By Mario Peucker, Thomas J Fisher, Jacob Davey

The media does not enjoy a high level of trust among Australians, as many people question the commitment of mainstream media to objective and nonpartisan reporting. While this mistrust is widespread, it manifests in particularly antagonistic ways within far-right milieus, where mainstream media is often seen through a conspiratorial lens as the ‘enemy of the people’ who actively conspire against the wellbeing of ‘ordinary’ or ‘white’ people. This almost unanimously hostile perception, however, does not stop people within far-right online spaces from posting mainstream media outputs to convey ideological messages in their online communities. Context This research report presents key findings from an analysis of far-right online communities on Facebook and the alt-tech fringe platform Gab, which has been described as a ‘right-leaning echo chamber’ (Lima et al. 2018:1). The study was conducted by researchers at the Institute for Sustainable Industries & Liveable Cities at Victoria University (VU), in collaboration with the Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD), within the research stream ‘Dynamics of Violent Extremism’ at the Centre for Resilient and Inclusive Societies (CRIS). What we did The research combines quantitative and qualitative methods. We analyzed around 11,000 Facebook posts and 45,000 Gab posts by Australian-based accounts and users who meet our working definition of far-right (see section 2). This quantitative analysis offers insights into the prevalence of mainstream media sources in their far-right online messaging and which outlets are particularly frequently shared. In addition, we conducted a qualitative multimodal in-depth analysis of a quasi-random sample of 224 Facebook and 298 Gab posts that contained an outbound link to a URL domain associated with a mainstream media outlet. This qualitative analysis allowed us to identify how mainstream media are (re)framed and (mis)appropriated within these far-right online space to deliver certain ideological messages.    

Melbourne; The Centre for Resilient and Inclusive Societies. August 2022. 26p.

By Leke de Vries

The association between crime and place is one of the most empirically supported notions in criminology. However, less is known about whether the internet has impacted the environmental conditions that contribute to crime in physical space. To address this gap, this dissertation examines the intersection of crime, place, and networks in the context of online promoted illicit massage businesses (IMBs). IMBs are establishments that host a wide variety of crimes and deviancies, and have recently gained attention due to their connection to human trafficking operations. While commercial sex and sex trafficking in IMBs are promoted through online classifieds and review boards, the illicit behaviors still require an offline act or transaction in stationary locations such as storefronts. Therefore, IMBs offer a compelling case to understand whether a criminology of place perspective applies to online-promoted crimes. Using innovative data and robust, quantitative and computational methods, this study shows that the geography and use of IMBs are driven by environmental conditions that are central to criminological theory about crime and place. However, the findings also suggest subtle changes to the geography of online-promoted crimes. In particular, IMBs and clientele demand were identified in neighborhoods that on the one hand feature aspects of social disorganization and crime opportunity theories, and on the other hand were theoretically unanticipated (e.g. in advantaged areas). Moreover, many clientele traversed neighborhood boundaries to frequent IMBs, connecting both spatially proximate and distant neighborhoods in patterns of crime. Lastly, the findings show the limitations of current policing models that are challenged by the locational flexibility of IMBs. Overall, these findings raise questions about a criminology of place in the digital age, call for theoretical integration, and a response model that engages online and offline domains and involves partnerships within and outside of the criminal justice system. 

 Boston: College of Social Sciences and Humanities of Northeastern University  202o. 124p

By Ciarán O’Connor

This report investigates the activities of the Irish Channel, a website, and associated social media accounts that have emerged as a highly active hub of misinformation in Ireland. The website gained notoriety in June 2024 following its publication of an article containing fabricated quotes and false claims alleging election interference during the local elections.1 This ‘election interference’ narrative reflected other baseless conspiracies alleging voter fraud was a threat to election integrity in the country. The Irish Channel website is part of the Premier Content Network which is run by the Digital Publishing Company. Its primary form of content across its range of websites is embedded YouTube videos, likely with the aim of driving traffic to its site and boosting ad revenue. Yet, as this analysis details, this may violate YouTube’s terms of service. This report profiles how original content produced by the Irish Channel contains inaccuracies and falsehoods, as well as content that is supportive of far-right ideologies including hateful anti-immigrant rhetoric. Analysis by ISD also indicates some of this content appears to have been generated using AI, with basic factual errors and non-existent citations being found on more than one article on the Irish Channel website. Accounts on social media and messaging platforms linked to the Irish Channel were found to feature white supremacist conspiracy theories, antisemitic hate, and support for Adolf Hitler. Additionally, the report highlights how the Irish Channel has forged close ties with the Irish Freedom Party and has, over time, become a key media distribution and broadcasting arm for the party. Many of the most egregious instances of false, misleading, and inflammatory claims found in this analysis originated from content published in conjunction with Irish Freedom Party-linked entities and hosted and promoted by the Irish Channel. This Irish Channel case study illustrates how small, far-right political parties can use digital media platforms and social media accounts to develop alternative media networks, promote their ideology, and grow their.

London :  Institute for Strategic Dialogue 2024. 18p.

By Lucy Cooper and Kevin D. Reyes

Once considered a mere novelty app, TikTok is now a certified force in the information ecosystem.  

