By Nina Hudson, Rachel Moody, Heather McKay, Rae Kaspiew

The guide presents research-based insights that challenge common stereotypes, highlighting the diverse experiences of victims and survivors and offering practical examples and approaches for professionals to implement in their practice. It is intended for use by professionals within the Australian justice sector, specifically police, lawyers, and judicial officers.

This resource aims to support a more trauma-informed, victim-centred approach within the Australian justice system, ultimately fostering a greater understanding of the complexities of sexual assault. It was developed in response to calls for improvements in the justice system's handling of sexual assault cases and draws on research from over 100 Australian and international sources.

Australian Institute of Family Studies, 2024. 83p.

By The Texas Organized Retail Theft Task Force

Organized Retail Theft (ORT), the large-scale theft and reselling of merchandise, is a growing problem, according to Texas retailers. In 2023, the Texas Legislature created a special task force led by Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts Glenn Hegar to analyze and develop strategies for combatting ORT. The ORT Task Force, which includes law enforcement, retailers and policy experts, conducted research, listened to expert testimony and conducted site visits as part of its study. The following report represents the findings of the Task Force and offers recommendations for further action. Summary of Findings and Recommendations As the Task Force listened to expert testimony and Comptroller staff visited retailer sites, ORT Task Force members noted three recurrent themes: a lack of ORT data, a need for coordination among ORT stakeholders and a need for consistency in the application of ORT laws. Finding 1 Statewide data relating specifically to ORT are not collected in Texas, which makes it difficult to quantify the extent and cost of ORT, pinpoint where crimes are happening and dedicate sufficient resources to combat ORT. Retailers are reluctant to share certain proprietary data with their competitors. Recommendations • Develop a statewide repository to collect ORT data that can be aggregated and analyzed. • Work with retailers to categorize and mask their confidential data in a manner that doesn’t expose proprietary information while still allowing analysts to estimate the cost of ORT and detect trends. • If ORT trends indicate a need, consider creating an organization to combat ORT modeled after or housed under the Texas Financial Crimes Intelligence Center. Finding 2 Thefts conducted by perpetrators who target multiple types of merchandise or who operate in more than one law enforcement jurisdiction may be difficult to identify as ORT. Improved transparency, interaction and communication among all stakeholders—retailers, law enforcement and prosecutors—have yielded positive results in some cities. Recommendations • Continue support for the Texas Department of Public Safety’s Organized Retail Theft Prevention Unit and consider increasing the total number of FTEs for the unit. • Identify an existing state agency to serve as both an information clearinghouse and a facilitator to help local law enforcement departments develop and improve ORT coordination, cooperation and knowledge sharing with other jurisdictions so that potential links to related cases may be identified and shared. • San Antonio’s Businesses Against Theft Network (BAT-NET) program could serve as a model for other cities to improve communication, transparency and collaboration among stakeholders. • Establish a store walk-through program. Retailers can launch a store walk-through program inviting law enforcement agencies and prosecutors’ offices to get a better understanding of the ORT issue. This can also help foster a stronger relationship between retailers and law enforcement. • Incorporate training on ORT in new officer training classes and as part of a continuing education class for law enforcement. • One-hour presentation to new academy classes. • Quarterly and annual meeting/certification by Texas Organized Retail Crime Association (TXORCA) or similar association. Finding 3 Prosecuting ORT can be time and resource intensive, and prosecutors sometimes apply ORT charges inconsistently (e.g., charging an ORT crime as simple theft, which may take less time and be easier to prove). Prosecutors find the requirement to prove intentionality in ORT cases to be an obstacle in the pursuit of charges under the ORT statute. Other state laws may inadvertently make it difficult for ORT crimes to be prosecuted. Retailers, for example, are required by law to wait 10 days before reporting the theft of certain rental items. Although normally this provision likely would be in a consumer’s best interest, it is a barrier when the retailer becomes aware that the items are being resold before the retailer is allowed to report the theft. Recommendation • Form a committee of prosecutors to review the ORT statute’s requirements, including proof of intentionality, and other statutes that are barriers to ORT prosecution, such as the waiting period on reporting stolen rental items. The committee should seek input from retailers and law enforcement during its review. The committee will present its suggestions to the ORT Task Force before the next legislative session. • Develop training on ORT as a continuing education course, such as a one-hour presentation on the key steps for prosecuting an ORT case.

