverse childhood experience (ACE) surveys demonstrating that English adults exposed to four or more ACEs were 11 times more likely to be imprisoned at some time in their lives (Bellis et al., 2014) while Welsh adults experienced a 20 times greater likelihood in comparison to adults with no ACEs (Bellis et al., 2015). More recently, research in Manchester found that justice-involved children typically had multiple ACEs (see Academic Insights paper 2021/13 by Gray, Smithson and Jump). The complex links between health, social inequality and crime are also increasingly recognised (for example Public Health England, 2018) with justice-involved persons known to suffer significantly worse health than the general population and more likely to be the victims of crime (Anders et al., 2017). Although much of the US SIM literature refers specifically to people impacted by ‘mental health and substance use disorders’, this paper uses the overarching term of persons with ‘complex needs’ to better capture the range of adversities common in justice-involved young people and adults. These include: different forms of abuse; family breakdown and care experience; domestic violence; homelessness; lack of education and employment; as well as mental ill health and substance use problems (see Table 1). UK policy developments have recognised these challenges with adult and youth justice processes striving to take account of these intersecting influences on offending behaviour and promote cross-sector partnership to enable upstream intervention to prevent or mitigate the underlying causes of offending (see, for example, Public Health England, 2018; Department of Health and Department of Justice, 2019).

Academic Insights 2024/01, Manchester, UK: HM Inspectorate of Probation, 2024. 17p.

By Summer Walker

This brief summarizes research conducted in December 2022 on gender-based violence (GBV) in Cité Soleil, an impoverished, high-density commune of Port-au-Prince, Haiti. GBV – and sexual violence, in particular – has escalated dramatically in Port-au-Prince in recent years, as gangs have multiplied and taken greater control over communities, local economies and many aspects of daily life. Clashes between armed gangs, including attempts to take over territory, have severely affected security, particularly for women and girls.

A report by the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and the UN Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH), published in October 2022, documented how gangs have used rape and other forms of sexual violence in their quest for power and to instill fear in communities. Meanwhile, a breakdown in public safety across Port-au-Prince is a risk factor associated with increasing levels of GBV and reduces the ability to respond in an effective way.

This brief focuses on research collected in and around Cité Soleil (in the areas of Brooklyn, Sarthe and Village des Rapatriés), using a questionnaire, focus groups and a round table discussion. The study assesses five aspects of vulnerability: safety, legal protection, mental well-being, economic empowerment and education. This research was undertaken under very difficult conditions, and with a high degree of sensitivity to the subject matter and involvement of participants.

This brief offers insight into the current state of GBV in Cité Soleil and identifies potential areas of support for donors and organizations interested in improving the situation. It offers three overarching recommendations, as outlined in the conclusion: building the capacity of institutions that women trust, identifying the ways women organize locally, and developing cross-sector cooperation.

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime. 2023. 27p.

By Romain Le Cour Grandmaison; Ana Paula Oliveira and Matt Herbert

Over the course of 2023 and early 2024, security has continued to deteriorate alarmingly in Haiti’s capital, Port-au-Prince, and in rural areas in the center and south of the country.

The Haitian crisis worsened critically in 2023. UN reports indicate that in 2023, over 4 789 people were murdered, 1 698 injured, and 2 490 kidnapped, with a 2023 homicide rate of 40.9 per 100 000, more than double the 2022 rate. Besides these figures, the nature of the criminal actors has been profoundly transformed, posing a series of challenges to international intervention.

Over the past years, gangs have undergone a radical evolution, going from rather unstructured actors dependent on resources provided by public or private patronage to violent entrepreneurs who have been able to convert their territorial power into governance capabilities. This shift has been fueled by the gangs’ unprecedented access to firearms and the Haitian state’s inability to halt their expansion, professionalization, and propensity to impose their rule over ever-larger territories, as well as by ongoing collusion by elements of the country’s political and economic elites.

