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Posts in Social Science
Criminal mobility of outlaw motorcycle gangs in Australia

By Christopher Dowling and Anthony Morgan

The criminal mobility of outlaw motorcycle gang (OMCG) members presents a significant challenge to Australian governments and police. Examining patterns of mobility can help to better understand the opportunity structures that underpin offending by OMCGs and to drive national collaborative responses to these gangs. This study examines the prevalence and patterns of criminal mobility in a sample of almost 4,000 OMCG members in more than 400 chapters. Around one in 10 members showed evidence of criminal mobility over the long term, while more than one-third of chapters comprised criminally mobile members. Criminally mobile gang members were heavily concentrated in a small number of chapters. Patterns of criminal mobility primarily involve movements into east coast jurisdictions. New South Wales and Queensland emerged as the most common destinations for criminally mobile OMCG members  

Trends & issues in crime and criminal justice no. 619. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology. 2021. 16p

How and Why Vendors Sell on Cryptomarkets

By Rasmus Munksgaard and James Martin

Cryptomarkets represent a growing component of the global illicit drugs trade. Australia is over-represented in the proportion of online vendors who use these platforms to reach drug consumers. Despite the growth in online drug trading, relatively little is known about people who use cryptomarkets to sell drugs. This study addresses the knowledge gap and provides qualitative insights into this new, and little understood, cohort of offenders. The study found that vendors perceive less risk of violence and police intervention when selling drugs online and that the potential for profit exceeds that available when selling drugs offline.

Trends & issues in crime and criminal justice no. 608. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology. 2020. 12p.

The Relationship Between Drug Price and Purity and Population Level Harm

By Caitlin Hughes, Shann Hulme and Alison Ritter

In illicit drug markets, the price and purity of drugs change frequently. While it is well known that purity-adjusted price affects drug use, impacts on other outcomes are less clear. This rapid review examines the relationship between price, purity and seven population level measures of drug-related harm and any differences across three drug types. With a few exceptions, it found an inverse relationship between purity-adjusted price and drug-related harm, with higher purity-adjusted price associated with less drug-related harm, and lower purity-adjusted price associated with increased harm. This shows the value of price and purity data for predicting drug market impacts and the importance of improving price and purity data collection and analyses, particularly in Australia.

Trends & issues in crime and criminal justice no. 598. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology 2020. 26p.

Responding to Cybercrime: Results of a Comparison Between Community Members and Police Personnel 

By Cassandra Cross, Thomas Holt, Anastasia Powell and Michael Wilson 

Advancements in information technology are sources of both opportunity and vulnerability for citizens. Previous research indicates that there are significant challenges for police in investigating cybercrime, that community expectations about police responses are based largely on media representations, and that victims experience high levels of frustration and stigmatisation. This paper examines the views of the Australian community and law enforcement officers about the policing of cybercrime. Results suggest that police personnel are more likely to view cybercrime as serious, and community members are more likely to ascribe blame to victims. Results also indicate a discrepancy between police and community members in their views of the efficacy of police responses. These discrepancies contribute to public dissatisfaction. Therefore, the paper covers some general strategies for short- and long-term cybercrime prevention.

Trends & issues in crime and criminal justice no. 635. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology. 2021. 20p.

The Identity Theft Response System 

By Megan Wyre, David Lacey and Kathy Allan

Identity theft continues to grow in prevalence and complexity. Despite this growth, little is known about the identity theft response system and how it assists victims to recover. This study examines the response system by analysing 211 identity theft cases reported to IDCARE, a national identity and cybercrime victim support service. The study applies a sociotechnical systems methodology to establish the social, task and information processes of the Australian identity theft response system. The study also examines identity theft victims’ response activities and needs over a 12-month period. The identity theft response system is almost entirely dependent on the victim to respond to and limit the harm caused by identity theft. Overall, the response system is disjointed and lacking in coordination. 

Trends & issues in crime and criminal justice no. 592.  Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology. 2020. 18p.

The Economic Victims of Violence: Local Exports During The Mexican Drug War

By Jesús Gorrín,  José Morales-Arilla , Bernardo Ricca

This paper documents how violence resulting from the Mexican Drug War hindered local export growth. Focusing on exports allows us to abstract from demand factors and measure effects on the local capacity to supply foreign markets. We compare exports of the same product to the same country, but facing differential exposure to violence after a close electoral outcome. Firms exogenously exposed to the Drug War experienced lower export growth. Violence eroded the local capacity to attract capital investment, disproportionately hampering large exporters and capital-intensive activities

2021. 60p.