The short form video giant is now being used by 14% of Americans as a news platform, according to a Pew Research Centre from 2023, an amount four times more than in 2020.  The impact of the platform, once best known for dance crazes and being a tastemaker for online trends, cannot be ignored. To better understand the impact that TikTok has, in 2023 ISD analysts gathered and analyzed data on trends in hate speech and extremist content on TikTok, and how effectively they were being moderated by the platform. The results, which center on a particular moment in time, have come to inform a series of studies – the first two of which focus on white supremacist content, and anti-migrant and -refugee content. While TikTok appears to have taken measures to improve content moderation practices since ISD’s 2021 study on extremism and hate speech on the platform, this new series demonstrates that TikTok is still ineffective in removing violative content. For example, data for the white supremacy content study was collected during one week in mid-August 2023 and indicates that such content was alive and well on the platform: 70 of the 108 video samples studied were uploaded to TikTok within the most recent three months at the time of collection. Of those 108 videos, the median number of views at the time of analysis was 6,097, a significant increase from ISD’s 2021 report where the median across 1,030 videos was 503 views. The last nine months have been tumultuous for TikTok as a company. In April 2024, President Joe Biden signed a bill that could result in a nationwide ban of the app should TikTok’s parent company, the Beijing-based ByteDance, not sell the platform within 12 months. As part of an ongoing legal fight over the possible ban, the Justice Department, according to the Associated Press, this summer alleged that TikTok was gathering bulk information on users’ “views on divisive social issues like gun control, abortion, and religion,” and harvesting data in violation of children’s online privacy law. As TikTok’s future remains undecided, content moderation issues on the platform persist. In July 2024, ISD published a report detailing the millions of views garnered by a network of neo-Nazi accounts on the platform. Just a month earlier, however, TikTok had published an updated transparency report in which they claimed that in the first four months of this year, moderators proactively removed 97.7% of violative content. Of that same sample, 89.8% were removed within 24 hours, down .1% from that same period in 2023. Despite TikTok’s statements, ISD and similar organizations consistently find content in clear violation of the platform’s policies

London: Institute for Strategic Dialogue 2024. 

By Ciarán O’Connor and Jared Holt

Once considered a mere novelty app, TikTok is now a certified force in the information ecosystem.  

The short-form video giant is now being used by 14% of Americans as a news platform, according to a Pew Research Centre from 2023, an amount four times more than in 2020.  The impact of the platform, once best known for dance crazes and being a tastemaker for online trends, cannot be ignored. To better understand the impact that TikTok has, in 2023 ISD analysts gathered and analyzed data on trends in hate speech and extremist content on TikTok, and how effectively they were being moderated by the platform. The results, which center on a particular moment in time, have come to inform a series of studies – the first two of which focus on white supremacist content, and anti-migrant and -refugee content. While TikTok appears to have taken measures to improve content moderation practices since ISD’s 2021 study on extremism and hate speech on the platform, this new series demonstrates that TikTok is still ineffective in removing violative content. For example, data for the white supremacy content study was collected during one week in mid-August 2023 and indicates that such content was alive and well on the platform: 70 of the 108 video samples studied were uploaded to TikTok within the most recent three months at the time of collection. Of those 108 videos, the median number of views at the time of analysis was 6,097, a significant increase from ISD’s 2021 report where the median across 1,030 videos was 503 views. The last nine months have been tumultuous for TikTok as a company. In April 2024, President Joe Biden signed a bill that could result in a nationwide ban of the app should TikTok’s parent company, the Beijing-based ByteDance, not sell the platform within 12 months. As part of an ongoing legal fight over the possible ban, the Justice Department, according to the Associated Press, this summer alleged that TikTok was gathering bulk information on users’ “views on divisive social issues like gun control, abortion, and religion,” and harvesting data in violation of children’s online privacy law. As TikTok’s future remains undecided, content moderation issues on the platform persist. In July 2024, ISD published a report detailing the millions of views garnered by a network of neo-Nazi accounts on the platform. Just a month earlier, however, TikTok had published an updated transparency report in which they claimed that in the first four months of this year, moderators proactively removed 97.7% of violative content. Of that same sample, 89.8% were removed within 24 hours, down .1% from that same period in 2023. Despite TikTok’s statements, ISD and similar organizations consistently find content in clear violation of the platform’s policies.  

London Institute for Strategic Dialogue (2024). . 15p.