In October 2023, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopted a resolution authorizing a non-UN multinational security support (MSS) mission to Haiti. After lengthy negotiations, the Kenyan government agreed to lead the deployment to support the Haitian National Police (HNP) in addressing gang violence and re-establishing security. However, the planned operation is currently being challenged in the Kenyan courts. This resolution came after the UNSC agreed on a sanctions regime for Haiti in October 2022 and the subsequent imposition of sanctions on key gang leaders, businessmen, and politicians. The UN sanctions have been supplemented by unilateral designations issued by Canada, the US, and the European Union (EU). Further, UN sanctions were levied on gang leaders in December 2023 as the preparations accelerated for the MSS deployment.

The UN’s current initiatives on Haiti potentially augur a new international approach to how organized crime actors can be tackled both from a security and human rights perspective. Ensuring international tools are effective in mitigating harm caused by gangs in Haiti is therefore vitally important for the people of the country and the international community.

Therefore, the various international tools must be tailored to the rapidly evolving criminal and violence dynamics on the ground and implemented in a strategically coordinated fashion.

This policy report is intended to further efforts to tailor both the MSS mission and the sanctions regime to the current operational challenges in Haiti, support Haitian and international decision-makers in their mission, and provide strategic backing to the country’s civil society.

It begins by detailing the current situation on the ground, including gangs and other violent groups’ operations, governance, and territorial domination. The following section describes the mandate and operations of the two primary international tools: the sanctions regime and the MSS mission. The third section flags key issues that need to be considered by both the sanctions regime and the international force and presents opportunities to align the two more comprehensively to strengthen public security responses and public policy initiatives to resolve the crisis.

Geneva, SWIT: The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2024. 50p.

By Romain Le Cour Grandmaison, Ana Paula Oliveira and Matt Herbert

Over the course of 2023 and early 2024, security has continued to deteriorate alarmingly in Haiti’s capital, Port-au-Prince, and in rural areas in the centre and south of the country.1 Criminal gangs, the main drivers of this degradation, have grown in strength and capacity, enabling them to supplant in part or in full the control of government forces.2 The gangs’ domination of critical infrastructure, such as commercial and oil port terminals, major roads, and population centres has heightened their influence over Haiti’s economy and political system. The gangs have also imposed governance on major parts of Port-au-Prince, leading both to rising criminal predation and human rights violations, including gender-based violence.3 Moreover, 2023 saw the development of particularly strong vigilante movements while the first weeks of 2024 witnessed the rise of violent political leaders, adding to an already disastrous security situation. As one United Nations (UN) report bluntly noted: ‘The situation is unravelling.’4 The Haitian crisis worsened critically in 2023. UN reports indicate that in 2023, over 4 789 people were murdered, 1 698 injured and 2 490 kidnapped, with a 2023 homicide rate of 40.9 per 100 000, more than double the 2022 rate.5 Besides these figures, the nature of the criminal actors has been profoundly transformed, posing a series of challenges to international intervention. Over the past five years, gangs have undergone a radical evolution, going from rather unstructured actors dependent on resources provided by public or private patronage to violent entrepreneurs who have been able to convert their territorial power into governance capabilities. This shift has been fuelled by the gangs’ unprecedented access to firearms and the Haitian state’s inability to halt their expansion, profession alization and propensity to impose their rule over ever larger territories, as well as by ongoing collusion by elements of the country’s political and economic elites. In October 2023, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopted a resolution authorizing a non-UN multinational security support (MSS) mission to Haiti. After long negotiations, the Kenyan government agreed to lead the deployment, aimed at supporting the Haitian National Police (HNP) in addressing gang violence and re-establishing security,6 although the planned operation is currently being challenged in the Kenyan courts.7 This resolution came after the UNSC agreed a sanctions regime for Haiti in October 2022, and the subsequent imposition of sanctions on key gang leaders, businessmen and politicians. The UN sanctions have been supplemented by unilateral designations issued by Canada, the US, and the European Union (EU). Further UN sanctions were levied on gang leaders in December 2023, as the preparations accelerated for the MSS deployment.

