By Katrien Luyten

The EU is an important market for illicit drugs (hereinafter referred to as drugs), both in terms of consumption and production. An estimated 29% of European adults aged 15-65 have used drugs at least once in their lifetime, the majority of them being men. Cannabis remains by far the most used drug, followed by cocaine, MDMA (ecstasy or molly) and amphetamines. Drugs have been claiming an increasing number of lives in the EU since 2012, but their impact goes far beyond the harm caused by their use. The drugs market is the largest criminal market in the EU, with an estimated minimum retail value of €30 billion per year in the EU alone. Over a third of the organised crime groups active in the EU are involved in the trade in drugs, which, besides generating massive criminal profits and inflicting substantial harm, incites associated violence. Drug markets furthermore have links with wider criminal activity, including terrorism; they have a negative impact on the legal economy and communities, cause environmental damage and can fuel corruption and undermine governance. Drugs have been trafficked into and through the EU for decades, but they are also increasingly produced in the EU, for both local and global markets, asis the case for cannabis and synthetic drugs such as amphetamines. In fact, the trade in synthetic drugs in the EU is unique compared to other substances,as the production of these drugs and new psychoactive substances in most cases takes place in the EU. In 2021, around 1million seizures of drugs were reported in the EU-27 plus Norway and Türkiye. Although the EU Member States carry the primary responsibility for developing their drug policy and legislation, cross-border cooperation is paramount in the fight against drugs. With the problem constantly expanding in scale and complexity, the EU has been increasingly active since the early 1990s, particularly with respect to law enforcement, health-related issues and the detection and risk assessment of new psychoactive substances. This is an update of a briefing published in September 2021.

Brussels: EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service , 2023.. 12p.

By:Natalie Butler

The Washington/Baltimore HIDTA Information Bulletin by Butler et al. highlights the emergence of Bis(2,2,6,6-tetramethyl-4-piperidyl) sebacate (BTMPS), or Tinuvin 770, in Maryland’s illicit drug supply. BTMPS, an industrial UV stabilizer not approved for human use, was found in 0.7% of drug-positive samples (Jan–Mar 2025), often alongside fentanyl, heroin, and xylazine. It acts as a potent L-type calcium channel blocker and non-competitive antagonist at nicotinic receptors and does not respond to naloxone. First detected in 2024, BTMPS has since spread to at least 11 states. In New Mexico, it appeared in counterfeit M30 tablets with reports of severe withdrawal. Individuals who have used it describe BTMPS as smelling like bug spray or burning plastic.

Washington/Baltimore HIDTA Investigative Support Center , 2025. 3p.

By Dean J. Connolly, Santino Coduri-Fulford c, Katherine Macdonald , Gail GilchristLuke Muschialli

Sexualised drug use (SDU) is a highly prevalent phenomenon of increasing public health significance in communities of men who have sex with men (MSM). This prospectively registered PRISMA-ScR-adherent systematic scoping review examines the current state of knowledge surrounding violence amongst MSM in the context of SDU. A broad search was conducted across four databases, with no restrictions. Studies citing or cited by all database-identified records retained for full-text review were retrieved and screened. Three journals were hand searched across the past five years, and three searches were conducted on Google Scholar. In addition, 13 key opinion leaders were contacted via email to request any additional published or unpublished data. The twentyeight studies included in the final synthesis reported mostly qualitative data from geographically diverse nonrepresentative samples, predominantly relating to sexual violence with other typologies seldom investigated or reported. Although quantitative data were limited, sexual violence appeared common in this context and was directly associated with impaired mental health and suicidality. Some participants reported first- or second-hand accounts of non-consensual administration of incapacitating doses of GHB/GBL to men who were subsequently raped. This was frequently perpetrated by men whose age, status, or financial privilege afforded them power over their victims. While reports from some participants suggested context-specific blurring of the lines of consent, a few quotes demonstrated a dearth of knowledge surrounding the centrality of consent in lawful sex. Given the historical denigration of MSM, any efforts to further investigate or address this issue must be community-led.

