By The University of Washington, Center for Human Rights

As the United States enters the height of the 2024 electoral season, a familiar pattern is at the forefront of campaign rhetoric: Democrats and Republicans alike declare themselves ever tougher on “the border,” making claims about “record” numbers—of arrests, deportations, border crossings—to bolster their arguments. The deep politicization of immigration policy provides incentives for the data to be used misleadingly by both sides. In fact, the reality of how immigration policy is carried out is more complex: against the backdrop of shifting local and national policies, raw numbers do not necessarily capture what is happening on the ground in actual communities, and may in fact obscure our understanding of the human rights implications of immigration enforcement. This report dives into the question of what shifting trends in immigration enforcement – nationally and locally – mean for communities here in the Pacific Northwest (PNW).1 Drawing on various collections of data from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), including some datasets we release here for the first time, as well as on data from immigration courts and insights from immigrant-serving organizations, we examine three central questions: • How is immigration enforcement happening in the PNW? • How does our region’s experience compare to national trends? • What are the implications of these trends for human rights? We find that recent changes in state and local   In this report, we refer to the “Pacific Northwest” or “PNW” as shorthand for the states of Oregon and Washington. These two states, plus Alaska, make up ICE’s “Seattle Area of Responsibility.” Because there is comparatively little immigration enforcement in Alaska, we do not address the circumstances in that state here. policy have contributed to important gains for migrant justice here in the PNW, many of which are highlighted in our recent report “Paths to Compliance: The Effort to Protect Immigrant Rights in Washington State”. This is reflected in changing arrest patterns across the PNW: whereas in past years, local and state law enforcement helped channel migrants into the custody of US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and Customs and Border Protection (CBP), in the wake of “sanctuary state” legislation in Oregon and Washington, this happens much less frequently. And while ICE officials warned that they would compensate for curtailed collaboration in sanctuary jurisdictions by conducting more “at large” arrests on the streets and in communities, this does not appear to have been the case in recent years. Instead, Biden administration policies have attempted to alleviate bottlenecks at the US/ Mexico border by shifting the processing of new arrivals to the interior of the country and opening up new pathways for some migrants seeking asylum. For the most part, the growing enforcement numbers we have seen in the PNW reflect this, as migrants arriving here from the southern border are arrested at subsequent check-ins while following instructions from CBP and ICE, rather than in community raids. This is not to suggest that enforcement has been lax. Quite the contrary: recently-arrived migrants, many of them families with small children, and from communities with fewer established support networks in the PNW, face dire conditions and deep challenges defending their rights. And although reports of workplace raids or community-based arrests appear to have waned, such practices could return under a more overtly repressive administration;  thanks to DHS’ growing use of public and private databases, tracking technologies, and digital detention, data on migrant communities is readily available to ICE and CBP, here as elsewhere in the country. At the same time, analysis of court data shows that in fact, outcomes of immigration court cases brought in Washington and Oregon are markedly worse than the national average. This means that although our communities have taken important steps to protect the rights of immigrants, there is no firewall between the “progressive” PNW and national anti-immigrant practices. The border is, in this sense, everywhere: our neighbors continue to be separated from their families in our courts, held under abysmal conditions in ICE detention, and deported through our airports; in some ways, in fact, migrants fare worse here than in other parts of the country. We have a lot of work to be done before the PNW can truly consider itself a “sanctuary” for immigrants.    

Seattle: The University of Washington Center for Human Rights 2024. 24[p.

The Australian Human Rights Commission

The treatment of children in the criminal justice system, some as young as 10 years old, is one of the most urgent human rights issues facing Australia today. Numerous inquiries and reviews, including Royal Commissions, as well as UN Committees, have highlighted serious breaches of rights and systemic problems with our child justice and related systems over many years. However, Australia continually fails to implement evidence-based reforms to our child justice systems which would reduce offending behaviour and make our communities safer. This report investigates opportunities for reform of child justice and related systems across Australia, based on evidence and the protection of human rights. It is the result of a project undertaken by the National Children’s Commissioner (NCC) in 2023–24. The project included a submissions process, consultations with children and young people, families, community members, and interviews and roundtables with government and non government stakeholders across Australia.