Austin: Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts 2024. 24p.

By Kristin Finklea

Retailers and retail industry advocacy groups have expressed concern about what they see as a general increase in retail crime, and more specifically an increase in organized retail crime (ORC). Reports of incidents where individuals, occasionally acting in flash mobs, storm stores to steal large amounts of items, and at times assault employees, have underscored these concerns. Some law enforcement agencies have increased resources and information sharing to counter these crimes. Additionally, some retail organizations have urged policymakers and law enforcement to take steps to educate the public and crack down on this apparent increase in retail crime, and more specifically ORC. A primary barrier to measuring ORC accurately is a lack of a consistent, widely accepted definition that can be used in a systematic and comprehensive effort to collect and report these data. Nonetheless, there is general consensus that ORC involves coordinated theft with the intent to resell for financial gain. ORC typically refers to large-scale retail theft and fraud by organized groups of professional shoplifters (or boosters). Organized crime rings resell illegally acquired merchandise via a variety of fencing operations such as flea markets, swap meets, pawn shops, and online marketplaces. ORC differs from shoplifting in that traditional shoplifters tend to steal merchandise for personal use. A number of factors contribute to the lack of comprehensive criminal justice data on ORC. At the federal level, there is currently no law prohibiting organized retail crime that could be used to help document the number of ORC incidents known to federal law enforcement, specifically. Combating retail theft has primarily been handled by state and local law enforcement under state criminal laws. While state laws prohibiting theft are the statutes that state and local law enforcement and prosecutors have often relied on to investigate and prosecute ORC, over 30 states have enacted ORC-specific laws. However, these laws differ by state and there is no centralized reporting system for ORC-related crimes. The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Uniform Crime Reporting Program, National Incident-Based Reporting System collects data on thefts reported to state and local law enforcement, including shoplifting; however, it does not capture ORC specifically. In the absence of comprehensive data on ORC, snapshots of data from various sources may offer insight into its extent and nature. For instance, 78.1% of respondents to the National Retail Federation’s 2023 National Retail Security Survey indicated that the threat of ORC was more of a priority than it had been in the prior year. While some observers believe that ORC is a national problem, others disagree, citing anecdotal and high-profile flash mob thefts and smash-and-grabs as driving this concern. Nonetheless, there is debate over the federal government’s role in deterring ORC and sanctioning various actors that may be involved in committing or aiding these crimes. A principal underlying issue is the lack of data on the scope of ORC to inform this debate. Without these data, Congress may not be able to accurately assess the proper role of the federal government. As such, policymakers may debate various options regarding data on ORC, including how new or existing mechanisms for collecting national crime data could be used to capture these data and help inform policymakers on the prevalence and nature of this type of crime.

Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2024. 11p.

By Tom G. Meling, Magne Mogstad, and Arnstein Vestre

We quantify the extent of crypto tax noncompliance and evasion, and assess the efficacy of alternative tax enforcement interventions. The context of the study is Norway. This context allows us to address key measurement challenges by combining de-anonymized crypto trading data with individual tax returns, survey data, and information from tax enforcement interventions. We find that crypto tax noncompliance is pervasive, even among investors trading on exchanges that share identifiable trading data with tax authorities. However, since most crypto investors owe little in crypto-related taxes, enforcement strategies need to be well-targeted or cheap for benefits to outweigh costs.

Chicago: University of Chicago, The Becker Friedman Institute for Economics (BFI) , 2024. 69p.

By Di Cooke, Abby Edwards, Alexis Day, Devi Nair, Sophia Barkoff, and Katie Kelly

THE ISSUE

• In recent years, threat actors have increasingly used synthetic media—digital content produced or manipulated by artificial intelligence (AI)—to enhance their deceptive activities, harming individuals and organizations worldwide with growing frequency.