By Luke Baumgartner

Tracing its origins back to the 19th century, the Black Hebrew Israelite (BHI) movement is ideologically and organizationally highly fragmented. At its core, it believes that modern African Americans are descendants of the Israelites in the Bible’s Old Testament, but some currents adopt variations of BHI ideology. While most adherents to the movement are peaceful, over the last few years, several individuals associated with BHI ideology participated in high-profile violent crimes targeting Jews in the United States, including the targeting of the JC Kosher Supermarket in Jersey City, New Jersey,[1] and a Hanukkah celebration in Monsey, New York, in December 2019.[2] While the attackers had little to no formal or institutional participation in the movement, their extremist interpretation of BHI’s core beliefs contributed to their radicalization, mobilization of violence, and, ultimately, their target selection. Moreover, violent attacks by adherents of the BHI ideology stretch back as far as 1974, when Marcus Wayne Chenault, a student of Hananiah E. Israel, shot Alberta Williams King–the mother of slain civil rights activist Martin Luther King Jr.[3] In 2022, the Program on Extremism released a report–one of the first of its kind–analyzing BHI’s ideology and relations to violence.[4] Despite its ample use of social media and track record of violence, little is known about how the broader BHI movement uses the internet to spread its message. In light of this research gap, this report examined 180 Facebook pages with large followings close to the more extreme sections of the BHI movement, further evaluating their scope, reach, longevity, activity, geographic location, typology, and major narratives. This study finds that: • Facebook pages are an especially popular way for extremist adherents of the BHI movement to reach a significant audience without being subject to content removal, takedowns, and strict service enforcement. Facebook’s record of success has several discrepancies, especially regarding enforcement against broader antisemitic narratives beyond Holocaust denial and with lesser-known hate groups and movements. • BHI extremist pages examined in this study are administrated across four continents and, on average, can maintain a presence on Facebook and avoid account removal for over five years, allowing them ample time and opportunity to accrue thousands of followers. The ability to establish a long-term presence on a major platform like Facebook increases the potential for audience engagement and opportunities to recruit and radicalize new members. • BHI pages consistently publish a range of antisemitic content and narratives, the most common of which consistently refers to white Jews as “impostors,” emphasizes the connection between Jews and Satan and adds a modern twist on traditional conspiracies of blood libel, arguing Jews are responsible for large-scale organ trafficking operations—among others. While the number of BHI pages posting antisemitic content decreased after October 7, the overall popularity of these pages continued to increase. These contradictory changes signal an improvement in Facebook’s ability to take down easily recognizable antisemitic content, such as Jews worship Satan, or recycled Nazi propaganda. Still, Facebook struggles to remove content that excludes explicit calls to violence or, alludes to conspiracies of blood libel or comparing Jews to rats, parasites, and others. • The frequency, longevity, and large follower bases of BHI extremist pages that publish antisemitic and other hateful content targeting protected classes such as the LGBTQ+ community suggest gaps in Facebook’s enforcement of its Community Standards, particularly its anti-hate speech and Dangerous Organizations and Individuals (DOI) policies. These findings suggest that antisemitic content congruent with extremist interpretations of the BHI ideology has a haven on Facebook–a social media platform with over 3 billion active monthly users.[5]  

Washington DC:  Program on Extremism at George Washington University, 2024. 52p.