Canberra: The Australian Human Rights Commission, 2024. 195p.

By Ruth Ellen Wasem

This article uses a multidisciplinary approach — analyzing historical sources, refugee and asylum admissions data, legislative provisions, and public opinion data — to track the rise and fall of the US asylum and refugee policy. It shows that there has always been a political struggle between people who advocate for a generous refugee and asylum system and those who oppose it. Today, the flexible system of protecting refugees and asylees, established in 1980, is giving way to policies that weaponize them.

It offers a historical analysis of US refugee and asylum policies, as well as xenophobic and nativist attitudes toward refugees. It places Trump administration refugee policies in three categories: those that abandon longstanding US legal principles and policies, most notably non-refoulement and due process; those that block the entry of refugees and asylees; and those that criminalize foreign nationals who attempt to seek asylum in the United States.

The article concludes with an analysis of public opinion research to square the growing public support for refugees and asylees shown in polling data with the subgroup popularity of Donald Trump’s harsh xenophobic rhetoric and policies. These seemingly contradictory trends are consistent with research on right-wing populism. It argues that the restoration of generous humanitarian policies requires robust civic engagement and steadfast legislative efforts.

Journal on Migration and Human Security Volume 8, Issue 3, September 2020, Pages 246-265

By Jesuit Refugee Service Europe

By definition, things that occur in detention occur behind walls, and in a context where those detained have been disempowered. Scrutiny and transparency are therefore often elusive, and access to justice to which people are legally entitled may be denied altogether or made more difficult. This situation is compounded because people are often detained under immigration powers at borders, or when facing removal—in contexts of limbo, where normal justice procedures are easier to circumvent.

Against this background, this report looks into if and how detained migrants can effectively access justice in Europe today. This is a particularly relevant topic, as this work comes at a moment in which the use of detention upon arrival at external borders is likely to increase, as a result of the adoption of the EU Pact on Asylum and Migration. Because of the complexity of immigration procedures in Europe, effective access to justice cannot be properly assessed without considering if migrants—in this case detainees—have effective access to legal assistance. For this reason, a chapter of this report is dedicated to access to legal aid. We further looked into how effectively detainees can access remedies against their detention and return orders. Another chapter explores the existence and effectiveness of complaint mechanisms for detainees to address violations of rights that happen in detention. Finally, we looked into the possibility for migrants to apply for international protection while in detention.

This work is based on the experience of JRS visiting people in detention centres across Europe. JRS opposes the use of administrative detention as a practice that is inherently harmful to human dignity and has a negative impact on both physical and mental health. As long as detention is a reality, however, JRS staff and volunteers work to accompany detained migrants and advocate for the respect of their rights and for humane detention conditions.

Brussels, Belfium, JRSEurope, 2024. 69p.

By The International Organization for Migration (IOM)

This toolkit builds on the outcomes of two international exchanges on access to justice for migrant workers and victims of trafficking for labour exploitation and on an additional round of internal consultations, consolidated with IOM best practices and additional research inputs. Various relevant stakeholders from different European countries participated in the workshop, including law enforcement authorities, prosecutors, labour inspectors, trade union representatives, international organizations and civil society organizations, among others.

Produced under the framework of the MiRAC-funded project Enhancing IOM’s Protection Capacity in the EEA+ Region to Protect the Rights of Migrants Subject to Labour Exploitation, this document serves as a practical guidance tool for addressing the needs of migrant workers and victims of trafficking for labour exploitation in the European Union, as well as in Iceland, Norway, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. It was specifically developed to support national authorities, in particular, relevant labour, immigration, prosecution and counter-trafficking agencies, as well as other relevant stakeholders, such as civil society organizations and trade unions, to provide the tools needed to effectively support and empower migrant workers and victims of trafficking for labour exploitation.

Brussels: International Organization for Migration, 2023. 124p.

