By Financial Action Task Force (FATF)

The aim of this project is to study one specific sport which could reveal money laundering schemes that may also be occurring in other sports. As one of the largest sports in the world, football1 was chosen. Both professional and amateur football were to be examined. Although the scale of vulnerabilities to money laundering is potentially different, risks in both areas were considered likely to be similar.

Paria: FATF, 2009. 42p.

By Elleman, Bruce A. and Paine, S.C.M

The sixteen case studies in this book reflect the extraordinary diversity of experience of navies attempting to carry out, and also to eliminate, commerce raiding. Because the cases emphasize conflicts in which commerce raiding had major repercussions, they shed light on when, how, and in what manner it is most likely to be effective. The authors have been asked to examine the international context, the belligerents, the distribution of costs and benefits, the logistical requirements, enemy countermeasures, and the operational and strategic effectiveness of these campaigns.

Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College Press, 2010. 277p.

By Davin Nina 1 Péan Maxence

Money laundering is an activity that consists of legitimizing the proceeds of crime by integrating them into the economic system. The primary objective of this process is to conceal the origin of money from illegal activities (drug trafficking, insider trading, corruption, etc.). The proceeds of these crimes take different forms. It can be cash, financial assets or material objects (works of art, jewelry, etc.). Money laundering is most often carried out in three distinct stages: placement, layering and integration. The placement stage consists of placing the dirty money in the financial system. Most often, criminal organizations come through companies to increase the inflow of capital, which is then deposited in a banking institution. Afterwards, the stratification process takes place, which consists of a large series of conversions and movements of funds in order to mask the origin of these products. Finally, once the money is laundered, it is reused by criminals to finance their activities. Today, the emergence of new information and communication technologies (NICT) in particular is giving a new boost to money laundering activities. The advent of online payment systems, crypto-currencies and dematerialized cash transfers make it even more difficult to track down illegal money transfers. Moreover, the multiplication of online auctions or gambling sites greatly facilitates money laundering. Faced with the development of these new methods, the authorities of European countries are trying to set up a new system to fight against money laundering, in particular by strengthening their cooperation. In addition, following the numerous attacks that occurred in the decade 2010-2020, the fight against the financing of terrorism has become the focus of these institutions. Despite the strengthening of the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing (AML/CFT), the latter "has weaknesses1". These weaknesses are based on "institutional fragmentation and insufficient coordination at the European Union level2" but also because the EU bodies have "limited tools". Furthermore, following the work of many researchers, it is estimated that today the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing is liberticide. Indeed, as early as 2003, a report by the CNIL pointed out the numerous liberticidal measures to fight against money laundering. In this paper, we will first present the framework of the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing in the European Union (I), then we will describe the main flaws of this system (II), and finally we will demonstrate that this fight is today deeply liberticidal, notably because of the tools it uses (III)

Sciencespo.aix. ND. ca. 2021.p.12.

By Tomas Williams, Pablo Slutzky, and Mauricio Villamizar-Villegas

We explore how anti-money laundering (AML) policies affect banks and credit provision to firms. For identification we exploit the enactment of a financial regulation in Colombia. Aimed at controlling the flow of money from drug trafficking into the financial system, we find that after implementation bank deposits in municipalities with high drug trafficking decline. This negative liquidity shock has consequences for credit in other municipalities. Banks sourcing their deposits from areas with high drug trafficking cut lending relative to other banks. Using a proprietary database containing data on bank-firm credit relationships, we show that small firms that rely on credit from affected banks experience a negative shock to sales, investment, and profitability. Furthermore, we use night-lights data to show that these results are not due to a reallocation of activity across firms nor between the formal and informal sectors. Our evidence uncovers a hidden to be considered when implementing AML policies.

Washington, DC: Elliott School of International Affairs, The George Washington University, 2020. 62p.

By Pacelli, Joseph, Janet Gao, Jan Schneemeier, and Yufeng Wu.

Bank employees face discretion in investigating and reporting money laundering activities via suspicious activity reports (SARs), a primary tool to combat financial crimes. We investigate the incentives banks face to initiate SARs and the implications for criminal activity. Our theoretical and empirical analyses document that banks with more profit-seeking pressure adopt lax reporting policies to attract criminal customers, ultimately leading to more suspicious activity reports. A structural estimation approach helps us uncover the relation between bank profitability, reporting stringency, and the demand from criminal customers. Our results also suggest an assortative matching between lax banks and criminal clientele.

Boston, MA: Harvard Business School, 2021. 61p.,

By Steven Pierce.

State Formation & Political Culture in Nigeria. “The messages are familiar to almost anyone with an e-mail account. During the early 2000s they became an international punch line. Often purporting to come from the relative of a Nigerian government official, they requested the recipient’s help to transfer vast sums of money out of the country. In return for this assistance, the recipient would receive a significant percentage of the funds being transferred. Usually unsaid was that the money had been acquired corruptly and that the sender needed help in avoiding the attention of law enforcement.”

Duke University Press (2016) 305p.