By the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights

Crime victimization has wide-reaching consequences for victims, their families and friends, their communities, and society in general. The rate of violent crime victimization has decreased dramatically since its peak in the early 1990s,1 providing the most relief to residents of disadvantaged neighborhoods who are most likely to experience violent crime.2 However, the nation recently experienced an increase in serious forms of violence. In 2020, homicide rates were 30 percent higher than the previous year.3 In the same period, aggravated assaults, including nonfatal shootings, also increased.4 While violent victimization rates started to decrease again after the first two years of the COVID-19 pandemic,5 violence remains a pressing concern for Americans.6 This trend merits closer investigation given that it follows decades of sustained progress and disproportionately affects underserved communities.7 To gain an understanding of federal efforts to evaluate racial disparities in crime victimization, the Commission voted on July 21, 2023, to examine the U.S. Department of Justice’s data collection on violent crime victimization and what that data show about disparate impacts of violent victimization on minority communities. This report uses social science methodologies to synthesize reliable research and present quantitative evidence from federal sources about racial and ethnic disparities in violent crime victimization from 2017-2021. Because crime concentrates in small geographic areas,8 the Commission also selected five jurisdictions to conduct a more in depth analysis of trends and racial disparities in violent crime victimization over the study period. In addition to relying on publicly available studies and data, the Commission held a public briefing on November 17, 2023, to receive written and oral testimony from academic and policy experts, former and current government officials, members of community advocacy groups, and violent  crime victims (see Appendix B). The Commission also sent formal requests for information to the U.S. Department of Justice. When considering all forms of violent crime, aggregated at the national level, there are no differences in the risk of victimization for White, Black, and Latino people.9 There are, however, enduring racial differences in homicide rates. Black Americans have long been the group most likely to be killed by homicide.10 Black Americans are 12 times as likely as White Americans to die by firearm homicide.11 The risk of homicide is highest for young, Black men. According to the Center for Disease Control and Prevention, homicide is the leading cause of death for Black males ages 1-44.12 Racial disparities in homicide are especially pronounced in large, metropolitan areas, where violent crime rates are the highest.13 The concentration of crime in large cities is a consistent pattern in crime trends over time.14 Within cities, violent crime concentrates in certain neighborhoods, street segments, or blocks.15 Ruth Abaya, Pediatric Emergency Medicine Physician and Senior Director for the Health Alliance for Violence Intervention, explains, “In many places throughout the country, community violence is concentrated, it’s cyclical, and it’s networked, creating cycles of harm and trauma that often impact multiple generations.”16 Hyperlocal crime concentration is not a new phenomenon. In their foundational study about the relationship between crime and place, influential U.S. criminologists Clifford R. Shaw and Henry D. McKay show that crime rates remain stable in neighborhoods over time even as the demographic composition of residents change.17 They argue that structural conditions, such as physical deterioration and high population turnover, create the conditions for crime.18 This finding is critical for framing racial disparities in crime victimization because it shows that the structure of high-crime neighborhoods, not factors related to the race of their residents, allows crime to flourish. Crime concentration in certain areas became associated with race because contemporary disadvantaged neighborhoods are predominately Black or Latino.19 Outdated government policies that created intentional residential racial segregation have had long-lasting consequences for where Americans still live.20 Ongoing racial segregation is associated with violent crime as the most segregated neighborhoods have elevated levels of violent crime.21 Data show that violence in these racially segregated and socioeconomically disadvantaged neighborhoods drives racial disparities in one serious type of violent crime: homicide.22 During the COVID-19 pandemic, as the overall crime rate fell,23 murder rates rose because of an increase in gun homicides in disadvantaged neighborhoods.24 A recent study demonstrates that the risk of firearm-related death or injury is more acute for young Black and Latino men who live in certain zip codes than for U.S. soldiers who were deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan.25 Enduring racist narratives of crime26 dismiss this violence as “Black-on-Black” without acknowledging that most crimes occur within racial groups (intra-racial).27 Elliot Currie, professor of Criminology, Law and Society at the University of California Irvine, argues that America’s “peculiar indifference” to high rates of murder among young Black men “is not only socially destructive and economically wasteful but a profound moral default.”28 Homicides comprise a small share of all violent crimes; there are no racial disparities in the overall rate of violent crime victimization.29 There are, however, other social and demographic correlates of victimization. One strong predictor of being a victim of a violent crime is having previously been a victim of crime.30 Data suggest that victims of violent crime are four times as likely to experience repeat victimization.31 Additionally, both income and age predict victimization. People living in households that earn the lowest incomes (i.e., less than $25,000), are more likely to be victimized than their higher income counterparts.32 Adolescents and young adults are also disproportionately likely to be victims of violent crime, regardless of geography.33 The relationship between age and being involved in crime, as both an offender and a victim, is one of the most enduring patterns in crime.34 There are no overall gender disparities in violent victimization.35 There are, however, gender disparities in experiencing certain kinds of violence. Men are more likely than women to be homicide victims.36 When women are murdered, however, they are five times more likely than men to be killed by an intimate partner.37 Regardless of the severity of the crime, most victims of violent crime know the offender.38 Data show that an individual who commits a violent offense is statistically at a higher risk of becoming a victim of a later violent crime.39 Violent crime victims are also more likely than others to engage in violence.40 Too often, however, this victim-offender overlap is ignored41 because it complicates the false narrative of the “good victim/bad offender” dichotomy.42 This dichotomy is problematic because it risks disregarding past experiences of victimization and trauma for people who have engaged in violence.43 Studies also show that it is highly unlikely that these victims seek or receive any victim services.44 For instance, one study shows that only 16 percent of crime victims who had been involved in the justice system as offenders report accessing programs such as victim compensation, victim advocate services from the police or district attorney, or help with legal proceedings.45 The researchers argue that so few victims accessing services is a “potential harm to the short- and long-term health of offender-victims, and harm to the overall well-being of urban, minority communities.”46 The effects of violent crime extend beyond immediate physical pain and injury. There are long term physical health correlates of violent victimization, including conditions such as heart disease,47 cancer,48 high blood pressure,49 and premature mortality.50 Violent crimes also have emotional and psychological consequences for those who are injured, which can include suffering from post-traumatic stress and other manifestations of trauma that negatively impact the victim’s quality of life.51 The effects of violent crime can also extend beyond the victims to adversely affect  family members and entire communities.52 Access to justice and rehabilitative services offers a vital opportunity to break the cycle of violence in communities. A major impediment to exploring crime victimization rates is that many crimes, even violent crimes, are not known to law enforcement; therefore, official numbers collected by the FBI may underreport the prevalence of the issue.53 For instance, in 2020, less than half (40 percent) of violent victimizations were reported to police.54 Victims may choose not to report a crime to the police for a multitude of reasons, such as fear of reprisal or stigmatization, believing the police would not or could not do anything to help, or believing the crime was too personal to report.55 Not reporting a crime has serious implications beyond public safety; data show that victims are more likely to receive services and access resources if they report an incident to law enforcement.56 Compensation and assistance programs are available to crime victims, but long standing research shows that these programs are underutilized, mostly because victims are not aware of the programs and services available to them.57 For instance, 2016 data from the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) show that about 13 percent of violent crime survivors reported using victim services. For those who did not report the offense to police, only 5 percent reported utilizing services.58 More recent data show that the vast majority of violent crime victims continue not to receive assistance from victim service agencies; in 2021 just 9 percent of victims received services.59   (Continued) 

Washington, DC: USSC, 2024. 