By Paul Butcher, Alberto-Horst Neidhardt

Migration remains a salient political issue and a major topic of disinformation. Lies and half-truths about migrants spread freely across the EU. But the narratives and themes used by disinformation actors are not static. As events develop and public concerns shift, so do the types of stories pushed by those seeking to mislead. For example, the COVID-19 pandemic has led to a growing stream of articles linking migrants to infection risks and accusing them of receiving preferential treatment. Disinformation actors have certain advantages over other communicators, as they can promote simplistic or one-sided depictions of migration without regard for truth or accuracy. Rather than seeking to counteract specific claims, such as through fact-checking or counternarratives, communicators and policymakers should instead promote alternative narratives that can undermine the appeal of hostile frames and create ‘herd immunity’ against disinformation. Alternative narratives should especially target those in the ‘movable middle’ who are most open to changing their views, especially as these groups may also be more liable to being influenced by disinformation. This Issue Paper examines nearly 1,500 news articles from four EU member states (Germany, Italy, Spain and the Czech Republic) published between May 2019 and July 2020. It shows that disinformation narratives about migration seek to exploit readers’ fears to polarise public opinion, manufacture discontent, sow divisions and set the political agenda. Disinformation actors link migration to existing insecurities, depicting it as a threat to three partly-overlapping areas: Health (migrants as violent criminals, potential terrorists, or a COVID-19 infection risk); Wealth (migrants as social benefits cheats, unfair competition for jobs, or a drain on community resources); Identity (migrants as a hostile invasion force, a threat to European or Christian traditions, or the subject of a conspiracy to replace white Europeans). An effective communication strategy based on alternative narratives should take account of the following recommendations: The message should aim to reframe the debate. It should resonate with the target audience’s lived experience, acknowledging their values and concerns, but avoid amplifying anxieties. Messages promoting alternative narratives must be timely and reflect the news cycle. Like a vaccine administered at regular intervals, communicators should repeat simple, specific messages that can prompt the best immune response against hostile frames spread by disinformation. The medium should aim to restore trust among groups. Institutions, which are often subject to discrediting campaigns, should prioritise communication through trusted intermediaries who can get messages to the hard-to-reach. They should work in partnership with civil society and local actors to deliver coordinated messages in the right environments. They should seek to reach people ‘where they are’ using the most appropriate communication channel, taking into consideration where their audience consumes information. The selection of the audience should aim to reclaim readers from the fringes. Audiences should be targeted based on their values and what they feel is important. To gain a first hearing, communicators should find an ‘entry point’ where the messenger and audience share common ground. All communicators seeking to promote a more balanced debate should aim to develop messages that can support a single overarching meta-narrative: for example, that migration is a normal phenomenon that can bring benefits to European societies if managed effectively and in full respect of fundamental human rights. More effective communication strategies can help to undermine threat-based discourses about migration. But such narrative strategies must also be backed up by policy changes. Effective policies combined with alternative narratives will go a long way towards resolving the concerns that drive disinformation on migration. A more balanced debate will, in turn, facilitate the adoption of meaningful reforms in line with EU fundamental values and human rights, thus creating a mutually reinforcing cycle of alternative narratives and policymaking

Brussels, Belgium: Foundation for European Progressive Studies (FEPS). 2020. 52p.

By PICUM

Migration policies are far from being racially neutral. They determine who is eligible for citizenship, regulate mobility across borders, and dictate the type of residence permits people may obtain, if any. These policies serve as gatekeepers of inclusion and exclusion within our communities, shaping individuals’ experiences of discrimination and marginalisation, and leave many individuals with undocumented or precarious statuses. The resulting patterns of marginalisation often follow racialised lines. This briefing explores EU migration policies and enforcement practices from the perspective of racial justice. It does so by drawing upon insights from a legal seminar that PICUM co-organised with the Equinox Initiative for Racial Justice in November 2023, which looked at the intersection of racial profiling, policing and immigration control. It also draws upon prior analysis conducted by a wide range of civil society organisations. The briefing shows both how the EU’s anti-discrimination legal and policy framework fails to adequately protect racialised communities, and how EU migration policies contribute to racial inequalities.