Intervention by the UN in Haiti is not new, with the embryonic MSS mission representing the third initiative in as many decades. However, the proposed international mission stands out, both for Haiti and more broadly for international responses to organized criminal violence. Historically, the UN has become involved in Haiti in response to political crises, worsening insecurity and repeated natural disasters.8 While the 2004-2017 United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) engaged in counter-gang operations, largely in and around Port-au-Prince, this came after the force had been on the ground for several years and was generally intermittent.9 In contrast, the prospective 2024 intervention will be conducted outside the auspices of the UN and has been motivated by, and focuses on, criminal gangs as the main threat to peace and security. This reflects the substantial change in gangs’ power, structure and capacity for territorial governance since the MINUSTAH era. These entities are nowadays far more economically autonomous and territorially powerful, making them less controllable. As one Haitian entrepreneur described the contemporary evolution of the gangs: ‘We saw a lion being born, we fed it and watched it grow, we tried to domesticate it, but the animal eventually escaped from the cage, and here we are.’10 Nonetheless, the focus by the UNSC on profit-oriented criminal entities as primary conflict actors in their own right, in both the resolutions setting up the sanctions regime and the MSS mission, is a substantial conceptual shift for the UN.11 Given the growth of transnational organized crime, and expansion of instability and violence linked to such crime, situations like the present one in Haiti are likely to become more common. The UN’s current initiatives on Haiti potentially augur a new international approach to how organized crime actors can be tackled both from a security and human rights perspective. Ensuring international tools are effective in mitigating harm caused by gangs in Haiti is therefore vitally important for the people of the country, and for the international community

The situation presents an extremely difficult test. Haitian armed groups today are more militarily powerful, networked, and resilient than those during the MINUSTAH intervention. It is therefore essential that the various international tools be tailored to the rapidly evolving criminal and violence dynamics on the ground, and be implemented in a strategically coordinated fashion. Meetings between Kenyan and Haitian police teams have taken place, as well as trainings, and vetting processes prior to deployment. However, the proposed mission, the UNSC and the Haitian government have yet to present a public plan and strategy for the intervention, either for short-term engagement on the ground or for a long-term political solution.12 This policy report is intended to further efforts to tailor both the MSS mission and the sanctions regime to the current operational challenges in Haiti, support Haitian and international decision-makers in their mission, and provide strategic backing to the country’s civil society. It begins by detailing the current situation on the ground, including gangs and other violent groups’ operations, governance and territorial domination. The next section details the mandate and oper ations of the two primary international tools, the sanctions regime and the MSS mission. The third section flags key issues which need to be considered for both the sanctions regime and the interna t ional force, and presents opportunities to align the two more comprehensively, to strengthen public security responses and public policy initiatives so as to resolve the crisis. This report is the first of several planned publications on the political economy of violence in Haiti and the international cooperation that seeks to uproot it. It follows a 2022 Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC) report on gang evolution and a 2023 GI-TOC report on gender-based violence in the country.

Geneva, SWIT: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2024. 50p.

By David C. Brotherton and Rafael Gude

In 2008, the Ecuadorian Government launched a policy to increase public safety as part of its “Citizens’ Revolution” (La Revolución Ciudadana). An innovative aspect of this policy was the legalization of the country’s largest street gangs. During the years 2016–2017, we conducted ethnographic research with these groups focusing on the impact of legalization as a form of social inclusion. We were guided by two research questions: (1) What changed between these groups and society? and (2) What changed within these groups? We completed feld observations and sixty qualitative interviews with group members, as well as multiple formal and informal inter views with government advisors, police leaders and state actors related to the initiative. Our data show that the commitment to social citizenship had a major impact on gang-related violence and was a factor in reducing the nation’s homicide rate. The study provides an example of social control where the state is committed to polices of social inclusion while rejecting

Critical Criminology, Volume 29, pages 931–955, (2021)

By: The International Crisis Group

What’s new? Foreign security personnel are expected to begin arriving in Haiti in early 2024 to assist the national police in fighting the gangs besieging much of the country. UN-authorised, Kenyan-led and designed with U.S. support, this multinational mission aims to restore security and enable long overdue elections.

