By Christopher Dowling and Anthony Morgan

The criminal mobility of outlaw motorcycle gang (OMCG) members presents a significant challenge to Australian governments and police. Examining patterns of mobility can help to better understand the opportunity structures that underpin offending by OMCGs and to drive national collaborative responses to these gangs. This study examines the prevalence and patterns of criminal mobility in a sample of almost 4,000 OMCG members in more than 400 chapters. Around one in 10 members showed evidence of criminal mobility over the long term, while more than one-third of chapters comprised criminally mobile members. Criminally mobile gang members were heavily concentrated in a small number of chapters. Patterns of criminal mobility primarily involve movements into east coast jurisdictions. New South Wales and Queensland emerged as the most common destinations for criminally mobile OMCG members  

Trends & issues in crime and criminal justice no. 619. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology. 2021. 16p

By Rasmus Munksgaard and James Martin

Cryptomarkets represent a growing component of the global illicit drugs trade. Australia is over-represented in the proportion of online vendors who use these platforms to reach drug consumers. Despite the growth in online drug trading, relatively little is known about people who use cryptomarkets to sell drugs. This study addresses the knowledge gap and provides qualitative insights into this new, and little understood, cohort of offenders. The study found that vendors perceive less risk of violence and police intervention when selling drugs online and that the potential for profit exceeds that available when selling drugs offline.

Trends & issues in crime and criminal justice no. 608. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology. 2020. 12p.

By Cassandra Cross, Thomas Holt, Anastasia Powell and Michael Wilson 

Advancements in information technology are sources of both opportunity and vulnerability for citizens. Previous research indicates that there are significant challenges for police in investigating cybercrime, that community expectations about police responses are based largely on media representations, and that victims experience high levels of frustration and stigmatisation. This paper examines the views of the Australian community and law enforcement officers about the policing of cybercrime. Results suggest that police personnel are more likely to view cybercrime as serious, and community members are more likely to ascribe blame to victims. Results also indicate a discrepancy between police and community members in their views of the efficacy of police responses. These discrepancies contribute to public dissatisfaction. Therefore, the paper covers some general strategies for short- and long-term cybercrime prevention.

Trends & issues in crime and criminal justice no. 635. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology. 2021. 20p.

By Megan Wyre, David Lacey and Kathy Allan

Identity theft continues to grow in prevalence and complexity. Despite this growth, little is known about the identity theft response system and how it assists victims to recover. This study examines the response system by analysing 211 identity theft cases reported to IDCARE, a national identity and cybercrime victim support service. The study applies a sociotechnical systems methodology to establish the social, task and information processes of the Australian identity theft response system. The study also examines identity theft victims’ response activities and needs over a 12-month period. The identity theft response system is almost entirely dependent on the victim to respond to and limit the harm caused by identity theft. Overall, the response system is disjointed and lacking in coordination. 

Trends & issues in crime and criminal justice no. 592.  Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology. 2020. 18p.

By Ariel G. Ruiz Soto

Immigrants in the United States commit crimes at lower rates than the U.S.-born population, notwithstanding the assertion by critics that immigration is linked to higher rates of criminal activity. This reality of reduced criminality, which holds across immigrant groups including unauthorized immigrants, has been demonstrated through research as well as findings for the one state in the United States—Texas—that tracks criminal arrests and convictions by immigration status. A growing volume of research demonstrates that not only do immigrants commit fewer crimes, but they also do not raise crime rates in the U.S. communities where they settle. In fact, some studies indicate that immigration can lower criminal activity, especially violent crime, in places with inclusive policies and social environments where immigrant populations are well established. A Look at the Overall Immigrant Population National studies have examined incarceration rates and prosecutions of immigrants in the country, overwhelmingly finding that immigrants of all legal statuses commit crimes at lower rates than those who were born in the United States. Immigrants Are Prosecuted and Imprisoned at Lower Rates than the U.S. Born Immigrants in the United States have had lower incarceration rates than the native-born population since at least 1870 (when such data were first recorded). In 2020, immigrants were 60 percent less likely to be incarcerated than the U.S. born, according to a study by the National Bureau of Economic Research. And though a 2021 Justice Department study points out prosecutions of immigrants increased between 1990 and 2018, nearly 90 percent were for violations of immigration-related laws. Notably, U.S. born citizens were ten times more likely than immigrants to be incarcerated for committing weapons- related offenses, five times more likely for violent offenses, more than twice as likely for property crimes, and nearly twice as likely for drug offenses.  At the state level, multiple studies have found there is no clear relationship between violent crime and immigration. And research at the city level suggests that increases in immigration can be associated with declining homicide rates, with the largest effect on municipalities with long histories of immigration, as well as reductions in property crimes and robbery. This makes immigrants  less likely to be either offenders or victims of crime at the local level compared to the U.S.-born population