Brussels, Belgium: PICUM, 2024. 46p.

By Paola Echave and Dulce Gonzalez

Latinx populations have been among those with disproportionately high rates of COVID-19 infection and mortality (Mackey et al. 2021). The factors underlying these disparities are many. One is Latinx people’s disproportionate employment in occupations with high risk for coronavirus exposure (Do and Frank 2020; Goldman et al. 2021). Others include limited access to federally funded public health insurance for immigrants and employment in occupations that do not offer paid sick leave (Glynn and Farrell 2012). But studies have not yet examined how immigration enforcement has contributed to disparities in COVID-19 mortality among Latinx populations, despite evidence that immigration enforcement affects Latinx people’s health and health care access (Capps et al. 2015; Castañeda et al. 2015).

In this study, we assess whether medium-to-high exposure to immigration enforcement between 2008 and 2017 in a given county was associated with county-level disparities in COVID-19 deaths between Latinx people and non-Latinx white people (hereafter referred to as “white people”).

We first describe our measures of COVID-19 deaths and immigration enforcement and assess the relationship between the two, overall and among Latinx-concentrated counties (i.e., those with concentrations of Latinx residents greater than 10 percent). We then describe our statistical analyses of the relationship between the number of years a county had medium-to-high exposure to immigration enforcement and Latinx-white COVID-19 death disparities, controlling for select, observable characteristics of Latinx-concentrated counties. We find the following: 

• Across all US counties,

  • white people had slightly higher COVID-19 death rates than Latinx people (350 versus 348 deaths per 100,000 people) between 2020 and 2022;

  • just over half of counties (56 percent) had one or more years of medium-to-high exposure to immigration enforcement between 2008 and 2017;

  • counties with one or more years of medium-to-high immigration-enforcement exposure were primarily located along the southern border and in the western and eastern US, and had high Latinx population concentrations and high COVID-19 death-disparity ratios; and

  • as the number of years of medium-to-high immigration-enforcement exposure increases, so does the Latinx-white COVID-19 disparity ratio.  

• Among Latinx-concentrated counties,

  • the majority (88 percent) showed a COVID-19 death-disparity ratio between Latinx and white people larger than 1, meaning Latinx people were more likely to die from COVID-19 than white people in those counties; and

  • most (71 percent) were at or above the annual average for deportations at least once between 2008 and 2017.

• As the number of years a county is exposed to medium-to-high immigration enforcement increases by one, the Latinx-white COVID-19 death-disparity ratio increases by 21 percent, after controlling for counties’ key observable characteristics.

Our findings contribute to the literature by exploring how exposure to immigration enforcement over time may be related to COVID-19 death disparities for Latinx populations. Because of limitations in our data, we provide only an exploratory and descriptive snapshot of the association between immigration enforcement and COVID-19 death disparities. The results of this study, however, reinforce the importance of acknowledging the role of immigration enforcement as a social determinant of health.

Washington, DC: Urban Institute, 2024. 44p

By Commission on the Integration of Refugees

The UK’s asylum system is broken: it is expensive, ineffective, and harmful. There is a desperate need for new ideas on how to create a system that works effectively and enjoys public consent. Taking up this challenge, the Commission on the Integration of Refugees has undertaken the most significant and detailed exploration of the UK asylum system in a generation. Our work has shown that it is possible to find solutions and to build political consensus around them. Based on six pillars of research, including evidence from more than 1,250 individuals and organisations, the Commission – with its diversity of experience and political perspectives – has been able to achieve full or near-consensus around 16 recommendations to shape a new future for the UK’s asylum system based on integration. approach is also necessary to unlock the economic benefits projected by the LSE. The three main conditions for this are that the government needs to meet its target to process asylum applications within six months (meaning people can work from this point), and that asylum seekers receive English language provision from day one and access to employment support from six months. The second is localisation of delivery. At the heart of our recommendations is a new settlement for refugees delivered through ‘local integration partnerships’. These would put devolved governments, regional and local authorities, and communities in control of resources and delivery in order to create the best possible conditions for integration. The national government would play a coordinating role, including setting overall numbers