• In addition, the weaponization of synthetic media has also begun to undermine people’s trust in information integrity more widely, posing concerning implications for the stability and resilience of the U.S.’s information environment.

• At present, an individual’s ability to recognize AI-generated content remains the primary defense against people falling prey to deceptively presented synthetic media.

• However, a recent experimental study by CSIS found that people are no longer able to reliably distinguish between authentic and AI-generated images, audio, and video sourced from publicly available tools.

• That human detection has ceased to be a reliable method for identifying synthetic media only heightens the dangers posed by the technology’s misuse, underscoring the pressing need to implement alternative countermeasures to address this emerging threat.

CSIS, 2024. 11p.

By: Carlton W. Reeves, Luis Felipe Restrepo, Laura E. Mate, Claire Murray, Claria Horn Boom, John Gleeson, Candice C. Wong, Patricia K. Cushwa, and Scott A.C. Meisler

The use of cyber technologies, such as cryptocurrency and the dark web, provides new and evolving means to commit crimes and avoid detection. These technologies are used to commit a variety of federal offenses. The dark web is sometimes used to create, hide, or access websites containing child pornography. Illegal drugs and firearms are sometimes sold through dark websites. Cryptocurrency is sometimes used to facilitate these crimes. [...] Regardless of the type of crime involved, the relative anonymity these technologies provide to their users creates challenges for the investigation and prosecution of the crimes committed with them. The use of cyber technology to commit crimes transcends national borders. As Interpol has found, this causes investigative and legal challenges that can be difficult to overcome. United States government agencies, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, have reported on the increasing threats from these technologies and estimated yearly losses in the billions from the crimes committed with these technologies. There has been little analysis on the individuals sentenced for a federal offense who use these technologies for illegal purposes, the offenses they committed, and trends in these areas over time. In developing this report, the United States Sentencing Commission ('the Commission') collected information on individuals sentenced for offenses using cryptocurrency, the dark web, and hacking for fiscal years 2014 through 2021."

United States Sentencing Commission Sep. 2024

By Christie Franks and Russell G Smith

Identity crime and misuse cost the Australian economy an estimated $3.1b in 2018–19 (Smith & Franks 2020). Protecting individuals’ personal identification information and finding secure ways to verify identities has become an increased priority as the impact of identity crime continues to grow in Australia and worldwide. Biometric technologies for identity verification provide an enhanced security solution, although implementation of biometric systems within Australian society has met with varying degrees of acceptance. Since 2013, the Australian Institute of Criminology (AIC) has conducted online surveys to gain a greater understanding of identity crime and misuse in Australia. These surveys have asked about respondents’ experience of identity crime and also their previous use of, and future willingness to use, biometric technologies to safeguard their personal information. This report presents both qualitative and quantitative research findings obtained from a sample of respondents in the most recent surveys concerning their experiences of biometrics and perceptions as to its role in identity security.

Research Report no. 20. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology. 2021. 76p.

By: Cassandra Cross

This article investigates the contributing factors (or triggers) to the realization of romance fraud victimization, based on 1015 reports lodged with Scamwatch (Australian online reporting portal for fraud) between July 2018 and July 2019 (inclusive). The article examines the free text narrative of each report to propose five discernible trigger categories: further requests for money; characteristics of communications; verification checks; an offender's action(s); and being told by a third party. Based on a comprehensive understanding of these five categories, the article advocates for broader messaging approaches to encompass financial literacy and well-being, cyberliteracy and critical thinking skills, cybersecurity practices, and respectful and healthy relationships. Leveraging the use of these wider education and awareness campaigns could improve recognition of romance fraud. Importantly, it is suggested that banks and other financial institutions are in a strong position to focus their efforts on some of these broader messages to effect positive change.

Criminology & Public PolicyVolume 22, Issue 4: Cybercrime and Cybersecurity Nov 2023 Pages 585-894