By Hannah E. Meyers, Ilya Shapiro, Tim Rosenberger

Just as Ku Klux Klan members used white hoods to conceal their identities and terrorize their targets, modern activists are using keffiyehs, Guy Fawkes masks, balaclavas, and other inherently intimidating face coverings. Indeed, face-masking is pervasive among participants in demonstrations that are growing in frequency and disruptiveness. Most recently, the pro-Hamas “protests” that have proliferated across college campuses and city streets involve activists who cover their faces explicitly to make it impossible to determine who is engaged in violence, intimidation, and property destruction. Just as masks emboldened KKK activity a century ago, they are a central feature in the 360% surge in antisemitic incidents since Hamas’s attack on Israel last year.1 New York City experienced about 2,000 protests in the half-year following October 7—including incidents involving more than 10,000 participants illegally blocking bridges and major infrastructure.2 Cities across the country seem to be struggling to maintain order and check the growing number of attacks associated with these events on Jewish owned businesses and other institutions.  There is an obvious and simple answer to protesters’ growing aggressiveness, an answer that proved effective against their forebears in the KKK: denying intimidating and violent protesters the right to conceal their identities via face coverings. Hamas supporters, Antifa, Patriot Front, and others act boldly so long as they can remain anonymous. Stripped of this anonymity and the intimidating power of the keffiyeh and black bandanna, they will be far less likely to engage in criminal behavior.

New York: The Manhattan Institute, 2024. 5p.

By Merve Betül Gökçe, Murat Güray Kirdar:

This study investigates the impact of the Syrian civil war and refugee status on the risk of physical intimate partner violence (IPV) among Syrian women in Jordan, the country with the second-highest refugee-to-native ratio worldwide. We analyze data from the 2017-18 Jordan Population and Family Health Survey, which includes a nationally representative sample of Syrian refugees. Using the information on the timing of first violence after marriage within a discrete-time duration analysis, we examine the hazard rates of IPV exposure across different periods: prewar Syria, postwar Syria, and refugee status. Our findings demonstrate that war and refugee status increase the risk of IPV, and these findings persist for women who were married before the civil war. Additionally, the rise in IPV after the refugees' arrival in Jordan diminishes over time. The study identifies the economic strain resulting from lower household wealth and refugee husbands' employment losses as a driver of the rise in IPV. Moreover, our innovative approach utilizing GPS locations of refugee households to calculate refugee density reveals that greater social isolation, indicated by reduced proximity to other refugees, significantly exacerbates the risk of IPV among these women. In addition, we explore whether the civil war and refugee status alter marriage patterns, which could contribute to the observed effects on IPV. Both the civil war and forced migration lower the marriage age and increase the incidence of non-cousin marriages at the expense of cousin marriages—both of which are associated with a higher risk of IPV.

Bonn: IZA – Institute of Labor Economics, 2024. 61p.  

By Paul M. Barrett

The main finding of this report is that social science research reveals that social media platforms can be—and often are—exploited to facilitate political intimidation and violence. Certain features of social media platforms make them susceptible to such exploitation, and some of these features should be changed to reduce the danger. “ The main finding of this report is that social science research reveals that social media platforms can be—and often are— exploited to facilitate political intimidation and violence. ” Based on a review of more than 400 studies published by peer-reviewed journals and think tanks, the report provides a platform-by-platform survey focusing on the particular features of each site that make it susceptible to exploitation by extremists promoting intimidation and violence and/or seeking recruits for their various causes. The report emphasizes that neither subjective observation nor social science research indicates that social media platforms are the sole or even primary cause of political intimidation and violence. Other media and irresponsible political leaders play crucial roles. However, the use of social media can enable or facilitate violence in a fashion that deserves attention and mitigation. Most of this problem—extremism and occasional use of force for political ends—occurs on the political right. But the left is not immune to these pathologies. The platforms discussed in the following pages range from some of the best known, like Facebook and YouTube, to the more recently ascendant TikTok to those on the right-wing fringe, such as Gab, Parler, and 4chan. Among the features, we examine are: • Facebook’s Groups, which helped the sometimes-violent QAnon to grow into a full-blown movement devoted to the delusion that former President Donald Trump has secretly battled “deep state” bureaucrats and Satanic pedophiles.1 • Instagram’s comments function, which has allowed the Iranian government to threaten dissidents with sexual assault and death as a way of silencing them.2 • TikTok’s powerful recommendation algorithm, which in one experiment promoted violent videos, including incitement of students to launch attacks at school.3 After a case study of January 6 by our collaborators at Tech Policy Press, the report concludes with recommendations for industry and government.

NYU Stern Center for Business and Human Rights Leonard N. Stern School of Business 2024. 32p.  

By Cristina Cretu-Adatte, Renaud Zbinden, Luca Brunoni, Hazel Bunning, Josselin Wilfred Azi & Olivier Beaudet-Labrecque

This article delves into the intricacies of managing illicit financial gains among Ivorian cyber fraudsters, shedding light on the findings of a field study conducted in Côte d’Ivoire by Swiss and Ivorian research teams. The study involved interviews with cyber criminals, law enforcement officials, and subject matter experts, to answer a specific question: What strategies do Ivorian cyber fraudsters use to manage and launder the criminal proceeds originating from romance scams and sextortion? The results explore the tactics employed by cyber fraudsters to obfuscate illicit financial flows, their organizational structures, and the strategies they employ in managing and using their gains. It confirms certain elements from the scientific literature, in addition to introducing new insights for a better understanding of the processes of money laundering and the use of illicit funds. The article also unravels the multifaceted challenges encountered within the anti-money laundering framework in the context of cybercrime and raises avenues for further reflection and future work to enhance the fight against this scourge.