An integration-based asylum system can deliver benefits not only for refugees but for wider society – from contributing to tackling the housing crisis and homelessness to promoting economic flourishing. The recommendations are underpinned by a financial model developed by the London School of Economics, which found that the benefits outweigh the costs within three years, and that they would yield a net economic benefit to the country of at least £1.2 billion within five years. There are two core elements to our proposals. The f irst is that our recommendations are designed to be mutually reinforcing and their impact will be greater if they are taken together. A coherent and holistic There is an abundance of good practice available to guide this shift towards localisation, including from the devolved national governments of Scotland and Wales, but also from other local authorities in the UK, from other countries, and from the success of initiatives including the community sponsorship and Ukrainian refugee settlement programmes. The solutions we are proposing would not only be more effective than the current system, but cheaper, more coherent, more in tune with the values of compassion and fairness that so many people manifest towards asylum seekers, and capable of delivering long-term economic benefits and positive social outcomes both for refugees and wider British society

Cambridge, U: Woolf Institute, University of Cambridge, 2024. 93p.

By Nina Siulc and Noelle Smart

The use of civil immigration detention has expanded exponentially over the past few decades, with a record high of more than half a million people detained in fiscal year 2019. The widespread use of civil detention—at a cost to taxpayers of billions of dollars annually—is often justified by the government as being necessary to ensure that immigrants continue to appear for their court hearings. Yet there is irrefutable evidence that over the past two decades the majority of immigrants—including adults, families, and children—have shown up for immigration court hearings. In fact, those who attend court outside detention on what are known as “non-detained” dockets almost always continue to appear for their hearings when they are able to secure legal representation, calling into question the logic of confining people in costly and inhumane prison-like conditions when representation is clearly a viable alternative to ensure continued court appearances. This fact sheet reviews evidence from the Vera Institute of Justice’s (Vera’s) programs and related studies as well as government data analyzed by independent researchers to help unpack what is known about appearances in immigration court and, alternately, orders of removal in absentia, which are issued when a person does not appear in court.

Non-detained immigrants with representation almost always continue to appear in court

Data from Vera’s programs and other studies shows that most immigrants released from custody continue to appear in court when represented by counsel.

• During the first three years of Vera’s Safety and Fairness for Everyone (SAFE) Initiative, which provides free representation through a universal access model in 21 jurisdictions across the country, 98 percent of clients released from custody have continued to appear for their scheduled court hearings.

• Similarly, Vera’s evaluation of the New York Immigrant Family Unity Project (NYIFUP) found that at the time of the study fewer than 2 percent of clients released on bond had received orders of removal in absentia for failing to appear in court.

• These high appearance rates are supported by findings in an in-depth study of orders of removal in absentia published in March 2020 by Eagly and Shafer, who observed that, “those who obtained lawyers also almost always came to court: 96 percent attended all court hearings in pending and completed non-detained cases since 2008.”

• An earlier study by Eagly and Shafer also found high appearance rates among immigrants released on bond nationwide from 2007 to 2012: among immigrants with completed cases, only 7 percent of those with representation received orders of removal in absentia.

• The Migrant Protection Protocols (MPP) or “remain in Mexico” program has made it nearly impossible for many asylum seekers to attend court. Yet even among this program rife with due process challenges, 95 percent of immigrants with representation have continued to appear for all their hearings. In short, representation continues to be associated with high rates of appearance in immigration court.

New York: Vera Institute of Justice, 2020. 5p.