Why does it matter?: Haiti’s wave of violence and political breakdown have deepened the country’s humanitarian emergency. With police outnumbered and outgunned by criminal groups, foreign assistance is needed. But the mission must overcome daunting operational and political challenges for it to be effective.

What should be done?: The mission should not deploy in force until it has sufficient troops, training and equipment to overpower the gangs. It should prepare for urban combat, and develop community-level sources of intelligence, to help minimise civilian harm. A political settlement and major reforms will be required for gains to endure.

Crisis Group Latin America & Caribbean Briefing N°49, Port-au-Prince/New York/Washington/Brussels, 5 January 2024 . 24p.

By James A. Densley

Drawing on extensive interviews with gang members, this book provides a vivid portrayal of gang life. Topics include the profiles and motivations of gang members; the processes of gang evolution, organization, and recruitment; gang members' uses of violence, media, and technology and the role of gangs in the drugs trade and organized crime

Palgrave Macmillan, 2013. 226p.

By  Suojellaan Lapsia, Protect Children

A new report by Suojellaan Lapsia, Protect Children provides chilling insights on the ways offenders use mainstream tech platforms to access and distribute child sexual abuse material (CSAM, the more apt term for "child pornography"). Some highlights:

• 77% of surveyed CSAM offenders have encountered CSAM or links to CSAM on the surface web (e.g. on a social media platform, a pornography website, a messaging app, or other mainstream website) 

• 32% say that they have used social media platforms to search for, view, or disseminate CSAM.

  • The top platforms used for this purpose were Instagram (29%), X (Twitter) (26%), and Discord (23%).

• 40% said they sought contact with a child after viewing CSAM

• Of those, 70% sought such contact online (e.g. on social media platforms, gaming platforms, or messaging apps

Suojellaan Lapsia, Protect Children ry, 2024. 35p.

By Susan Burke, et al

This Code of Practice document provides guidelines that were designed to guide juvenile justice administrators as they establish policies, procedures, and practices in alignment with research-supported evidence, and to promote discussion within jurisdictions on existing practices. The document is divided into five primary sections: general policy considerations; training; de-escalation and nonphysical interventions; physical interventions; and after-action reviews. The “General Policy Considerations” section provides guidance on how agencies can create and educate staff on their use of force continuum. The sections are presented in a sequence that aims to reinforce their dependency and relationship to other components. The document concludes with sections of term definitions and links resources cited.

Hingham, MA: The Council of Juvenile Justice Administrators (CJJA) , et al, 2023. 24p.

By Sarah Hockenberry; Charles Puzzanchera

Juvenile Court Statistics 2021 draws on data from the National Juvenile Court Data Archive to profile 437,300 delinquency cases and 51,500 petitioned status offense cases handled in 2021 by U.S. courts with juvenile jurisdiction. The report also tracks trends in delinquency and petitioned status cases between 2005 and 2021. The data used in this report were contributed to the Archive by nearly 2,400 courts with jurisdiction over 83% of the juvenile population in 2021. National estimates of juvenile court delinquency caseloads in 2021 were based on analyses of 299,432 automated case records and court-level statistics summarizing an additional 29,369 cases. Estimates of status offense cases formally processed by juvenile courts in 2021 were based on analyses of 32,897 automated case-level records and court-level summary statistics on an additional 2,852 cases. The data used in the analyses were contributed to the National Juvenile Court Data Archive by nearly 2,400 courts with jurisdiction over 83% of the juvenile population in 2021. Courts with juvenile jurisdiction may handle a variety of matters, including child maltreatment, traffic violations, child support, and adoptions. This report focuses on cases involving juveniles charged with law violations (delinquency or status offenses).

Pittsburgh: National Center for Juvenile Justice, 2024. 114p.