International Journal of Drug Policy

Volume 136, February 2025, 104706

By Aaron Lenihan,  Amanda Hauke,  Francisco Sanchez and Paul Guerin,

The Department of Health, Housing, and Homelessness (HHH) launched the Albuquerque Peer to Peer: Opioid Coordination and Outreach Project in September 2017. The project aims to reduce opioid misuse, overdose, and death in the Albuquerque area by using peer support workers to connect individuals suffering from opioid use disorder with appropriate treatment and recovery support services. This report presents the results of CARA’s evaluation of the Peer to Peer project. We review the scientific literature on similar programs to establish a baseline for expected client outcomes and best practices, and then compare the Peer to Peer project to this baseline through an analysis of program documents and service data. The results of our analysis reveal that Albuquerque Peer to Peer is broadly designed and implemented according to best practices. However, we recommend clarifying the procedures for assessing client needs and facilitating client engagement in referred-to services. In terms of the short-term outcome -- proportion of clients who engaged in the treatment services to which they were referred – we found that Albuquerque Peer to Peer is performing as well as comparable, state-of-the-art peer outreach programs. We recommend the project track middle to long-term client outcomes, like rates of EMS involvement and overdose death, moving forward.

Albuquerque: New Mexico Statistical Analysis Center, Institute for Social Research, Center for Applied Research & Analysis, 2023. 40p.

By The International Drug Policy Consortium

In 2024, the World Drug Report broke its historical silence on the human rights dimension of drug policy with a special chapter on “Drug Use and the Right to Health.” The present analysis compares this chapter with the April 2024 report on “Drug Use, Harm Reduction, and the Right to Health” by the UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Health, Dr. Tlaleng Mofokeng, to assess whether the 2024 edition of the World Drug Report constitutes a genuine move towards integrating a human rights perspective into the global drug control regime.

The answer is negative. The World Drug Report chapter suffers from a critical and unjustifiable methodological flaw: it has been developed without any reference to the standards and recommendations on drugs and the right to health developed over the last 15 years by UN human rights mechanisms. These standards were created precisely to provide Member States with guidance on their human rights obligations. Instead, the chapter is often guided by the UNODC’s own policy preferences and its desire to manage political tensions at the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND).

The result is a flawed rendering of the right to health that omits essential elements such as a robust interpretation of harm reduction and support for the decriminalisation of people who use drugs. It also glosses over the undeniable tension between the drug control regime and the right to health, and introduces problematic concepts such as “the right to health of communities affected by drug use.” This notion is not grounded in human rights standards and risks decentring people who use drugs.

Although the special chapter pitches itself as the basis for a new framework to evaluate States’ performance with regards to the right to health, Member States should withhold support for this flawed initiative until it fully integrates the guidance developed by the UN human rights system.

London: International Drug Policy Consortium, 2025. 23p.

By Claire Provost,

U.S. leads global drug war

The role of the United States in exporting the destructive war on drugs to other countries is unparalleled. Since 1971, the U.S. has spent more than a trillion dollars on the war on drugs, prioritising law enforcement responses and fuelling mass incarceration within its borders. It has also played a leading role in pushing and funding punitive responses to drugs internationally. This has continued despite clear evidence that such approaches don’t work to achieve their stated aims (ending drug use and sales) while having devastating effects on rights and health, including mass criminalisation, disease transmission, repression and displacement.

This report demonstrates how U.S. assistance has supported and expanded destructive and deadly anti-drug responses in low- and middle-income countries around the world. It also presents new follow-the-money data analysis on U.S. international drug control spending by various government departments and budgets. This includes official development assistance (ODA) intended to support poverty reduction and other global development goals; and three case studies – Colombia, Mexico, and the Philippines – to reveal the damage done by this spending.