Washington, DC: Immigration Policy Institute, 2024. 5p.   

By Oliver Bennett MBE, Ali Shalchi

The precise scale of economic crime in the UK is unknown, but it could run to tens or hundreds of billions of pounds per year. The extent of these crimes – which include money laundering, fraud, and corruption – led the Intelligence and Security Select Committee in its July 2020 report on Russia to note that London is considered a ‘laundromat’ for corrupt money. In December 2019 the Treasury Committee found various regulatory and legislative failings in the way in which these crimes are being tackled. It urged the Government to make improvements to the supervisory system and to introduce new powers to combat economic crime. A February 2022 Treasury Committee follow-up report concluded that the Government was still not prioritizing economic crime sufficiently. In 2019 The Financial Action Task Force (the global money laundering and terrorist financing watchdog) praised the UK’s efforts on the issue, but also found failings and identified a lack of resources for investigating these crimes. The Economic Crime Plan The Government agrees about the need to tackle economic crime, which it says causes “much harm to individuals and communities and damage to legitimate business and the UK’s reputation.” It set out its overall approach to tackling the issue in its July 2019 Economic Crime Plan. The Plan covers the years 2019-2022 and draws together all the work being conducted by the public and private sector. A number of the 52 actions contained in the plan may involve future legislative reforms, including changes to: • the Proceeds of Crime Act to improve how the proceeds of crime can be confiscated; • corporate criminal liability, to punish and prevent economic crimes when committed on behalf of or in the name of companies; • block company stock exchange listings on national security grounds; • improve transparency over UK property ownership; • Companies House powers to enable it strike off from its register dissolved or inactive limited partnerships. Progress with the Plan In February 2022, the Royal United Services Institute said that 40% of actions in the Plan had been completed, 17% were in progress, 23% were overdue, and 19% of actions had no due date. The Government says it is “on course to deliver 49 of the 52 actions” in the Plan. The Treasury Committee has recommended that the Plan be adapted and renewed for a further three years.   

London: UK Parliament, House of Commons Library, 2022. 22p.

By Gareth Mott, James Shires, Jen Ellis, James Sullivan and Jamie MacColl

Commercial cyber tools and services have many legitimate applications, from corporate penetration testing (an authorised simulated cyber attack on an IT system) to law enforcement and national security operations. But they are also subject to misuse and abuse, when they are used in ways that are contrary to national or international law, violate the human rights of their targets, or pose risks to international security. Some states are currently grappling with this policy challenge. Meanwhile, collective international initiatives for action are underway. For example, there is the US’s 2023 Joint Statement on Efforts to Counter the Proliferation and Misuse of Commercial Spyware and the UK- and France-led Pall Mall Process of 2024. Ultimately, one aim of these initiatives is to enable states to harmonise their policy interventions where possible. To inform principles and policies for intervention at national and international levels, it is necessary to understand the dynamics that encourage or facilitate offensive-cyber proliferation. This paper identifies a range of ‘non-state proliferating factors’ (NPFs) and ‘state permissive behaviours’ (SPBs), and its findings draw on desk-based research on the international commercial offensive-cyber market. These findings were supplemented by a data validation and consultative workshop with industry stakeholders held in person at Chatham House in March 2024. This half-day validation workshop drew on the expertise and insights of 44 participants predominantly based in the UK, the US and Western Europe. To facilitate candid discussion, remarks made at the workshop are not attributable, and the identities of participants are not referenced here.