The Impact of Poisoning in British Columbia: A Cost Analysis

By Fahra Rajabali, Kate Turcotte, Alex Zheng, Roy Purssell, Jane A. Buxton, Ian Pike

Poisoning, from substances such as illicit drugs, prescribed and over-the-counter medications, alcohol, pesticides, gases and household cleaners, is the leading cause of injury-related death and the second leading cause for injury-related hospital admission in British Columbia. We examined the health and economic costs of poisoning in BC for 2016, using a societal perspective, to support public health policies aimed at minimizing losses to society. Methods: Costs by intent, sex and age group were calculated in Canadian dollars using a classification and costing framework based on existing provincial injury data combined with data from the published literature. Direct cost components included fatal poisonings, hospital admissions, emergency department visits, ambulance attendance without transfer to hospital and calls to the British Columbia Drug and Poison Information Centre (BC DPIC) not resulting in ambulance attendance, emergency care or transfer to hospital. Indirect costs, measured as loss of earnings and informal caregiving costs, were also calculated. Results: We estimate that poisonings in BC totalled $812.5 million in 2016 with $108.9 million in direct health care costs and $703.6 million in indirect costs. Unintentional poisoning injuries accounted for 84% of total costs, 46% of direct costs and 89% of indirect costs. Males accounted for higher proportions of direct costs for all patient dispositions except hospital admissions. Patients aged 25–64 years accounted for higher proportions of direct costs except for calls to BC DPIC, where proportions were highest for children younger than 15 years. Interpretation: Hospital care expenditures represented the largest direct cost of poisoning, and lost productivity following death represented the largest indirect cost. Quantifying and understanding the financial burden of poisoning has implications not only for government and health care, but also for society, employers, patients and families.

CMAJ Open. 2023 Feb 14;11(1):E160-E168.

Not Taking Crime Seriously: California’s Prop 47 Exacerbated Crime and Drug Abuse

By Hannah E. Meyers

In November 2014, California voters approved a criminal justice reform measure, Proposition 47 (“Prop 47”), with almost 60% support. Ten years later, California voters are now considering rolling back some of its soft-on-crime policies. Prop 47 identified six “petty” crimes—grand theft, larceny, personal drug use, forgery, and two types of check fraud—and reclassified them. It downgraded these crimes, including thefts with property values under $950 and illegal drug possession for personal use, from felonies to misdemeanors. This paper presents a data-based argument on how Prop 47 shifted dynamics in both offender behavior and prosecutorial decision-making that damaged public safety and public health. Representative data from Riverside, one of California’s largest counties, suggest that Prop 47 increased re-offending, including serious felony re-offending, detention times, failures to appear in court, warrants issued on offenders, case dismissals in conjunction with plea deals, and the persistence levels of drug and theft offenders. Additional data collected from both Riverside and San Bernardino law-enforcement agencies show a significant drop in sentencing and in arrests, due partly to the diminished incentive for businesses to promptly report thefts. These shifts have also resulted in fewer defendants participating in in-custody drug treatment programs or other mandatory, supervised services because the incentives for doing so (avoiding prosecution and significant sentences) have evaporated. And, as California business owners can attest, reducing the cost of repeatedly committing theft removes the incentive for offenders to change their behavior. This has fueled increases in organized retail theft and fencing rings. Prop 47 also strained the resources of counties, by increasing the number of defendants sentenced to serve in overcrowded jails rather than prison.

New York: Manhattan Institute, 2024. 20p.