Eur J Crim Policy Res 30, 359–378 (2024).

By Paulo J Murillo-Sandoval1, Steven E Sesnie2, Manuel Eduardo Ordoñez Armas3, Nicholas Magliocca4, Beth Tellman5, Jennifer A Devine6, Erik Nielsen7 and Kendra McSweeney8,*

We assess how much of Central America is likely to be agriculturally suitable for cultivating coca (Erythroxylum spp), the main ingredient in cocaine. Since 2017, organized criminal groups (not smallholders) have been establishing coca plantations in Central America for cocaine production. This has broken South America's long monopoly on coca leaf production for the global cocaine trade and raised concerns about future expansion in the isthmus. Yet it is not clear how much of Central America has suitable biophysical characteristics for a crop domesticated in, and long associated with the Andean region. We combine geo-located data from coca cultivation locations in Colombia with reported coca sites in Central America to model the soil, climate, and topography of Central American landscapes that might be suitable for coca production under standard management practices. We find that 47% of northern Central America (Honduras, Guatemala, and Belize) has biophysical characteristics that appear highly suitable for coca-growing, while most of southern Central America does not. Biophysical factors, then, are unlikely to constrain coca's spread in northern Central America. Whether or not the crop is more widely planted will depend on complex and multi-scalar social, economic, and political factors. Among them is whether Central American countries and their allies will continue to prioritize militarized approaches to the drug trade through coca eradication and drug interdiction, which are likely to induce further expansion, not contain it. Novel approaches to the drug trade will be required to avert this outcome.

Environ. Res. Lett. 19 (2024) 104068  

By The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)

Understanding the changing dynamics of heroin and methamphetamine flows from Afghanistan, through southwest Asia to Eastern and Southern Africa, continues to be important, particularly in light of the Taliban’s drug ban in Afghanistan and the harmful effects drugs have on the populations along the route. In order to improve information sharing and to help build connections between countries and International Organisations and to strengthen regional co-operation, UNODC held an Expert Working Group in Maputo, Mozambique during 10th-11th October 2023. Topics discussed at the EWG included an update on the current drug situation in Afghanistan, the opiate and methamphetamine flows from southwest Asia to Eastern and Southern Africa, regional drug seizures, the nature of organized crime groups and a summary of the drug demand situation in the region. The findings of the EWG are published in this report. This EWG report covers the flow and distribution of heroin along the Southern Route, highlighting key trends and vulnerabilities. Exploration of the routes utilized for drug trafficking sheds light on movements from Afghanistan into Eastern and Southern Africa, within Africa, and towards other destination countries. Moreover, an overview of the demand for illicit drugs in the region offers insights into the societal impact and challenges faced by communities. Insight into the fragmented groups and the critical role played by brokers, as well as the strong presence of criminal networks, provides valuable context on the organized crime landscape. Furthermore, the EWG discussed the regional cooperation efforts aimed at addressing drug trafficking challenges and promoting collective action underscores the importance of collaborative approaches in responding to the drug trade in the region. An examination of the policy and law enforcement responses implemented by affected countries provides valuable insights into national efforts to address the supply and demand dynamics. Analysis of the various modus operandi and trafficking methods employed by organized crime groups, including poly drug trafficking and links to other crime types, enhances understanding of the operational tactics used in the region. Finally, recommendations for policy interventions and follow-up actions aim to enhance counter-trafficking efforts and promote regional security and stability. Through a comprehensive examination of these topics, this report seeks to provide valuable insights and inform stakeholders on the complexities of drug trafficking along the Southern Route, with the ultimate goal of fostering effective strategies and initiatives to combat illicit drug trade in the region.   

 Vienna:  UNODC  2024. 36p.

By Saurabh Thakur, Monika Roszkowska

General Findings. Organized Criminal Networks (OCNs) operating in the Eastern Indian Ocean are predominantly hierarchical in their organizational structure with individuals or a network of individuals at the helm of operations. The geographical location, proximity to two major drug-producing regions in Asia, and the vast shoreline have aided the transit of illicit drugs in the Maldives and Sri Lanka through the Southern Route. The transnational drug smuggling in the region is mostly transactional, carried out through a series of patron-client networks. Other modes include freelancing and family and community-based networks. . The involvement of the local population is driven by both push and pull factors, including profit motive, patronage, protection, poverty, addiction, street masculinity, involvement of family members, peer influence, and social media influence. Corruption within law enforcement and legal institutions was listed as a key problem in both countries. The broken chain of custody and complicity of government officials in illicit activities have affected the prosecution rates in both countries. The socio-cultural factors (i.e. ethnic, national, or family ties) form the basis for building trust and loyalty within the organized drug trafficking networks, establishing working relationships and promotions within networks. Emerging routes in Maldives and Sri Lanka seem to deviate towards the lesser-patrolled areas in the southern part of the Indian Ocean as the criminal networks continue to adapt to the enhanced maritime enforcement measures in the region. 8 The ability of new elements to enter the market can depend on various factors, including existing power dynamics between various local gangs, local political connections, law enforcement efforts, the adaptability of new entrants, and institutional corruption. However, an increase in the trafficking of synthetic drugs and a rise in local consumption were reported as factors that are likely to impact these existing market dynamics. The maritime route holds the largest share in illicit drug trafficking in the Maldives and Sri Lanka, especially larger consignments, but there has been a noticeable rise in the share of the air routes and postal methods post-COVID-19 restrictions.  

Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime; 2024 44p.

By Nicholas R. Magliocca , Diana S. Summers , Kevin M. Curtin , Kendra McSweeney, Ashleigh N. Price

Cocaine traffickers, or ‘narco-traffickers’, successfully exploit the heterogeneous landscapes of Central America for transnational smuggling. Narco-traffickers successfully adapt to disruptions from counterdrug interdiction efforts by spatially adjusting smuggling routes to evade detection, and by doing so bring collateral damages, such as deforestation, corruption, and violence, to new areas. This study is novel for its integration of landscape suitability analysis with criminological theory to understand the locations of these spatial adaptations by narco-traffickers as intentional, logical, and predictable choices based on the socio-environmental characteristics of Central America’s landscapes. Multi-level, mixed effects negative binomial regression models predict the suitability of landscapes for cocaine trafficking across 17 departments (the unit of analysis) in Costa Rica, El Sal vador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama from 2007 to 2018. Informed by long-term research in the region, independent variables included proximity to roads, country borders, international ports, indigenous territories, population density, and protected areas. The year of peak interdiction (measured by kg of cocaine seized) in each department was used to analyze spatial shifts in landscape suitability before and after maximum counterdrug interdiction pressure. We find that areas with lower population density and closer proximity to international borders became more suitable following peak interdiction—i.e, they are more likely to be sought out by traffickers seeking to avoid further disruptions from counter-narcotic efforts. Additionally, indigenous territories were disproportionately exploited as cocaine trafficking routes following significant interdiction activities by law enforcement. While interdiction may reduce the suitability of targeted locations, it can also unintentionally increase the attractiveness of other locations. Our study pushes criminological theory through its application to a unique space/time context, and it advances land system science by considering landscape suitability for logistical rather than productive uses. Policy implications are clear. Since interdiction resources are limited relative to the overall amount of trafficking activity, knowing which landscape features are viewed as  suitable by traffickers can in the short term guide interdiction deployment strategies, and in the longer term build strategies to mitigate associated harms from trafficking where they are most likely  

Landscape and Urban Planning Volume 221, May 2022, 104359

By Robert Zeithammer, James Macinko, Diana Silver

Introduction

Ignition interlock devices installed after conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) have been shown to reduce subsequent DUI arrests (specific deterrence). However, there is little evidence on how interlock-device penalties might affect general deterrence, that is, deterring people from driving after consuming alcohol before a DUI conviction.

Methods

A discrete choice experiment was conducted and data were analyzed in 2023 with 583 U.S.-based adults who consumed alcohol at least once in the past week to assess the deterrent effects of five different penalties (fine, jail time, interlock device, license suspension, alcohol treatment) for alcohol-impaired driving under randomized sequential scenarios of high (20% chance of being caught) and low (1%) police enforcement. Participants resided in 46 states.

Results

Deterrent effects of an interlock penalty, operationalized as having to install an interlock device for 1 year, are large and on par with a 20-fold increase in police enforcement activity (from 1% chance of being caught to 20%), or a $2,000 increase in the DUI fine under the status quo enforcement regime. On average, a 1-year interlock penalty had the same deterrent effect as a 10-day increase in jail time.

Conclusions

Wider use of interlock devices as a DUI penalty could have large deterrent effects, independent of their ability to physically prevent the motor vehicle of an intoxicated driver from starting. The deterrent effect documented here adds to evidence of interlock devices’ overall effectiveness as well as their potential to shift DUI penalties away from criminalization (jail time) and toward immobilization and rehabilitation.

American Journal of Preventive Medicine; 2024 Articles in Press

By Leke de Vries, Toby Davies

The role of street networks in shaping the spatial distribution of crime has become a foundational component within environmental criminology. Most studies, however, have focused on opportunistic crime types, such as property offenses. In this study, we instead research a theoretically distinct phenomenon by examining the placement of venues that host criminal activity. In particular, we study the relationship between network structure and the placement of illicit massage businesses, which operate at the intersections of illicit and legitimate activity by hosting illicit commercial sex under the guise of legitimate massage. We model their placement as a function of two network metrics: betweenness, which measures a street's usage potential, and a variant called “local betweenness,” which measures the potential of nearby streets. Multilevel models are used to examine the importance of these street-level metrics while accounting for tract-level covariates. Our findings demonstrate that, unlike property crimes, illicit massage businesses tend to be located on streets that are quiet but that are close to areas of high activity. Such locations seem to combine accessibility and discretion, and therefore, represent ideal conditions for such businesses to thrive. Our findings can inform problem-oriented approaches to prevent the harms associated with illegitimately operating businesses.