In this paper, NPFs and SPBs are categorised into five areas:

1. Regulation of corporate structure and governance.

2. Legal frameworks for product development, sale and transfer.

3. Diplomatic support and engagement.

4. Development of cyber-security ecosystem and workforce.

5. Integration with defence and security industrial base.

Using these categories, this research analyses the roles of both state and non-state actors. It identifies critical inter-relationships between different SPBs and NPFs that serve to facilitate or enable potentially irresponsible offensive-cyber proliferation. This is one of two papers. A second paper, authored by the researchers and published by Chatham House in October 2024, draws on the findings in this paper and identifies a range of ‘principles’ that could be used to build a code of conduct to counter irresponsible offensive-cyber proliferation.

London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies - RUSI and The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2024. 39p.

By Magnus Lofstrom and Brandon Martin

California’s violent crime rate rose somewhat in 2023 and remains above its pre-pandemic level; the statewide property crime rate fell slightly. Both rates vary widely across crime categories and regions.

Public Policy Institute of Californiam 2024, 2p.

By Paul Jeffrey Brantingham, George E. Tita,  and George Mohler 

The onset of extreme social distancing measures is expected to have a dramatic impact on crime. Here, we examine the impact of mandated, city-wide social distancing orders aimed at limiting the spread of COVID-19 on gang-related crime in Los Angeles. We hypothesize that the unique subcultural processes surrounding gangs may supersede calls to shelter in place and allow gang-related crime to persist. If the normal guardianship of people and property is also disrupted by social distancing, then we expect gang violence to increase. Using autoregressive time series models, we show that gang-related crime remained stable and crime hot spots largely stationary following the onset of shelter-in-place. Policy Implications: In responding to disruptions to social and economic life on the scale of the present pandemic, both police and civilian organizations need to anticipate continued demand, all while managing potential reductions to the workforce. Police are faced with this challenge across a wide array of crime types. Civilian interventionists tasked with responding to gang-related crime need to be prepared for continued peacekeeping and violence interruption activities, but also an expansion of responsibilities to deal with “frontline” or “street level” management of public health needs. 

Criminology & Public Policy. 2021;20:423–436. 

By Mario Peucker, Thomas J Fisher, Jacob Davey

The media does not enjoy a high level of trust among Australians, as many people question the commitment of mainstream media to objective and nonpartisan reporting. While this mistrust is widespread, it manifests in particularly antagonistic ways within far-right milieus, where mainstream media is often seen through a conspiratorial lens as the ‘enemy of the people’ who actively conspire against the wellbeing of ‘ordinary’ or ‘white’ people. This almost unanimously hostile perception, however, does not stop people within far-right online spaces from posting mainstream media outputs to convey ideological messages in their online communities. Context This research report presents key findings from an analysis of far-right online communities on Facebook and the alt-tech fringe platform Gab, which has been described as a ‘right-leaning echo chamber’ (Lima et al. 2018:1). The study was conducted by researchers at the Institute for Sustainable Industries & Liveable Cities at Victoria University (VU), in collaboration with the Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD), within the research stream ‘Dynamics of Violent Extremism’ at the Centre for Resilient and Inclusive Societies (CRIS). What we did The research combines quantitative and qualitative methods. We analyzed around 11,000 Facebook posts and 45,000 Gab posts by Australian-based accounts and users who meet our working definition of far-right (see section 2). This quantitative analysis offers insights into the prevalence of mainstream media sources in their far-right online messaging and which outlets are particularly frequently shared. In addition, we conducted a qualitative multimodal in-depth analysis of a quasi-random sample of 224 Facebook and 298 Gab posts that contained an outbound link to a URL domain associated with a mainstream media outlet. This qualitative analysis allowed us to identify how mainstream media are (re)framed and (mis)appropriated within these far-right online space to deliver certain ideological messages.    