Suffering For Justice: Sexual Violence Victim-Survivors’ Experiences of Going to Court and Cross-Examination

By Ania Moroz and Tamar Dinisman

“Looking back now, I wouldn’t have gone to the police, because it is one of the hardest things you can ever do in your whole life. I can’t even sum up in words what it does to you mentally and physically. You can be the world’s strongest person ever in the world, but going to court can break you. It’s awful.” Victim-survivor It is estimated that 1 in 4 women and 1 in 18 men have been subjected to some form of sexual violence since the age of 16 and that 1 in 6 children have been sexually abused.1 The majority of victim-survivors will not report the offence to the police. Of those who do report it, a very low proportion will receive a charge and have their case go to court. The number of victim-survivors of sexual violence who give evidence in trial is not openly available. Nevertheless, the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) data shows that in the year ending June 2023, 11,506 defendants were proceeded against for sexual offences2 and, in 2022–23, 3,004 defendants were charged with rape-related offences.3 This report focuses on the experience of sexual violence victim-survivors where the defendant has been charged and their case has gone through the court process. It focuses on the three main stages of this experience – before, during and after giving evidence – and highlights the main challenges victim-survivors face at each stage. This report also makes recommendations for changes in policy and practice to address these challenges. To meet the aims of the research, a multimethod approach, combining qualitative and quantitative methods, was used. These include: 12 semi-structured interviews with victim survivors; focus groups and interviews with Victim Support sexual violence practitioners; and Victim Support sexual violence cases analysis.

Cardiff: Victim Support, 2024. 63p.  

20-Year Trends in Australian Methamphetamine-Related Deaths, 2001–2020

By Oisin Stronach, Paul Dietze, Michael Livingston, Amanda Roxburgh

Background

Over the past two decades methamphetamine-related harms have increased in Australia. Previous analysis of methamphetamine-related deaths has covered limited timeframes, and largely focused on drug-toxicity deaths. This paper examines long-term trends in methamphetamine-related deaths over 20 years, including deaths due to a range of specific causes.

Methods

Descriptive analyses were conducted on Australian methamphetamine-related deaths (2001–2023) by cause, extracted from the National Coronial Information System, an online database containing deaths reported to coroners in Australia and New Zealand. Joinpoint trend analyses were used to assess changes over time between 2001 and 2020 (with data from 2021 to 2023 likely incomplete and thus excluded).

Results

Unintentional drug toxicity was the cause of 49.8 % of methamphetamine-related deaths, intentional self-harm (including toxicity) 23.3 %, unintentional injury 15.1 %, natural causes 9.6 %, and assaults 2.3 %. Between 2001 and 2020, joinpoint analysis showed three trend change points among all-cause methamphetamine-related mortality rates, resulting in four distinct periods: two periods where they increased (2001–2006 – annual percentage change (APC) = 15.4 %; 2009–2016 – APC 25.5 %), and two where they decreased (2006–2009 – APC = –11.8 %; 2017–2020 – APC = –2.9 %). Similar patterns were evident among rates of intentional self-harm and unintentional injury. Deaths caused by unintentional drug toxicity saw two trend change points (2011, 2016), and rates increased across all three periods. Natural cause deaths had three trend change points (2007, 2010, 2015), and rates continued to rise after 2015, largely driven by increases in circulatory diseases.

Conclusion

Cause-specific models highlighted diverse trends. Recent trends show unintentional drug toxicity deaths have slightly increased, intentional self-harm stabilised, and unintentional injury and assault deaths have declined. Deaths from natural causes involving methamphetamine continued to increase, highlighting a public health concern and a potential need for early circulatory disease screening among people who use methamphetamine.

International Journal of Drug Policy Volume 131, September 2024, 104548  

Immigrants and Crime in the United States 

By Ariel G. Ruiz Soto

Immigrants in the United States commit crimes at lower rates than the U.S.-born population, notwithstanding the assertion by critics that immigration is linked to higher rates of criminal activity. This reality of reduced criminality, which holds across immigrant groups including unauthorized immigrants, has been demonstrated through research as well as findings for the one state in the United States—Texas—that tracks criminal arrests and convictions by immigration status. A growing volume of research demonstrates that not only do immigrants commit fewer crimes, but they also do not raise crime rates in the U.S. communities where they settle. In fact, some studies indicate that immigration can lower criminal activity, especially violent crime, in places with inclusive policies and social environments where immigrant populations are well established. A Look at the Overall Immigrant Population National studies have examined incarceration rates and prosecutions of immigrants in the country, overwhelmingly finding that immigrants of all legal statuses commit crimes at lower rates than those who were born in the United States. Immigrants Are Prosecuted and Imprisoned at Lower Rates than the U.S. Born Immigrants in the United States have had lower incarceration rates than the native-born population since at least 1870 (when such data were first recorded). In 2020, immigrants were 60 percent less likely to be incarcerated than the U.S. born, according to a study by the National Bureau of Economic Research. And though a 2021 Justice Department study points out prosecutions of immigrants increased between 1990 and 2018, nearly 90 percent were for violations of immigration-related laws. Notably, U.S. born citizens were ten times more likely than immigrants to be incarcerated for committing weapons- related offenses, five times more likely for violent offenses, more than twice as likely for property crimes, and nearly twice as likely for drug offenses.  At the state level, multiple studies have found there is no clear relationship between violent crime and immigration. And research at the city level suggests that increases in immigration can be associated with declining homicide rates, with the largest effect on municipalities with long histories of immigration, as well as reductions in property crimes and robbery. This makes immigrants  less likely to be either offenders or victims of crime at the local level compared to the U.S.-born population