Vast and complex global network

The 2023 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report by the U.S. State Department described a “whole of government approach” to drug control and a strategy of deep collaboration and “capacity building” with counterparts in other countries. A vast and complex global network of U.S. government agencies, programs, and activities has been developed in the ongoing “war on drugs.”

U.S. support for drug enforcement internationally includes financial, material and technical assistance. The U.S. drug war bureaucracy is expansive, involving numerous agencies of the government, including the Department of Defense (DOD), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), National Security Agency (NSA), State Department, Department of Homeland Security, United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), as well as the infamous Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), under the Department of Justice (DOJ). By 2023, the DEA had 93 foreign offices in 69 countries.

Follow the money

Over the decade between 2015-2024, a total of almost $13 billion of U.S. taxpayer money was allocated to “counternarcotics” activities internationally.

For fiscal year 2025, the President requested $1 billion for international “counternarcotics” activities. Almost half of this request was to be received and spent by the DEA ($480 million); the second largest planned intermediary for this spending was to be the State Department’s INL bureau (about $350 million).

Separate budget documents from the involved departments contain further detail on where and how international drug control funding is to be spent. For instance, the U.S. Department of State’s 2023 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) showed that Latin America was budgeted to receive more than half ($225 million) of the total $375 million for “counternarcotics” requested by the department and its agencies (including INL and USAID). Colombia was to be the largest single country recipient ($115 million).

Aid donors (led by the U.S.) spent almost $1 billion of their ODA on “narcotics control” projects in dozens of low- and middle-income countries over the decade 2013-2022. No donor contributed more to these “narcotics control” budgets than the U.S.

Controversially, the U.S. has been increasingly classifying drug control spending as ODA: in 2020, it counted just over $30 million like this; in 2021 that figure was $309 million (and while it dropped to $106 million in 2022, this was still higher than earlier years).

Profit-making companies are also benefiting from this ODA spending on “narcotics control.” The top “channel” for this spending has been private companies (“private sector institutions,” receiving $244 million over the decade) followed by the governments of countries funded ($202 million), and then multilateral organisations such as UNODC ($77 million).

Harm Reduction International | Drug Policy Alliance, 2024. 47p.

By Drug Policy Alliance

We all want people living with addiction to get the help they need. At the Drug Policy Alliance, we believe that everyone should have access to the substance use disorder (SUD) supports that they choose to improve their physical and mental health — and that effective services should be available when and where people are ready for them, without hurdles like cost or preconditions to get help. In short, SUD supports should be voluntary, effective, affordable, accessible, and appealing.

Unfortunately, the United States has neither prioritized on-demand care nor ensured that available SUD supports are effective or beneficial. Having failed to provide even remotely sufficient access to the kinds of health-centered approaches that research shows are most effective (e.g., medications for opioid use disorder, or MOUD, and contingency management for stimulant use disorder, or CM), some ill-informed policymakers are advocating for expanding the power of courts to force people into existing SUD services, against their will and not of their choosing. This is not entirely new. Forced treatment has been a familiar practice in criminal courts for decades — where criminal defendants have had the “choice” to opt for court-ordered SUD services or face traditional sentencing, often including incarceration

New York: Drug Policy Alliance, 2024. 32p.

By Jon Heidt

This report reviews the key research literature on the impact of decriminalization, depenalization, diversion, and harm reduction programs from countries in Europe, North America, South America Oceania, and several U.S. states including California, Maine, Oregon, and Washington state. From this review, key indicators emerged in two domains: crime and criminal justice and mental and public health. Crime and criminal justice indicators include crime rates, levels of organized crime, rates of imprisonment, levels of public disorder (e.g., open air drug use and dealing), drug use trends and patterns, drug availability and price, rates of treatment uptake, addiction and overdose, police clearance rates, costs of enforcement, and functioning. Mental and public health indicators include drug use rates and patterns, rates of drug treatment participation, and rates of drug related mortality. These indicators were used to evaluate the impact that different approaches to drug policy have on society.

Vancouver, BC:  International Centre for Criminal Law Reform, 2021. 80p.