Melbourne; The Centre for Resilient and Inclusive Societies. August 2022. 26p.

By Leke de Vries

The association between crime and place is one of the most empirically supported notions in criminology. However, less is known about whether the internet has impacted the environmental conditions that contribute to crime in physical space. To address this gap, this dissertation examines the intersection of crime, place, and networks in the context of online promoted illicit massage businesses (IMBs). IMBs are establishments that host a wide variety of crimes and deviancies, and have recently gained attention due to their connection to human trafficking operations. While commercial sex and sex trafficking in IMBs are promoted through online classifieds and review boards, the illicit behaviors still require an offline act or transaction in stationary locations such as storefronts. Therefore, IMBs offer a compelling case to understand whether a criminology of place perspective applies to online-promoted crimes. Using innovative data and robust, quantitative and computational methods, this study shows that the geography and use of IMBs are driven by environmental conditions that are central to criminological theory about crime and place. However, the findings also suggest subtle changes to the geography of online-promoted crimes. In particular, IMBs and clientele demand were identified in neighborhoods that on the one hand feature aspects of social disorganization and crime opportunity theories, and on the other hand were theoretically unanticipated (e.g. in advantaged areas). Moreover, many clientele traversed neighborhood boundaries to frequent IMBs, connecting both spatially proximate and distant neighborhoods in patterns of crime. Lastly, the findings show the limitations of current policing models that are challenged by the locational flexibility of IMBs. Overall, these findings raise questions about a criminology of place in the digital age, call for theoretical integration, and a response model that engages online and offline domains and involves partnerships within and outside of the criminal justice system. 

 Boston: College of Social Sciences and Humanities of Northeastern University  202o. 124p

By Ciarán O’Connor

This report investigates the activities of the Irish Channel, a website, and associated social media accounts that have emerged as a highly active hub of misinformation in Ireland. The website gained notoriety in June 2024 following its publication of an article containing fabricated quotes and false claims alleging election interference during the local elections.1 This ‘election interference’ narrative reflected other baseless conspiracies alleging voter fraud was a threat to election integrity in the country. The Irish Channel website is part of the Premier Content Network which is run by the Digital Publishing Company. Its primary form of content across its range of websites is embedded YouTube videos, likely with the aim of driving traffic to its site and boosting ad revenue. Yet, as this analysis details, this may violate YouTube’s terms of service. This report profiles how original content produced by the Irish Channel contains inaccuracies and falsehoods, as well as content that is supportive of far-right ideologies including hateful anti-immigrant rhetoric. Analysis by ISD also indicates some of this content appears to have been generated using AI, with basic factual errors and non-existent citations being found on more than one article on the Irish Channel website. Accounts on social media and messaging platforms linked to the Irish Channel were found to feature white supremacist conspiracy theories, antisemitic hate, and support for Adolf Hitler. Additionally, the report highlights how the Irish Channel has forged close ties with the Irish Freedom Party and has, over time, become a key media distribution and broadcasting arm for the party. Many of the most egregious instances of false, misleading, and inflammatory claims found in this analysis originated from content published in conjunction with Irish Freedom Party-linked entities and hosted and promoted by the Irish Channel. This Irish Channel case study illustrates how small, far-right political parties can use digital media platforms and social media accounts to develop alternative media networks, promote their ideology, and grow their.

London :  Institute for Strategic Dialogue 2024. 18p.

By Lucy Cooper and Kevin D. Reyes

Once considered a mere novelty app, TikTok is now a certified force in the information ecosystem.  