Washington, DC: Immigration Policy Institute, 2024. 5p.   

The Rise of Cybercrime as a Service: Implications and Countermeasures

By Prithwish Ganguli      

The rise of Cybercrime-as-a-Service (CaaS) represents a new frontier in the evolution of cybercrime, where sophisticated tools and malicious services are made readily available to a broad range of users through online marketplaces, often on the dark web. CaaS has democratized cybercrime, enabling even low-skilled attackers to launch powerful cyberattacks such as Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS), phishing campaigns, and ransomware attacks with ease. This paper explores the operational structure of CaaS, including the use of cryptocurrencies for transactions and the global reach of these illicit platforms. The implications of this shift extend beyond economic losses, threatening national security, corporate stability, and personal privacy. While governments and law enforcement agencies are struggling to keep pace with the rapid evolution of these services, the paper examines legal and regulatory challenges in combating CaaS, as well as the role of international cooperation. Furthermore, it discusses technological countermeasures, including artificial intelligence and machine learning, as potential solutions to mitigate the threat. Ethical considerations surrounding the surveillance and control of online spaces are also addressed. The paper concludes by highlighting future trends in CaaS and stressing the need for a balanced approach between innovation and security to effectively counter this growing threat.

International Journal for Multidisciplinary Research (IJFMR), 2024.

Is the UNTOC Working? An assessment of the implementation and impact of the Palermo Convention

By Mark Shaw | Ian Tennant Ana Paula Oliviera | Daren Brookbanks

In 2000, the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC), also known as the Palermo Convention, was adopted in a milestone moment for fostering global cooperation to combat organized crime. With 192 state parties, the convention and its protocols have provided a crucial legal framework for addressing types of crime such as human trafficking, migrant smuggling, and firearms trafficking. However, as transnational criminal networks continue to expand, new challenges are emerging, and the global community must take decisive action to ensure the UNTOC reaches its full potential. Our latest report highlights key obstacles to effective implementation: inconsistencies in national legislation, a lack of centralized data, and delays and restrictions in the convention’s Independent Review Mechanism (IRM). While the UNTOC’s widespread ratification is an achievement, these gaps hinder its ability to deliver impactful results. Without timely evaluations and better international cooperation, the global response to organized crime remains fragmented and insufficient. We believe that strengthening the UNTOC requires more robust data collection, greater transparency, and deeper engagement with civil society. Our report recommends the creation of an independent research center to monitor organized crime trends and track the convention’s progress. Additionally, we call for increased political will and resources to accelerate the IRM, ensuring that the UNTOC becomes a more powerful tool in the fight against evolving criminal markets.

Geneva: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime. 2024. 48p.