By The Vera Institute of Justice

We need a federally funded universal legal defense service for immigrants — one that is deliberately modeled on the criminal federal defender system, which, while not perfect, is generally regarded as more successfully realizing the values of high-quality, appropriately funded representation than its state counterparts. This service should provide universal, zealous, and person-centered legal defense to all immigrants in any immigration proceedings. The Vera Institute of Justice (Vera) makes this recommendation based on years of experience building and managing national immigrant legal defense programs. A federal defender service built on these core values is effective and achievable, and it would help ensure that the lives, liberty, and community health of immigrants are given full and equal protection under the law, regardless of status. There is an urgent need for a federal defender service for immigrants because most immigrants are unrepresented, and the stakes in immigration proceedings are so high. Deportation can result in physical exile from home, separation from family, loss of income, and even forcible return to conditions of persecution, violence, torture, or death in a person’s country of origin. But immigrants are not entitled to publicly funded counsel in these proceedings. Currently, there are 1.25 million pending cases in the immigration court system, and people in more than 500,000 of those lack legal representation. The lack of representation is particularly staggering for people subjected to immigration detention, where over the past five years, 70 percent have had no counsel. The stakes in immigration proceedings are extraordinary: the U.S. Supreme Court has described them as no less than “both property and life, or of all that makes life worth living.”

New York: Vera Institute of Justice, 2021. 4p.

 By Daniel Di Martino  

This report estimates the lifetime fiscal impact of immigrants, of various ages and educational attainment, to the United States. It offers a methodological upgrade over similar analyses and estimates and evaluates the fiscal impact of various proposed immigration reforms. A clear picture of the fiscal cost of immigrants is particularly important, given the ongoing border crisis. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that the border surge will number 8.7 million unlawful immigrants between 2021 and 2026. The original analysis in this report finds that the border crisis will cost an estimated $1.15 trillion over the lifetime of the new unlawful immigrants—a cost larger than the entire U.S. defense budget and almost equal to the cost of Social Security in 2023. Looking at immigrants more broadly, this report shows that the average new immigrant (lawful or unlawful) has a positive fiscal impact and reduces the federal budget deficit by over $10,000 during his lifetime. For comparison, the average native-born citizen is expected to cost over $250,000 to the federal government. Despite the average immigrant reducing the budget deficit, immigrants without a college education and all those who immigrate to the U.S. after age 55 are universally a net fiscal burden by up to $400,000. The large positive fiscal impact of young and college-educated immigrants pulls up the overall average. Each immigrant under the age of 35 with a graduate degree.   Therefore, for policymakers considering the fiscal impact of immigrants to the U.S., the characteristics of people seeking entry into the country are crucial. Certain immigrants are fiscally beneficial; others are fiscally detrimental. This report quantifies the fiscal impact of common immigration reform proposals: • Mass deportations would significantly reduce the national debt over the long run, but a policy of selective legalization, coupled with mass deportations, would be even more fiscally beneficial, reducing the debt by about $1.9 trillion. • Given the education, age, and earnings of H-1B visa recipients, doubling the number of H-1B visas for just one year would reduce the budget deficit by $70 billion over the long run—and by another $70 billion each year thereafter. • The most beneficial immigration policy change would be to exempt STEM graduate degree holders from green-card caps, increasing immigration by some 15,000 people per year and reducing the visa backlog; this would reduce the deficit by $150 billion in the first year and $25 billion each year thereafter. • Eliminating refugee resettlement and permanent immigration by parents of U.S. citizens would reduce the debt by a combined $40 billion in net present value every year. • Congress could upskill the existing immigration flow by eliminating the diversity visa category and increasing the visas available to the top employment-based categories, and requiring immigrants to have earned a high school diploma to be eligible for a family visa, reducing the national debt by over $60 billion per year. By enacting a selectionist immigration policy—which requires securing the border from unlawful immigration, reducing low-skilled immigration, and expanding high-skilled immigration—the U.S. could reduce future federal debt by trillions of dollars over the long run. This report proposes a legislative package that provides over $2 trillion in net present value during the first year and over $200 billion each subsequent year, without accounting for the additional productivity growth resulting from high-skilled immigration. Furthermore, under these reforms, the annual number of immigrants who are new permanent residents decreases by about 15% after a temporary legalization program and a partial clearing of the employment-based visa backlog. Over the long term, annual legal immigration decreases under this plan from approximately 1 million in FY 2019 to approximately 860,000 

New York: The Manhattan Institute, 2024. 58p.