The short form video giant is now being used by 14% of Americans as a news platform, according to a Pew Research Centre from 2023, an amount four times more than in 2020.  The impact of the platform, once best known for dance crazes and being a tastemaker for online trends, cannot be ignored. To better understand the impact that TikTok has, in 2023 ISD analysts gathered and analyzed data on trends in hate speech and extremist content on TikTok, and how effectively they were being moderated by the platform. The results, which center on a particular moment in time, have come to inform a series of studies – the first two of which focus on white supremacist content, and anti-migrant and -refugee content. While TikTok appears to have taken measures to improve content moderation practices since ISD’s 2021 study on extremism and hate speech on the platform, this new series demonstrates that TikTok is still ineffective in removing violative content. For example, data for the white supremacy content study was collected during one week in mid-August 2023 and indicates that such content was alive and well on the platform: 70 of the 108 video samples studied were uploaded to TikTok within the most recent three months at the time of collection. Of those 108 videos, the median number of views at the time of analysis was 6,097, a significant increase from ISD’s 2021 report where the median across 1,030 videos was 503 views. The last nine months have been tumultuous for TikTok as a company. In April 2024, President Joe Biden signed a bill that could result in a nationwide ban of the app should TikTok’s parent company, the Beijing-based ByteDance, not sell the platform within 12 months. As part of an ongoing legal fight over the possible ban, the Justice Department, according to the Associated Press, this summer alleged that TikTok was gathering bulk information on users’ “views on divisive social issues like gun control, abortion, and religion,” and harvesting data in violation of children’s online privacy law. As TikTok’s future remains undecided, content moderation issues on the platform persist. In July 2024, ISD published a report detailing the millions of views garnered by a network of neo-Nazi accounts on the platform. Just a month earlier, however, TikTok had published an updated transparency report in which they claimed that in the first four months of this year, moderators proactively removed 97.7% of violative content. Of that same sample, 89.8% were removed within 24 hours, down .1% from that same period in 2023. Despite TikTok’s statements, ISD and similar organizations consistently find content in clear violation of the platform’s policies

London: Institute for Strategic Dialogue 2024. 

By Ciarán O’Connor and Jared Holt

Once considered a mere novelty app, TikTok is now a certified force in the information ecosystem.  

The short-form video giant is now being used by 14% of Americans as a news platform, according to a Pew Research Centre from 2023, an amount four times more than in 2020.  The impact of the platform, once best known for dance crazes and being a tastemaker for online trends, cannot be ignored. To better understand the impact that TikTok has, in 2023 ISD analysts gathered and analyzed data on trends in hate speech and extremist content on TikTok, and how effectively they were being moderated by the platform. The results, which center on a particular moment in time, have come to inform a series of studies – the first two of which focus on white supremacist content, and anti-migrant and -refugee content. While TikTok appears to have taken measures to improve content moderation practices since ISD’s 2021 study on extremism and hate speech on the platform, this new series demonstrates that TikTok is still ineffective in removing violative content. For example, data for the white supremacy content study was collected during one week in mid-August 2023 and indicates that such content was alive and well on the platform: 70 of the 108 video samples studied were uploaded to TikTok within the most recent three months at the time of collection. Of those 108 videos, the median number of views at the time of analysis was 6,097, a significant increase from ISD’s 2021 report where the median across 1,030 videos was 503 views. The last nine months have been tumultuous for TikTok as a company. In April 2024, President Joe Biden signed a bill that could result in a nationwide ban of the app should TikTok’s parent company, the Beijing-based ByteDance, not sell the platform within 12 months. As part of an ongoing legal fight over the possible ban, the Justice Department, according to the Associated Press, this summer alleged that TikTok was gathering bulk information on users’ “views on divisive social issues like gun control, abortion, and religion,” and harvesting data in violation of children’s online privacy law. As TikTok’s future remains undecided, content moderation issues on the platform persist. In July 2024, ISD published a report detailing the millions of views garnered by a network of neo-Nazi accounts on the platform. Just a month earlier, however, TikTok had published an updated transparency report in which they claimed that in the first four months of this year, moderators proactively removed 97.7% of violative content. Of that same sample, 89.8% were removed within 24 hours, down .1% from that same period in 2023. Despite TikTok’s statements, ISD and similar organizations consistently find content in clear violation of the platform’s policies.  