Economic Crime in the UK: A Multi-Billion Pound Problem

By Oliver Bennett MBE, Ali Shalchi

The precise scale of economic crime in the UK is unknown, but it could run to tens or hundreds of billions of pounds per year. The extent of these crimes – which include money laundering, fraud, and corruption – led the Intelligence and Security Select Committee in its July 2020 report on Russia to note that London is considered a ‘laundromat’ for corrupt money. In December 2019 the Treasury Committee found various regulatory and legislative failings in the way in which these crimes are being tackled. It urged the Government to make improvements to the supervisory system and to introduce new powers to combat economic crime. A February 2022 Treasury Committee follow-up report concluded that the Government was still not prioritizing economic crime sufficiently. In 2019 The Financial Action Task Force (the global money laundering and terrorist financing watchdog) praised the UK’s efforts on the issue, but also found failings and identified a lack of resources for investigating these crimes. The Economic Crime Plan The Government agrees about the need to tackle economic crime, which it says causes “much harm to individuals and communities and damage to legitimate business and the UK’s reputation.” It set out its overall approach to tackling the issue in its July 2019 Economic Crime Plan. The Plan covers the years 2019-2022 and draws together all the work being conducted by the public and private sector. A number of the 52 actions contained in the plan may involve future legislative reforms, including changes to: • the Proceeds of Crime Act to improve how the proceeds of crime can be confiscated; • corporate criminal liability, to punish and prevent economic crimes when committed on behalf of or in the name of companies; • block company stock exchange listings on national security grounds; • improve transparency over UK property ownership; • Companies House powers to enable it strike off from its register dissolved or inactive limited partnerships. Progress with the Plan In February 2022, the Royal United Services Institute said that 40% of actions in the Plan had been completed, 17% were in progress, 23% were overdue, and 19% of actions had no due date. The Government says it is “on course to deliver 49 of the 52 actions” in the Plan. The Treasury Committee has recommended that the Plan be adapted and renewed for a further three years.   

London: UK Parliament, House of Commons Library, 2022. 22p.

State Permissive Behaviours and Commercial Offensive-Cyber Proliferation

By Gareth Mott, James Shires, Jen Ellis, James Sullivan and Jamie MacColl

Commercial cyber tools and services have many legitimate applications, from corporate penetration testing (an authorised simulated cyber attack on an IT system) to law enforcement and national security operations. But they are also subject to misuse and abuse, when they are used in ways that are contrary to national or international law, violate the human rights of their targets, or pose risks to international security. Some states are currently grappling with this policy challenge. Meanwhile, collective international initiatives for action are underway. For example, there is the US’s 2023 Joint Statement on Efforts to Counter the Proliferation and Misuse of Commercial Spyware and the UK- and France-led Pall Mall Process of 2024. Ultimately, one aim of these initiatives is to enable states to harmonise their policy interventions where possible. To inform principles and policies for intervention at national and international levels, it is necessary to understand the dynamics that encourage or facilitate offensive-cyber proliferation. This paper identifies a range of ‘non-state proliferating factors’ (NPFs) and ‘state permissive behaviours’ (SPBs), and its findings draw on desk-based research on the international commercial offensive-cyber market. These findings were supplemented by a data validation and consultative workshop with industry stakeholders held in person at Chatham House in March 2024. This half-day validation workshop drew on the expertise and insights of 44 participants predominantly based in the UK, the US and Western Europe. To facilitate candid discussion, remarks made at the workshop are not attributable, and the identities of participants are not referenced here.

In this paper, NPFs and SPBs are categorised into five areas:

  1. Regulation of corporate structure and governance.

  2. Legal frameworks for product development, sale and transfer.

  3. Diplomatic support and engagement.

  4. Development of cyber-security ecosystem and workforce.

  5. Integration with defence and security industrial base.

Using these categories, this research analyses the roles of both state and non-state actors. It identifies critical inter-relationships between different SPBs and NPFs that serve to facilitate or enable potentially irresponsible offensive-cyber proliferation. This is one of two papers. A second paper, authored by the researchers and published by Chatham House in October 2024, draws on the findings in this paper and identifies a range of ‘principles’ that could be used to build a code of conduct to counter irresponsible offensive-cyber proliferation.

London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies - RUSI and The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2024. 39p.

Disappearance of Central American Migrants in Mexico: Discursive Formation and Value Forms on The Migratory Route

By Sergio Salazar Araya

The article reconstructs and critically analyses two main contemporary discursive formations associated with migrants disappearing in transit through Mexico: the official state discourse and the social discourse of organizations searching for missing persons along the migratory route. This article discusses how the two discourses contradict each other, disputing how to represent a phenomenon occurring at the intersection of diverse, complex forms of violence. This exposes collusion between states and criminal organizations, as well as the scattered duplications and continuities between legal and illegal dynamic forces producing regional social order. Disappearance is a technique specific to actors who are battling one another in a broader field of transnational mobility and circulation. In addition, both discourses hinge on social value forms that go beyond the strictly pecuniary and situate people’s systematic disappearance as a central feature of regional power networks. The empirical data was collected during fieldwork in Mexico and Central America and collated with data published in recent reports (state and non-governmental) on migrants’ disappearance in Mexico. 