 Criminology Volume 62, Issue 3 Aug 2024 Pages 377-618

By: InSul Kim

The purpose of this dissertation study is to conduct an art-based, community action research study as a means (1) to support the recovery process of domestic violence survivors; (2) to produce social capital among members of the community to initiate civic discussions on the consequences of domestic violence; and (3) to investigate its implications for cultural policy as the outcomes of this study highlight the unique role of the arts in making a difference in people’s lives and communities. The artworks produced by the workshop participants of this study (i.e., domestic violence survivors) were exhibited in a professional gallery as a form of visual narrative that speaks for their wounded past and difficult journeys. The collected data strongly indicates that art can be an exceptionally powerful tool for communication and healing, when words and discussions fall short. Overall, this research investigates the instrumental functions of the arts as a means to produce social capital for personal well-being, social support, and social justice. The study was framed within action research methodology and the triangulation model in data sources, research methods, and theoretical lenses, while both quantitative and qualitative techniques were employed. The collected data were analyzed at three different levels: (1) Personal level (i.e., the art workshop participants: n=16), (2) Organizational level (i.e., the staff of the transitional housing facility and the gallery: n=6), and (3) Community level (i.e., the general audience who came to the exhibit: n=74).

Ohio State University 2011

By Nicole Renehan and David Gadd 

As the Probation Service moves towards a ‘new generation’ of programmes for domestic abuse perpetrators, it is important not to forget the lessons of the past. It is more than two decades since the inception of the Duluth Domestic Violence Pathfinder, the first probation-led programme for domestic abuse perpetrators in England and Wales. Despite the lack of an outcome evaluation, and a report critical about the early stages of its implementation (Bilby and Hatcher, 2004), the Integrated Domestic Abuse Programme, and an alternative Community Domestic Violence Programme, were rolled across all probation areas by 2005. The evidence in terms of what worked for domestic abuse offenders remained elusive nonetheless, with only one post-hoc evaluation more than ten years later suggesting marginally better outcomes for abusive men who at least start a programme (Bloomfield and Dixon, 2015). Both programmes were disbanded in favour of Building Better Relationships (BBR), currently the only accredited programme in probation for domestic abuse perpetrators, now about to be retired with a very limited evidence base against which to judge its effectiveness. As BBR is replaced with Building Choices, we must learn whatever lessons we can about how to intervene safely and effectively with perpetrators of domestic abuse. We do, however, know that the BBR era will not leave the intervention landscape unblemished. Two ethnographic studies, two inspections, and an evaluation feasibility study all raised substantive concerns regarding the quality of its implementation, unsustainable waiting lists, a less-than-impressed probation client group about the service received, and a stressed and overstretched workforce (Renehan and Gadd, 2024; Hughes, 2024; Teasdale et al., 2023; HM Inspectorate of Probation, 2023; 2018). The most critical lesson of Duluth – that effective work with men who abuse cannot be secured without adequately supporting their partners – has not always been heeded. It will need to be if Building Choices, a more generalised strengths-based programme, is to enhance the safety of adult survivors and their children at risk of repeat victimisation and to protect any new partners that men – who have been domestically abusive – form relationships with. Both the Home Office and the VCSE sector have agreed clear standards in terms of working with domestic abuse perpetrators (Home Office, 2023; Respect 2022). These include centralising victim safety; multi-agency working; timely, accessible and gender-informed interventions; and suitably skilled and supported intervention practitioners who can foster motivation for change. Fostering motivation, of course, relies upon the quality of the relationship between practitioner and client, something that can be hard to achieve for practitioners with high caseloads. The working alliance, therefore, should not be subordinated in any intervention, generalised or otherwise. There is scope for this within the Building Choices model, though it still requires considerable elaboration. Three elements provide the scaffolding of a preliminary, optional module ‘for those that need it’: • establishing a sense of safety • building working relationships • stimulating curiosity in change In this Academic Insights paper, we argue that these three elements should form the bedrock of – and be embedded throughout – any safe and effective intervention.  We explain some of the challenges that must be surmounted if the Probation Service is to achieve this.    

Academic Insights 2024/05 Manchester, UK:  HM Inspectorate of Probation, 2024. 14p.

By Bryce Westlake, Russell Brewer, Kellie Toole, Tom Daly, Thomas Swearingen, Scott Fletcher, Franco Ucci and Katie Logos

Transitioning to cloud-based infrastructure (CBI) for processing child sexual abuse material (CSAM) collected during police investigations could address resource challenges agencies currently face. While CBI provides quantifiable scalability and budgetary and interagency collaborative advantages, potential risks associated with data security, data sovereignty, and various legal and regulatory concerns may make agencies hesitant to make this transition. However, this paper demonstrates how a ‘shared responsibility model’ approach to cloud security can minimize risks, allowing investigators to take advantage of CBI benefits. In partnership with Oracle Corporation, we demonstrate how this could be implemented and continually monitored for new vulnerabilities within a CSAM context over time.   

Trends & issues in crime and criminal justice no. 699. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology. 2024.