London Institute for Strategic Dialogue (2024). . 15p.

By Luke Baumgartner

Tracing its origins back to the 19th century, the Black Hebrew Israelite (BHI) movement is ideologically and organizationally highly fragmented. At its core, it believes that modern African Americans are descendants of the Israelites in the Bible’s Old Testament, but some currents adopt variations of BHI ideology. While most adherents to the movement are peaceful, over the last few years, several individuals associated with BHI ideology participated in high-profile violent crimes targeting Jews in the United States, including the targeting of the JC Kosher Supermarket in Jersey City, New Jersey,[1] and a Hanukkah celebration in Monsey, New York, in December 2019.[2] While the attackers had little to no formal or institutional participation in the movement, their extremist interpretation of BHI’s core beliefs contributed to their radicalization, mobilization of violence, and, ultimately, their target selection. Moreover, violent attacks by adherents of the BHI ideology stretch back as far as 1974, when Marcus Wayne Chenault, a student of Hananiah E. Israel, shot Alberta Williams King–the mother of slain civil rights activist Martin Luther King Jr.[3] In 2022, the Program on Extremism released a report–one of the first of its kind–analyzing BHI’s ideology and relations to violence.[4] Despite its ample use of social media and track record of violence, little is known about how the broader BHI movement uses the internet to spread its message. In light of this research gap, this report examined 180 Facebook pages with large followings close to the more extreme sections of the BHI movement, further evaluating their scope, reach, longevity, activity, geographic location, typology, and major narratives. This study finds that: • Facebook pages are an especially popular way for extremist adherents of the BHI movement to reach a significant audience without being subject to content removal, takedowns, and strict service enforcement. Facebook’s record of success has several discrepancies, especially regarding enforcement against broader antisemitic narratives beyond Holocaust denial and with lesser-known hate groups and movements. • BHI extremist pages examined in this study are administrated across four continents and, on average, can maintain a presence on Facebook and avoid account removal for over five years, allowing them ample time and opportunity to accrue thousands of followers. The ability to establish a long-term presence on a major platform like Facebook increases the potential for audience engagement and opportunities to recruit and radicalize new members. • BHI pages consistently publish a range of antisemitic content and narratives, the most common of which consistently refers to white Jews as “impostors,” emphasizes the connection between Jews and Satan and adds a modern twist on traditional conspiracies of blood libel, arguing Jews are responsible for large-scale organ trafficking operations—among others. While the number of BHI pages posting antisemitic content decreased after October 7, the overall popularity of these pages continued to increase. These contradictory changes signal an improvement in Facebook’s ability to take down easily recognizable antisemitic content, such as Jews worship Satan, or recycled Nazi propaganda. Still, Facebook struggles to remove content that excludes explicit calls to violence or, alludes to conspiracies of blood libel or comparing Jews to rats, parasites, and others. • The frequency, longevity, and large follower bases of BHI extremist pages that publish antisemitic and other hateful content targeting protected classes such as the LGBTQ+ community suggest gaps in Facebook’s enforcement of its Community Standards, particularly its anti-hate speech and Dangerous Organizations and Individuals (DOI) policies. These findings suggest that antisemitic content congruent with extremist interpretations of the BHI ideology has a haven on Facebook–a social media platform with over 3 billion active monthly users.[5]  

Washington DC:  Program on Extremism at George Washington University, 2024. 52p.