  European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies Revista Europea de Estudios Latinoamericanos y del Caribe December, pp. 159-178  2020.

A 10-Year Trend in Cannabis Potency (2013–2022) in Different Geographical Regions of The United States of America

By Mahmoud A ElSohly , Chandrani G Majumdar , Suman Chandra , Mohammed M Radwan 

The prevalence of cannabis as the most commonly used illicit substance in the United States and around the globe is well-documented. Studies have highlighted a noticeable uptrend in the potency of cannabis in the United states. This report examines the concentration of cannabinoids in illicit cannabis samples seized by the United States Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) over the last 10 years (2013–2022).

Methods

Samples received during the course of study (2013–2022) were categorized based on the geographical region where collected, as Western Region, Midwest Region, Northeast Region, South East Region, Southern Region as well as Alaska and Hawaii. These samples were processed for analysis using a validated gas chromatography with flame ionization detector method.

Results

The data showed that the cannabinoids profile of all high Δ9-THC cannabis samples, regardless of the state or region from which the samples are seized or the state from which the sample is produced under a state medical marijuana program, is basically the same with the major cannabinoid being Δ9-THC (>10% for most samples) and all other cannabinoids with less than 0.5%, with the exception of CBG (<1%) and CBN (<1%).

Conclusion

Overall, it appears the cannabinoids profile is controlled by the genetics of the plant and is not affected much by the geographical location in which the plants are cultivated.

Front Public Health. 2024 Oct 3;12:1442522.

Mexican Cartels and the FTO Debate The Designation Process and Relevant Government Stakeholders 

By María Calderón 

Mexican cartels represent a multifaceted and complex problem with significant implications for Mexico and the United States. These criminal organizations have long been a U.S. national security concern, which has become more severe with an increase of lethal drugs smuggled into the U.S., impacting millions of lives in North America. There are debates between governments and organizations on the most impactful way to combat these illicit groups. These have included the question of whether designating Mexican cartels as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) would debilitate transnational criminal organizations and reduce the amount of drugs entering the United States. An FTO is a legal designation the United States government uses to identify foreign organizations that engage in premeditated, politically motivated acts of terrorism against noncombatant targets. Designating a group as an FTO carries legal and financial implications aimed at protecting national security. In the past, when Mexican cartels have harmed American citizens, members of Congress and other experts have been quick to propose an FTO designation for these organizations. However, designating a group as an FTO requires completing a specific and multi-faceted legal process and meeting certain criteria. The potential designation of Mexican cartels as FTOs is complex and contentious as it involves considering various implications, including security concerns, legal issues, and human rights impacts. This paper aims to explain the stages of an FTO designation and the roles of the various government stakeholders involved. Clarifying the complexities and technicalities of this process may prove beneficial when engaging in debates and weighing the potential impact of an eventual FTO designation for Mexican cartels.

Washington, DC:  Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2024. 16p.

Gang‐Related Crime in Los Angeles Remained Stable Following COVID‐19 Social Distancing Orders

By Paul Jeffrey Brantingham, George E. Tita,  and George Mohler 

The onset of extreme social distancing measures is expected to have a dramatic impact on crime. Here, we examine the impact of mandated, city-wide social distancing orders aimed at limiting the spread of COVID-19 on gang-related crime in Los Angeles. We hypothesize that the unique subcultural processes surrounding gangs may supersede calls to shelter in place and allow gang-related crime to persist. If the normal guardianship of people and property is also disrupted by social distancing, then we expect gang violence to increase. Using autoregressive time series models, we show that gang-related crime remained stable and crime hot spots largely stationary following the onset of shelter-in-place. Policy Implications: In responding to disruptions to social and economic life on the scale of the present pandemic, both police and civilian organizations need to anticipate continued demand, all while managing potential reductions to the workforce. Police are faced with this challenge across a wide array of crime types. Civilian interventionists tasked with responding to gang-related crime need to be prepared for continued peacekeeping and violence interruption activities, but also an expansion of responsibilities to deal with “frontline” or “street level” management of public health needs. 

Criminology & Public Policy. 2021;20:423–436.