By Kayla R. Freemon, Melissa A. Gutierrez , Jessica Huff, Hyunjung Cheon, David Choate, Taylor Cox a, Charles M. Katz 

Limited research attention has focused on homicides involving foreign-born victims. Using data from the National Violent Death Reporting System, we examined 9428 homicides that occurred in 2017 in the United States across 32 states and D.C. Approximately 8% of homicide victims were foreign-born. Homicide victimization rates were substantially lower for foreign-born persons, compared to U.S.-born persons. However, foreign-born persons from Honduras, El Salvador, and Jamaica had a substantially higher risk of homicide victimization. Notably, few homicides involving foreign-born victims were gang- or drug-trade-related. With the growing number of immigrants in the United States, policy and prevention efforts should be guided by research.

Preventive Medicine Reports Volume 26, April 2022, 101714

By Alex Nowrasteh, Sarah Eckhardt, and Michael Howard

The National Research Council and the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) published ground breaking investigations into the economics of immigration in 1997 and 2017. Both publications contained thorough literature surveys compiled by experts, academics, and think tank scholars on how immigration affects many aspects of the U.S. economy. The 2017 NAS report included an original fiscal impact model as a unique contribution to immigration scholarship. Its findings have been used by policymakers, economists, journalists, and others to debate immigration reform. Here, we acquired the exact methods used by the NAS from its authors to replicate, update, and expand upon the 2017 fiscal impact model published in the NAS’s The Economic and Fiscal Consequences of Immigration. This paper presents two analyses: a measure of the historical fiscal impacts of immigrants from 1994 to 2018 and the projected long-term fiscal impact of an additional immigrant and that immigrant’s descendants. An individual's fiscal impact refers to the difference between the taxes that person paid and the benefits that person received over a given period. We use and compare two models for these analyses: the first follows the NAS’s methodology as closely as possible and updates the data for more recent years (hereafter referred to as the Updated Model), and the second makes several methodological changes that we believe improve the accuracy of the final results (hereafter referred to as the Cato Model). The most substantial changes made in the Cato Model include correcting for a downward bias in the estimation of immigrants’ future fiscal contributions identified by Michael Clemens in 2021, allocating the fiscal impact of U.S.-born dependents of immigrants to the second generation group, and using a predictive regression to assign future education levels to individuals who are too young to have completed their education. Other minor changes are discussed in later sections. Immigrants have a more positive net fiscal impact than that of native-born Americans in most scenarios in the Updated Model and in every scenario in the Cato Model, depending on how the costs of public goods are allocated. The Cato Model finds that immigrant individuals who arrive at age 25 and who are high school dropouts have a net fiscal impact of +$216,000 in net present value terms, which does not include their descendants. Including the fiscal impact of those immigrants’ descendants reduces those immigrants’ net fiscal impact to +$57,000. By comparison, native-born American high school dropouts of the same age have a net fiscal impact of −$32,000 that drops to −$177,000 when their descendants are included (see Table 31). Results also differ by level of government. State and local governments often incur a less positive or even negative net fiscal impact from immigration, whereas the federal government almost always sees revenues rise above expenditures in response to immigration. With some variation and exceptions, the net fiscal impact of immigrants is more positive than it is for native-born Americans and positive overall for the federal and state/local governments

Washington, DC: The Cato Institute, 2023. 246p.  