By Hannah E. Meyers, Ilya Shapiro, Tim Rosenberger

Just as Ku Klux Klan members used white hoods to conceal their identities and terrorize their targets, modern activists are using keffiyehs, Guy Fawkes masks, balaclavas, and other inherently intimidating face coverings. Indeed, face-masking is pervasive among participants in demonstrations that are growing in frequency and disruptiveness. Most recently, the pro-Hamas “protests” that have proliferated across college campuses and city streets involve activists who cover their faces explicitly to make it impossible to determine who is engaged in violence, intimidation, and property destruction. Just as masks emboldened KKK activity a century ago, they are a central feature in the 360% surge in antisemitic incidents since Hamas’s attack on Israel last year.1 New York City experienced about 2,000 protests in the half-year following October 7—including incidents involving more than 10,000 participants illegally blocking bridges and major infrastructure.2 Cities across the country seem to be struggling to maintain order and check the growing number of attacks associated with these events on Jewish owned businesses and other institutions.  There is an obvious and simple answer to protesters’ growing aggressiveness, an answer that proved effective against their forebears in the KKK: denying intimidating and violent protesters the right to conceal their identities via face coverings. Hamas supporters, Antifa, Patriot Front, and others act boldly so long as they can remain anonymous. Stripped of this anonymity and the intimidating power of the keffiyeh and black bandanna, they will be far less likely to engage in criminal behavior.

New York: The Manhattan Institute, 2024. 5p.

By Paul M. Barrett

The main finding of this report is that social science research reveals that social media platforms can be—and often are—exploited to facilitate political intimidation and violence. Certain features of social media platforms make them susceptible to such exploitation, and some of these features should be changed to reduce the danger. “ The main finding of this report is that social science research reveals that social media platforms can be—and often are— exploited to facilitate political intimidation and violence. ” Based on a review of more than 400 studies published by peer-reviewed journals and think tanks, the report provides a platform-by-platform survey focusing on the particular features of each site that make it susceptible to exploitation by extremists promoting intimidation and violence and/or seeking recruits for their various causes. The report emphasizes that neither subjective observation nor social science research indicates that social media platforms are the sole or even primary cause of political intimidation and violence. Other media and irresponsible political leaders play crucial roles. However, the use of social media can enable or facilitate violence in a fashion that deserves attention and mitigation. Most of this problem—extremism and occasional use of force for political ends—occurs on the political right. But the left is not immune to these pathologies. The platforms discussed in the following pages range from some of the best known, like Facebook and YouTube, to the more recently ascendant TikTok to those on the right-wing fringe, such as Gab, Parler, and 4chan. Among the features, we examine are: • Facebook’s Groups, which helped the sometimes-violent QAnon to grow into a full-blown movement devoted to the delusion that former President Donald Trump has secretly battled “deep state” bureaucrats and Satanic pedophiles.1 • Instagram’s comments function, which has allowed the Iranian government to threaten dissidents with sexual assault and death as a way of silencing them.2 • TikTok’s powerful recommendation algorithm, which in one experiment promoted violent videos, including incitement of students to launch attacks at school.3 After a case study of January 6 by our collaborators at Tech Policy Press, the report concludes with recommendations for industry and government.

NYU Stern Center for Business and Human Rights Leonard N. Stern School of Business 2024. 32p.  

By Cristina Cretu-Adatte, Renaud Zbinden, Luca Brunoni, Hazel Bunning, Josselin Wilfred Azi & Olivier Beaudet-Labrecque

This article delves into the intricacies of managing illicit financial gains among Ivorian cyber fraudsters, shedding light on the findings of a field study conducted in Côte d’Ivoire by Swiss and Ivorian research teams. The study involved interviews with cyber criminals, law enforcement officials, and subject matter experts, to answer a specific question: What strategies do Ivorian cyber fraudsters use to manage and launder the criminal proceeds originating from romance scams and sextortion? The results explore the tactics employed by cyber fraudsters to obfuscate illicit financial flows, their organizational structures, and the strategies they employ in managing and using their gains. It confirms certain elements from the scientific literature, in addition to introducing new insights for a better understanding of the processes of money laundering and the use of illicit funds. The article also unravels the multifaceted challenges encountered within the anti-money laundering framework in the context of cybercrime and raises avenues for further reflection and future work to enhance the fight against this scourge.

Eur J Crim Policy Res 30, 359–378 (2024).