By Miguel Pinedo, and Carmen R. Valdez

We examined the differential impact of having a family member, friend, or co-worker/community member detained or deported on the mental health of US citizens. In 2019, a sample of 3446 adult participants of White, Black, and Latinx racial/ethnic descent were recruited to complete an online questionnaire. Participants completed the Patient Health Questionnaire-4 to screen for anxiety, depression, and psychological distress. Analyses were restricted to US citizens (n = 3282). Multivariable logistic and linear regressions were conducted to examine the mental health of US citizens who reported personally knowing a migrant who has been detained or deported and by their relationship to the migrant, overall and among Latinxs only. Among US citizens, 32% reported personally knowing someone who has been detained or deported. In multivariable analyses, US citizens who personally knew a detained or deported migrant were more likely to report anxiety, depression, and greater psychological distress. Associations were more pronounced among those who reported having a family member detained or deported. US-citizen Latinxs with social ties to migrants who have been detained or deported were especially more likely to report poor mental health than White and Latinx participants who did not personally know a migrant who has been detained or deported. It is critical that policy makers consider the potential mental health harms on migrants and its own citizens when designing policies targeting migrant communities. 

Am J Community Psychol (2020) 66:119–129 

By Andrea Gómez Cervantes, and Cecilia Menjívar

Using interviews and ethnography started in 2016 in rural and urban Kansas, we examine the consequences of an amplified immigration enforcement combined with a local limited health care infrastructure that reproduce legal violence manifesting on Latina immigrants’ health, access to care, and community participation. We highlight the conditions rooted in place that generate short- and long-term negative impacts for Latina immigrants’ health. Fear and anxiety about the deportation of themselves and their family members make them ill and also generate apprehension about contacting medical institutions, driving, and spending time in public spaces. These circumstances coalesce in women’s lives to block access to medical care and undermine women’s roles in their communities. Following gendered expectations, women turn to their informal networks to seek health care for their families. In the context that the 

Journal of Health and Social Behavior Volume 61 Issue 3 Pages 307-323, 2020

By Cecilia Menjívar

This essay examines the intertwined nature of seemingly neutral immigration laws that illegalize certain immigrant groups and the socially constructed attitudes and stereotypes that associate the same legally targeted groups with “illegality,” to produce the racialization of illegality. These complementary factors are further sustained by other social forces, including media discourses that reify those associations. The racialization of illegality is a fundamentally situational, relational, dynamic, and historically and context-specific process. Today, Latino groups are the preeminent target group of both the social and the legal production of illegality. Thus, this essay examines Latinos' racialized illegality across geographical contexts, within their group, and in relation to other contemporary immigrants. Although expressions of racialized illegality and specific targeted

Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences , 150 Issue 2 Pages 91-105, 2021

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By Joanne Passaro

Gender and Homelessness: The book explores how gender differences contribute to the persistence of homelessness, with a focus black men in New York City.

Cultural and Moral Location: Homelessness is not just an economic issue but also a cultural and moral one, where homeless men are seen as both hypermasculinized and emasculated.

Survival Strategies: Homeless women often strategize to appear"worthy" to move through the system, while homeless men lack similar strategies and face greater stigmatization.

Impact of Family Structures: The book argues that nuclear family ideologies play a significant role in who remains homeless versus who becomes houseless.

Psychology Press, 1996, 128 pages

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By Osmond K. Praenkel

Importance of Civil Liberties: The document emphasizes that civil liberties, such as freedom of speech, assembly, and protection from arbitrary arrests, are fundamental to a free society.

Historical Context: It discusses the origins and development of civil liberties in the United States, particularly through the Bill of Rights and subsequent amendments.

Challenges and Limitations: The text highlights the challenges in fully realizing civil liberties, including during wartime and in the face of discrimination.

Role of the Judiciary: The document underscores the critical role of courts in interpreting and enforcing civil liberties, ensuring that government actions do not infringe on individual rights.

The Viking Press, 1944, 277 pages

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Edited by Marcela Raffaelli & Reed W. Larson

Focus on Street Youth: The document explores the developmental issues faced by homeless and working street youth around the world,highlighting their unique challenges and resilience.

Geographical Approach: It presents studies from different regions,including India, Brazil, Kenya, and the United States, to show the diverse experiences and factors affecting street youth.

Research and Methodology: The document discusses the methodological and ethical issues in researching street youth,emphasizing the importance of understanding their context and using appropriate research methods.

Developmental Impact: It examines how street life affects the development of street youth, including their cognitive skills, identity formation, and psychological adjustment.

Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1999, 90 pages