By The United State Secret Service, National Threat Assessment Center

Averting Targeted School Violence: A U.S. Secret Service Analysis of Plots Against Schools examines 67 plots to conduct a school attack that were averted in the United States from 2006 to 2018. The report was released in conjunction with a virtual presentation to more than 13,000 registered education stakeholders representing all 50 states and 64 countries. U.S. Secret Service Director James Murray welcomed participants, and noted specifically to participants the role that everyone has to play in preventing the next tragedy. “The takeaway from this report, and the 67 cases you are about to examine, is that when people come forward to report concerning behaviors, they can and do save lives,” said Director Murray. “That’s the bottom line, here. Bystanders save lives, and the Secret Service stands ready to support you and your communities in helping to reduce targeted violence in the years to come.” Secretary of Homeland Security Alejandro Mayorkas also addressed participants during the event. “Ensuring the safety of children while they are at school is our utmost responsibility,” said Secretary of Homeland Security Alejandro Mayorkas. “It requires us working together through our law enforcement and community partnerships. Many of the tragedies that have occurred in schools could have been prevented, that is why it is so important to establish targeted violence prevention programs, including those that the Secret Service recommends.”

The report identified numerous qualitative key findings and commonalities across the 67 incidents:

• Targeted school violence is preventable, if communities can identify warning signs and intervene.

• Schools should seek to intervene with students before their behavior warrants legal consequences.

• Students were most often motivated to plan a school attack because of a grievance with classmates.

• Students are best positioned to identify and report concerning behaviors displayed by their classmates.

• The role of parents and families in recognizing concerning behavior is critical to prevention.

• School resource officers (SROs) play an important role in school violence prevention.

• Removing a student from school does not eliminate the risk they might pose to themselves or others.

• Students displaying an interest in violent or hate-filled topics should elicit immediate assessment and intervention.

• Many school attack plots were associated with certain dates, particularly in the month of April.

• Many of the student plotters had access to weapons, including unimpeded access to firearms.

“The National Threat Assessment Center has been studying targeted violence for over 20 years to help our public safety partners stop violence in their communities,” said National Threat Assessment Chief Dr. Lina Alathari. “The research and guidance we publish is focused on prevention, with a particular focus on preventing targeted school violence, and the report released today builds even further on the work we do every day to best position community and school leaders to effectively intervene before the next potential tragedy.” Since the 1990s, the Secret Service NTAC has been conducting research, training, consultation, and information sharing on threat assessment and the prevention of targeted violence. NTAC has studied attacks directed at government agencies and officials, workplaces, schools, colleges, universities, and other public spaces. This systematic approach identifies individuals who may be exhibiting threatening or concerning behavior and assesses the risk posed by the individual. The academic research-based approach to studying the behaviors associated with acts of violence supports the Secret Service's protective mission and our nation's effort to better protect our communities. The Secret Service will continue to build on our threat assessment methodology and provide research findings and guidance to public and private sectors, to enhance the prevention efforts of those charged with safeguarding our nation.

Washington, DC: United States Secret Service, 2021. 64p.

By James Jaehoon Lee and Jeffrey Layne Blevins

 Informed by critical theory, this book employs Social Network Analysis (SNA) to examine the ever-increasing impact that social media has on politics and contemporary civic discourse. In just the past decade, social media platforms have been at the forefront of political discord that played out in the January 6th insurrection, the expulsion of a US President from major social media platforms, the attempted regulation of social media in various states, and the takeover of Twitter (now “X”) by one of the richest and (arguably) most financially influential persons in the world. This book examines these phenomena through a comprehensive and in-depth exploration of their meaning and implication for democratic society. Informed by SNA, James Jaehoon Lee and Jeffrey Layne Blevins examine several types of social and political commentary on one of the most influential social media networks and argue that the use of emotional appeals in these posts about social and political topics degrades the quality of civic discourse and encourages the abandonment of reasoning in democratic self-governance. A timely and vital text for upper-level students and scholars in a variety of disciplines from media and communication studies, journalism, and digital humanities to social network analysis, political science, and sociology. 

 New York; London: Routledge, 2023. 161p.